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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights”  
H. Clinton, 2011 
 
 
The contemporaneity has been famously defined as “the age of rights” (Bobbio 1995,), and the 
logic of rights has become “the principal language that we use in public settings to discuss 
weighty questions of both right and wrong” (Glendon 1991, 63). If human rights give voice to 
minorities and marginalized groups in society, and they can do so with powerful legal and sym-
bolical resources, the tendency to frame almost every social conflict in terms of a clash of rights 
also favours absolute formulations and the activation of judiciary. 
The rhetoric of human rights, the language of fundamental freedoms, and the appeal to intan-
gible values represent the linguistic code through which divergent interests contrast; when 
scratching beneath the surface, the Universalist pretence of international human rights law starts 
to creak. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights may even state that “all human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights” (UDHR, Article 1), but for decades the segregation of 
blacks/natives/aborigines and whites has been a consistent reality, tolerated by the international 
community; States may have even been prevented from discriminating against or from denying 
the enjoyment of rights because of “sex” (UDHR, Article 2), but until the drafting of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in 1979, the vio-
lence perpetrated against women has been treated as representing a minor form of inhuman 
treatment, somehow justified by traditional cultural practices. 
Likewise, the opening quote from the former US Secretary of State, at the UN Assembly in 
Geneva, encapsulates the ideal for which generations of lgbt activists have been fighting over the 
past decades, and to whose enforcement several NGOs worldwide still devote all their efforts. 
Clinton’s statement might seem almost redundant and pleonastic, when recalling the human 
rights’ Universalist yearnings. 
Yet, it is not; as extensively demonstrated by a large stream of literature, the drafting of the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights mantled with neutrality a catalogue of Western-centered values, 
and it took the image of a subject which is tacitly presumed to be, among all other things, white, 
male, adult, and heterosexual as a reference model (Glendon 1991; Dembour 2006; Douzinas 
2007; MacKinnon 2006).  
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In fact, until very recent times, homosexuals did not enjoy any rights at all, and they were even 
unable to claim freedoms which were recognized as being basilar and essential for heterosexual 
people.  
Until the latter half of the XX century sexual orientation drew a distinction between the normal 
and the so-called abnormal groups in society, such as the homosexuals for example. 
The following abrogation of criminal sanctions against same-sex acts did not dismantle the prej-
udices rooted in tradition. Rather, these policies represented a liberal attitude, and they sup-
ported tolerance for private acts committed behind the veil of decency, but it was generally still 
considered inappropriate that homosexual people should enter the public arena and claim 
rights on the grounds of their sexual orientation. 
Only thanks to the homosexual movements’ efforts, the unstated heterosexual premises of the 
Western legal system have been challenged and partially breached; obviously, this process is 
still ongoing, it combines innovative hints with moments of backlash, and its trajectory has be-
come intertwined with the experience of other social and political movements, such as the fem-
inist one and the US movement for civil rights. 
The judiciary plays an essential role: thanks to the interpretation laid down by national and in-
ternational judges, homosexual claims can be dignified, framed as relating to not only the inter-
ests of a minority, but, also the compliance with the actual law and the enforcement of values 
enshrined in Western theoretical foundations.  
Hence, in many contexts the emergence of human rights related to sexual orientation is tightly 
interwoven with the judiciary, and strategic litigation recurring in all national and international 
judicial venues. 
 
Under such premises, this dissertation provides a qualitative socio-legal analysis of the jurispru-
dence on sexual orientation of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR). 
More in detail, I focus on the arguments produced by the judges, and I analyze the legal con-
troversies, the normative framing, the social perspectives, and the moral standpoints that orient 
the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR) 
The aim is twofold; on one hand, I investigate how the aforementioned arguments influence the 
evaluation, the acceptance, or the refusal of claims grounded on sexual orientation. On the oth-
er, the purpose is to critically engage in the asserted neutral character of judicial reasoning, in 
order to reveal the clash of perspectives underpinned to the interpretation of human rights. 
To appreciate the relevance of this issue, it suffices to recall the kinds of questions that it raises: 
how do situated standpoints, moral and cultural assumptions influence judicial reasoning on 
sexual orientation? Has the ECtHR developed a unitary legal culture on this theme? If any, 
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how do you explain internal disagreement, be it on the claims advanced or on the role per-
formed by the Court? Which element might explain the caution of the ECtHR in respect to 
certain issues, such as same-sex marriage, and which, instead, the activism shown in relation to 
other themes, such as the presence of homosexuals in the army? What role does the ECtHR 
play in shaping, restricting, transforming, or rejecting the rights claimed? Is there a discrepancy 
between the tenure of the ECtHR’s reasoning and its effective innovative potential?  
Again, does the ECtHR’s approach to sexual orientation depend on pre-determined evaluations 
or it is the Court to be entrusted with expectations that can’t be met, which are not however re-
lated to a negative evaluation of homosexuality? If, instead, prejudice is effectively conveyed by 
judicial interpretation, to what extent and in which cases does it affect the final outcome? 
 
I focus on the case of the European Court of Human Rights, because it provides a unique envi-
ronment in order to study judicial law-making in the context of human rights. In fact, the EC-
tHR is entrusted with the task to interpret a text, which, on the one hand, has remained substan-
tially unaltered since its drafting, in 1950, but which, on the other, still continues to be a beacon 
for the enforcement of human rights.  
Sexual orientation is not mentioned in the ECHR and the entire ECtHR’s case law on this 
theme lies in the creative reading at the hands of the judges. 
By applying the ‘living instrument’ doctrine, and by interpreting the ECHR in relation to the 
Council of Europe’s socio-legal context, the ECtHR has greatly contributed to the shaping of 
new rights, new meanings and new interpretations, never previously even been discussed. 
Against this background, the study of ECtHR’s judgments allows us to investigate the argumen-
tative paths followed by the Court and to assess the role played by this institution, in legitimizing 
new claims and in acknowledging homosexuality as being worthy of legal protection. As far as 
creative hints can actually be traced also in the jurisprudence of other Courts (Andersen 2004; 
Richards 2009), the ECtHR offers the clearest example, in that it opposes the static nature of 
the Convention to the dynamic performance of the only Court appointed to interpret it. 
Generally speaking, sexual orientation for the ECtHR is strained by divergent perspectives, 
which can generally be expressed in contraposing terms between stances supporting judicial ac-
tivism and stances supporting self-restraint. National authorities generally back the latter per-
spective and emphasize the pre-eminence of domestic authority, according to the famous prin-
ciple of subsidiarity. Conversely, homosexual movements constantly press for the opposite out-
come; thanks to international coordination supported by Ilga Europe - the European branch of 
the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association - judicial litigation is 
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intended to impose lgbt issues on the international agenda, to expand and to strengthen the set 
of demands related to sexual orientation falling into the cluster of human rights1. 
Hence, given both the vagueness and openness of the ECHR, judges are called to give actual 
meaning to general provisions, enjoying a large room for discretion. 
 
The theoretical framework that informs my qualitative analysis consists of three guidelines.  
Firstly, the institution of the ECtHR and the ECHR system which are defined and characterized 
according to the seminal theories of Jhering, Holmes, Pound, Friedman and Ferrari, on the 
permeability between the social and legal sphere, on the clashes between opposing interests in 
the judicial arena, on the creativity in the hands of the judges, and on the phenomenon of judi-
cial law-making. 
Indeed, the ECtHR can be framed as a venue where social and legal inputs become intertwined 
(Friedman 1975, 11 and fol.), where interaction between the applicants and the judges mirrors 
the mutual influence between the social and the legal sphere (Ferrari 2004).  
If strategic litigation stems from the social dimension to then go on to affect the legal realm, ju-
dicial interpretation spreads effects outside the juridical sphere, in a circular dynamic (Ferrari 
2004, 161). Far from being merely a mechanic process, judicial interpretation stands at the 
crossroads of social, political, legal, and moral assumptions, embodying the complexity and the 
contradictions of reality. 
Secondly, I filter the interpretations of the ECtHR according to anti-formalist paradigms, to 
Friedman’s and Cotterrell’s studies on internal legal culture and to Cotterrell’s critique; hence I 
emphasize the social meaning of judicial reasoning and I study how extra-juridical standpoints, 
values, or considerations influence the reasoning of the ECtHR and shape the final meaning at-
tached to the human rights declared in the ECHR. This frame is then further enriched by Gor-
don’s critical proposal to scrutinize legal reasoning in order to challenge the apparent neutrality 
of the law and legal discourse. 
In more detail, I proceed to question ECtHR’s jurisprudence by considering judicial reasoning 
as the result of contingent and subjective determinants; as a device of secondary, derivative, le-
gitimacy, whose main aim is to justify the decisions made by the Court in light of superior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For instance, Ilga-Europe's plan 2011-2013 described strategic litigation as a resource to guarantee the 
“promotion of GLBTI rights”; in the Ilga-Europe plan for period 2014-2018 judicial litigation is de-
scribed as one of the most relevant strategies for each and every realm addressed. All Ilga-Europe’ stra-
tegic plans can be accessed at this address: http://www.ilga-europe.org/who-we-are/organisational-
documents/stragetic-plans/strategic-plan-2011-2013 . 
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sources of law. As Friedman argues (1975, 237), judicial decisions have to be consistent with 
relevant premises, and the opinion released by the Court provides such a link. 
The argumentative process whereby this connection is set, is neither univocal nor infrequent, in 
that different judges may reach differing conclusions, even relating to the same case, or that they 
may overrule past jurisprudence, tracing a new linking path with primary legitimacy.  
If the judge is integrated in a specific cultural, social, and political environment, then there are 
many factors which are likely to affect her reasoning they can be loosely gathered under the 
conceptual label of internal legal culture, a notion that, as explored throughout this dissertation, 
includes subjective standpoints deriving “from the experience of social relations in which we are 
situated” (Bourdieu 2000, 139), as well as the attitude towards the law, and the judicial role it-
self. 
Thirdly, the documental analysis is built on qualitative criteria deduced from a specific branch 
of studies critical to the neutrality of the law and to the impartiality of judicial reasoning: femi-
nist jurisprudence, gay and lesbian studies, and legal queer theory. 
Eminent feminist jurists and authors ascribable to gay, lesbian, and queer legal studies deeply 
investigate how bias affects and shapes both the theorization and the enforcement of legal per-
ceptions and human rights; having this angle as their starting point, they call for widespread legal 
reform in order to guarantee substantial actualization of the principle of equality and to pro-
mote existing ‘differences’ as a valuable subjective element (Minow 1987; Bartlett 1989; Har-
ding 1997; Morgan 2001; Stychin 2003; Moran 1996).  
 By departing from relevant themes emerged in this field of I start by considering the ability and 
the willingness of the ECtHR either to detach from a heteronormative understanding of human 
rights or to reinforce it; then, I move on to consider how the ECtHR weighs and balances ma-
joritarian and minorities’ interests. Lastly, judges’ wording and arguments are thoroughly ques-
tioned, precisely in order to assess whether the ECtHR subordinates the recognition of rights of 
homosexual people to a condition of secrecy, privacy, and invisibility. Public and private often 
represent a crucial distinction: being relegated to the private sphere means to be condemned to 
public silence and invisibility, to be deprived of the possibility of influencing public debate and 
orienting the political agenda. 
Critical Discourse Analysis and specific studies on ECtHR’s reasoning have set the methodolog-
ical frame in order to unravel the extremely vast cluster of judgments and decisions.  
The very structure of ECtHR’s judgments facilitates documental analysis: the majority opinion 
is composite but, usually, structured in recurrent sections, such as the description of the circum-
stances of the case, the analysis of relevant domestic and international laws and practice, and, 
when filed, also the submission by third parties as amici curiae. Moreover, as Lasser remarks, 
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the open argumentative structure of the Court is marked by frequent separate opinions, indi-
vidually or jointly filed, and they enrich the picture of the ECtHR’s internal legal culture, high-
lighting tensions and contrasted interpretations (Lasser 2004).  
 
Before explaining in more details the structure of this work, I shall put forward few caveats. 
Firstly, I have narrowed the theme so as to only touch sexual orientation, and I have excluded 
those judgments which incidentally might relate to homosexuality, but whose main concern fall 
outside the subject of my research. This means that I have not analyzed complaints related to 
gender identity; as far as being interesting and relevant, they introduce standpoints, tensions, 
and interests that are not necessarily referable to sexual orientation. Moreover, as extensively 
illustrated in chapter I, the legal treatment of homosexuality has been quite peculiar for centu-
ries, and it has significantly differed from that implemented for transgenders; consequently also 
the demands and attitudes towards the law within the lgbt community have been long fragment-
ed. Secondly, it could be contended that the theoretical frame I have adopted is just one of the 
many possible; this is undoubtedly true, and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence might have been read 
through different lens. However, I have built the present frame by choosing the approaches that 
provide the conceptual and the methodological tools which appear most suitable to answer the 
limited number of questions outlined above, and I shall extensively account for this decision in 
the forthcoming pages and chapters. 
 
The sample consists of 81 judgments and decisions made by the ECtHR and by the European 
Commission of Human Rights (hereafter EComHR). 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters, and it is structured as follows: chapter I recon-
structs the various legal perspectives that have emerged in the Western homosexual movement, 
analyzing the multifaceted standpoints underpinned to each approach and emphasizing internal 
tensions; the aim is to contextualize the recent emergence of claims related to sexual orienta-
tion, and to observe how strategic litigation is perceived by the heterogeneous homosexual 
movement’s trends. 
Relevant literature is extensively reviewed in chapters II and III: in the first, socio-legal theories 
are carefully analyzed in order to develop a sound theoretical and methodological framework; 
in the latter the ECHR’s system and the relevant legal literature on the ECtHR are addressed, 
with particular emphasis placed on the tensions and the inconsistencies related to the ECtHR’s 
functioning. 
The results of documental analysis are discussed in the chapters IV and V. 
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In chapter IV the judgments are divided according to the rights claimed, and diachronic analysis 
is conducted within such thematic clusters. By this, it’s possible to understand how judicial atti-
tude has evolved over time, and to assess which are the issues perceived by the ECtHR as being 
more problematic and, conversely, which appear to raise less concerns or doubts. 
Chapter V presents conclusive considerations of the overall jurisprudence of the ECtHR in re-
spect to sexual orientation, by focusing on the social meaning of judgments and also by consid-
ering whether the innovative breadth of ECtHR’s judgments actually mirrors the expectations of 
lgbt strategic litigation. 
Appendix I contains the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 1 of Protocol 1, 
being the latter invoked quite frequently in complaints. 
Appendix II contains brief summaries of cases analyzed: for each complaint it is offered a con-
cise but exhaustive description of the facts at stake, the points at issue, and the final decision.  
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CHAPTER I. WESTERN HOMOSEXUAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAW: A HISTORICAL 
REVIEW 
 
 
“It takes no compromise to give people their rights, 
It takes no money to respect the individual. 
It takes no political deal to give people freedom. 
It takes no survey to remove oppression.” 
Harvey Milk 
 
 
1.0 Foreword 
 
In this chapter the features of legal perspectives emerging throughout the Western homosexual 
movement will be described, highlighting internal tensions due to different conceptions of the 
law, and delving into the multifaceted political and legal standpoints held by each approach. 
I will specifically look into the theoretical contribution that could be described as being exclu-
sively dependent on homosexual reflection. Therefore, I will mainly focus on the male gay 
movement, since it enables us to better isolate the multiple paths of homosexual legal attitudes. 
During the late 1960s and 1970s, lesbian groups thrived in feminist organizations, generally 
sharing several similar themes, goals, and social practices of self-consciousness. Lesbian activists 
retained the overwhelming male majority in the gay movement as being highly problematic, in 
that it would reproduce a sexist conception of gender roles, and they argued that a common 
homosexual identity would be unable to overcome the influence of gender stereotypes relating 
to the perception of social and sexual relations.  
Moreover, criminal sanctions historically prosecuted only same-sex acts between males, whilst 
the repression of female homosexuality relied on diffused informal sanctions, which led to the 
public invisibility of lesbian women. On the other hand, gay men devoted their efforts to bring-
ing about a reform of the criminal law, lesbians were far more concerned with strategies that 
challenged social and familiar oppression. Lesbian thinking, videlicet, mostly addressed the 
double nature of discrimination, emphasizing the overlapping of issues related to gender and 
sexual orientation, and disputing that gay leaders ignored this crucial issue and were blinded by 
interiorized sexism. Thus, a rather notable theoretical and organizational separatism divided gay 
and lesbian groups, at least up until the HIV crisis. From the early 1980s the mainstream 
movement achieved a partial congruence, focusing on certain goals common to both gays and 
lesbians, such as the demand for the public recognition of same-sex couples, the claim in favour 
of anti-discrimination laws and social security schemes, the opportunity to serve in the army and 
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the case ensuring access to heterologous insemination and joint/second parent adoption for 
same sex couples. Meanwhile, the pre-eminence of lesbian philosophers in queer thinking 
weakened divergences caused by gender issues, leading to a stronger cohesion, described in 
paragraphs 1.4 and 1.72. 
The purpose of this chapter is: a) to present a historical account of the most relevant events that 
marked the emergence of the Western lgbt3 movement b) to reconstruct internal legal trends, so 
as to describe the original outcome of homosexual reflection in the legal system and c) to con-
textualize the dynamics that led to the primacy of ‘rights language’ and to the massive activation 
of law, especially in the context of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR). 
It could be suggested that in order to distinguish the many theoretical perspectives, epistemolog-
ical choices and strategic goals underlying homosexual activism, it would be appropriate to refer 
to the existence of multiple movements. Firstly, a number of heterogeneous, sometimes incom-
patible, standpoints coexist between the common criticism against models shaped by discrimi-
natory assumptions and beyond the public claiming on behalf of traditionally oppressed sexual 
outsiders (Morgan, 2000, 208). 
Secondly, the emergence of homosexual movements outside Western Countries surely enrich-
es the overall reflection and generates new legal, social, and anthropological perspectives that in 
the near future are likely to lead to an internal discussion and a multicultural approach to the 
definition of gayness4. 
However, for the purposes of this research I suggest narrowing the field and to only refer to the 
Western homosexual movement. Western Europe and the United States of America represent 
the historical, cultural, and legal frame in which the homosexual movement both appeared and 
evolved. Not only did Western philosophy lay the theoretical foundations in favour of the de-
criminalization of homosexuality (Leroy-Forgeot, 1997) but, it was, in Europe and the USA that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For further discussion, see throughout chapter I and II. For an in-depth account of the disagreement 
between gays and lesbians see, among the others, Johnson (1973), Lee (1986), Blasius (1994); Vaid 
(1995). 
3 From the early 1990s the collective term lgbt frequently found in academic journals and in media lan-
guage used to indicate the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community. This acronym refers to ma-
jor social components which refuse both the heterosexual norm and the definition of one’s identity 
based on his/her biological gender. In recent years some activists have proposed adopting lgbtqi and 
lgbtaqi, in order to include new sexual minorities that claim relevance and recognition; as far as being 
used by homosexual activists, at the present time, these definitions don’t yet consistently recur in public 
or academic debate.  
4 For a sociological account of non-Western gay communities see Martel (2014); for an introduction to 
post-colonial perspectives on lgbt issues see Assad (2002); Pullen (2012). 
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words such as ‘gay’, at first, and then ‘queer’, acquired political meaningfulness and a positive 
identitarian value.  
Foundational elements of the present lgbt identity lie deeply in the context in which they were 
established, to the extent that comparable trajectories recur in Western countries. Throughout 
chapter I will, however, stress local peculiarities, so as to report the richness and the multiplicity 
of national experiences of the Western homosexual movement.  
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1.1 Law and Homosexuality: A Complex Relationship 
 
For centuries the relationship between law and homosexuality in Western societies has been 
multifaceted, complex, and rather ambiguous. 
During the middle-ages and early modern times, despite the severe sanctions against sodomy 
spreading throughout Europe, spaces of social and legal tolerance remained quite open, and the 
enforcement of criminal sanctions was not at all systematical (Boswell 1980, 3). 
Moreover, as Eskridge aptly points out (2010, 1337-1338), legal provisions referred to sodomy 
regardless of the sex of the partners involved and, at the same time, this signifier included all 
sexual activities in contrast with Christian morality, among which buggery wasn’t the worst (Ivi, 
169-180). The crime of buggery applied, thus, to a very specific type of intercourse whereas 
other sexual acts, considered at a later stage as criminal offences, were not even mentioned.  
Effectively in most of Europe the law left consistent grey areas where males, especially influen-
tial political and religious ones, could engage in same-sex acts without necessarily being exposed 
to the threat of torture and death. 
However, such informal strategies were shaped hugely by the law itself, and the boundaries of 
personal freedom depended on the continent flaws in the criminal system. The degree of en-
forcement was fairly unstable, fluctuating according to the attitude of political and religious rul-
ers towards this issue; the risk of blackmailing was also relevant and elites quite frequently 
brought the charge of buggery against their opponents, so as to destroy and debunk their public 
reputation.  
I do not intend to delve further into this discussion, as it is far beyond the scope of this re-
search, but there are a few relevant features from a socio-legal perspective that I would like to 
discuss. 
Regardless of the effective number of condemns, from the late Roman Empire onwards laws 
and judges mentioned male same-sex acts just to prosecute them (Cantarella 1988, ch. V-VI). 
The absence of any formal regulation implied that religious and political institutions denied 
such practices without any kind of legitimacy and tolerability. Popular culture also heavily 
mocked homosexual practices5, absorbing and reinforcing negative prejudices.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Mockery of same-sex acts has been a topos from Greek theatre and literature onwards; in medieval and 
modern times men depicted as being ‘catamite’ and ‘effeminate’ were polemically addressed. (Boswell 
1980, 235). Furthermore, as Boswell demonstrates, this image was common to many European cultures 
and legal codes; for instance, in Iceland, during the high middle age, “Common Proverbs equated male 
sexual passivity with failure to defend oneself in battle, and a Law prohibited the depiction of one’s en-
emies in carvings of homosexual intercourse, presumably because of this association” (Ibidem). Cru-
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In order to grasp the standpoints underpinned to the modern European legal attitude towards 
homosexuality, it’s necessary to take distance from present categories of sexual orientation and 
gender identity. As a rich seam of literature attests6, at least until the second half of the XVIII 
century, sexuality was legally defined by acts and not by personal inclinations. The Law prose-
cuted conduct while it did not take into account the potential deviant nature of one’s sexual de-
sires, so long as he didn’t breach the law; moreover, the scope of criminal punishments was 
mainly oriented towards a retributive and restorative function, with little emphasis on preventive 
purpose.  
As Bobbio argues (1995, 190), retributive function relies on “the rule of justice as equality”, 
namely the rule according to which he who commits a specific crime, has to suffer punishment 
of the same kind. Since Scriptures mention the famous burning rain that destroyed Sodoma, 
fire was understood as being both the appropriate element to purify the community of sodo-
mites, and as the appropriate form of punishment for buggery. Hence, the criminal system was 
not structured to identify those who were likely to commit offences, but it inflicted punishments 
in order to restore the moral balance altered by crime.  
The distinction between legal and illegal sexual acts evidently depended on the bodily parts in-
volved7;, however, those who did not conform to dominant precepts suffered from social stigma 
and marginalization. 
Between the XIX and XX century new paradigms invaded Western society and heavily influ-
enced many aspects of European culture: the scientific or rational approach affected the emerg-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sades and hostility against Muslims, however, significantly altered the antecedent satirical, but quite toler-
ant attitude; the chronicles at that time, began to depict Muslims as sodomites, without any respect for 
women, men, nuns, or even dead bodies. Generally speaking sodomy was soon equated to betrayal and, 
consequently, those who engaged in such acts, as well as heretics, Hebrews, and Muslims were held up 
to public shaming and prosecution (Boswell 1980, 279-285). For an in-depth discussion see also Can-
tarella (1988); Brundage (2009); Bullock and Brundage (2013). 
6 Michel Foucault describes the emersion of the specific homosexual personage as a sign of discontinuity 
between the medieval/modern and the contemporary conception of sexuality. This thinking has been 
widely criticized, as it would mark too sharped distinctions, not paying proper attention to gender stereo-
types already present in past centuries. It appears quite logical that also before the invention of the term 
‘homosexuality’ men who experienced same-sex desires developed a proper sub-culture. Historical 
sources do in fact suggest that during the Renaissance the ideal of Platonic love was used to refer to 
same-sex relations, and not simply to sexual activities; moreover, long before the second half of the XIX 
century in urban cities a hidden geography of tolerant places towards sodomites developed. Still, it’s 
hard to dispute that, up to the second half of the XIX century medicine and new-born sciences support-
ed and justified the prosecution of gays, lesbians, and trans genders, marking a specific and distinct ap-
proach to sexuality and to homosexuality. For an in-depth analysis see Foucault (1990), and for a critical 
review of his thesis refer to Murray (1989). 
7 Modern US Statutes generally prosecuted all non-procreative sexual activities and offered a detailed, 
almost morbose, qualification of such acts. See Eskridge (2008; 2010). As concerns European back-
ground see Murray (1989). 
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ing field of social sciences, and almost every aspect of human behavior was filtered through the 
canons of medicine, psychology, psychiatry, criminology, and of theories of social Darwinism. 
Criminals and delinquents became privileged subjects of scientific enquiry, which was aimed at 
discovering the inherent characteristics that brought them to transgress legal, social and moral 
conventions.  
Male homosexuality became one of the most studied examples of deviance, and all emerging 
sciences - from psychiatry to criminology- engaged in the dilemma of explaining the rational 
cause of homosexuality, and in searching for the cure to turn every homosexual person ‘nor-
mal’.  
From this perspective, crime and abnormality were tangible manifestations of an innate predis-
position; human kind, therefore, could be divided into normal and so-called ‘born criminals’, 
who, if not prevented, would fatally break the law. 
The main consequence of this new paradigm was the separation between intentions and actions 
and, as far as sexuality between homosexuality and sodomy is concerned.  
The first term8 refers to a personal characteristic, while the second simply describes a specific 
and objectively defined kind of sexual activity. 
If, on the one hand, this process led to a huge justification of homophobic social and legal prac-
tices on pseudo-scientific grounds, on the other, it also labelled all those who engaged in same-
sex acts with common features, giving them the initial cue to create communities and to resist to 
such pathologizing framing. 
I suggest, that being exposed to often obsessive scientific, curiosity and academic arguing could 
have triggered an unexpected reaction, though limited to metropolitan areas and middle-class 
intellectuals: new sciences reduced the grey areas of the past, and they brought same-sex orien-
tation to public shaming, inducing some homosexuals, well equipped with cultural and financial 
resources, to react. Furthermore, the increased number of studies on the topic might have rein-
forced the informal networks between members of this labelled minority. 
Effectively, the early homophile groups combined legal and scientific stances, trying to disman-
tle medical prejudices in order to promote normative reforms. 
In Germany by the middle of the XIX century the first attempts to promote an unprejudiced 
conception of homosexuality arose, with the primary aim of repealing criminal laws against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Hungarian literate Karl Maria Benkert invented the term ‘homosexuality’ in 1869, and proposed it as 
the appropriate word to describe this peculiar sexual preference, without biased or pejorative meanings. 
Indeed, he combined Greek term homoios, same, and the Latin sexualitas, sexuality, to denote in the 
most aseptic way the desire directed towards people of same sex. 
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same-sex acts. The term ‘homosexual’ itself first appeared in a legal pamphlet, where Benkert 
supported the decriminalization of sodomy in all pre-unitary German States. Drawing inspira-
tion from the rising discipline of embryology, Kraft Ebing explained homosexual desire as the 
outcome of an abnormal foetus development and, therefore, he contended that such behaviour 
should not be formally punished (Dall’Orto 2015, 540 and fol.). Ulrichs, a jurist with deep sci-
entific knowledge, also conceived homosexuality as a physiological element, but he ascribed 
homosexuals to a distinct third sexual cluster, named “uranians”9. Ulrichs was officially the first 
man in history to come out, claiming his diversity in a letter to his relatives, and he presented 
the first amendment against anti-homosexual German laws, without however altering the status 
quo.  
Hirschfeld, a pioneer of sexology, was profoundly affected by Ulrich’s theories; in 1897 he 
founded the Humanitarian Scientific Committee and the motto of the association, Per scien-
tiam ad justitiam, demonstrates the importance of the legal sphere. Scientific inquiries had the 
essential role of spreading an objective understanding of sexuality, but the crucial and ultimate 
goal remained the decriminalization of sodomy. 
For this purpose, in 1898 Hirschfeld presented a legal petition which gathered more than 5000 
signatures to overturn paragraph 175, which was then discussed in Parliament; but since only a 
small group of the Social Democratic Party supported the proposal, the bill was dismissed. 
Even though Parliament discussed similar proposals again in the 1920s, the German Criminal 
Code was never amended.  
He also set up the famous Institut fur Sexualwissenschaft, Sexology Institute opened in Berlin 
after the First World War, and until his death, in 1935, he internationally promoted legal toler-
ance of homosexuality and a new scientific approach to sexuality10. 
Looking beyond the historical details of his extremely valuable work, it’s worth noting that by 
supporting the reform of the German Criminal Code, Hirschfeld publicly conceived a valuable 
image of homosexuality. Not only did Hirschfeld write several academic articles, but he also dif-
fused several pamphlets celebrating gay and lesbian love and, in 1919, co-wrote and acted in the 
first movie with an openly homosexual plot, Anders also die Andern, different from Others.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Kennedy (1981). 
10 in 1921 Hirschfeld organized the first worldwide International Congress for Sexual Reform on the Ba-
sis of Sexual Science, which led to the development of the World League for Sexual Reform. Following 
that experience, Congresses were held in Copenhagen (1928), London (1929), Wien (1930) and Brno 
(1932) to raise awareness of the public opinion, without achieving significant legal reforms. For an histor-
ical account see Dose and Selwyin (2003). 
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Hirschfeld did not conceive sexual orientation and gender identity as being distinct concepts, he 
rather considered homosexuals as male people with a female gender identity, who were attract-
ed to other men and, most of whom adopted a feminine way of behaviour. Consequently, the 
theme of transsexuals and transvestites recurs throughout Hirschfeld’s works and he identified 
these specific conditions as the prototype of the ‘homosexual’, as a result then clashing with his 
colleagues. Between 1903 and 1906some members did in fact leave the Humanitarian Scientific 
Committee, arguing that homosexuality was a distinctive sign of masculinity, and they founded 
an organization firstly named Gemeineschaft der Eigenen, Community of the Special, and then 
Bund fur Mannliche Kultur, Union for the Male Culture. This organization, however, disap-
peared before the Nazis came to power. 
I would hold Hirschfeld’s experience as the initial stage of a naming, blaming and claiming pro-
cess, defined by social scientists Abel, Felstiner and Sarat as the pre-requisite for the beginning 
of public litigation (Abel, Felstiner, Sarat 1981, 635). Hirschfeld, along with Ulrichs and Kraft 
Ebing, proposed a neutral nomination of homosexuality, significantly detached from the pejora-
tive terms used in academic and common language, as ‘inverted’ and ‘perverts’. 
Though heavily influenced by his medical background, Hirschfeld perceived an experience, 
namely the formal prosecution of homosexuals, as injurious and transformed it into a grievance, 
sociologically described as the attribution of “an injury to the fault of another individual or so-
cial entity” (Abel, Felstiner, Sarat, 1981, 635). The causes of marginalization clearly emerge, 
and so does the guilty part: criminal enforcement, ignorance and biased science infringed the 
natural rights of homosexuals, therefore responsibility lay with legislators and with the academic 
world. As Abel, Felstiner and Sarat argue, in the emergence of public disputes other stages are 
required: “[claiming] occurs when someone with a grievance voices it to the person or to the en-
tity believed to be responsible and asks for some remedy. […] A claim is transformed into a dis-
pute when it is rejected in whole or in part” (Ib., 635-636).  
I would, then, ascribe the first draft to repeal Paragraph 175 and the subsequent work of the 
Sexology Institute to a claiming strategy, which definitely resulted in rejection. The reactive an-
swer of Hirschfeld and his supporters can be thus read within the frame of public litigation - 
they promoted homosexual rights up until 1933 when the Nazis closed down the Institute, 
burning all documents, incarcerating hundreds of homosexuals, and forcing Hirschfeld into ex-
ile -. 
This experience, as far as being geographically and temporally restricted, marks an important 
change in homosexuals’ attitude towards legal and political systems. Differently from the past, in 
addition to informal tolerance, Hirschfeld claimed that homosexuals should be entitled to rights 
and, moreover, he called for the withdrawal of public authorities from the individual private 
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realm. Informal spaces of tolerance, often tiny and changeable, were brought to question, as 
well as the previous model according to which legal provisions were entitled to strict discipline 
with personal sexuality, whereas sexual minorities could neither put forward a claim nor influ-
ence legal prejudice against them. 
The legacy of Hirschfeld’s ‘movement’, adopted by homophile groups in the 1950s, began a 
relevant change, in that it brought homosexual issues to public debate, pushing for legal toler-
ance, and above all, considering the law as an essential opportunity to enhance homosexuals’ 
living conditions. 
Right from the beginning both Ulrichs and Hirschfeld considered the law as the primary arena 
in which to question homosexuals’ treatment. Although their outcomes have been harshly criti-
cized by contemporary activists, it’s necessary to remember that they lived in a period where ac-
ademics believed in the existence of a rational explanation for every circumstance; as such, it 
may be hypothesized that the quest for assessing the exact origin of homosexuality was deter-
mined more by the will to anchor their legal proposals to an indisputable scientific truth, than 
by a purely medicalized image of sexuality (Dall’Orto 2015, 530 and fol. ). 
As extensively analyzed below, in the following decades the inclusion of gay issues in the politi-
cal agenda, and the mobilization of legal reforms favored reactive dynamics between the homo-
sexual movement and the legal system, thus significantly affecting the evolution of gay liberation 
movement. 
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1.2 Homophile Trends and First Attempts of Reform 
 
The associations promoting homosexual emancipations appearing in the aftermath of the Se-
cond World War appealed to moderate political positions and endorsed a liberal legal order 
(D’Emilio 1983; Engel 2000). These groups generally called themselves ‘homophile’, to high-
light the emphasis placed on the emotional sphere, removed from any suggestion of (ho-
mo)sexual practices; they created effective interpersonal networks in European and American 
metropolitan cities, proposing an anti-stigmatizing approach to sexual orientation11. 
Homophile associations resumed pre-war efforts, though detaching themselves form Hirsch-
feld’s approach and endorsing a masculine ideal of homosexuality; the international spreading 
of the Swiss magazine ‘Der Kreis’, the only homosexual publishing to have escaped Nazi fury, 
supplied homophiles with theoretical and organizational suggestions, and it also functioned as 
the connection with previous experiences (Dall’Orto 2015, 540-547). 
In Paris, for instance, André Baudry founded Arcadie with the purpose of breaking social isola-
tion in which many French gay men and lesbians were pent-up; during the 1950s Arcadie chal-
lenged censorship and judicial authorities, broadcasting movies with homosexual plots and sup-
porting the creation of a collective identity. 
For the purposes of a socio-legal analysis, I however consider the British and American cases as 
the most relevant examples. In the UK as well as in the USA criminal sanctions against gay men 
were actively enforced12; consequently, a broad reform of both legal culture and criminal system 
stood as the pre-requisite for any public gay mobilization. Most notably the Mattachine Society, 
established in 1951 in San Francisco, was able to ensure a safe space where homosexuals could 
argue over discriminations they suffered, build good relations and foster a sense of collectivity 
(Engel 2000; Adam 1995). Within a narrow-minded and hostile society, distrustful of almost all 
minorities, and under a legal system imposing heterosexuality as the dominant normality, Mat-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For an extensive historical account of the European and the American homophile movement see: Ma-
rotta (1981); D’Emilio (1983); Adam (1995); Bernstein (1997); Rossi Barilli (1999); Engel (2000); 
Meeker (2001); Jackson (2006); Jackson (2009); Douglas (2010); Rupp (2011); Stein (2012). 
12 Until 1961 all US judicial systems included sodomy laws, and proscribed a wide range of sanctions, re-
gardless of the consent expressed by the partners involved. In 1961 the State of Illinois repealed all laws 
that interfered with individual sexuality, remaining an unicum for more than a decade (Engel 2000, 36). 
In 1972 a slow process of reform began, but it soon incurred significant setbacks. In the 1986 famous 
Bowers v Hardwick case, the US Supreme Court upheld the legitimacy of sodomy laws, arguing that 
claiming “that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition’ or 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious” (Bowers v Hardwick, § 191). Only in 
2003 did the Supreme Court ratify the unconstitutionality of sodomy laws, leading to the complete re-
peal of laws criminalizing homosexuality. See Andersen (2004) 
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tachine principally aimed at a gradual innovation in public consciousness and at spreading lib-
eral ideals, in clear contraposition with sodomy laws. The education of “homosexual masses” 
(Engel 2000, 31) proved essential, since Mattachine leaders thought that the society would have 
been more tolerant if gay men had adhered to an exemplar, virtuous and moderate model of 
citizenship, miles apart from the dangerous and depravate depiction set by Sen. McCarthy. 
Through legal reform Mattachine pursued the guarantee of private spaces, though not claiming 
public visibility; the inviolability of individual privacy, in accordance with liberal Millian’s prin-
ciple of harm13, seemed the only strategy to avoid the paranoiac threats spreading in the first half 
of the 1950s.  
Mccarthyism caused a real witch-hunt for anyone suspected of communist or homosexual 
tendencies, especially if employed in public institutions. Over a period of eight years more than 
5000 public employees were fired because of their alleged sexual orientation; furthermore, in 
1950 the US Senate set up a specific Committee to evaluate whether the employment of homo-
sexuals and other moral perverts threatened national security. The final Report dramatically 
stated:  
 
Indulgence in acts of sex perversion weakens the moral fiber of the individual. […] Even one 
pervert in a Government agency tends to have a corrosive influence upon his fellow em-
ployees. […] One homosexual can pollute a Government office. The Government would be 
assuming a grave burden if it allowed such morally contaminated persons to remain in its 
service’ (US Committee quoted in D’Emilio 1983, 44). 
 
Despite the tensions opposing the conservatives to radicalize sections of Mattachine14, the ur-
gency to amend criminal statutes fostered a lively debate. In 1955 the Mattachine Society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 During half of the XIX century John Stuart Mill elaborated on utilitarian and liberal bases the funda-
mental concept of harm principle, whereby “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually 
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant. […] The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which 
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (Mill 1859, 21-22). Harm prin-
ciple is a milestone of Western philosophy and it’s worth noting that, one century later, both the 
Wolfendern Report and H.L.A. Hart invoked this principle to support the decriminalization of adult, 
private, and consenting buggery. 
14 In 1953 a group of activists of Mattachine opposed the creation of a legal committee aiming at produc-
ing reform proposals and they dreaded “any organized pressure on lawmakers by members of the Mat-
tachine Society as a group would only serve to prejudice the position of the Society […]. It would provide 
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praised the Model of the Penal Code drafted by the American Law Institute, wherein homo-
sexuality was no longer considered a crime, and, from the early ‘1960s, its leaders claimed the 
right of movement, the right to work and the recognition of all rights denied to homosexual 
people (D’Emilio 1983, 198). 
Though legal advisors of the American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU, refused to uphold the 
unconstitutionality of sodomy laws in Courts, in 1958 the homophile association ONE chal-
lenged legal provisions that allowed the national postal service to not send items with homosex-
ual contents, being granted by the Supreme Court the authorization to freely publish homosex-
ual magazines, as long as they were not explicitly pornographic15. Nowadays this result may ap-
pear minimal, but at that time it marked an essential step, enabling the US homosexual com-
munity to open new channels of communication and to strengthen the existing ones. 
In the UK between the second half of the 1950s and the next decade, the Homosexual Law Re-
form Society, HLRS, was in operation that had been specifically founded to lobby the British 
Parliament for the repeal of the Criminal Offences Act, which provided hard labour, impris-
onment or chemical castration for men convicted of ‘gross indecency’ - a vague concept includ-
ing any activity held to be inadmissible under Victorian morality16. 
The release of the Wolfenden Report launched the first public discussion raising the issue of 
same-sexuality, reducing the image of homosexuality to a scary matter which had not to be men-
tioned. 
In 1954 the British Parliament appointed a Committee to study whether the repeal of Criminal 
Offences Act could fit with British juridical pillars. The Committee included professors, psychi-
atrists, theologists magistrates, who for the next three years would conduct an extremely detailed 
study. In the final Report the majority reached an overwhelming conclusion that upheld the ne-
cessity to repeal criminal laws against buggery:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
an abundant source of hysterical propaganda with which to foment an ignorant, fear inspired and anti-
homosexual campaign” (D’Emilio 1983, 83) 
15 One incorporated v Olsen, 355 US. 371 (1958). See D’Emilio (1983, 115). 
16 Criminal Offences Act, as amended in 1885, read: “Any male person who, in public or private, com-
mits, or is a party to the commission of, or procures, or attempts to procure the commission by any male 
person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and 
being convicted thereof, shall be liable at the discretion of the Court to be imprisoned for any term not 
exceeding two years, with or without hard labour”. Historians estimate however that between 1885 and 
1967 nearly 49.000 men were convicted of buggery. For a further discussion see Moran (1996); Engel 
(2000). 
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We have […] worked with our own formulation of the function of the criminal law […] In 
this field, its function, as we see it, is to preserve public order and decency, to protect the cit-
izen from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploita-
tion and corruption of others. […] It is not, in our view, the function of the law to intervene 
in the private lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern of behavior” 
(Wolfenden Report, 1957). 
 
The Report encouraged philosophers as well as politicians to weigh up the connection between 
law and morals. The debate opposing Professor H.L.A. Hart and Lord Devlin remains the 
most relevant and, still nowadays, it stands as a milestone in the realm of public ethics17. Though 
not presenting simply homophobic argument, Devlin advocated for the criminalization of same-
sex acts, on the grounds of philosophical “technical reasons” (Zanetti 2015, 27). The core of his 
reasoning lies in the famous “disintegration thesis”, by which human societies are tied together 
by an invisible bondage, a hugely essential one, that permeates legal norms, shared social prac-
tices and values, and that must be preserved so as to safeguard social cohesion. Therefore, “a 
common morality is part of the bondage. The bondage is part of the price of society; and man-
kind, which needs society, must pay its price” (Devlin 1965, 10). According to Devlin morality 
and legality often overlap; it’s interesting to note that he did not propose a substantive cluster of 
ideals or values, rather assuming a majoritarian definition of morals. Society would be entitled 
to enforce the dominant conception of morals, for contingent traditional and shared values that 
create national solidarity, identity and security. Law, therefore, should be subordinated to mor-
als, namely to that common feeling expressed by the reasonable man (Devlin 1965, 78). The 
contempt of public morals in the name of individual liberty would lead to the society’s complete 
disgregation (Ib. 76-78). 
From this standpoint, since in the 1950s the majority of British people disregarded homosexu-
ality, the Criminal Offences Act was considered both legitimate and desirable, in that it helped 
maintain public cohesion. H.L.A. Hart, by contrast, argued for a contingent and not normative 
relation between law and morals; in general terms, if it’s true that what is illegal is often deemed 
as also immoral, not every immoral act should be considered illegal. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17See Hart (1961); Hart (1963); Hart (1964); Devlin (1965). On the influence of Hart-Devlin debate in 
the UK legal culture see Weeks (1980) and Moran, cit. The Hart-Devlin debate is also at the foundation 
of recent US philosophical debate over moral obligations of law; see Dworkin (1977); Finnis (1980); 
Macedo (1996); Nussbaum (2010). 
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Law should be primarily aimed at protecting and promoting individual liberty, without imposing 
a moralistic conception of reality that, as such, would never be unanimously shared, always re-
sulting disrespectful of minorities. Hart did not discuss the value of homosexuality but claimed 
that as a private behaviour that did not cause harm to third parties, it fell within one’s own pri-
vate sphere. He strongly contested Devlin’s argument, suggesting that neither society can be 
treated as a “seamless web” (Hart 1963, 68) nor would a detachment from common morals dis-
gregate the overall society itself:  
  
It is no doubt true that if deviations from conventional sexual morality are tolerated by the 
law and come to be known, the unconventional morality might change in a permissive direc-
tion, though this does not seem to be the case with homosexuality in those European coun-
tries where it is not punishable by law. But even if the conventional morality did so change, 
the society in question would not have been destroyed or subverted. We should compare 
such a development not to the violent overthrow of government but to a peaceful constitu-
tional change in its form, consistent not only with the preservation of a society but with its 
advance (Hart 1963, 52). 
 
In the late 1950s British public opinion became willing to debate the appropriate legal treat-
ment of homosexuals (Moran and McGhee 2000, 68 and fol.) and, unlike in the USA, the 
HLRS orchestrated a number of initiatives to push members of the Parliament to implement 
Wolfenden’s Report. In 1957, for instance, the HLRS launched in the national newspapers a 
plea for the repeal of the Criminal Offences Act, gaining the support of leading intellectual fig-
ures, as such H.L.A. Hart, Isaiah Berlin, Julian Huxley and Bertrand Russell, members of the 
House of Lords, and also religious representatives, and bishops of Birmingham and Exeter 
(Johnson and Vanderbeck 2014, ch. I). In the same year homosexual activists distributed 
Chesser's, ‘Live and Let Live’ pamphlet in parliament, with the intent to persuade conservatives 
that the repeal of the Criminal Offences Act would have not weakened national security nor 
threatened collective moral integrity (Engel 2000, 72). All under-taken actions did not over-
come conservative refusal nor eradicate the stereotype of gay men as being dangerous and trai-
torous people. Wolfenden’s Report was only implemented in 1967, and it granted homosexuals 
minimalist protection: it set the age of consent at 21 - for heterosexuals it was 16 - and only de-
criminalized same-sex acts performed in private. This meant that acts in which a third party ei-
ther took part or was just present remained a criminal offense; moreover, the notion of private 
was decisively narrower than one given to heterosexuals. Whilst the law did not restrict freedom 
to engage in heterosexual group-sex nor it provided legislative ad hoc sanctions against public 
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performance of such acts18, the Sexual Offences Act read that homosexual acts done “in a lava-
tory to which the public have or are permitted to access, whether at payment or otherwise” 
could be sanctioned with detention. Compared to the US example, the distinguishing factor of 
the British case is twofold: on the one hand the HLRS preferred political mobilization to judi-
cial litigation and, on the other, activists attempted to start a reformist process following a top-
down model, by primarily focusing on the persuasion of national cultural elites. 
With the exception of Illinois, during the 1950s and the 1960s none of the US States embraced 
the American Law Institute’s recommendation to introduce a less intrusive criminal legislation19 
and the efforts of Mattachine Society resulted mostly ineffective, affecting neither public debate 
nor US legal culture. 
In conclusion, homophile associations achieved important results, when compared to resources 
then available, but Western culture still remained permeated with strong negative prejudices.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Heterosexual acts performed in private by more than two persons were not an offense, while if in pub-
lic they fell within the wide category of acts contrary to public indecency, prosecuted by the 1956 Sexual 
Offences Act. The maximum penalty amounted to two years’ imprisonment but in the overwhelming 
majority of cases were dealt with a fine. 
19 In 1955 the American Law Institute drafted a new model of Penal Code calling for the rejection of all 
sodomy statutes, endorsing liberal principles. (D’Emilio 1983, 108-129; Dall’Orto 2015, 545). 
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1.3 Libertarian Trends: Law as an Oppressive Institution 
 
In the turmoil of the ’68 protests, homophile associations declined and left room for libertarian 
trends. 
In the USA the Stonewall riots20 marked this change, resulting in the birth of the contemporary 
homosexual movement. 
On the night of 28th June 1969 police officers burst into the Stonewall Inn, a notorious gay bar 
in the Greenwich neighbourhood, New York, to control licenses and record customers. The 
registration of homosexuals was a widely adopted repression tactic, in order to prevent the 
emergence of public claims. Furthermore, raids had quite often a violent nature and customers 
were treated as common offenders (Engel 2000, 20-22; 39-41). That night, the reaction of the 
patrons took an unpredictable turn: despite the order of respectability promoted by the Mat-
tachine, gays, lesbians and transsexuals began to fight the police in a confrontation that in the 
following two days involved two thousand gays, lesbians and black people. It was the first time 
that gay men dared to oppose to the police raids, claiming and celebrating their diversity, free-
dom, and dignity. The radicalness of the protest marked the breach with Mattachine leaders, 
who for the most did not share grassroots libertarian stances and refused to endorse the rebels. 
As Engel recalls, in response to a message scrawled on one bar’s boarded-up windows that ex-
alted ‘gay power’, the Mattachine Society posted outside the same bar the following message: 
‘We homosexuals plead with our people to please help maintain peaceful and quiet conduct on 
the streets of the village’ (Engels 2001, 41). The fracture could not have been deeper. The 
Stonewall riots were not only the sign of the explosion of radical stances but, in the following 
decades, they became a founding myth of collective gay identity, celebrated in poems, writings 
and movies. 
Following the outburst at the Stonewall Inn, young activists from the new-born Gay Liberation 
Front, GLF, and a myriad of widespread collectives, developed innovative claims, expectations, 
social and discursive practices, irreversibly differentiating themselves form previous generations, 
and they disavowed the tactic of respectability, of gradual innovations and deference to hetero-
sexual norm, showing more accord with methods of the New Left and feminist movement21. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For an in-depth analysis I recall Carter (2010). 
21 In the 1960s Feminists and New Left hostilely judged the gay liberation theory; for instance, Stokley 
Carmichael, the US leader of SNCC, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committe, defined homosexual-
ity as “a sickness, just as are baby-rape or wanting to be head of General Motors” (Carmichael cit. in En-
gel 200, 42). Both in Italy and France gay militants were forced to the margins of early contestations and 
they atoned a double prejudice, which depicted them as immoral and reactionary, committed to bour-
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Echoes of the Stonewall riots and GLF actions captured the imagination of radical British activ-
ists, leading to the creation, of the London GLF in 1971, which, in its short life, theoretically 
and methodologically resembled the American example.  
Also Parisian and Italian gay left-wingers absorbed the example of the US protest, which be-
came a “sign of hope”, a promising “whispering” (Gunther 2009, 45) to all militants trying to 
mould a distinct homosexual thought within libertarian spirit flown from May ’68. 
In the early 1970s the gay movement borrowed from the latter the argumentative, the rhetorical 
and the strategic repertoire, and it launched a fervid critical discussion about the oppressive 
character of inherent social and sexual models, in political institutions as well as in capitalist 
economy.  
The Gay liberation theory did in fact represent a cutting edge view of the overall 1960s Youth 
Movement, and it originally reappraised ground-breaking stances; the medicalized definition of 
sexuality was presented as being intertwined with the protest against practices reinforcing asym-
metrical familiar models, and the disapproval of the capitalist system was coupled with the in-
terpretation of gay oppression in light of Marxist ‘class conflict’. Libertarians suggested a paral-
lelism between proletarians and homosexuals: if the former were oppressed because capitalists 
held the monopoly of the means of production, the latter had historically been subjected to the 
monopoly of political, religious and juridical power to define sexually legal models, marginaliz-
ing and prosecuting all who did not meet those criteria. Only neutralizing all cultural, social and 
institutional outcomes embedded with heterosexism22, above all the very notion of heterosexual-
ity and the institution of the nuclear family -the libertarians argued- each person should finally 
be able to freely undergo his/her own desires and drives. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
geois vices. Up to the second half of the1970s the Italian Communist Party endorsed a rigid morality 
and supported the image of a working-class extremely disciplined and moderate, in which workers’ virili-
ty stood as a basilar and undisputed value. As Casali recalls “i ceti dominanti erano accusati, tra l’altro di 
bassa virilità, effeminatezza, omosessualità […]. Per tutto il periodo la rappresentazione classica 
dell’uomo comunista coincise con quella dell’operaio, preferibilmente di una grande industria, forte e 
vigoroso nel corpo e dotato di un’alta moralità, assolutamente monogamo e lontano dai vizi” (Casali 
2005, 40-41). In such a rigid and austere environment the PCI mixed homosexuality up with paedophil-
ia and expelled any suspect individual, as the affair of Pierpaolo Pasolini shows. See Casali (2005). 
22 I adopt the definition put forward forward by the sociologist and sexologist Herek, according to whom 
heterosexism “is used to characterize heterosexuals' prejudices against lesbians and gay men, as well as 
the behaviors based on those prejudices. Heterosexism is manifested both at the cultural and individual 
levels: cultural heterosexism, like institutional racism and sexism, pervades societal customs and institu-
tions. Psychological heterosexism is the individual manifestation of cultural heterosexism […] reflected in 
heterosexuals' feelings of personal disgust, hostility, or condemnation of homosexuality and of lesbians 
and gay men” (Herek 1996, 101). 
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The awareness that homophobic prejudices were also entrenched in radical left-winged culture 
drove activists to look for origins of hate in the moral and cultural structures behind educative 
processes of socialization, and to denounce the bias against homosexuals conveyed by left-
winged values. 
On this regard Mario Mieli, a reference intellectual of the Italian and European gay liberation 
movement, coined the concept of ‘educastration23’, educastrazione, to define the core of the re-
pressive set of norms inherent to bourgeois society, aimed at stifling children's natural transsex-
uality24 and at constricting their sexual drives to reproductive models suitable and useful in a 
capitalist context (Bernini 2007, 43 and fol.). He furthermore denounced that similar mecha-
nisms also occurred in communist culture and clashed with left-wing -leaders as well as with 
more moderate activists. 
The French Front d’action homosexual revolutionaire, FHAR, during its short history de-
nounced the national working class movement for the celebration of a sexist dimension of 
maleness, and supported sexual revolution in order to unhinge oppressive moral pillars interior-
ized in every class:  
 
Vous qui voulez la révolution, vous avez voulu nous imposer votre répression. […] Vous, 
adorateurs du prolétariat, avez encouragé de toutes vos forces le maintien de l’image virile 
de l’ouvrier, vous avez dit que la révolution serait le fait d’un prolétariat mâle et bourru, a ̀ 
grosse voix, baraque ́ et roulant des épaules. […] Nous sommes avec les femmes le tapis mo-
ral sur lequel vous essuyez votre conscience25. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “The repressive society and the dominant morality consider only heterosexuality as normal - and only 
‘genital’ heterosexuality at that. Society enforces ad educastration on children designed to repress those 
congenital sexual tendencies that are deemed ‘perverse’. […] the objective of educastration is the trans-
formation of the infant, in tendency polymorphous and ‘perverse’, into a heterosexual adult, erotically 
mutilated but conforming to the Norm.” (Mieli 1980, 24). 
24 “Mieli’s understanding of transsexualism is significantly detached from the mainstream meaning at-
tached to this concept; Mieli himself explains his epistemological choice, rejecting the idea of transsexu-
als as adults whose gender identity is different from the identity defined on the ground of their biological 
sexual organs: “I shall use the term trans-sexuality throughout this book to refer to the infantile poly-
morphous and ‘undifferentiated’ erotic disposition, which society suppresses and which, in adult life, 
every human being carries within him either in a latent state or else confined in the depths of the uncon-
scious under the yoke of repression. ‘Trans-sexuality’ seems to me the best word for expressing, at one 
and at the same time, both the plurality of the erotic tendencies and the original and deep hermaphrodit-
ism of every individual”. (Mieli 1980, 25-26) 
25 Fhar (1972, 1) available at www://inventin.lautre.net/lives/FHAR.pdf 
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As it emerges from the quoted passage, FHAR stood out for its audacity, often addressing issues 
considered immoral by the radical Left, among which I recall the question of adolescents’ sexu-
ality. 
The abolition of any legal age of consent became one of the key-issues and FHAR depicted the 
distinction between incompetent minors and adults as discriminatory, oppressive and instru-
mental (FHAR 1972, 1-2). It was discriminatory because it produced an unjust difference, by 
assuming that boys and girls aged under a strict limit did not feel sexual desire. It was, thus, op-
pressive since in denying minors’ sexuality, the majoritarian culture shamed precocious ones, 
making them feel guilty and predisposing them to passively obey moral, economic and political 
authority. Such a distinction also appeared as instrumental, given that it formed two distinct 
asymmetrical classes: adults, who in fact were entitled to freely seek for sexual pleasure, though 
not with minors, whereas those under the age of consent were presented both as desirable and 
desiring subjects 26 (Ibidem) . The overthrow of sexual classism preluded for the fulfilment of a 
libertarian and egalitarian utopia. FHAR also claimed the positive value of consensual relation-
ships between adults and minors, thus allowing the assimilation between homosexuality, peder-
asty and paedophilia on the part of public opinion (Gunther 2009, 47-53). 
Within this multifaceted frame, libertarian trends conceived the law as inherently oppressive 
and unfair, adducing reasons that I would ascribe to two main reasoning-lines: the first is perti-
nent to the nature of the juridical system and to the relation between morals and law-making, 
whilst the second entails the embracing of the general utopian project.  
National movements read homosexual liberation from an anti-establishment standpoint, and 
they considered the control of sexuality as a dispositive to mould acquiescent citizens to a cer-
tain political and economic status quo. Law was hence defined and described from a conflictual 
perspective, and it was considered the vehicle through which dominant classes imposed, per-
petuated and depicted as natural a material and moral order, optimal for the maintaining of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This issue raised doubts within the FHAR itself, mostly because it endorsed the traditional image of 
homosexuals as predators of young boys, and internal divisions arose early on. Whereas moderates 
asked for more pragmatism and for the adoption of anti-discriminatory tactics, the early militants still 
gave more relevance to the theorization of a coherent libertarian project, rather than to a rapid normali-
zation of gay and lesbians: “The homosexual movement can content itself with asking for the end of dis-
crimination against homosexuals or it can go further by calling into question laws that restrict any sexual 
act, gay or straight, for individuals under fifteen years of age. Homosexuals who are looking for a rapid 
integration into society are especially averse to the question of pederasty, which is too troublesome in 
their eyes. But if we think about it, the question of pederasty and of childhood sexuality is today the core 
of sexual liberation, including homosexual liberation” (Bach-Ignasse, quoted in Gunther 2009, 58). 
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society where the elites detained power and authority, in the broadest sense of term (D’Emilio 
1983). 
Liberation, therefore, could not pass through legal norms, not even through a pervasive and 
radical reform, because its grounds were against libertarian and egalitarian stances. 
For libertarians, the foundations of any Western juridical system conveyed sexist and homo-
phobic values, functional to reproduce, to pretend the naturalness and the neutrality of social 
practices deriving from a/the heterosexual norm, and to label any difference as deviant.  
Family and labour law effectively favoured asymmetric gender roles, appointing males as head 
of the household, endorsing male payed-work and justifying the cultural model of a deferent 
and prolific housewife, whilst criminal law prosecuted prostitution and all so-called sexual per-
verts. In the 1960s law didn't follow social reality but, instead, men and women had to adapt to 
its strict models; the desire to start a traditional and nuclear family was central to the public 
recognition of valuability and heterosexuality lied at the very heart of the enjoyment of citizen-
ship rights. 
As previously mentioned, juridical reforms remained in second place in the theoretical and stra-
tegic liberationist plans, and they were integrated in a far broader frame of intents. 
Between 1969 and the first half of the 1970s, gay activists supported the building of a collective 
autonomous identity; they encouraged expressive practices of self-determination27, imagination, 
and experimentation of alternative ways of defining and living sexuality, sociality and public visi-
bility. In such a radical environment, the gay movement celebrated the ‘coming out’ practice, 
through which the individual proudly claimed both his diversity to the whole society and estab-
lished a bound of solidarity with other gay men. At that time most claims that now typify pro-
grammatic lgbt agenda were simply unacceptable: marriage and the army opposed utopia and 
the exclusion of gay and lesbians from these institutions was not perceived as problematic28. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The refusal of labels definingheterosexual society is plainly expressed in an American pamphlet from 
the early 1970s: “liberation for gay people is defining for ourselves how and with whom we live, instead 
of measuring our relationship in comparison to straight ones, with straight values” Wittman (1970). 
28 On this point I recall once again Wittman: “Marriage is a prime example of a straight institution 
fraught with role playing. Traditional marriage is a rotten, oppressive institution. Those of us who have 
been in heterosexual marriages too often have blamed our gayness on the breakup of the marriage. No. 
They broke up because marriage is a contract which smothers both people, denies needs, and places 
impossible demands on both people. And we had the strength, again, to refuse to capitulate to the roles 
which were demanded of us. Gay people must stop gauging their self-respect by how well they mimic 
straight marriages. Gay marriages will have the same problems as straight ones except in burlesque. For 
the usual legitimacy and pressures which keep straight marriages together are absent, e.g., kids, what par-
ents think, what neighbors say. To accept that happiness comes through finding a groovy spouse and set-
tling down, showing the world that ‘we’re just the same as you’ is avoiding the real issues, and is an ex-
pression of self-hatred. […]” Wittman (1970,1-2). 
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Libertarian stances refused to significantly engage with the law and, accordingly, structured their 
claims following the logic of utopian paradigms. The analysis of statutes, programs and newspa-
pers written by the gay community in that period highlights a number of internationally shared 
issues,: the already mentioned refusal of capitalism, the quest for a liberated sexuality and the 
absolute rejection of whatsoever reformist perspective. I recall, for instance, the Italian 
FUORI!29 and the British manifesto of Gay Liberation Front, where the utopian flavor is ex-
tremely accentuated: “Siamo usciti fuori ma ad una condizione fondamentale, autenticamente 
rivoluzionaria: siamo usciti con la pretesa di essere noi stessi, con la volontà di ritrovare la no-
stra vitale identità i strutture in cui l’ALTRO ha assorbito, modificato, reificato qualsiasi possibi-
lità espressiva del SE” wrote FUORI! in the very first issue of its newspaper, then explicating the 
joyful and spontaneous nature of gay liberation: “La rivoluzione è GIOIA e le è nel momento 
stesso in cui, superate tutte le barriere di una condizione non vitale diventa LIBERAZIONE” 
(FUORI 1972, 1). Similar stances can be also traced in GLF Manifesto: “ [gay liberation] means 
a revolutionary change in our whole society […] a NEW-LIBERATED LIFE-STYLE which 
will anticipate, as far as possible, the free society of the future” (GLF Manifesto, 1971). Rights 
talk, where present, acquired a negative meaning: the malcontent against moderate stances left 
no room for a theoretical compromise. British GLF labelled juridical reforms as the product of 
patriarchy and sexism, further arguing that “reforms may make things better for a while, changes 
in the law can make straight people a little less hostile, a little more tolerant but reform cannot 
change the deep down attitude of straight people that homosexuality is at best inferior to their 
own way of life, at worst a sickening perversion” (Ibidem). Also US GLF affirmed similar stanc-
es, and even in Italy and France, where criminal prosecution against gay men wasn’t as strongly 
enforced as in the USA and UK, the logic of rights generally appeared unsuitable. “Omosessu-
alità è immaginazione” read a typical Italian slogan of that time and FUORI! Committee vi-
brantly proclaimed “Ciò che a noi preme è il sovvertimento del sistema capitalistico, per la no-
stra liberazione, nel contesto della reale emancipazione del genere umano. […] Noi non lottia-
mo per essere accettati in questa società ma per la società in cui non si porrà più il problema di 
accettazione”. Therefore, public claims were not backed up by a legally based logic but they re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 FUORI! is an acronym for Fronte Unitario Omosessuale Rivoluzionario Italiano; it rose from the ex-
perience of previous gay groups organized in Italian cities, such as Milan, Turin, Padua, and Rome. 
Even though heterogeneity, internal conflicts, and harsh debates badly affected the overall organization 
of FUORI!, at least until 1979 it promoted a libertarian perspective, also by means of a popular journal, 
named after the FUORI! itself, which had significant success. In the early 1980s, the urgency for a na-
tional dimension became more visible, and many activists called for the end of internal divisions, forcing 
the leaders of this association forward to declare, at the 1982 annual Congress, the dissolution of 
FUORI!. For a detailed account see Rossi Barilli, (1999, 32 and fol.). 
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lied on political grounds. Lgbt activists dreamt of a society refusing the individualistic concep-
tion of the correct human rights theory: community, liberty, fluidity, absence of constrictions, 
and devotion to relational dimensions constituted the cornerstones of radical frame. 
Justice and injustice were the poles of the libertarian debate and the socio-anthropological Uni-
versalist paradigm affected every claim: everyone was entitled not to what she was morally legit-
imated to claim as her own right, but to what was just for every human being. The issue at stake 
did not limit the pursual of benefits for lgbt community and to struggle over their discrimina-
tion, but it embraced a complex reflection on the principles that should govern human rela-
tions, and on the methods dismantling the existing political and economic institutions  
The criticism of subjective rights30 recalled the famous Marxist critique of human rights31. The 
bond among capitalism, ideology of oppression, and heteronormativity seemed unavoidable 
and, as Mieli explains, rights would represent a functional instrument in reproducing such sys-
tem and, ultimately, to marginalize homosexuals: “the freedom that is guaranteed homosexuals 
by the law is reducible to the freedom to be excluded, oppressed and exploited, to be the object 
of moral and often physical violence, and to be isolated in a ghetto that is generally dangerous 
and […] squalid” (Mieli 1980, 100-101). On this issue, the Italian writer Saba Sardi, recalled, by 
Mieli himself, noted “late capitalist society, while it may extend to homosexuality the legal sanc-
tion of tolerance, still imposes on homosexuals a mark of infamy” (quoted in Mieli, ibidem) 
and Mieli further added: 
 
the protection of homosexuals, the permissive morality, tolerance and political emancipa-
tion all go together, within certain limits, in the countries f capitalist domination, all these 
aspects proving in substance functional to the program of commercialization and exploita-
tion of homosexuality on the part of capitalist enterprise. The commercialization of the 
ghetto pays well, […]. Capital is working for a repressive desublimation of homosexuality. 
(Mieli 1980, 105) 
 
Activists of UK GLF drew a line between capitalism and patriarchal family, asserting that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 I specifically refer to subjective rights because gay radical criticism not only targeted human rights but 
the concept of rights itself as a legal, legitimate, and enforceable pretense that the individual can advance 
to the society. 
31 Karl Marx dismissed rights declared in the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and in the 
Universal Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 as “nothing but the rights of a member of 
civil society, i.e. the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community” 
(Marx 2012, 162). 
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Sexism is not just an accident, it is an essential part of our society, and cannot be changed 
without the whole society changing with it. In the first place our society is dominated at eve-
ry level by men who have an interest in preserving the status quo; secondly the present sys-
tem of work and production depends on the existence of the patriarchal family. 
 
Gay libertarians preferred the language of liberty to that of rights, because the former allowed 
them to imagine a brand new environment while the latter stuck to an image where property 
and capitalism remained the focal points of economical personal, sexual and political exchang-
es. 
It would however be incorrect to hold that, in the 1970s, libertarian trends entirely monopo-
lized the gay movement; reformist stances continued to exist and to propose a perspective cen-
tred on the prominence of a feasible and pragmatic strategy. 
A few months after the birth of GLF, the GAA- Gay Activist Alliance- was founded in New 
York, with the primary task to “secure basic human rights, dignity and freedom for all gay peo-
ple” (Marotta 1981,71). To that end, GAA supported gay candidates at local elections and pre-
sented several amendments to repeal formal discriminations against gays and lesbians. 
In 1973 Lambda was established, becoming in just a short time the main US network involved 
in litigation relating to sexual orientation; in the following years it patronized gay applications 
free of charge, challenging the effective constitutionality of sodomy laws, denouncing the dis-
charge of gay soldiers32, and asking for public recognition of same-sex unions33 (Andersen 2004) 
The combined effect of legal efforts and cultural provocations, combined with the spreading of 
a more tolerant sexual morality led to relevant changes, in several realms of public life; during 
the 1970s several US States repealed sodomy laws, in 1974 the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, deleted egosyntonic homosexuality from the list of mental pathologies (Lingiardi, 2011, 
59) and in 1975 gays and lesbians were allowed to enter the civil service. Metropolitan cities of 
Boston, Detroit, Huston, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Washington introduced anti-
discriminatory statutes: openly gay politicians, such as Harvey Milk, joined municipal councils, 
occupying public positions also in France and in the UK (Engel 2000; Gunther 2009). In Italy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Matlovich v. Secretary of State, 1974 
33 Jack Baker and Mike McConnell were the first gay couple to claim the right to marry under Minnesota 
laws. In 1970, indeed, they were prevented from fulfilling the bureaucracy requirements to obtain the 
wedding license and, consequently, brought their case to the Courts, without success. In a few years the 
number of couples that asked Lambda to patronize their claim increased, even though until the mid 
1990s public recognition of same-sex couples did not emerge as a priority issue (Andersen 2004). 
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thanks to the pressures of local associations, national and territorial agreements increased the 
interaction between the gay movement and political institutions, even though with poor results. 
(Barilli 1999, 85 and fol.).  
In the middle of the1970s, however, the burst of libertarian trends began to diminish. 
The strain of libertarian utopia34, the weakening of radical youth movements, and the appear-
ance of a new politically heterogeneous generation of activists compromised libertarian cohe-
sion, to the benefit of reformist impulses. 
As Altman recalls, despite the radicalism of GLF and FHAR, the 1970s produced a gay male 
who was “non-apologetic about his sexuality, self-assertive, highly consumerist and not at all 
revolutionary, though prepared to demonstrate for gay rights” (Altman 1988, 52). 
Militants increasingly called for the improvement of their actual living conditions through the 
gradual reform of existing institutions, and radical yearnings consistently drained away. 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Such strain is well captured by a French FHAR militant, describing the valorization of monogamous 
models by younger activists: “transgressing the social order every day is exhausting. The homosexual 
couple will continue to recreate a second species of normality […]. They are responding to the desire to 
enter into the ranks to participate like the others in the social order” (Gunther 2009, 55). 
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1.4 Reformist Trends: from Libertarian Discourses to Rights Talk 
 
In the second half of the 1970s reformist stances strengthened in all Western Countries, favour-
ing the establishment of fruitful relationships with political institutions. 
In the USA, after the collapse of GLF and GAA, the National Gay and Lesbian Network was 
created in order to directly lobby with the members of the Congress; in France the Comiteé 
d’urgence d’anti-repression homosexuelle, CUARH, silenced its libertarian minority in order to 
open a constructive dialogue with the Socialist Party towards the complete repeal of 1942 legis-
lation35, which fixed the age of consent for same-sex acts at 21 years old and at 15 for heterosex-
uals. Finally, on the basis of the FUORI! alliance with the Radical Party at national elections of 
1977, in 1983 the Italian new-born Arcigay indicated the strengthening of the bonds with politi-
cal national, local, and regional institutions as the crucial point of its strategy (Rossi Barilli 1999, 
80 and fol.). Not only the tactics but also the organizational structure changed, and a more 
branched, professionalized reality substituted previous unstable collectives. 
The bureaucratization of the overall movement, the professionalization of internal hierarchies, 
and a distinct process of juridification36 marked the gay movement in this period. 
Furthermore, from the end of the 1970s onwards the growth of reformist trends favoured the 
internationalization of the gay movement, to such an extent that national leaders opened suc-
cessful discussions with many world-leading political organizations (Trappolin 2004). 
The actual asset of the lgbt movement was affected by these dynamics, and still nowadays re-
formist perspective mainstreams the theoretical and methodological agenda of Western lgbt 
groups. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The equalization of the age of consent was finally achieved in 1982, in accordance with a perspective 
that did not actually challenge the existence of a legal age of consent, but only its discriminatory en-
forcement. As Gunther notes, supporters of the reform advocated the universalist values of secularism 
and liberalism, while relegating the value of difference, so celebrated in radical trends, to the back-
ground; specifically deputy Gisèle Halimi defended the reform with a “classic example of republican-
ism”, arguing “sexual morality must be considered as having the same characteristics as religious morality 
or a-religious morality: it must be seen as arising from personal choice and individual conscience”. 
(Halimi quoted in Gunther 2009, 64). 
36 I adopt the term juridification here meaning the existence of an increasing ‘legal framing’, namely the 
tendency to understand self, the others, and the relationship between self and others, in light of legal or-
der; the main consequence of such a standpoint is to foster the consistent reference to law. In so much 
as individuals mainly perceiving themselves as legal persons and attaching social relevance to law, they 
will also increasingly define themselves as belonging to a community of legal subjects, with equal legal 
rights and duties. Therefore, if law consistently shapes the structures of understanding, individuals will 
be more likely to recur to law in disputes’ resolution. For a review of different positions see Blichner and 
Molander (2004). For an introduction of different dimensions of juridification see Felstiner, Abel and 
Sarat (1981); Habermas (1987); Stone Sweet (2002). 
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The pragmatic approach and, most importantly, the idea that the subversion of the bourgeois 
State was neither necessary nor desirable affected the attitude towards the law. 
Law was valued as a strategic instrument, whereby advancing lgbt interests and obtaining enti-
tlement to equal dignity and rights. 
Activists did in fact strongly advocate for judicial activism and strategic litigation, also promoting 
inclusive values, feasible with existing liberal systems. 
Strategic litigation placed emphasis on judicial activism, whether direct or indirect, and it re-
quired the careful selection of the cases which were likely to achieve reforms which would oth-
erwise have been very hard to obtain. The most famous example of strategic litigation is the US 
case Brown v Board of Education, which laid the foundations to dismantle the “separate but 
equal” doctrine; this strategy has been widely adopted by almost all social and political move-
ments appeared in the second half of XX century37. 
Even though I extensively explore the concept of judicial creativity in chapter II, I find it useful 
to flesh out here a general depiction of this phenomenon. 
Thirlway38 offers a general, still accurate, definition of judicial activism, distinguishing between 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ activism. The former occurs when “the judge deals with legal issues […] 
other than those which could suffice to constitute the logical structure leading up to his ruling.” 
(Thirlway 2002, 75). The latter, on the contrary “being unsatisfied with existing law, or with 
what [appears] as lacunae in the existing law” judges “will be ready to indulge in something close 
to open law-creation in order to base his decision” (Ivi, 76).  
Change would, thus, pass through the combination of formal and informal paths, and lgbt activ-
ists devoted much effort to stimulating judges on both aspects. 
The theoretical and epistemological frame where these strategies developed is that of human 
rights’ language. 
The overall gay movement went through a process of juridification, which nourished the incli-
nation to resort to the Courts and, at the same time, it fostered the tendency to ascribe social 
inequalities to a discrepancy between legal rights and legitimated claims inscribed in the natural 
law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37Literature about strategic litigation is extremely vast; roughly, it can be separated into authors that ana-
lyze the impact of judgments and authors that trace the activation of law within specific movements. In 
the former category see Scheingold (1975); Merry Engle (1990); Rosenberg (2008); Anagnostou (2014); 
in the latter, for an introduction, see Andersen (2004); McCann (1994). 
38 See Thirlway (2002); Zarbiyev (2012). 
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In a place of liberation, reformist trends preferred the concept of non-discrimination; the ulti-
mate goal of creating a society free from every constraint was replaced by the achievement of 
full equality and dignity, formal and substantial, to all lgbt citizens. 
I would further the analysis by recalling Glendon’s sharp analysis (Glendon 1991). She estab-
lishes a link between the legalization of popular culture, the reference to values expressed in le-
gal texts, and the quest for legitimacy from those who adopt similar talk (Ivi, 3). Social, cultural, 
religious and moral heterogeneity, combined with diffuse disagreement over traditional precepts 
would encourage to “look at law as an expression and carrier of the few values that are widely 
shared in our society: liberty, equality, and the ideal of justice under law” (Ibidem). Moreover, 
when addressing a fragmented public opinion, or when trying to build an international cohesive 
platform, the adoption of a universally legitimate code of meanings or values offers undoubted 
advantages.  
Hence, given the international dimension of actual/present/current lgbt mobilization, the lan-
guage of human rights provided a shared and powerful resource; human and Constitutional 
rights affirm absolute, but general, norms that can be variously declined and that hold personal 
liberty, autonomy, equality, and justice as the essential moral and juridical cornerstone. 
Rights talk, thus, represents a unique arsenal, whereby proposing a platform of claims suitable 
to be upheld in national and international Courts and political arenas, by local lgbt groups.  
The increasing legalization of lgbt discourse has to be contextualized within the general process 
of multiplication and universalization of human rights described by Bobbio39; nevertheless, it 
raises another important question, concerning the typology of rights called in.  
At the origin lies the logic of subjective rights which supported the demand for a public with-
drawal from private sphere; over time, however, the lgbt movement began to demand an active 
institutional role, both in implementing anti-discriminatory policies and in recognizing same-sex 
couples. The preamble of GAA Constitution of 1969, for instance, resembles the language of 
human rights, stating that homosexuals “demand the freedom of expression of our dignity and 
value as human beings”, further claiming the specific “right to our own feelings”, “the right to 
love”, “the right to our own bodies” and “the right to be persons” (GAA, 1969).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Bobbio conceives the affirmation of human rights as marked by a number of progressive steps: the 
constitutionalization of rights, that is their expression in a positive legal form; the extension of such 
rights, both as far as the subjects covered and the human rights afforded are concerned; the explicit uni-
versalization of these rights, as envisaged in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; finally, the 
process of specifying rights declines them in relation to the specific demands for protection, as in the 
case of women’s rights, children’s rights, sick and disabled’s rights. See Bobbio (1995). 
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More recently, US NLGTF and British Stonewall have patronized several applications concern-
ing the recognition of same-sex marriage and, thus, the entitlement to social rights arising from 
civil unions and marriage (Stonewall and NLGTF, 2015).  
As it can be deduced, rights talk entails civil, political and social demands; the lgbt movement 
tackles civil issues, like the recognition of egalitarian marriage, it supports the right not to be de-
prived of political liberties because of sexual orientation, it demands to recognizing lgbt individ-
uals, couples, and citizens, as being entitled to all social measures publicly provided to other cit-
izens. 
The ongoing reference to fundamental rights testifies the prominence of a morally-based legal 
language, in that human rights as well as natural rights are ultimately grounded on value-
oriented arguments. Both clusters do in fact rely on theories of the entrenched and specific 
moral qualities of human beings, by virtue of rights which are equally held by everyone, regard-
less from their incorporation in legal systems (Smith 2002, 46).  
Ilga-Europe, the International Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender and Gay Association, for in-
stance, grounds its policies on the idea that dignity, freedom, and the full enjoyment of human 
rights should be granted to everyone (Ilga-Europe 2015); also the preamble of Yogyakarta Prin-
ciples, discussed below, recalls the promise of “a different future where all people born free and 
equal in dignity and rights can fulfil that precious birth right” (Yogyakarta Principles, 2006).  
The constitution of Ilga-World provides even starker evidence: along with the aim of “working 
for the equality of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, trans people and intersex people and liberation 
from all forms of discrimination” it mentions the necessity “to promote the universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the elimination of all 
forms of discrimination” (Ilga-World, 2014). The intertwined bond between non-
discrimination, human, and lgbt rights is clearly built on the very Universalist, egalitarian para-
digm that, at least formally, should guide human rights law. 
It could be questioned why the law should treat heterosexuals and homosexuals as equals; yet, 
the concept of ‘equality’ recurs throughout all mentioned documents without being further justi-
fied. 
Indeed, the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the introduction of the 
ECHR and the adoption of subsequent international Conventions and Declarations removed 
the urgency to clarify reasons whereby certain human groups should be treated as equals. The 
constitutionalization of human rights has overcome the problem of finding an ultimate philo-
sophical foundation, providing itself a solution and causing a shift of paradigm. If previous de-
bates aimed at assessing whether human rights did exist, and, if so, to whom should they be 
recognized, after the UDHR the pressing questions /have become how to interpret and decline 
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prescribed values and concepts, how to enforce such rights, in order to avoid a Western-centric 
approach, and how to respect cultural specificities40. 
 The Universalist and inclusive wording of human rights documents already provides a suffi-
cient argument to the lgbt movement, who, in fact frame claims as arising from a misguided ap-
plication or interpretation of original norms. 
The activation of law is the main perspective through which gay associations are able to criticize 
existing institutions and, at the same time, it also amounts to the theoretical, epistemological and 
methodological framework in which to funnel collective needs and demands. 
Effectively, legal experts involved in lgbt issues appeal to the core values of Western democra-
cies, such as equality, freedom, and non-discrimination, in order to show that gay and lesbian 
claims are not only compatible, but also essentially necessary to fulfil the core ideals declared in 
Constitutional Charts, and in international human rights declarations and treaties. 
The recognition of full juridical dignity and the achievement of completing equality are the to-
talizing cornerstone of reformist trends, to the detriment of possible stances that, though target-
ing the same results, might request the State to positively evaluate those differences that, regard-
less of their immutability, are fundamental for the construction of self-identity and for the de-
velopment of individual personality. 
Through the constant reference to judicial arena lgbt associations look for public legitimation, 
while at the same time supporting, the legal system itself.  
Political scientists and sociologists highlight that strategic litigation is a form of participation to 
the governance of institutional architecture and, as Zemans argues, it contributes to legitimize 
the existing polity:  
  
Law supplies the weak with adventitious strength […].In other words law confers power. In 
Dahl's (1961) words, the mantle of legality conferred on private citizens provide them with 
power previously unavailable to them. Any new authoritative rule, whether statue, judge-
made common law, or administrative regulation, merely provides opportunities. (Zemans 
1983, 694). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 I recall here Bobbio’s well known argument of the possibility of solving the problem of rights founda-
tions “given that the great majority of governments have officially adopted it, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, it represents a unique demonstration that a value system can be considered to be 
founded on humanity and thus acknowledged by it: the proof is in the general consensus over its validity. 
Advocates of natural law would have spoken of consensus omnium gentium or consensus humani gene-
ris” (Bobbio 1995, 13). 
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Therefore, the eventual willingness of the institutions to enforce lgbt friendly reforms is a source 
of potential opportunities for the gay movement, which will hence be, more likely to act within 
existing political and legal boundaries, and abandon utopian and libertarian stances41.  
Formal and indirect lobbying, international policy-oriented networks and think-tanks, proposals 
of law reform, and complaints filed to territorial, national and international Courts of justice, are 
some of the principal strategies through which reformist activists pursue the lgbt quest for rights 
(Andersen 2004; Johnson 2014). 
The actual juridification of mainstream movement determines also gatekeeping side-effects: in-
deed, the top level might grant more relevance, priority and resources to those claims which can 
be easily expressed in terms or rights and, which as such, have a chance of winning or challeng-
ing the existing legal doctrine. 
Unlike in previous decades, the strong institutionalization undergone by the lgbt movement is 
also reflected in the ways in which strategic litigation are displayed 
 
In [planned public interest lawsuit] model, gay rights organizations try to figure out which 
courts are the most likely to be receptive to their claims, then recruit plaintiffs to challenge 
the laws on the books and file suits. We think, then we act. The whole undertaken is cen-
trally planned in advance of any legal activity. (Kopplemann 2008, 1) 
 
Moreover, I recall Wintemute’s analysis on the risks embedded in the activation the law. He 
did in fact compare strategic litigation with the process of legislative reforms, highlighting bene-
fits and disadvantages of each route: 
 
The ‘political route’ […] involves persuading legislators or governments to change the law, 
by repealing existing discriminatory legislation or by creating new legal protection against 
discrimination […]. The ‘legal route’ involves persuading national and international courts 
and human rights tribunals that a particular instance of sexual orientation discrimination vio-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Critical Legal thinker Robert Gordon labelled reformism as a normalizing process: “The reformer 
usually points to a whole body of ideas or practices that is out of line with the basic structure, but that 
can, with appropriate revisions, be made to fit. This exercise is apologetic because the assumption that 
existing practices are rational and good, or may readily be made so by procedures and options currently 
available to policymakers, tends to exclude consideration of other possibilities, such as that the practices 
are irrational or bad beyond the chance of correction save by fundamental change-in ways of think- ing 
as well as in institutional design. In other words, (to overstate some- what): if the situation cannot be 
‘fixed’, it is not a ‘problem’ for the field at all” (Gordon 1981, 1019). 
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lates existing human rights law, whether statutory, constitutional or international. (Win-
temute 1995, 1-2) 
 
In the ‘political route’ a compromise with conservative trends is almost inevitable and conces-
sions to the majority will increase along with the weakness of the minority, therefore affecting 
the original range of claims put forward. Strategic litigation, on the contrary, doesn’t necessarily 
require mediation, and judgments, when favourable, are generally more adherent to initial goals 
than the reforms that the same minority could have achieved by taking the political route. How-
ever, if pursued in particular homophobic environments, legal route might also lead to side-
effects: political elites could not enforce judgments, whether national or international, and pub-
lic opinion might indicate both judges and lgbt organizations as lobbies that are trying to impose 
a new moral order, resulting in a possible increasing of social and institutional homophobia. 
However, the strategy of gradual reforms allows the lgbt movement to achieve extremely signifi-
cant legal results, helping to conceive a less heterosexist legal and informal culture, becoming 
more respectful towards homosexual people.  
Among the international achievements obtained through Courts, I recall the repeal of the sod-
omy laws, the rejection of bans on gay and lesbian soldiers, the recognition of same-sex couples, 
the acceptance of lgbt adoption and, more generally, the provision of positive policies to en-
force substantial equality42.  
This strategy brought about extremely significant reforms and, despite being based on the anal-
ogy between sexual orientation and other classes already secured by law, it still allowed the ful-
filment of demands arising from the lgbt community and the development of new legal assets 
that deeply affect everyday lives of gays and lesbians. In Western Countries homosexual people 
are not only no longer criminally prosecuted, but also enjoy fundamental, civil and social rights 
and, thus, legitimately claiming protection, services and recognition in an increasing number of 
Countries. The heterogeneity of European legal systems predictably creates parallel schemes of 
protection and, consequently, depending on the Country, homosexuals are recognized to a var-
ying amount of rights; it’s however indisputable that hadn’t lgbt organizations not pushed at na-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 As extensively analyzed in the following chapters, there is a rich international jurisprudence on a plu-
rality of issues concerning sexual orientation. As regards to the ECtHR, I recall Dudgeon v UK, 
22/10/1981 (criminalization of male same-sex), Smith and Grady v UK, 27/12/1999 (ban on homosexual 
troops), Karner v Austria, 24/10/2003 and Kozak v Poland, 02/06/2010 (rights granted to same-sex part-
ners living in a de facto marriage), Schalk and Kopf v Austria, 22/11/2012 (same-sex marriage), Vallian-
atos v Greece, 07/11/2013 (public recognition of same-sex couples), Gas and Dubois v France, 
15/06/2012, Fretté v France, 26/05/2002, E.B. v France, 22/01/2008, X and others v Austria, 
19/02/2013 (single and second-parent adoption). See Hodson (2013); Johnson (2014). 
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tional, European and international level, politicians would have been far more reluctant and 
cautious in amending discriminatory laws or in introducing laws specifically based on lgbt 
claims. 
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1.5 The International Lgbt Movement: Introductive Hints 
 
In order to grasp the paradigms that orient the reformist international lgbt movement I suggest 
focusing on the valuable example of Yogyakarta Principles. In 2006 a conference was held in 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, to explore the legal rights of sexual minorities; activists as well as intel-
lectuals, policy-makers, legal experts, and “influential figures” from multilateral bodies and gov-
ernments took part in the drafting of a list of widely recognized rights that should be awarded to 
sexual minorities. The 29 Yogyakarta Principles, are not binding however and they cannot even 
be qualified as sources of international law; nevertheless, UN institutions tend to refer to these 
principles as a programmatic and quasi-authoritative document concerning the rights of sexual 
minorities (Thoreson 2009, 327.). 
Yogyakarta Principles are worded using the same language as positive international law and they 
rely on positive sources of law, insisting that the abuse against lgbt people is a violation of bind-
ing obligations already signed by the majority of States, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As an observer of the NGO Human 
Rights Watch argues “the aim [of Yogyakarta Principles] was normative, not utopian” (Long 
quoted in Thoreson 2009, 328).  
Moreover, the drafters managed to encompass cultural concerns of the different conceptions of 
family and gender roles, usually put forward by conservative elites. They firstly focused on bodi-
ly harm and basic freedoms, stating that a minimum of protection remained “non-negotiable”. 
As Donnelly notes, drafters “isolate[d] the discrimination that deprives sexual minorities of 
rights that should theoretically exist for everyone - like freedom of association and freedom of 
speech- but are frequently and unjustly revoked on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity” (Donnelly 2003, 226). 
For instance, whilst affirming the right to have a family, Principle 24 recognizes that “families 
exist in diverse forms” and does not indicate marriage or civil partnership as the main order to 
achieve this right, stressing on the contrary that any kind of family or couple relationship should 
not be discriminated against in any aspect of social, political or cultural life.  
Such an arrangement encourages international institutions as well as national authorities to rec-
ognize lgbt claims without implicitly endorsing a state of rights that might appear too western-
ized. Yogyakarta Principles have been translated and also distributed at the grassroots level to 
impact both the institutional level and local activism and, consequently, to mainstream these 
principles in every dimension of human rights initiatives (Thoreson 2009; Sanders 2008).  
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This description sheds light on the theoretical paradigm that orients lgbt groups and associa-
tions: international human rights law provides the “working legal canon” (Heinze 1998, 38) 
which is analysed through a pragmatic approach, so as to promote substantial equality and to 
support legal demands of sexual minorities. 
The most important organization on a worldwide level is ILGA - International Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transsexual Association; it was founded in 1978 on the impulse of European, Ameri-
can and Australian activists, who structured ILGA as an umbrella-organization of associations, 
collectives and realities committed to sexual orientation and gender identity issues. Nowadays it 
contains more than 400 groups from all continents, and it represents an essential socio-political 
actor pushing for including lgbt demands in the international agenda. 
The variety of living conditions, of claims and cultural specificities experienced by lgbt commu-
nities has led to the necessity to establish the ILGA regional sections, retaining consistent au-
tonomy. Such multilevel arrangement allows each section to contrast divergent realities; while, 
for instance, in North America and Europe public attention is focused on the recognition of 
same-sex marriage and of rights connected to homoparentality, ILGA-Africa is far more con-
cerned with criminal laws that read severe sanctions, including death penalty, for alleged gay 
and lesbian people. Such course doesn’t exclude, of course, a valuable internal coordination, 
insomuch as ILGA-Europe and ILGA-North America fund campaigns to sustain lgbt organiza-
tions in Africa and lobby European and UN institutions to firmly condemn prosecutions perpe-
trated. At the European level, ILGA-Europe is qualified both at the Council of Europe and at 
the European Parliament and it benefits from funding from the European Commission, of pri-
vate enterprises, also counting on the support of many prestigious academic departments and 
legal scholars.  
Core strategies and priorities are defined at Strasbourg, but national groups enjoy considerable 
autonomy due to domestic peculiarities. The staff of ILGA-Europe is available to give funds, to 
favor international cooperation and to share expertise with national groups but, at the same 
time, it demands domestic levels to single out the strategies they judge to be the most effective43. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 I attended the 2014 Conference of ILGA- Europe, in Riga, and on that occasion I was able to observe 
that the major efforts of the organization were devoted to developing relations that could then result in 
joint actions, for instance favoring the exchange of knowledge and best practices, and encouraging a 
broad confrontation on different national problems. During one informal occasion, representatives of 
Italian lgbt associations had a meeting with Evelyne Paradise, chief of ILGA- Europe, about the strategy 
to adopt when, few weeks later, PM Renzi would have spoken to the European Commission. Even 
though Paradise and her collaborators gave suggestions, it was up to Italian activists to decide whether to 
picket outside the Commission to denounce the absence of political sensibility towards lgbt issues, or to 
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The European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice are strategic arenas 
where to obtain either the enforcement of already recognized rights or to reach judicial interpre-
tations favourable to gay and lesbian claims. 
The European Agency for Human Rights in collaboration with ILGA- Europe recently ap-
pointed a panel of national legal and social experts to monitor and analyse existing discrimina-
tions, national problematics and the best practices, with the final aim formulating policy pro-
posals to European institutions. The last result44 of this network was the approval of a Resolu-
tion, commonly known by the parliamentary that drafted the text as the Lunacek Resolution, 
which establishes a “EU Roadmap against homophobia and discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation and gender identity” and calls for the active participation of the European 
Commission and multilevel EU institutions to mainstream respect and non-discrimination in all 
fields. although not binding, this Resolution has a strong symbolic and programmatic value and 
it incorporates eight key areas of strategic importance: the securing of lgbt migrants, equal access 
to education, health systems, and social services, protection from hate crimes and speeches, en-
forcement of fundamental rights - i.e. the freedom of assembly and speech and the implementa-
tion of the freedom of movement within the European Union through the guarantee of mutual 
recognition of partnerships and marriages contacted abroad (Lunacek 2014). 
I do not dispute that there’s a long way to go before achieving formal and substantial equality 
but it’s also undeniable that lgbt claims are now a publicly debated issue: discrimination and vio-
lence are broadly condemned, national authorities are called to justify their own conduct and 
prejudices are increasingly brought to question.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
collect demanding, precise, and critical questions that Paradis would have read to Renzi within the insti-
tutional environment of the EU Commission.  
44 Over the last years, the Council of Europe and the European Union have approved a number of rele-
vant resolutions and directives targeted at tackling discrimination against lgbt subjects. Firstly, all States 
wishing to join the Council of Europe must fully decriminalize same-sex acts; the CM/Rec 2010(5) fur-
ther recommends implementing national laws and equal opportunities to dismantle prejudice and dis-
crimination. In 1994 the EU Parliament also upheld the Resolution 28/1994, calling to end all legal and 
administrative discrimination and “to pass legislation providing homosexual access to marriage or an 
equivalent legal framework” and to allow “the adoption of fostering children” (EC 28/1994, § 14). In 
2007 the EU Parliament stated that every 17th May an international day against homophobia and tran-
sphobia should be celebrated. The only binding anti-discriminatory instrument within Eu laws remains, 
however, the directive 78/2000, “establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation”. 
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1.5.1 The Activation of the ECtHR 
 
In this section I will reflect on how to frame the litigation before the ECtHR within the multi-
faceted frame previously outlined. There are some noteworthy elements, which allow us to ap-
preciate the peculiarity of this case study. 
Firstly, right from its establishment onwards, European homosexuals have consistently been fil-
ing complaints to the ECtHR, asking for the repeal of national criminal laws45. The first applica-
tions date back to 1955 and over the following fifteen years the EComHR had to decide on the 
admissibility of 13 applications grounded on sexual orientation. From 1970 to 1975 there is a 
gap, which could be explained by both the outburst of libertarian trends and by a temporary dis-
illusionment in the potential benefits descending from favourable ECtHR judgments. After the 
mid-1970s, however, the number of homosexual applicants started to increase again: over a pe-
riod of 40 years 112 complaints dealing with sexual orientation were submitted, with various 
outcomes to be discussed in chapter IV. Even from such a plain description, it emerges that, 
apart from the already mentioned 1970-1975 period, the recourse to Strasbourg characterizes 
the trajectory of European homosexual militants from the early beginning.  
Between 1955 and 1970 the overwhelming majority of applicants were German or Austrian and 
lived under a criminal law that sanctioned same-sex acts; in Germany the Constitutional Court 
had indeed declared paragraph 175 compatible with a democratic regime, thus legitimating the 
prosecution of gay men, even of those already imprisoned by Nazis (Moeller 1984). 
In a context where the gay movement was neither as developed nor as organized as it is today, 
those who filed applications and engaged in such a complex procedural machinery, must surely 
have had not only strong personal motivations but also social, economic and personal re-
sources. I would read this data as suggesting that although homophile movements nationally re-
sorted to mild strategies, individuals no longer had to suffer discrimination and oppression in 
silence. I do not dispute that, all applicants were probably involved in homophile associations to 
some extent, but I highlight that in none of these applications a direct and consistent involve-
ment of a structured movements emerges.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 As carefully analyzed in chapter III, the ECtHR is not entitled to repeal national legislation, nor to 
amend it; however, if the Court judges specific provisions in breach of the ECHR, a binding mechanism 
might impose heavy fines and might also provide the ultimate possibility to throw non-compliant States 
out of the Council of Europe. This has remained to now a mere abstract possibility, and the enforce-
ment of ECtHR judgments has generally reached high rates (White and Boussiakou 2009; Anagnostou 
2014). 
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Secondly, this evidence testifies that despite the fact that the activation of law is commonly 
thought to descend from US legal strategies, strategic litigation also has autonomous roots in 
Western Europe: the recourse to the ECtHR marks an autonomous dynamic, triggered by both 
the desperation of single men who had to face long sentences of conviction and by the faith 
placed in the universal, neutral and inclusive wording adopted by the ECHR. 
After 1975 a two-step change occurred: firstly, national and, then, international lgbt movements 
began to directly achieve fundamental results thanks to ECtHR judgments. Mr. Dudgeon, Mr. 
Morris, and Mr. Modinos, who respectively challenged UK, Irish and Cypriot criminal laws 
against same-sex acts, were all leaders of national gay liberation groups and they lodged com-
plaints with the precise strategy to push politicians to repeal hostile legal provisions (Johnson 
2014).  
From the early 1990’s onwards, international organizations, such as ILGA-Europe and the Brit-
ish Stonewall, resorted to directly engaging in strategic litigation, through manifold actions 
thanks to their growing resources.  
Lawyers patronizing UK soldiers discharged from the army because of their sexual orientation 
were affiliated to Stonewall, and the same NGO had ensured its support to the applicants be-
fore applications were filed46. Nowadays, thanks to vast webs of networking, ILGA-Europe is 
able to select cases with higher chances of promoting change in ECtHR jurisprudence or, at 
least, to open a public discussion; strategic litigation is thus considered about “using European 
courts to advance the rights of lgbti people, […] as part of a wider advocacy campaign, [in order] 
to ensure full recognition and implementation of human rights for everyone” (ILGA-Europe 
2015). It’s not infrequent that even the ECtHR admits lgbt associations as third parties or as 
amicus curiae, therefore positively legitimizing the role of the lgbt movement within communi-
tarian judicial institutions. 
As it can easily be imagined, claims brought forward entail the reform of the existing legal sys-
tem and, as such, they can be labelled as reformist. By this I do not uphold that they are mod-
erate or mild in content; on the contrary, in the 1950s claiming in trial the right to freely engage 
in homosexual acts was quite radical and still nowadays there are applications, especially regard-
ing gender identity, that promote extremely innovative interpretations of the ECHR. 
As extensively analysed in chapter III, applications have to pass a preliminary judgment and if 
they fall out of the Court’s legislation, they are dismissed. It logically follows that the very institu-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For a description of Stonewall involvement in other ECtHR applications concerning sexual orientation 
see the official website of the organization: www.stonewall.org 
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tional asset of the ECtHR casts off any libertarian pretence, for it would not appear compatible 
with ECHR wording, and encourages a reformist perspective. If this observation is quite pre-
dictable, it’s worth stressing that the pronounced tendency to resort to judiciary strengthens the 
expression of lgbt claims according to a legal and theoretical frame compatible with that of the 
ECHR and with the legal culture of ECtHR judges. 
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1.6 Queer Trends 
 
Historical and theoretical origins of queer trends go back to the Aids epidemic and they uncov-
er long-term tensions, hidden within the gay movement since its foundations. As Engel recalls, 
indeed: 
 
AIDS brought into question the underlying point of gay liberation: was gay liberation about 
the right to have sex? Was gay liberation only about sex? In some sense, AIDS helped to 
bring back to the surface the same questions that impelled a lesbian-separatist movement to 
form in the 1970s. (Engel 2000, 52) 
 
The Aids epidemic, the political indifference to health claims, at least until the illness seemed to 
be confined to gay people, and the general de-sexualization47 promoted by reformist organiza-
tions, pushed intellectuals and activists ‘at margins’ to reappraise libertarian claims and strate-
gies. These new radical trends named themselves as queer48, claiming their difference to the so-
ciety, embracing it, and positively evaluating all caricature traits generally attached to gays and 
lesbians, then rejecting the label of public respectable homosexuals. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 In response to the Aids epidemic, the mainstream movement promoted monogamous relationships, 
discharged the idea of sexual freedom as inherent to gay liberation, and developed new, less sexualized, 
discursive practices. Such dynamics have been widely criticized and I find specifically challenging the ar-
gument put forward by Stychin, according to whom the process of the de-sexualization of the entire 
movement would have been functional to grant gays and lesbians access to citizenship rights. By analyz-
ing reforms approved in the UK to contrast HIV, and by drawing similar conclusions on the French de-
bate about the introduction of Pacs, he stressed the urgency to pay “attention to what the reform-minded 
had to say” (Stychin 2003, 26). He also reached a provocative, though quite catchy conclusion: “for the 
reformers, homosexuality should not be (but then it cannot be) promoted. It is a condition that demands 
toleration and it can’t be dangerous because it’s not contagious. But it’s also non-threatening because it 
can be, and it needs to be, channeled into relationships that are about romantic love; part of a process of 
normalization [of] banalized respectability” (Ivi, 36).  
48 Feminist Teresa de Lauretis firstly adopted the term ‘queer’ in the 1990 Conference “Queer Theory: 
Gay and Lesbian Sexualities”, to denote an approach to sexuality and sexual orientation in opposition to 
the reformist pursued by Gay and Lesbian Studies. In the same year grassroots activists also resorted to 
this concept, and New York radicals founded Queer Nation, a group aimed at directly tackling homo-
phobia and at promoting the visibility of marginalized sexual minorities, by means of provocative actions 
and strategies defined ‘into your face’. Even though short-lived, Queer Nation renovated and upset 
mainstream movement, affecting popular culture and effectively conveying more consciousness about 
the Aids epidemic.  
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Queerness became a source of pride and the key to affirming specific identities, which by refus-
ing the notion of sameness also exalted the difference arising from the experience of a minority, 
who had been traditionally oppressed and marginalized49. 
According to the queer perspective, not only is the ideal of sameness undesirable, since it si-
lences the highest criticism targeted at society and at its political and economic structures, but 
neither is it feasible, in that sexual orientation affects one’s experience of life and shapes differ-
ent relational paths for heterosexuals and homosexuals. 
Post-modernism and post-structuralism lay at the core of queer theories, supporting a multifac-
eted perspective, through which analysing inequalities and challenging the idea that the needs of 
gays and lesbians can be univocally defined. 
The targets of queer criticism, born in the USA and soon spreading to other Countries, are the 
deconstruction of the ideal subject entitled to rights; the refusal of the immutable conception of 
gender identity; the rejection of massive preventive health measures, judged as oppressive and 
marginalizing instruments; the denial of binary dichotomy heterosexuality/heterosexuality; and 
the theorization of multiple relational and subjective identities (Bernini 2013). 
The refusal of an innatist and inherent understanding of homosexuality is prominent; sexual 
desire would be fluid, unfixed, not specifically defined by nature, and the labelling of homosex-
uality would be functional to delimit the borders of the heterosexual majority, and to stigmatize 
those who do not fit under the normative ideal of family and human being.  
Inspiring queer authors are Foucault and Deleuze, as far as the philosophical relation among 
sexual desire, political power and marginality is concerned; Hocquenghem, who combined a 
fervid theoretical reflection with participant activism; Lacan and Derrida, due to the political 
declination of their psychoanalytical and philosophical theories; and Freud, certainly reap-
praised in an extreme original way by Foucault and Butler. 
Queer theories offer a peculiar theoretical, epistemological, methodological, and political rich-
ness which is hard to fully capture. Broadly, they could be defined according to three trends: a 
freudo-marxist trend, grounded on the reinterpretation of Marxist theory and Freudian psycho-
analysis, by authors such as Mieli; a constructivist queer trend, mostly shaped by Foucault’s and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 I recall Valdes’ compelling definition of what queer could mean: “queer serves as a reminder and a 
challenge to avoid replicating oppressive aspects of the past and present that we seek to discredit and 
displace with our critics. This term challenges us to honor the inclusiveness and egalitarism that the 
term, at its best, signifies. In doing so this term specifically challenges to avoid indulging and perpetuat-
ing the androsexism ad racism that afflict sexual minorities as music as they afflict the sexual majority” 
(Valdes 1995, 349). 
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Butler’s reflections on sexuality and power; lastly, anti-social trends, marked by a sharp radical-
ness of the arguments and by a distinct epistemological provocation (Bernini 2013, 25-48).  
The absence of structured bureaucracy and the refusal of pragmatic strategies are common to 
these streams; quite often indeed queer theories are accused, also within the lgbt environment, 
of lacking political pragmatism and feasibility50.  
Generally speaking, queer academic theorists and activists strongly contest the image of lgbt mi-
nority devoted to assimilationist strategies, they challenge the current socio-economic life-style, 
and judge constraining to overlap the whole lgbt platform with the claim of public/legal recogni-
tion. 
Besides refusing the dichotomy heterosexual/homosexual, queer theories strongly recall the in-
tersectional dimension of discrimination, aiming at giving a voice to marginalizes subjectivities - 
such as transgenders, sex workers, migrants, homosexuals, bisexuals - at gathering the several 
forms of oppression, and at structuring a coalition with gender, racial, class minorities, and with 
all those who do not correspond to the actual normative socio-economic model51. 
From a queer perspective, battles for legal and social inclusion are paths of assimilation towards 
a normative, bourgeois model which would impoverish libertarian stances of the early gay liber-
ation movement and, secondly, which would normalize the homosexual community in prede-
fined labels; finally, this strategy would marginalize those who refuse, or can’t meet such stand-
ards. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  Being questioned about the apparent lack of pragmatic stances in libertarian gay trends, Michel 
Foucault argued “one of the great experiences we've had since the last war is that all those social and po-
litical programs have been a great failure. We have come to realize that things never happen as we ex-
pect from a political program, and that a political program has always, or nearly always, led to abuse or 
political domination from a bloc-be it from technicians or bureaucrats or other people. […] But in my 
opinion, being without a program can be very useful and very original and creative, if it does not mean 
without proper reflection about what is going on, or without very careful attention to what's possible. […]. 
One of the things that I think should be preserved, however, is the fact that there has been political in-
novation, political creation, and political experimentation outside the great political parties, and outside 
the normal or ordinary program.” Foucault (1982, 172-173). 
51 On this point Valdes emphasizes the intersectionality that should characterize a correct queer legal 
theory: “Queer legal theory can be positioned as a race-inclusive enterprise, a class- inclusive enterprise, 
a sex-inclusive enterprise, and a gender-inclusive enterprise, as well as a sexual orientation-inclusive en-
terprise […].Thus, Queer legal theory, perhaps even more so than Queer consciousness and Queer ac-
tivism to date, must convey a sense of political resolution that this Project seeks to invoke: reflecting the 
gains and challenges of sexual minorities since the Stonewall Riots, Queer legal theory must connote an 
activist and egalitarian sense of resistance to all forms of subordination, and it also must denote a sense 
of unfinished purpose and mission.” Valdes (1995, 354).  
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The portrayal of queer activists as being solely utopian, hostile to any legal improvement for the 
lgbt community, and fully devoted to disruptive social criticism is, however, simplistic and inac-
curate.  
Indeed, authors such as Butler, Valdes, Stychin, and Moran consider it appropriate and fair to 
claim a legal frame respectful of gay, lesbians and transgenders but, nevertheless, they deny that 
homosexual liberation can be entirely channelled in the process of legal emancipation. 
Existing legal institutions would stand upon a political-philosophical neoliberalism and a 
homonormative understanding of society.  
Paraphrasing Us sociologist Lisa Duggan52, a gay reformist public speech would lack consistent 
democratic public culture, while favouring exacerbate individualism: rights talk would represent 
a “kind of political sedative - we get marriage and the military then we go home and cook din-
ner, forever” (Duggan 2002, 185). Duggan was the first academic53 to adopt the concept of 
‘homonormativity’ to underline the most contested social, legal, and economic aspects embed-
ded in the mainstream lgbt movement: 
 
Homonormativity […] is a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assump-
tions and institutions but upholds and sustain them while promising the possibility of a de-
mobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesti-
city and consumption. (Ivi, 179). 
 
Reformism would blink to both the liberal economic model and to a moderate political para-
digm, leaving no room for egalitarian, libertarian, and Universalist aspirations. 
What Duggan considers striking, is that gay and lesbians, specifically due to their history of op-
pression and marginalization, stand in a peculiar position in order to grasp the oppressive na-
ture of sexual and familistic public policies, to denounce the isolation rising from individualistic 
approaches, to uncover the injustices due to the enforcement of neutral norms, and to address 
entrenched prejudices. Therefore, the lgbt target should entail the dismantling of actual status 
quo, not the will to be part of it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Duggan (2002). For an in-depth discussion on the concept of homonormativity see chapter II. 
53 Warner adopts the term “homonormativity” to denounce the possible normalization of gay and lesbi-
an mainstream politics. He highlights, however, the impossibility of a dispositive of homonormativity 
functioning as that of heteronormativity; since “homosexuality can never have the invisible, tacit society-
founding rightness that heterosexuality has, it would not be possible to speak of homonormativity in the 
same sense” (Berlant and Warner 1998, 3 footnote 2); See also Warner (1999). 
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Diffidence is the principal queer attitude towards the law, mostly because of the unavoidable 
crystallizations/simplifications is entails; it’s undisputed that law, due to the demands it meets 
and to the logical structure upon which it stands, marks varied clear-cut demarcations, and qual-
ifies legal relevant paradigms by somehow simplifying reality. 
For instance, legislation against homophobic violence - spread in many European countries- re-
produces a double binary: the first between gays/lesbians and heterosexuals and the second be-
tween homosexuals/heterosexuals and those who do not identify with any of the clusters envis-
aged by the legislator. 
Queers also contest the arguments that underpinned the implementation of certain measures 
that identify sexual orientation as being a feature worthy of legal protection: in national systems 
as well as in the ECtHR jurisprudence, it a juridical reasoning recurs grounded on the analogy 
of sexual orientation with gender and racial belonging, which thus assumes the innatist nature of 
homosexuality. While the lgbt mainstream movement seems to support such arguments, queer 
radicals question whether it is possible to define the origin of sexual drives. 
Despite the negative answer to this answer, I suggest that queers do not rule out the possibility 
of combining critical reflection of rights with the activation of law in Courts.  
If criticism of marriage is almost absolute54, queer trends evaluate the introduction of a wide 
range of rights quite positively, namely those that allow the change of one’s gender identity 
without undergoing gender-reassignment surgery or nullifying eventual ongoing marriages, that 
recognize social parenthood, and that introduce the chance to juridically settle affective bonds 
different to the couple paradigm through private contracts. 
Through such norms, the legislator would endorse existing sexual fluidity without constricting it 
and, at the same, time, it would enhance individuals’ opportunities.  
The review of all existing differences within queer literature is very difficult, since they embrace 
an increasing number of fields and fork in a multitude of complex and often divergent out-
comes; I consider it significant, however, to focus on the emergence and general characteristics 
of legal queer theory, a reflection built by legal scholars and jurists who apply queer paradigms 
to critically approach legal debate55. 
Broadly speaking, if the queer movements reacted to the early 1990s mainstream movement 
and its policies of de-sexualisation and respectability, if queer theories challenged gay and lesbi-
an studies “drawn on the tradition of social constructionism, in an attempt to bring to the centre 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For a review on critical queer arguments against same-sex marriage see Ettlebrick (1997); Stein (1999); 
Conrad (2010); Bernini (2013). 
55 I go on to conduct a critical review of legal queer theories in chapter II. 
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those individuals and subcultures which exist at the margins of mainstream society” (Morgan 
1995, 2), then legal queer theory critically addresses those legal studies on sexual orientations 
based on positivist paradigms, aimed at including homosexuals in the existing society without 
criticizing its foundations or displaying a compelling criticism to disciplinary the power of the 
law. 
The essential premise of legal queer theory is well expressed by Carl Stychin (1996; 2003) and 
Wayne Morgan (1995), and it hinges on the twofold assumption that legal “disciplinarity is nev-
er total” and that law “as a discourse does exercise direct control over people’s lives” (Stychin 
1996, 53). 
Moreover, as Stychin (1996, 56) points out, legal regulation offers the space for the articulation 
of alternative identities, through the agency of the excluded ones. A prohibition or a normative 
binary, indeed, draws categories and, therefore, it acknowledges the existence of ‘others’, hence 
bringing prohibited practices and identities into the realm of public space/discourse, and 
providing a possible departing point of solidarity among marginalized groups (Stychin 1996, 
49). 
It logically follows that legal queer theory critically tackles both the normalizing of hints within 
the legal framework and aims at enlarging the spaces, the opportunities and the identities still 
not disciplined by legal power.  
Legal queer theory shares many assumptions with race, post-colonial and post-feminist studies, 
and it comprises a number of academics, generally with a socio-legal background, whose efforts 
attempt to “break down rigid and reductionist thinking about identity and to scrutinize law’s 
complex and at times contradictory relationship to sexual practices, identities and representa-
tions” (Pickel 1997, 484).  
Several themes recur, also depending on whether the author is more inclined to legal practice 
or cultural studies; here I will highlight a few that cross different approaches. 
Firstly, legal queer theory questions about identities and interrogates law on the processes of 
constitution, consolidation, and regulation of sexual identities (Ivi, 1). 
If the very idea of identity as a set of fixed features and subjective characteristics are depicted as 
socially misguided, legal discourse is thought to be embedded within a web of practices that 
construct the ‘normal’ sexuality and that, by contrast, define the ‘other’; the legal construction of 
the homosexual subject, is thus functional to better define and isolate heterosexuality, represent-
ing it as normal. 
Norms, social practices, and legal discourses would create and reinforce identities; legal queer 
theory, therefore, has to reveal these dynamics both at international and national level (Moran 
1995; Stychin 1996). 
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Legal queer theory surely has a rich theoretical potential and its critical attitude results in being 
quite compelling also to those who do not share its aims, but one disputes its practical conse-
quences (Bamforth 1996), or its consistency. 
If, as Morgan suggests, also the dichotomy between theory and practice is to reject, since “a the-
ory is […] always already a part of practice especially when it is hidden under a guise of point-of-
view and […] the two binaries already define each other. [..]” (Morgan 20003, 222), it is possible 
to share the argument according to which, in the absence of a critical discussion over the foun-
dations of social and legal system, the impact of reforms will always result incomplete and will 
remain within an oppressive and heteronormative framework. 
In the next chapter I will discuss the debate opposing moderate and queer trends on this point, 
and I will delve deeper into the discussion of the performative role of ECtHR legal discourses. 
Another key point of legal queer theory is related to the intertwining relationship between law, 
politics, and economic power; more precisely to what law can reveal about the bond between 
legal discourses and the legitimation of existing political and economic systems. 
Legal queer activists argue that it’s necessary to understand specific aspects of every realm 
where power can generate effects, so as to challenge the pervasiveness of values, norms and 
rules shaped by a heterosexist conception of sexuality: 
 
[mainstream gay and lesbian theories] often fail to delineate some crucial concepts, such as 
‘the state’, ‘law’, ‘the dominant (hetero) culture’ and ‘power’. Gay liberation theory often 
seems to assume that these concepts can be used interchangeably or else assumes the liberal 
belief in the separability of law and politics. (Morgan 1995, 3) 
 
Queer authors are, thus, committed to a intersectional and interdisciplinary approach, particu-
larly developed by feminists such as Smart, Minow and Young, and the activation of law has not 
to be privileged “in sense of assuming more importance in defining cultural practices than it re-
ally does” (Ivi, 5), to the extent that activists also possessing a legal background embrace multi-
disciplinary perspectives as an instrument of direct and political action. 
Reappraising Smart, it is important to look for extra-legal strategies (1989, 163-5), because oth-
erwise the movement would consider the legal system as the only realm where heterosexist dis-
plays its effects, and consequently it would foster the juridification and the normalization of ac-
tions undertaken. As Zemans suggests, see supra, if law is considered the ultimate solution there 
will be few incentives to question the foundations of legal systems, whilst the highest premium 
will lie in taking full advantage of a wise activation of rules, norms, contradictions, and inconsist-
encies embedded within judicial reasoning and juridical statutes. 
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The privileged queer methodology implies counter discourses that disrupts traditional narrative 
about subjective predetermined identities. As already mentioned and in accordance with post-
modern feminism, methods and aims overlap: discursive analysis, on the one hand, is extensive-
ly adopted to tackle prejudices and undisputed standpoints of traditional legal science, whereas, 
on the other, the deconstruction of fixed legal subjects serves a broader social and political pro-
ject.
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1.7 Conclusive Remarks 
 
Throughout the intense history of the modern gay liberation movement, the perspective on the 
role of the law represents a primary element of distinction, and it plays a crucial role in defining 
internal identities. 
The Criticism put forward shed significant light on the contradictions and the biased stand-
points inherent to the theoretical foundations of human rights; like feminist, race and post-
colonial critical studies, lgbt activists contested the misguided interpretation of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and of principal Constitutional Charters. 
As Morgan suggests, “human rights law for much of this century has done no more than in-
crease the silence surrounding non-hetero desire, refusing to acknowledge the abuse suffered by 
sexual outsiders around the world” (Morgan 2000, 209). 
The shared starting point of criticism pertains to the debunking of the universalist, absolute, and 
rational idealized subject entitled to rights as conceived by liberal legal theory.  
Judicial system assumed, de jure and de facto, citizens’ heterosexuality and imposed it as a re-
quirement for the full enjoyment of civil and political rights: in addition to criminalization, also 
involuntary admission to psychiatric hospitals, exclusion from public offices, and the loss of pa-
rental rights were held against gays and lesbians until very recent times, and fully judged in ac-
cordance with the notion of a democratic system. 
Throughout different phases of homosexual movement, a strong attitude emerges, namely that 
of a recurrent criticism of a legal system lacking rationality, coherence, and neutrality. 
Both gay and lesbian studies and legal queer theory fall into the cluster of postmodernist legal 
theories that “sign the movement away from interpretation premised upon the belief of univer-
sal truths, core essences, or foundational theories” (Minda 1995, 3); even moderate activists, do 
in fact critically address the objectivity of national and international laws, and aim at doing away 
with prejudiced standpoints from judicial and legislative activity.  
From such perspectives, judges and legislators are not super-partes but, on the contrary, they 
are fully engaged in the strategic activation of the law, and their perspective can strengthen as 
well as disrupt existing inequalities. 
From a historical perspective, a reasonably distinct progression becomes visible. Initial liberal 
homophile stances promoted the decriminalization of same-sex acts, thus focusing on the en-
forcement of formal equality and denying the existence of relevant differences between homo-
sexuals and heterosexuals. 
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This approach has been surpassed by reformist trends devoted at tackling inequalities56, in ac-
cordance with the principle of full formal and substantial equality, thus fostering anti-
discrimination norms and equal opportunities policies. Reformist trends are fragmented and al-
so the meaning attached to the concept of ‘difference’ varies, swinging from negative evalua-
tions, similar to homophobic ones, to interpretations imbued by the concept of inclusive equali-
ty, namely a theoretical and legal understating where differences are neither ignored nor evalu-
ated as a condition to remove, but, rather, considered as positive and relevant characteristics 
(Facchi 2012). 
From a radical standpoint, however, the central scope of the lgbt movement is not about defin-
ing the correct legal treatment of differences but, rather, about the dismantling of the existing 
normative order, and about fostering the anti-majoritarian potential hidden in marginalized 
groups. Sexual minorities should crumble gender binaries through their otherness: the empow-
erment of a free and fluid sexuality, and the deconstruction of normalizing legal institutions and 
practices are essential in order to break down pillars of oppression. The main stance of gay rad-
icalism is political, rather than juridical, and it involves an anti-essentialist, dynamic comprehen-
sion of interpersonal relations, combined with the continuous deconstruction of individual iden-
tities.  
Even though the early gay libertarian motivation has been overtaken, the influence of that peri-
od still stands, especially in social practices developed in the lgbt community. Practices aimed at 
building a common sense of identity, the diffusion of relational networks characterized by cohe-
sion, and the celebration of difference effectively come from the after-Stonewall period and 
strongly mark the reality of gay communities even nowadays. 
Queer theories assume a strong political sense and interpret the law as a disciplinary dispositive 
of power (Stychin 2001, 2003; Morgan 1995; 2001). Generally speaking, queer theories do not 
aspire to the simple inclusion of marginalized minorities but they support a general rethinking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 I recall Ferrajoli’s distinction between difference and inequality; according to him, differences are the 
constitutive elements of personal identity, whilst inequalities are the condition that prevents the full de-
velopment of one’s own identity (Ferrajoli 2001 vol. I, cap. XI). Differences, therefore, inhere to the 
private sphere and identify peculiarities entrenched in all individuals; inequality, on the other hand, can 
be considered as the outcome of a normative assumption, that attaches hierarchic values to different fea-
tures or behaviors and that, consequently, reinforces socio-economic or symbolic inequality. As such, 
legal and political actors should aim at removing all inequalities based on differences. Even though posi-
tively described, differences remain a quasi-private element, in that, as Pitch argues, the public element is 
limited to the inequality that the difference has produced, and it does not entail the very definition of dif-
ference itself. See Ferrajoli (2001); Pitch (2004). 
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of social, legal and political dynamics, precisely starting from the experience of oppressed 
groups.  
I suggest, however, that while 1970s libertarians did not produce a coherent and large-scale legal 
thinking, queer provocations are far more compelling. The political aspect of law and the de-
marcation between insiders, entitled to a cluster of rights, and outsiders, the excluded ones, are 
queer’s principal targets. There are three key questions that legal queers raise, namely which 
new distinctions does the law create? How does political power deploy rights language to im-
pose the creation of a defined and fixed human ideal-type? (Morgan 1995; Moran 1995; 
Stychin 2003), which normalizing processes do gay and lesbians have to go through, so as to 
have full access to citizenship’s rights? 
 
[the] aim […] is to interrogate how recognition, social inclusion and citizenship claims come 
at a price, in terms of the demands of assimilation, normalization and disciplinarily in sever-
al different guises (e.g. marketplace; monogamy; traditional patterns of gendered relation-
ships, home ownership) and to underscore the role which law plays in these construction. 
(Stychin 2003, 113) 
 
Finally, I wish to stress the overall risk of impoverishment deriving from mutual delegitimization 
and from the tension between moderate and queer theories. An example of such dynamic can 
be seen in the negative criticism brought to light by some moderate authors against queers 
(Bamforth,1996; Sullivan 1995), the latter publicly depicted with grotesque features or as lack-
ing any practical usefulness. 
A common criticism held against queer authors argues that the core of radical theories would 
comprise much pars destruens and few pars construens, specifically when legal and practical is-
sues are involved; Nicholas Bamforth, for instance, asserts: 
 
While queer theory may be well interesting as a form of social analysis, it cannot - at least as 
presently constituted- take us very far in our search for an adequate justification [of law re-
form]. […] Liberationism, including queer theory, is far too vague when applied to practical 
questions of law reform. In particular is is unclear how far liberationists are prepared to 
work with the established legal system […]. It is hard to see how liberationist theory could 
fail in practice to operate in an internal inconsistent fashion. (Bamforth 1996, 229-231) 
 
I however am not, persuaded by this argument since, as I described earlier and as I will show in 
detail in chapter II, within the extremely heterogeneous realm of queer there are relevant legal 
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theorists who propose precise paths to reform legal system. Recalling Morgan, for instance, 
queer efforts should 
 
include paying attention to the ways in which identity is constructed in legal texts and to our 
own assumptions, continuously made, concerning identity. In terms of lobbying and litiga-
tions strategies, it means attempting to refuse the fixity of sexual categories, to argue about 
identity borders, and to refuse to define what sexuality and any sub-category of it is. Instead 
of focusing on these status questions concerning individuals labelled gay or lesbian, focus 
could be placed on questions of power, i.e. how law regulates differently individuals who 
claim ‘outsiders’ identities, how the law assumes and privileges heater nuclear families and 
so on. (Morgan 2000, 222) 
 
Several legal queer authors look for practical outcomes, and what at first glance could seem a 
merely destruens approach, it actually stands as the pre-requisite for any pragmatic strategy, ac-
cording to the paradigm whereby to dismantle and overcome normalizing and oppressive insti-
tutions, it's firstly necessary to extensively analyse and describe in their essential mechanisms. 
According to radical perspective, thus, law reform is not inherently positive, but its desirability 
relies upon the resistance opposed to the disciplinary effects of law, which are never total, as 
Stychin points out (Stychin 2003, 113). 
Even though the institutionalization of moderate trends and the development of pressure tech-
niques, typical of lobbies and advocacy groups, permeate the international lgbt mainstream 
movement, social and cultural realities committed to libertarian argumentations still fulfil a rele-
vant role, both in proposing new causes for reflection and in providing an internal critic voice57. 
While gay and lesbian studies are strongly anchored to the current and practical improvement 
of every-day life conditions, legal queers embrace a more complex perspective, well summa-
rized by a writing of the poetess Audre Lorde: "There is no thing as a single-issue struggle be-
cause we do not live single-issue lives” (Lorde 1976). Moreover, the theory/practice binary is 
another ground of discussion and it lays on a different evaluation of how practice should be de-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 On the constructive value of internal criticism, I recall Butler: “For either set of intellectual movements 
to remain vital, expansive and self-critical, room must be made for the kind of immanent critique which 
shows how the presupposition of one critical enterprise can operate to forestall the work of another. In 
many ways the resistance to sympathetic or, indeed, immanent critique only and always weakens a 
movement rather than understanding that the democratic and non-dogmatic future of nay such move-
ment depends precisely on its ability to incorporate, without domesticating, challenges from its alteri-
ties”(Butler 1997, 1-2). 
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fined. Gay and lesbian studies prefer to focus on strategies and practical campaigns that react to 
existent injustices, selling queer perspectives as superfluous, if not too provocative and counter-
productive as well: “the reactive nature of queer - the continual deconstruction of identity cate-
gories - cannot provide justifications for the practical questions involved in law reform. We must 
have arguments based on more than just reaction to existing social norms.” (Bamforth 1996, 
228). 
The integration of legal queer methodology could however increase mainstream jurists’ vigor 
and, at the same time, queer theoretical cues could well encourage an ambitious project, aimed 
at spreading, in the society as well as in the legal system, those social, cultural and relational 
specificities that represent the peculiarity and the richness of homosexual experience(s), and 
that convey a notion of inclusive equality, alongside substantial equality, already claimed in all 
possible venues. 
Cooperation between these extremely valuable trends would lead to a strategy able to convey 
lgbt issues in every public realm, by contrasting formal and informal homophobe practices, by 
simultaneously supporting the development of a wide social consciousness, and by prodding 
legislators, judges and the institutions to discuss their unstated assumptions. 
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CHAPTER II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 
TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
“The end of the law is peace. The means to that end is war.  
So long as the law is compelled to hold itself in readiness to resist the  
attacks of wrong — and this it will be compelled to do until the end of time — 
 it cannot dispense with war. The life of the law is a struggle,  
a struggle of nations, of the state power, of classes,  
of individuals” 
Rudolf von Jhering, 1872 
 
 
2.0 Foreword 
 
In this chapter I aim to develop a sound socio-legal theoretical and methodological framework, 
suitable to analyse the ECtHR jurisprudence and the EComHR decisions. 
The review follows a number of questions, that mark the thread of forthcoming pages and rep-
resent the interpretative standpoint of this research. 
Specifically, which role do Courts perform in interpreting and enforcing abstract and general 
provisions, such as human rights? How and with which outcomes can the presence of situated 
standpoints shape or affect the interpretation of claims put forward by homosexual applicants? 
Is it possible, therefore, to argue that judicial reasoning, by Courtesy of which lgbt requests have 
been ratified or dismissed, has been significantly influenced by moral, social or policy-oriented 
concerns?  
To this purpose, I draw upon a wide range of social and legal approaches, and I deduce theo-
retical premises and methodological criteria which constitute the lens through which judgments 
will be further analysed.  
Throughout this chapter three are the thematic clusters intensively examined: a) the role of ju-
dicial creativity and the impact of judicial discretion in moulding the effective meaning of rights 
b) the theoretical and methodological contribution of Feminist Jurisprudence, Gay and Lesbian 
studies and Legal Queer theories and c) the proposal of Critical Discourse Analysis, a specific 
methodological approach, to delve into judgments, in order to highlight hidden tensions and 
based assumptions. 
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2.1 The Creative Role of Judges 
 
The theme of judicial power has been deeply and variously investigated by a broad field of liter-
ature58. Political scientists, legal and political philosophers, sociologists, and historians have been 
long studying the relation between the juridical authority and judicial powers, discussing the 
proper degree of autonomy conferred to the latter, and describing the Courts’ functions within 
the complex national and international normative system. 
It appears indisputable that judicial conduct doesn’t limit to a mechanical implementation of 
statutes, as well as it’s unavoidable that, when ascertaining relevant facts and legal norms, judges 
operate with a variable degree of discretion. 
As far as detailed and comprehensive, legal systems can’t anticipate all eventual concrete cir-
cumstances, nor could the legislator rule a priori the most adequate combination of norms to 
apply to each dispute. Furthermore, social, economical, and political environment is likely to 
affect judicial interpretation and, as time passes and specific moral assumptions become obso-
lete, it’s not unusual for the Courts to depart from the original legislative ratio59. 
The concept of judicial activism precisely refers to the creation of law at the hands of judges in 
the execution of their duties60 (Kmiec 2004, 1471). It is extremely difficult to balance activism 
and restraint, namely the will not to push legal interpretations beyond the semiotic parameters 
clearly expressed by the norms; also the separation between judicial law-making and law-
declaring often appears blurred, thus recalling a wide range of political and philosophical issues. 
Academics are extremely divided, and a broad variety of shades emerges on this issue. Benven-
isti for instance, argues that a rigid restraint approach may lead to a procedural understanding of 
justice and to a potential oppressive legal system, “prone to failure when minority rights are in-
volved” (Benvenisti 1999, 854). 
Generally, scholars agree that judgments perform more than a purely adjudicative function. 
Courts’ decisions include reasoning-lines, which come up to transform substantial aspects of 
provisions, to modify the area of application, or to specify the general meaning of a certain legal 
principle - for instance by extending/restricting cases to which a norm can be applied, by enlarg-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 For an introduction see Mahoney (1990, 57-70); Barak (2009); Holland (2010); Coutinho, La Torre 
and Smiths (2015). 
59 Examples of these dynamics can be traced in almost every legal system on a heterogeneous field of is-
sues. As concerns the already mentioned sodomy laws, in the Usa from 1960s onwards the prosecution 
of ‘gross indecency’ significantly dropped off, regardless of the wording of criminal laws. See Eskridge 
(2008). 
60 For a review of different meanings attached to the concept of “judicial activism”, especially in the Us 
system, see Kmiec (2004). 
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ing legitimate subjective safeguards, by changing the burden of proof, or by producing new in-
terpretations from those hereto developed61. 
Academic literature recognizes judicial discretion as part of the adjudication process (Fiss 1982; 
Dworkin 1985); the main difference actually stands between those who dismiss judicial creativity 
as pathologic, in that it would attest the failure of the ideal of law as an objective and neutral 
realm, and those who, on the one hand, recognize the unavoidable subjective implications at-
tached, but, on the other, also consider creativity as not contradicting the enforcement of a fore-
seeable frame or as threatening legitimate institutional boundaries. 
Fiss defines adjudication as the “process by which a judge comes to understand and express the 
meaning of an authoritative legal text and the values embodied in that text” (Fiss 1982, 739); the 
adjudicative process, thus, entails both subjective and objective dynamics and establishes a 
bound between the reader and the text. 
Us sociological jurisprudence, spread over the end of XIX century and first decades of XX cen-
tury, first developed a systematic thought, critical to judicial interpretation62. 
Pound upheld that judicial discretion would not merely amount to an inadvertent element, due 
to life unpredictability, rather, it would constitute the logical consequence of tasks assigned to 
judgments. The author, indeed, emphasized that especially in common law system, besides ad-
judicating the actual case, Courts also declare “the law for other controversies” (Pound 1923c, 
941), hence developing and clarifying methods or doctrines which influence future pro-
nouncements. Depending on the arguments put forward, on the principles invoked, and on the 
provisions recalled, a single judgment could become a precedent even for dissimilar future cas-
es63.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The comparison between Plessy vs Ferguson and Brown vs Board of Education is relevant: both 
judgments challenged racial segregation and the applicants upheld that a similar assessment was in 
breach of the 14th amendment of the Us Constitution, concerning the equality of citizens. Whereas in 
Plessy the Supreme Court legitimated the “separate but equal” doctrine, in Brown judges declared seg-
regation incompatible with the principle of equality. If one considers that the Amendment was drafted 
long before slavery abolition, that Plessy dates back to 1896, in a cultural context where discrimination 
against Afro-American was extremely widespread, whilst the latter occurred in 1954, when the pressure 
of the ACLU and other Civil Rights Movement was increasing, it seems likely that in both cases the cul-
tural environment affected judges, thus molding their final interpretation of the notion of equality. 
62 I refer to works of O.W. Holmes e R. Pound, mainly Holmes (1891a; 1891b; 1894; 1897; 1899); 
Pound (1907; 1910; 1911a; 1911b; 1921; 1923a; 1923b; 1923c). 
63 I recall, for instance, the path which led Us Courts to apply extremely strict scrutiny to evaluate the dif-
ferentiated treatment involving groups that bore a history of discrimination, belonged to a discrete mi-
nority, showed immutable characteristics, and were deprived of political power. Reappraising Zanetti 
(2015, 60), the notion of ‘suspect’ firstly emerged in United States v Carolene Products, concerning milk 
trading among different States; somehow accidentally judge Stone inserted in his opinion a footnote 
which in short became a cornerstone of Us jurisprudence: “Prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
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It logically follows that Courts’ interpretive autonomy is likely to give rise to effects comparable 
to those resulting form the introduction of new legal provisions. 
On this point academic literature generally distinguishes between judicial law-making and judi-
cial law-declaring; the latter applies to cases where the focus of the Court is solely targeted at 
singular, present case (Pound 1923c; Friedmann 1961; Rasmussen 1986; Von Bogdandry and 
Venzke 2012). 
The former stresses that judges are enabled to clarify blurred, flawed, or obscure aspects by 
previous jurisprudence, even if not strictly relevant to the case at stake. 
I would define this standpoint as ‘future oriented’, for it concretely attaches more relevance to 
general elements, which are likely to orient future jurisprudence64.  
Therefore Courts keep an eye not only about the contingent proper solution but, at the same 
time, they are concerned about which is the most appropriate doctrine to introduce into the ju-
risprudential case-method or how to innovate, sometimes even overrule, precedent decisions. 
Reappraising Pound’s fitting metaphor, judges are comparable to a chemist “who does not 
make the chemicals which go into his test tube. He selects them and combines them for some 
purpose and his purpose thus gives form to the result” (Pound 1923c, 941).  
The creative process requires to go  
 
outside of the legal materials of the time and place or event outside the law and selecting 
something which was then combined with or added to the existing materials or the existing 
methods of developing and applying those materials, and gradual given form as a legal pre-
cept to legal institution or legal doctrine.” (Ibidem). 
 
Judgments are the outcome of these paths of creativity, and they do allow to delve into judicial 
standpoints and performances. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ties may be a special condition upon which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political pro-
cesses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities and […] may call for a correspondingly more 
searching inquiry” (Judge Stone in Ibidem). 
64 Fluctuation between these two judicial approaches clearly emerges from Pound’s words: “When we 
look narrowly at the cause present dot the court which established the doctrine, we discover that there is 
an element moving behind the logical scene. In each case we struggled painfully for more than half a 
century to unshackle the law from these decisions and their consequences, and in more than ore juris-
diction the process is far from achieved. On the other hand, quite as many cases may be found strong 
judges have said, in effect: The result is unfortunate in this particular case, but we must apply the ap-
pointed legal precept or the logical consequences of the applicable precedent, be the result what it may” 
(Pound 1923c, 942). 
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By tracing and highlighting arguments upheld by the Court, the reader is able to examine judg-
es’ creative contribution and to assess the existence of substantial overruling, even if hidden be-
hind a formal attitude to precedent jurisprudence (cfr. infra). 
Quite predictably the selection of relevant facts and doctrines leaves considerable space for dis-
cretion; thus, it’s not unusual that different Courts, even though reviewing analogous cases in 
their essential features, reach disparate interpretations.  
In the event of unanimously ascertained facts, judgments are likely to be structured as follows:  
 
i) selection of legal material on which to ground the decision or as we commonly say, find-
ing the law ii) development of the grounds of decision from the material selected or inter-
pretation in the stricter sense of that term iii) application of the abstract grounds of decision 
to the facts of the case (Ivi, 945). 
 
In every modern judicial system, discretion may affect judicial review from the very beginning 
and the Court could be influenced by subjective elements even when assessing which are essen-
tial facts at stake. If there is internal dissent on the correct interpretation of one or more legal 
materials, events, or precedents to refer to - as it often happens in the ECtHR and in several 
Western Constitutional Courts- the researcher will directly observe the discretion left to judges, 
for each of them holds interpretive legitimacy, though contradicting one another. 
Quite frequently, then, the process of selection involves a choice among competing texts or op-
posing analogies65. In such events: 
 
interpretation shows that no existing rule is adequate to a just decision and it becomes nec-
essary to formulate the ground of decision for the given facts for the first time. The proposi-
tion so formulated may […] become binding for like cases in the future” (Pound 1923c, 
945). 
 
Several field researches have concretely verified that judges draw hints from multifaceted realms 
outside legal system, spacing from custom, to comparative law, from morals to economics 
(Friedman 1975,180 and fol.; Fiss 1982, 752 and fol.) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Pound further notes “in any event this process has gone on and still goes on in all systems of law, no 
matter what their form, and no matter how completely in their juristic theory they limit the function of 
adjudication to mechanical application of authoritatively given precepts” (Pound 1923c, 946). 
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Despite the attempt to detach from morals and politics, judges are often called to give meaning 
and substance to flawed values, flaunting signifiers (Douzinas 2007, 8), which entail essential 
concepts, like that of liberty, equality, due process, discrimination, and sexuality, which are also 
surrounded by moral assumptions. As Fiss notes, especially when human rights are concerned, 
morals can be considered the “prism through which [a judge] understands the legal text” (Fiss 
1982, 753). 
Formally, a decision may even appear just as the result of a purely mechanical deduction but, as 
Pound suggests, it’s necessary to delve beneath the surface of judgments to catch paradigms that 
inspire the Court: 
 
[an] application may be apparently mechanical but with a greater or less latent margin of 
something else. [a judgment] depends on the judge’s feelings as to what is right between the 
parties to the particular case and how this is covered up by a margin of choice between 
competing rules. Where it seems the better solution to hold that an easement was acquired, 
a Court will speak only of adverse user. Where it seems a preferable solution to hold that an 
easement was not acquired the Court speaks of permissive user” (Pound 1923c, 950). 
 
Reasoning on what it is generally considered desirable, traditional legal science calls for Courts 
able to select the grounds of decisions with reference to fixed precepts, whenever possible, 
which resort to outside the legal system only when the others fail, or at least when they “clearly 
fail to give a just result” (ibidem). 
If, instead, one adopts a practical perspective she will discover a far more complex and blurred 
situation, in that “there is no standard method of determining between [different methods of in-
terpretation]. […]The mental bent of the particular judge or the availability of the result with ref-
erence to the particular case seem to be the decisive factors.” (Ibidem). 
Since interpretation plays a fundamental role both in the European context and in my research, 
I consider appropriate to further analyse two fields strictly related to judicial activism, namely 
the permeability between social and legal sphere and the bound between judgments and social 
changes.
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2.1.1 The Permeability of Legal System  
 
The interplay between social and legal realm is the cornerstone of sociological approach to law 
and it is widely addressed by several perspectives and theories66. 
Firstly, law has been famously defined as social fact, as the organization of social life in its “most 
stable, most precise form” (Durkheim 1997, 86); this perspective has inevitably brought to 
elaborate theoretical systems which significantly detach from what prescribed by traditional legal 
science, as concerns the meaning of law itself. 
Secondly, sociology of law tries to answer to many issues, including ones about the role of law 
within social organization (Treves 1987, 289 and fol.; Ferrari 1997), about the impact of legal 
instruments on individual life and collective relations (Ferrari 2010, 67 and fol.; Bettini 1998; 
Febbrajo 2009), and about the meaning attached to juridical norms and actors both by civil so-
ciety and legal experts (Treves 1987, 202 and fol.).  
The core element of aforementioned perspectives is, therefore, the twofold influence of legal 
elements on social system and, vice versa, the influence of social reality on legal realm. 
Methodological standpoints and techniques to investigate social reality are extremely variegated 
as well, including qualitative and quantitative methods (Ferrari 2004, 30). The common vision 
can be grasped in the empirical approach to reality, and in the study of social realm as both the 
referent point to verify/falsify theoretical assumptions and the field whereby drawing observa-
tions further integrated in a wider frame (Treves 1987, 202-227). 
As Friedman famously argued “social theories of law start form one basic assumption: […] soci-
ety makes the law. Law is not impartial, timeless, classless; it is not value-free” (Friedman 1975, 
178). 
From this perspective, judicial reasoning could be also interpreted as a trait d’union between 
social political and economic inputs, on the one hand, and legal outputs, on the other, which 
consequently result affected by the aforementioned extra-legal elements. 
Judicial reasoning is a blurred theoretical and argumentative terrain; to this regard Pound warns  
 
We must seek the basis of doctrines, not in Blackstone’s wisdom of our ancestors, not in 
the apocryphal reason of the beginnings of legal science, not in their history, useful as that is 
in enabling us to appraise doctrines at their true value, but in a scientific apprehension of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 For a general introduction see Treves (1987); Ferrari (1997); Ferrari (2004). 
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the relations of law to society and of the needs and interests and opinions of society of to-
day. (Pound 1907, 12-13). 
 
Even though Holmes, Pound and their epigones explicitly addressed the effect of the social 
sphere on the legal one, and not the contrary, from their theoretical outset a certain degree of 
mutual reciprocity is implied.  
The permeability of legal sphere became more investigated during 1950s and 1960s (Marradi 
1971, 393-445) and, as Tarello recalls (1977, 1 and fol.) it was firstly systematically addressed in 
Lawrence Friedman’s works. 
In Friedman’s theory the bound between social facts and legal norms neither is a simple de-
scriptive corollary, nor does it only attest the obvious eventuality that judges and policy-makers 
are subjected to external pressures; rather, it is the cornerstone of Friedman’s perspective and it 
influences the very definition of legal system itself, described as composed of “three kinds of 
phenomena, all equally and vividly real. Firstly, there are those social and legal forces that, in 
some way, press in and make ‘the law’. Then comes ‘the law’ itself - structures and rules. Third, 
there is the impact of law on behaviour in the outside world” (Friedman 1975, 2).  
As such, law “responds to outside pressure in such a way as to reflect the wished and the powers 
of those social forces which are exerting the pressure” (Ivi, 4). 
The dynamism of social elements is a distinctive figure embedded in the concept of permeabil-
ity; actors subjected to the force of law, they interact with it, transferring in legal terms “their 
feelings, attitudes, motives, and inclinations into group action, bargaining, attempts to influence 
the law and perhaps into attempts to bend or corrupt the application of law” (Ibidem). 
Accordingly, the most relevant index of dynamism lies in the ability of social actors to imple-
ment strategies targeted at altering the normative status quo, in accordance with their needs and 
expectations. 
To Friedman, the interaction between law and society can be explained resorting to three ideal-
typic elements: social inputs; structures and rules that filter claims and transfer them into legal 
terms; and normative outputs. 
The inputs for legal action and the causes of legal change should be searched throughout social 
sphere, where also the origins of legal disagreements lie. 
Value pluralism, the heterogeneity of interests, as well as the intent not to accept extra-judicial 
agreements, generally increase the propensity to resort to the judiciary. 
Living law (Ivi, 148) shows, thus, the imprint of social forces which “pressed against the legal 
system and […] results from and reflects the social forces that exerted themselves to produce, 
block or change the act” (Ibidem). 
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If, on the one hand, claims are moulded upon interests, partisan by definition, on the other, in 
Courts they are expressed through the language of ideals, namely that of universal, objective, 
and neutral pretences. 
“People feel they must follow their ideals; they also believe they should disguise their interests 
in idealistic clothing” (Ivi, 149) and, as Gordon suggests, the very juridical fictio requires to ex-
press any critique against the existing system by demonstrating the objective incontestability of 
proposals put forward:  
 
A complaint about a legal wrong-let's say the claim that one is a victim of discrimination 
must be framed as a complaint that there has been a momentary disturbance in a basically 
sound world, for which a quick fix is avail- able within the conventional working of existing 
institutions. A black applicant to professional school, whose test scores are lower than those 
of a competing white applicant, asks for admission on grounds of ‘affirmative action’. Eve-
rybody in that interaction (including the applicant) momentarily submits to the spell of the 
worldview promoted in that discourse, that the scores measure an ‘objective' merit (though 
nobody really has the foggiest idea what they measure besides standardized test-taking abil-
ity) that would have to be set aside to let him in” (Gordon 1981, 15). 
 
Despite the aforementioned frame can be applied to several fields, I suggest that when human 
rights are concerned, the concept of ‘interests’ should be consistently coupled with ‘values’ and 
‘beliefs’. By this I do not deny that the mobilization for human rights is affected by interests, 
but, rather, I emphasize the strict connection among legal claims, meta-juridical opinions, and 
assumptions about which values should be socially enforced regardless of their immediate utili-
ty67.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The connection between values and interests is multifaceted and, as such, it’s not possible to define a 
clear-cut; values may be understood as interests expressed through a universalist and impersonal struc-
ture and, from a critical perspective, it could be also argued that the entire system of values promotes the 
interests of dominant social actors (Friedman 1975; Gordon 1981). For instance, colonial and marginal-
ized studies consider foundational Western values as instruments whereby the West has imposed its cul-
tural, political, ideological, and philosophical hegemony (Slaughter and Helfer 1997). A classic, though 
simplified, distinction between values and interests goes back to Aubert’s essay Competition and Dissen-
sus: Two Types of Conflict and of Conflict Resolution, later reappraised also by Friedman. Aubert dis-
tinguished between interests and claims of right. A conflict of interests entails a clash on the same valua-
ble object, job, or position; the origin of disagreement would lie in the conditions of scarcity and, thus, 
conflict would come “from a certain base of agreement and there is no conflict over values or principles” 
(Friedman 1975, 226). On the contrary, a claim of right is couched in terms of rights and wrong, “each 
party will insist in the pleadings that his claim is right and the other’s party is wrong, that the opponent 
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The clash among opposed interests and values triggers disagreement, and it favours normative 
changes; consequently, the socio-legal frame not only is permeable and dynamic, but also 
marked by a relevant degree of contingency, traceable in claims, as well as in the normative 
output. 
Expectations are, indeed, anchored to actual hic et nunc and, however formally expressed they 
can be68, they mirror needs considered relevant by large portions of public opinion69.  
Therefore, judicial reasoning deals with social elements and with the quest of normative an-
swers, able to meet social demands. 
Once that expectations are expressed as juridical claims “Courts, its staff and the parties begin 
to process the materials put” (Friedman 1975, 12); in other words, legal actors filter the de-
mands through the lens of the existing rules, norms and values, thus reasoning on specific and 
circumstantial queries70. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
misconceives the fact or the rules. The argument will be couched in terms of rights, not interests” 
(Ibidem). 
In practice, it’s possible that sides claiming different values actually find a compromise, for instance by 
recognizing the necessity to balance the rights at stake. Nevertheless, this distinction grasps how social 
and political response vary depending on whether claims are couched either in a language based on in-
terests or on values. If in the former there’s at least space for discussion - which doesn’t mean by itself 
that a mediation will really occur- in the latter such opportunity is extremely reduced, and each side is 
likely to consider an eventual compromise as a betrayal. 
68 Ferrari (2004, 71) highlights the necessity to further specify some features of Dahrendorf’s classic polit-
ical model (1959), to the end of explaining the birth of social thought about law. Most notably, the socie-
ty perceives needs, which are reappraised and expressed as expectations by interest groups; thanks to the 
mediation of parties, such interests are conveyed in the political arena. Parties affect policy-makers, for 
they might have a gatekeeping effect or they might shape specific claims in the light of their own inter-
ests. On this issue Ferrari emphasizes that social perception of urgent needs and demands is rarely com-
pletely free or spontaneous: “nelle società cd. ‘opulente’ molti bisogni sono indotti dall’azione di coloro 
che saranno chiamati a soddisfarli. Il sistema mediatico […] funge da cassa di risonanza di molte esigenze 
che primariamente partono da gruppi privilegiati che vi hanno accesso e soprattutto da coloro che li con-
trollano. Che costoro possano farsi interpreti di sensazioni già percepite più o meno confusamente da 
una cittadinanza è senz’altro vero. Ma è altrettanto vero che, in questi casi, è proprio il riconoscimento 
mediatico ciò che trasforma quelle sensazioni in opinioni” (Ferrari 2004, 172). See also Dahrendorf 
(1959). 
69 I uphold such statements, especially as concerns the actors who are politically and socially disadvan-
taged and who consider themselves as bearers of a new legal standpoint, alternative to that existing. I 
think of the Us movement for civil rights and of the lgbt movement itself - both extremely likely to recur 
to Courts- which spoke and still speak on behalf of a marginalized portion of society, and which are of-
ten not equipped with political and material resources to promote change exclusively through legislative 
reform. See Andersen (2004); McCann (1994). 
70 Lgbt movement displays both lobbying and advocacy strategies to the end of obtaining the public 
recognition of same-sex couples. Depending on the normative and jurisprudential context, single judg-
ments on the same claim have followed different paths. In the Usa, Obergefell v Hodges judgment was 
achieved on the argument that wedding license could not be constitutionally denied to gay and lesbian 
people without discriminating against them. The ECtHR, instead, made clear in Schalk and Kopv v. 
Austria that Article 12, securing the right to marry, does not oblige Contracting Members to recognize 
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Judicial outputs are, then, the legal answer to social questions, they reflect how legal actors in-
terpret social reality, which juridical interpretation they find more suitable, and which functions 
they consider appropriate to their role. 
From this perspective, Courts are heavily involved in the process of legitimation and allocation 
of powerful positions, expressed through the logic of due rights. 
To some extent, the whole legal system is imbued by an unequal distribution of resources and 
Courts detain the power to strengthen, or spoil, dominant balance of power.  
According to Weber’s famous definition, power states the “probability that one actor within a 
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Weber, 
1968, 53); a possible legal meaning of the concept of power deals with two intertwined ele-
ments: the legitimacy over the claims to intervene/abstain which one or more actors can raise to 
third parties, and the effective implementation of activated rights. 
As Friedman suggests “rules of law and processes of law are products of power. They also de-
fine power, and they instruct how power can be used. At the heart of the system, then, are pro-
cesses and rules that give out units of power, ratify their distribution and describe their use” 
(Friedman 1975,169). 
To this regard, two are the main processes whereby legal reasoning actually reflects and rein-
forces the existing power relations. 
Norms can be formulated so to explicitly legitimate differentiated treatments; in this case the 
core of the unequal distribution of power does not occur in the application of legal provisions, 
but rather in their definition. 
Under these circumstances, norms come out of the struggle of the power (Ivi, 180) and ratify 
dominant interests. As concerns sexual orientation, many legal systems directly restricted, or 
still restrict, sexual freedom, work rights, social, political rights, and family rights to lgbt citizens. 
By criminalizing same-sex acts, by admitting discriminations against lgbt people, by excluding 
them from professions involving a contact with minors, by denying them the custody of their 
own children, and by stating the superiority of heterosexual marriage, law crystallizes paradigms 
soaked with heterosexist bias. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
same-sex marriage. Therefore in the European environment the legal recognition of same-sex marriage 
can’t rest on the claim of direct discrimination; as such movements and lawyers are actually exploring 
another strategy, namely that of arguing that the absence of whatsoever kind of legal recognition would 
infringe Article 8, securing the right to respect for private life. If adopted, this strategy would leave to na-
tional discretion whether to introduce civil partnerships or same-sex marriage. The final aim, as it will be 
explored in chapter IV, is to construct a European consensus over egalitarian marriage, though the EC-
tHR jurisprudence forces to choose a moderate and incremental strategy, different from that adopted in 
the Usa. 
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Norms, however, can convey inequality even when neutrally worded. As Friedman suggests 
“many rules do appear timeless and neutral - expressions of abiding faith and high ideals. How 
they are enforced in another question. The administration of justice is shot through with subtle 
and blatant forms of social control that official law does not recognize” (Ivi, 181).  
In conclusion, the sketched frame does not suggest that judges act boundless, without abiding to 
legal rules or principles, but it imposes to carefully scratch beneath the surface of the alleged 
neutral judicial reasoning, and to treat the Courts as actors embedded in a precise social and po-
litical environment. The possibility to perform law-making functions, the awareness of the im-
pact of a single judgment on future jurisprudence and, hence, the inclination to adjudicate cases 
with a future-oriented mind actually highlights that judges are permeable to social sphere, and it 
is likely that, whether in ascertaining relevant facts or in deciding and interpreting legal provi-
sions, the final outcome will balance precepts and rules of legal science with a gaze on the wider 
social system. 
However, this gaze does not entirely depart from an external perspective, but, also from judges’ 
values, attitudes, and from “pressure of interests and events” (Friedman 1975, 170). 
I would explain such a dynamic according to a mutual mechanism, for, on the one hand, 
judge’s values and perspectives are reshaped according to legal procedures, adapted to proce-
dures and bended to the logic of law while, on the other, also legal science can absorb extra-
judicial perspective conveyed through judgments, especially if reiterated; as such, meta-juridical 
foundations of specific jurisprudential practices are likely to stand on situated standpoints. 
Moreover, even the apparent procedural application of legal provision may not be entirely neu-
tral but, on the contrary, it may endorse and enforce already existing unequal power relations. 
Friedman indeed suggested that if Courts, lawyers and attorneys do not critically consider rea-
sons underpinned to their role and function, it is likely that as well as “power is unequally dis-
tributed and unequally exercised”, so “the law cannot help but reflect and sustain this distribu-
tion” (Friedman 1975, 179). 
A useful theoretical concept which actually enables to critically delve into the influence of extra-
judicial elements is that of legal culture, widely analysed in paragraph 2.2. 
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2.1.2 Judicial Interpretation and Social Change 
 
In his famous The Legal System in A Social Science Perspective Friedman proposes four ideal-
types to analyse the interaction between social and legal change. Relevant variables concern the 
origin of change and its trajectory; Friedman distinguishes whether they are external, i.e. 
grounded in the social sphere, or internal, thus circumscribed within legal realm. For purposes 
of this research I suggest to focus mostly on “the change originated outside the legal system but 
moving through it (with or without some internal processing) to a point of impact outside the 
legal system, that is society” (Ivi, 270). 
Jurisprudential innovations can be framed, indeed, as the answer of legal institutions to a social-
ly determined demand.  
Social and political movements ask for legal changes, which, in turn, affect the society. Recent 
history displays a number of relevant examples: consider for instance the already mentioned 
Brown vs Board of Education and the Italian Constitutional Court judgment n.27/1975 on 
abortion. They both arose from an external experience: activists of Civil Rights, Feminist 
Movement and Radical Party had previously tried to launch a legislative reform, without any 
success. Legal change was thus conveyed through judicial arena, where the legitimacy of the 
“separate but equal” doctrine and the criminalization of abortion were brought into question. 
The final outcome, favorable to the applicants, did not consume its effects within the legal sys-
tem only, but it significantly spread to cultural and informal customs: the success of Brown 
pushed other activists to challenge existing discriminating laws and to pretend equal opportunity 
measures (Kluger 2011); likewise the Italian Constitutional Court imposed the discussion of the 
abortion in the political agenda and ratified the supremacy of women health protection, en-
couraging a significant cultural shift (Sciré 2008). 
Thus, as Friedman argues “reforms have frequently gone to Court to upset many old and estab-
lished arrangements” (Friedman 1975, 277), supporting judicial activism as vehicle of legal 
change.  
Two are the main processes by which legal reform might affect civil society: disruption and 
planning. Although they are generally joined it’s appropriate to describe them as distinct phases. 
Disruption refers to a negative change, implying the dismantlement of the existing legal order, 
whereas planning recalls a positive action, oriented either at replacing the vacuum left by the re-
peal of previous provisions or at regulating newly emerged realms. 
If planning is associated to policies, disruption fits the characteristics of judicial system, for ef-
fectively Courts are functionally more equipped to disrupt rather than governing new frames. 
Even when imposing positive obligation, judges are entitled to state the criteria to be met and 
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values to be enforced, but they must attain to legislative autonomy and, as such, they enjoy a 
very narrow margin of planning. For instance, the Italian Constitutional Court held that the 
criminalization of abortion was illegitimate, if pregnancy was seriously threatening the woman’s 
wellbeing, but it was the Parliament that enacted law 194/78 and assessed detailed procedural 
guidelines. Likewise, in the Usa the competence to determine policies to empower racial deseg-
regation and to enforce equality was mostly left to political institutions.  
On a more in-depth level, it’s possible to also identify the category of creative disruption as the 
process of disruption that, on the one hand, impacts on the existing legislation and, on the oth-
er, it lays the foundations of a subsequent path of reforms, whether by highlighting core values 
to pursue, by creating an absence of norms that has to be fulfilled, or by developing doctrines 
detached from the past. 
Grounding its assumptions on empirical research, Friedman set out four conditions as essential 
to the emergence of judicial creative disruption (Ivi, 280 and fol.). The first prerequisite attains 
to the existence of a consistent group of legal experts keen to reformism and equipped with fi-
nancial funding, public and private. 
Judges have also to show a significant will to engage in activism; as Friedman warns, this is totally 
compatible with the presence of conservative Courts, partly because activism does not corre-
spond to progressivism, but it concerns the willingness to overrule doctrines and previous deci-
sions, and partly because even a minoritarian cluster of judges within the overall bar can reach 
an innovative outcome, by obtaining the majority in a single case that poses a milestone for sub-
sequent interpretations. 
The third condition pertains to the presence of a strong and activist social movement, which 
prods the Courts to reflect on the legitimacy of certain provisions. The last concerns the will-
ingness of powerful actors to enforce judicial outcomes, regardless from their content. 
As already outlined, in the Council of Europe lgbt community counts both an active multilevel 
movement and various legal think-tanks. In the documental analysis I will ascertain to what ex-
tent the ECtHR performs an activist role, and how the necessity to respect the sovereignty of na-
tional authorities affects judicial reasoning. 
Internal disagreement is essential and, depending on which element it hinges, it shapes the tra-
jectory of change brought forward. 
Turning to the ECtHR, human rights easily generate dissent, especially when discussing the 
meaning to attribute at values. From giving substance to the concept of “inhuman and degrading 
treatment” (Addo and Grief 1998), to defining the realm of “private and family life” (Benvenisti 
1999; Johnson 2014), to explaining whether the “right to life” is against abortion (Puppink 
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2013), judges of the ECtHR display a variety of opinions, which attest the flaunting and contin-
gent nature of these values. 
Also the role played by the ECtHR is not unanimously shared; if departing from judicial adju-
dicative function, judges will probably embrace a restrained approach, whereas if creative impli-
cations prevails, they will be more opened to interpret rules according to social, cultural, and 
political relevant factors. 
On the core reasons behind the drafting of the Convention there is no real debate, because the 
ratio is tersely expressed in the Preamble71; I would connect internal disagreement to the defini-
tion of the proper doctrines or to the duties falling within ECtHR’s jurisdiction, generally divid-
ed between originalist and purposive ones72.  
A crucial concept that helps to explain different attitudes towards law is the already mentioned 
notion of internal legal culture, for it delves into features that shape judges’ inclination towards 
legal system and, therefore, into fundamental assumptions orienting their interpretative mind.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The Preamble of the European Convention of Human Rights tersely expresses reasons moving the 
European countries to adopt the Convention and it echoes to the aim of “securing the universal and ef-
fective recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared […]”, of achieving a “greater unity be-
tween its members and […] the further realization of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”. See 
also chapter III. 
72 These issues are widely addressed in chapter III. 
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2.2 The Internal Legal Culture 
 
Throughout this paragraph I argue that the concept of internal legal culture allows to study vari-
ables, shaping judicial reasoning and connecting Courts’ decisions to social norms and cultural 
values. The notion of legal culture, however, is not a simply one, since it refers to heterogene-
ous ideas, often presented with blurred borders. 
The most known definition of legal culture is that proposed by Friedman, which can be sum-
marized as the combination of “ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and legal 
institutions, which some public or some parts of the public holds” (Friedman 1994, 34). He al-
so made explicit the distinction between external legal culture, namely “the legal culture of the 
general population” (Friedman 1975, 193), and internal legal culture, which targets values, ideo-
logies and principles of “those members of the society who perform specialized legal tasks” (Ivi, 
223).  
For purposes of this research I will use Friedman’s definition but, considering the complexity of 
this concept, in subsequent sections I review its usages and definitions, engaging with other per-
spectives and proposed definitions, in order to explain why I consider the frame proposed by 
Friedman as the most adequate to analyse the ECtHR jurisprudence. 
 
2.2.1 Legal Culture: A Multifaceted Concept  
 
The notion of legal culture has been generously discussed over the last forty years. Complexity 
and multidisciplinary features are unanimously attributed to this concept (Pennisi 1997; Nelken 
1997; 2004; Michaels 2011) and even authors who resort to it feel the need to clarify the mean-
ing of the adopted definition (Friedman 1975; 1994; Arold 2007).  
For instance, Friedman quite frequently stresses the vagueness of legal culture, in that it would 
“rest on shaky evidence at best” (Friedman 1975, 204) and it would ultimately constitute “an ab-
straction and a slippery one” (Ibidem).  
An important aspect, that leads to different outcomes and shows the risks entrenched when 
studying legal culture, concerns the realms where legal culture may prove useful; Nelken identi-
fies three main trajectories: comparative, explanatory, and interpretive (Nelken 1997). Firstly, 
legal culture may be used to explain the differences across cultures as concerns law, and to justi-
fy legal peculiarities; as Nelken notes, however, it’s hard to avoid the “ever-present danger of 
circular argument (they do it that way because that is how they do it in Japan, in Holland or 
wherever)” (Nelken 2004, 8) and also eminent anthropologists are quite sceptical about the pos-
sibility of producing accurate accounts of other cultures (Clifford and Marcus 1986). 
 82	  
The interpretative approach, instead, aim at grasping how specific aspects of multiple legal cul-
ture resonate and fit together. The scope lies in translating another system’s legal ideas, accord-
ing to a general web of meanings, a sort of Esperanto. Therefore, different legal cultures are 
likely to be treated as part of the same flow; quoting Nelken, interpretative authors “try to grasp 
the secrets of culture by focusing on local terms […]. They examine the idea of the State in 
common law and Continental countries so as to understand why litigation is seen as essentially 
democratic in the Usa and as anti-democratic in France” (Nelken 2004, 10).  
Lastly, the descriptive, or explanatory approach, pursues to assess the existence of a correlation 
between social elements, considered as independent variables, and legal culture, treated as a 
dependent one. This is probably the most socially employed meaning, even though it may lead 
to exaggerating the impact of legal culture. 
Depending on the departing assumptions, the concept of legal culture may have a legal, social, 
political, or anthropological prevailing meaning. Haberle, for instance, resorts to this concept 
synonymously with that of rule of law, and he conceives legal culture as a cluster of political 
democratic values lying at the very heart of Western constitutions (Haberle 2000).  
Geertz proposes, instead, a heavily anthropological perspective, devoted to the idea that legal 
culture has to be inferred from local legal habits, and centred on the paradigm whereby the 
analysis of legal culture is not “an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one 
in search of meaning” (Geertz 1973, 311).  
Reference to a web of legal knowledge is also central to Riles, who identifies legal culture with 
different models of thinking, approaching and practicing law73. Also Legrand focuses on legal 
professionals’ mind-set, arguing that “culture concerns frameworks of intangibles within which 
interpretive communities operate and which have normative force for these communities” 
(Legrand 1996, 56). Specifically, he states that rules and culture are essential parts of national 
identities and he denies the possibility of a convergence between legal families of civil and 
common law (Ivi, 57 and fol.). 
A national based conception permeates even Tuori’s multi-layered approach; he classifies a 
“surface level”, that is the gathering of written statutes and provisions, a “national legal culture”, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 “There is growing agreement among both anthropologists and critical lawyers that in many cases the 
knowledge practices at stake in human rights regimes borrow implicitly or explicitly from legal institu-
tions, theories, doctrines, and forms of subjectivity. In my own work, I have shown how the knowledge 
practices of even the least overtly legal of UN activities, the UN World Conferences, are best under-
stood as spheres of legal knowledge—insofar as they explicitly engage diverse constituencies (from so-
called experts to so-called grassroots) in a common practice of document production that emulates legal 
practices.” (Riles 2006, 54). 
 83	  
that refers to the legal tradition proper of that Country, and a “deep structures of law”, namely 
the core foundation of law shared by most of countries (Tuori 1997, 433).  
A partial confluence between Legrand’s and Tuori’s approach can be traced in Blankenburg’s 
definition of legal culture as the gathering of law-oriented practices and attitudes shared within 
legal institutions (Blankenburg 1997). 
He explores, indeed, historical, political, and social conditions under which people are likely to 
resort to legal institutions, and illustrates how they differ among societies, also addressing the 
fracture between civil and common law, by upholding the concept of “culture of legal behav-
iour” (Pennisi 1997, 10) and by studying the impact of cultural peculiarities on the propensity to 
recur to legal institutions and on the assets of legal system itself.  
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2.2.2 Internal and External Legal Culture 
 
As already fleshed out, Friedman provides the most extensive account on the concept of legal 
culture and he is the acknowledged father of the distinction between internal and external legal 
culture.  
His efforts arise from the will to develop a notion that gathers and explains behaviours, patterns 
of thought, and investigate the comprehension of law, whether involving common people or le-
gal professionals. Therefore, being so embedded within practical realm and entrenched with 
Friedman’s long-term research, the conceptualization of “legal culture” has been subjected to 
several changes, coming to ultimately comprise a large cluster of social and legal phenomena. 
Broadly speaking, legal culture is the mental and cultural filter which enables social inputs to 
become legal instances and, conversely, which heavily affects judicial reasoning, the choice of 
legal sources, the interpretation of a concrete case, and the Courts’ reaction to social claims. 
Attitudes and expectations shape legal culture, in that both public opinion and legal experts 
have some attitude and expectation towards law. 
Consequently, legal culture may indicate the “public knowledge of and attitudes and behaviour 
patterns towards the legal system” (Friedman 1975, 193), the ensemble of “ideas, values, opin-
ions, people in some society hold with regard to law and the legal system” (Friedman 1994, 
118) and also “expectations and attitudes towards the law and legal institutions, which some part 
of the public holds”(Friedman 1997, 33). Slight dissimilarities above depicted do not amount, 
however, to significant differences and I would read them as the consequence of a decades-long 
in-depth analysis. Values, interests, theoretical, and practical perspectives as well as methods of 
interpretation converge within a single, coherent, theoretical cluster (Ronfani 2004, 9). On the 
one hand the concept of legal culture surely appears flawed, blurred at least, but, on the other 
hand, it embraces many relevant socio-legal elements, thus allowing to conduct researches by 
taking into account the complexity of social reality.  
Legal culture determines “when, why, and where people use law, legal institutions or legal pro-
cess; and when they use other institutions or do nothing” (Friedman 1975, 76).  
A relevant perspective to this research entails the impact of extra juridical values on the devel-
opment of legal doctrines, and it contrasts the image of a totally rational modern legal culture, 
entrenched with a functional view of law. Indeed, as Friedman points out, “traditional and sa-
cred theories still colour the law, for example in constitutional and human rights” (Ivi, 207).  
Videlicet not only does the legal culture investigate juridical and judicial doctrines, methods, 
traditions, and laws, but it goes far beyond, to question the underpinned standpoints, the un-
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stated ideologies and perspectives, which pull the strings of internal and external attitudes to-
wards law and which, ultimately, shape the law itself. 
In order to enter the legal arena, social drives have to be transformed, specific demands have to 
be formulated, legal strategies have to be developed, theoretical frames to be built, and connec-
tions with existing normative system to be explored. Legal culture, therefore, is the “translat[or] 
of interests in demands” (Ivi, 193). As Friedman suggests, the utility of this concept is twofold, 
since it explains both the proceeding from the society to the law, and the answers given by legal 
system to those claims. 
The notion of internal legal culture recalls Frederich von Savigny and his distinction between 
technical and political legal culture, where the latter refers to the external legal attitude (Treves 
1987, 19; Cotterrell 2006, 84). Not only does Friedman enlarge this concept, detaching from a 
purely mechanistic touch, but he also offers a suitable tool to critically engage with the claim of 
judicial neutrality. 
I consider extremely useful to integrate Friedman’s theory with Pennisi’s researches on the issue 
(Pennisi 1997). Pennisi breaks the concept up in three paths and, depending on the type of ac-
tion involved, distinguishes among a) juridical models of reasoning used to translate abstract 
normative premises into specific legislative consequences, by means of codified decision-
making and legitimizing techniques; b) the specialized lexicon developed and adopted by legal 
professionals; c) values, assumptions, models, ideologies, techniques, and the politics of law that 
favor the maintenance of jurists as a peculiar professionalized group (Ivi, 7). 
To him, legal culture describes functions such as validity, flexibility, uniformity, and elements as 
certainty, predictability, efficacy, responsiveness (Ivi, 8); for the purposes of this research the se-
cond meaning is the most relevant, since it enables to focus on discursive and theoretical 
bounds between abstract human rights and ECtHR’s judgments. Judicial reasoning constitutes, 
indeed, the transmission vehicle through which judges convey ideas, values, and attitudes. 
Judgments represent the codified answer of legal system to social inputs, they explain and ac-
count for Court’s behaviour (Letsas 2004); it’s interesting to note, however, that unlikely it might 
seem at first glance, the explanatory function of legal reasoning is not targeted to applicants only 
but also, if not mainly, to legislative power (Friedman 1975, 388 and fol.; Gordon 1981,15). 
As Friedman suggests  
 
legal reasoning and its style are important social facts -whether these give any real clue to 
what judges think or not. Legal reasoning, in short, must be explained and accounted for. It 
is an element of internal legal culture and it has obvious significance, since reasoning is a 
type of legal act which produces rules and interpretations of statutes” (Friedman 1975, 235).  
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It has to be highlighted that judgments are structured according to “a formal, authoritative, ex-
position, which purports to show how and why a decision-maker reaches his particular conclu-
sion”, displaying thus a quasi-political nature (Ibidem). Authority and formality are embedded 
in this definitions, but one may question who is the subject entitled to this authority. Moreover, 
which are the main actors involved? To answer these questions, it is essential to grasp the ways 
by which judicial reasoning reflects the dynamics of power. As a matter of fact, these elements 
are strongly intertwined; parliamentary debates leading to the adoption of a certain provision do 
not fulfil an explanatory purpose, nor is the government obliged to legally prove a bound be-
tween existing legal principles and its policy-proposals. On the contrary, judgments are seen as 
the principal guarantee of a democratic, objective, and neutral adjudicative and interpretative 
process, based on the principle of the rule of law. 
Recalling the well-known Weberian sociological conception, legitimacy, whether political, legal, 
or social, is the pillar on which the authority of a given institution stands74. In this specific case, 
two kind of legitimacy can be distinguished (Ivi, 236 and fol.): primary legitimacy, typical of su-
preme and ultimate authorities, and derivative legitimacy, whose existence depends upon for-
mer higher institutions. 
Authorities invested with primary legitimacy, such as the monarch or national parliaments, are 
limited by constitutional norms and procedural rules, but within this frame no further legitimat-
ing explanations are required75; “whatever the basis of primary legitimacy - charismatic, tradi-
tional or rational authority using Weber’s terms- some form of it will be present in every socie-
ty” (Ibidem). In the context of the Council of Europe, legislative powers lie in the Council of 
European Ministers and Coe Parliamentary Assembly. Judicial institutions, conversely, have to 
comply with procedures designated to demonstrate their subordination to legislative power 
which, thus, mark their derivative legitimacy. To refer again to the Council of Europe, the 
ECHR was drafted by Member States of the Coe and the very ECtHR authority arose from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Max Weber distinguishes among three types of legitimate domination, according to the nature of legit-
imacy on which they stand: “rational grounds - resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the 
right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority); traditional 
grounds - resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of 
those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally charismatic grounds - resting on 
devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the 
normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority)” (Weber 1968, 113). 
75 This does not imply that political actors are not bound to any accountability to electors, supporters and 
public opinion. It is, however, a completely different matter since it entails the political credibility of the 
party and not its legal authority or compliance to the rule of law. 
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political power of legislative organs. Derivative legitimacy requires that institutions perform ac-
tions, discourses, rites, and practices that connect their conduct to the superior source of au-
thority, showing deference to rules established by the latter (Ivi, 237).  
Legal reasoning is precisely a transmitting vehicle of legitimacy, by which judges frame their de-
cision in the existent legal system, or by which they justify their innovation of legal rules and 
doctrines; its primary task is, thus, to “link the judge’s conclusions and decisions with some 
higher body of principles or some agency or institution with primary legitimacy” (Ibidem). 
Logic-based arguments are quite recurrent but, as Holmes notes, despite “the language of judi-
cial decision is mainly the language of logic […]. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to 
the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds” (Holmes 1897, 18); as a 
matter of fact any conclusion can indeed be veiled with a logical expressions. 
If social poles of this communicative act are fixed - the normative text and the judicial actors- 
neither the substantial outcome nor power dynamics are. As concerns the first let’s just note 
that the same legal provision gives rise to different, contrasting but equally legitimated interpre-
tations; furthermore similar outcomes can be justified also following divergent reasoning-lines.  
Judicial dissent is present in every Western society, even though it is not always recorded in 
public documents (Lasser 2004). The very existence of separate opinions demonstrates a) the 
influence of subjective perceptions and beliefs as well as b) the discretion implied by judicial 
task.  
On the relevance of separate opinions I hint a passage from Robert Gordon, who commenting 
the methodology of Critical Legal Studies notes “[judicial] discourse has turned contingency in-
to necessity”, trying to conceal “repressed alternative interpretations that are perfectly consistent 
with the discourse's stated premises” (Gordon 1981, 17). 
Thus, only the majority’s opinion has legal force, binds the applicants and, as concerns the EC-
tHR, represents the unique legitimated interpretation of the Convention; nevertheless, the dis-
senting minority displays a reasoning whose legitimacy is neither inferior nor compromised, and 
whose force depends only on the consensus it gains.  
Hence, I would suggest that, in defining its contents, the Courts, on the one hand, enjoy a con-
siderable margin of discretion by virtue of powers separation, while, on the other, they may tend 
to adopt a ‘political’ attitude. By this term I do not simply refer to the notion of judicial activ-
ism, but I also include the case when by choosing a restraint approach judges still perform a 
quasi-political role, for instance showing deference to specific legislative guidelines, irregardless 
of possible judicial interpretations that, as far as legitimate, would contrast with political agenda. 
The institutional asset, the architectural balance between the institutions, and the frailty that 
permeates the international and European arena impact on judges’ propensity to engage in crea-
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tive interpretation, thus affecting their final standpoints and their balance between contrasting 
interests (Mahoney 1990; Carozza 1998; Benvenisti 1999). 
Moreover, subjective elements may become prominent in complaints regarding sensitive and 
debated issues; as Holmes highlights “judges commonly are elderly men, and more likely to 
hate at sight any analysis to which they are not accustomed, and which disturbs repose of mind, 
than to fall in love with novelties” (Holmes 1899b, 455). Such statement seems confirmed by a 
plurality of judgments, both of the ECtHR and of other Courts: I recall, for instance, the long 
road that has led to the already mentioned repeal of ‘separate but equal regime’ in the Usa, the 
decades-long struggle over Us sodomy laws, not to mention the extreme carefulness of ECtHR 
to consider same-sex relationship as falling within the ambit secured by Article 8 of the Conven-
tion. 
Whether conservative or innovative, “the Courts have now definitely invaded the field of public 
policy.” (Pound 1910,15); therefore, legal culture appears as a relevant and appropriate theoret-
ical frame to delve into structures, theories, methods, institutional constraints, and subjective 
features that shape and orient the judiciary. As Friedman remarks, “judges have values, atti-
tudes, and intuitions but they have also accepted the ‘role’ of the judge; has this ‘role’ requires 
them to play the game of law. Judges […] are much the product of their institutional setting as of 
their backgrounds” (Friedman 1975, 173). 
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2.2.3 Culture, Tradition, Ideology 
 
Friedman adopts the term ‘culture’ without adducing any explicit justification to this choice, 
which appears justified by an historicist legal approach. He, indeed, traced the several meaning 
generally attributed to the concept of legal culture, without really questioning the noun culture76.  
The concept of culture is probably even less clear than the signifier ‘legal culture’ and, quite un-
surprisingly, several authors have proposed to adopt other concepts, such as ‘legal tradition’ or 
‘legal ideology’. 
A review of sociological studies about the concept of culture would go far beyond the scopes of 
this research77; it’s however appropriate to remember that both in sociology and in sociology of 
law the concept of culture is the element that assigns a specific social meaning to acts pertaining 
to any realm of individual and collective life, and that makes it socially relevant.  
The term ‘legal tradition’ basically refers to the asset and the historical development of a hierar-
chy of sources, as defined in systems of civil and common law; therefore, I would not adopt this 
term, since it theoretically and methodologically answers to comparative issues, not comprised 
in my research. On the contrary, reference to ideology might be useful, especially when target-
ing the outcome of a judicial institution as the ECtHR. 
Cotterrell analytically criticizes Fredman’s concept of legal culture, proposing the frame of ‘legal 
ideology’.  
Much of his criticism is shared by Friedman himself, and it attains to the fact that notion of legal 
culture “lacks rigor” (Cotterrell 2006, 82), is “vague” (Ivi, 87) and quite “imprecise” (Ivi, 83). 
However, Cotterrell goes further, challenging the foundations of Friedman’s work, depicted as 
incoherent: “[even though] this result should be seen […] less as a fault of Friedman’s particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Introducing the concept of legal culture Friedman does not discuss the appropriateness of the noun 
‘culture’, focusing instead on the wide range of theoretical and empirical fields where this concept has 
been employed (Friedman 1975, 193-194). 
77 Smelser provides a general but accurate review of multiple sociological approaches on the concept of 
culture. He identifies five major trends: a) culture is “a coherent set of expression of psychological pro-
cesses or conditions” (Smelser 1992, 8), b) according to Geertz “a product and a guide to actors search-
ing for organized categories and interpretations that provide meaningful experiential link to their rounds 
of social life. As such culture is both a simplifying and ordering device” (Ivi, 11), c) according to Parson 
ideology is a fundamental part of culture and consists of a “system of elaborated and rationalized state-
ments that attempt to make compatible those potential normative conflicts and discrepancies between 
expectations and reality that actors confront” (Ivi, 12), d) according to A.L. Kroeber culture would con-
sist of a “selection of a few core premises from the myriad of possibilities [and] the systematic differentia-
tion, cultural specialization, cultural play, and elaboration of those premises; and finally the exhaustion 
and cultural decline of the premises” (Ibidem), e) according to Foucault and Bourdieu culture is simply 
an expression of domination. See Smelser and Munch (1992); Pennisi (1997); Hall, Neitz and Battani 
(2003). 
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elaboration of the concept of legal culture than as a reflection of general problems in using cul-
ture as an explanatory concept in theoretical analysis of law” (Ivi, 82). 
According to Cotterrell legal culture would be a residual and loose concept, useful just to give 
an ‘impressionistic’ description of variables and relations between social actors within legal 
sphere. Moreover, even the flexibility of Friedman’s concept is problematized, in that it would 
spoil the theoretical accuracy of the entire framework; Friedman’s various works on this issue 
(Friedman 1975; 1990; 1994) suggest however that the notion of legal culture is suitable to pro-
vide explanation for transnational tendencies, and that it has the ambition to account for nation-
al and even groups level, on a multi-layered dimension. As Friedman suggests “it should be 
possible to isolate a pattern for any particular group we might select. This would include nation-
alities, too, and groups or types of nations” (Friedman 1994, 120). 
Instead of recognizing Friedman’s multilevel frame, Cotterrell judges it puzzling and, thus, limits 
the alleged utility of ‘culture’  
 
as a way of referring to legal clusters of social phenomena coexisting in certain social envi-
ronments, where the exact relationships existing among elements in the cluster are not clear 
or are not of concern. Culture is a convenient concept with which to refer provisionally to a 
general environment of social practices, traditions, understandings and values in which law 
exists. Legal culture, in this sense, may have the same degree of significance for sociology of 
law that the idea of legal families has for comparative law (Cotterrell 2006, 88). 
 
Effectively, Cotterrell’s criticism is quite compelling, and I would not cast his frame off, rather 
intending it as a component of internal legal culture. In Cotterrell words “much of what legal 
culture can embrace might be considered in terms of ideology. […] legal ideology can be re-
garded not as a unity but rather as an overlay of currents of ideas, beliefs, values and attitudes 
embedded in, expressed through and shaped in practices” (Ibidem).  
If this statement heavily recalls Friedman’s thought, in another passage Cotterrell glimpses an 
implication relevant to study the ideas, the values, and the perspectives internal to judicial rea-
soning. The concept of legal ideology provides a focus for important inquiries, about the ways 
in which legal doctrine impacts on ideological arguments, about how legal doctrine helps to 
constitute or shape social understandings and structures of beliefs, and about how juridical doc-
trine provides a path whereby extremely general premises can be translated into regulatory prac-
tices.  
 91	  
Though considering Cotterrell’s theory extremely relevant and useful, it’s useful to combine 
Friedman’s approach with Cotterrell’s legal ideology, so to provide a theoretical bridge between 
judicial creativity and interpretation.  
As Friedman aptly answers (Friedman 1997, 33-40), echoed by other authors (Pennisi 1997; 
Nelken 2004) the notion of legal ideology is far from being univocally defined and, on the con-
trary, it appears no clearer than other socio-legal signifiers; I would also add that not only ‘legal 
ideology’ is a flawed concept, but it also recalls a precise political and social framework, such as 
the Marxist one, potentially leading to misunderstandings and to consider law itself as an ideol-
ogy (Hunt 1985,11).  
Literature in the field of ECtHR remains anchored to the concept of ‘legal culture’ and the va-
riety of researches in the realm of judicial legal culture suggests that this concept, appropriately 
defined, still remains adequate. 
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2.2.4 The ECtHR Legal Culture: A Literature Review 
 
Literature concerning the ECtHR legal culture is a growing field of research, and a number of 
studies, relevant and interesting ones, address the cluster of values, ideals, and perspectives 
shared and conveyed by judges of the Court.  
Documental analyses of ECtHR judgments are still rare (Dembour 2006; Johnson 2014), alt-
hough inspiring and important considerations arise from the wider range of studies conducted 
by interning the judges, and by studying their national background and CVs. 
Recent studies stress the social and political meaning of the ECtHR, and offer the opportunity 
to place my approach within the specific debate related to the role of this Court’s reasoning in 
the institutional environment of the Council of Europe (Anagnostou 2014). 
Political scientists are increasingly exploring patterns and questions posed by the asset of the 
ECtHR, and their findings sound relevant to sociology as well. Hegel Boyle and Thompson, for 
instance, conducted a research about the correlation between States’ political system and the 
number of filed applications78 (Heger Boyle and Thompson 2001); Voeten explored the inter-
play of national policies, international architecture, and judges’ professional history to assess the 
degree of judicial independence, then reaching innovative conclusions. Politics would play a 
role in the international judicial appointment, and governments would be “heterogeneous in 
their preferred levels of activism of international Courts and this warrants attention in one’s 
conceptualizations of the interactions between governments and Courts” (Voeten 2007, 695). 
Consequently, also judges vary the “extent to which they show deference to governments when 
assessing whether a violation has occurred” (Ibidem), thus demonstrating that judgments are 
shaped also by other factors outside the mechanical enforcement of the ECHR. Even though 
national background does not significantly impacts on judges’ propensity over dissenting, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 In particular, they suggest that in respect of applications filed to the ECtHR “domestic political organi-
zation and the manner in which domestic systems link up to the international system each play a role.[…] 
Firstly, state structures that provide more political opportunity domestically are positively associated with 
claims-making in the international arena. Second, a country's overall membership in international gov-
ernmental organizations (IGOs) had a negative effect on claims-making under the European Convention 
System. IGOs may concentrate claims and/or channel them away from the European Commission by 
providing alternative outlets. In contrast, we found that the presence of international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) increases the likelihood that claims will be brought to an international forum” 
(Heger Boyle and Thompson 2001, 341). A paradoxical effect highlighted by the authors concerns the 
visibility of violations perpetrated by national authorities: “Levels of human rights abuse affected the lev-
el of claimants. In conjunction with the powerful effect of INGO membership, this suggests partial sup-
port for the ‘boemerang’ effect. Higher levels of abuse do lead to action, at least in the short term. […] 
An indirect implication is that those nation-states that produce the most claimants to the international 
system may ultimately have the greatest voice in shaping international law” (Ibidem). 
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Voeten suggests that “ECHR judges whose previous careers were primarily as diplomats or bu-
reaucrats are significantly less activist than are judges with other previous career tracks” 
(Ibidem), reinforcing an hypothesis already emerged in White and Boussiakou (2009b, 175). 
Lastly, Voeten infers from a quantitative analysis that Countries aspiring to join the European 
Union and countries that are long-time EU members are most likely to appoint activist judges 
(Voeten 2007, 697). Likewise, politics are also the focus of Flauss, who was concerned with the 
eventual impact of Eastern judges (Flauss 1998), and Schermers, whose main interest attained 
to the political elements involved in the judges election process (Schermers 1998). 
A classic and inspiring study addressing the substantial element of the ECHR is Who Believes 
in Human Rights? by Marié Dembour. She begins by recognizing the problematic intrinsic na-
ture of human rights, “both attractive and unconvincing” (Dembour 2006, 272), because they 
would rest upon an act of faith and, then, she critically examines human rights declared in the 
ECHR in the light of realist, utilitarian, Marxist, particularist and feminist critiques. In her view 
a multifaceted critique to human rights is urgent and necessary to avoid a sense of nihilism that 
may arise from the refusal of foundational paradigms: 
 
a critique of human rights is not only legitimate but also called for. […] human rights remain 
enmeshed in state interests; allow us to evade important moral dilemmas which must be 
confronted; fail to include in their ambit everyone irrespective of social position; trumpet 
universal truths which do not hold in the face of social diversity but nonetheless stand be-
cause of the prevalent balance of power; and ignore women’s concerns without even realiz-
ing it. […]” (Dembour 2006, 274).  
 
Admitting the contingent nature of human rights and recognizing that they enforce values prop-
er of a specific time and space, does not infringe their utility and symbolic meaning but, in con-
trast, allows to critically engage with oppressive dynamics that might otherwise be conveyed as 
natural. 
Dembour introduces one recurrent theme in studies on ECtHR legal culture, that is the rele-
vance of separate opinions: 
 
Separate (generally dissenting, but sometimes concurring) opinions, as they are called, are of 
special interest to me. In a separate opinion, the judge is free to express himself or herself 
outside the constraints of a collegiate text. The assumptions underlying his or her logic are 
more likely to surface, because the coherence of his/her reasoning need not be lost in the 
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process of accommodating the various perspectives of the individual judges who constitute a 
bench.” (Ivi, 9). 
 
White and Boussiakou (2009a), Bruinsma (2008), Bruinsma and De Blois (1997), and Rivieré 
(2004) also stress the importance of pluralism, expressed through separate opinions, and con-
sider it as an extremely important factor to evaluate the ECtHR environment. 
White and Boussiakou identify a number of reasons that probably justify the massive adoption 
of separate opinions: a) they allow to express the ‘nuance’ of law, its complexities, showing for 
instance in concurring opinions how “you can arrive at the same result with another line of rea-
soning” (White and Boussiakou 2009b, 177) b) they display empathy to the applicants, demon-
strating that although the majority has decided otherwise, some judges did take into account 
their reasons c) they make the audience understand that judges comprehend the complexity of 
reality and that they are in touch from the society. Finally, several judges stress an element per-
taining to the level of accuracy of the Court; beside legitimating the seriousness of the Court to 
the audience, they also enhance internal critical discussion, favouring a confront among its 
members. According to a ECtHR judge “the use of separate opinions favours at least the major 
debate within the judiciary, because if you have to five reasons why you disagree then that pro-
vokes more debate and more deep thinking. […] yesterday’s separate opinions are sometimes 
tomorrow’s majority opinions” (Judge B quoted in Ibidem). 
Furthermore “if the articulation of the dissenting position is more accurate than the majority’s, it 
will have an impact perhaps in the future” both on the Court and on the society since “plural-
ism of ideas is always helpful in a democratic society” (Judge D, Ivi, 178). Finally, the analysis of 
separate opinions sheds light on the internal culture about specific legal concepts “[separate 
opinions] show that some rules and concepts are accepted in any circumstances and some rules 
and concepts are still in development. There is no clear majority so the problem is more open” 
(Ibidem). 
White and Boussiakou highlight another relevant feature of the ECtHR legal culture, which in-
volves how the Court is perceived: judges were asked to comment the idea that because of its 
peculiar asset, the ECtHR could be considered as a Constitutional Court. This is an extremely 
relevant element, since the growing number of complaints effectively brings many scholars to 
depict the ECtHR as a fourth instance Court79; the authors found that “all the judges, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 White and Boussiakou recall elsewhere the famous Lozidou v Turkey judgment, where judges de-
scribe the ECtHR as “a constitutional instrument of European public order” (Lozidou v Turkey, § 75). 
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accepted that the Strasbourg Court has certain features or elements of both a constitutional 
Court and an international Court. […] The dual role was frequently emphasized” (Ivi, 172) and, 
although the ECHR “cannot be viewed as a constitution for Europe”, the Strasbourg Court has 
no jurisdiction to declare national law invalid” (Ibidem). Reappraising a study by Greer (2000), 
authors suggest also that a formal constitutionalization of international human rights law may 
not be rooted, but a dynamic of internationalization of constitutional law seems shared, to the 
extent that all judges “accepted that the Court could be regarded as having become a type of in-
ternational constitutional Court” (Ibidem). 
The presence of separate opinions and the consequent variable degree of homogeneity are fur-
ther investigated in Arold (2007). Her premise is twofold: on the one hand, she notes the pres-
ence of more than 20 nationalities and suggests that it would be unlikely “that the Court’s legal 
culture would be one of harmony” (Ivi, 9). On the other, contrasting Legrand who stated pre-
cisely that national mentalities prevented the creation of a European legal culture, Arold sug-
gests that “a common legal culture, or mentality, brings the judges together, and permeates the 
entire system of the Court” (Ivi, 15). 
After tracing individual professional profile, identifying three legal families -civil law, common 
law and the former socialist legal family - and interviewing judges on a plurality of themes, Arold 
delves into the jurisprudence on Articles 8, 9 and 10, testing her hypothesis and considering 
whether differences in the origin legal family do significantly impact on judicial interpretation. 
The final results verify the initial hypothesis, bringing Arold to state “in the Court, there is a le-
gal culture that successfully overrides the (legal) differences between its member states. The rich 
diversities that come to the Court create no obstacles to its work. The high amount of consen-
sus in the decisions shows a convergence of views.” (Ivi, 160) 
White and Boussiakou draw similar conclusions 
 
our interviews with judges seemed to support the view we had formed from intense discus-
sions of the material in our database, and from reading cases in which there were dissents. 
These seemed to be random; it was impossible from reading the cases to discern particular 
features of individual cases which had motivated the disagreement either with the outcome 
or the reasoning which appeared on the face of the published judgments and separate opin-
ions (White and Boussiakou 2009b, 180).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Quite interestingly, this expression rarely recurs in the ECtHR jurisprudence (White and Boussiakou 
2009a, 38), probably because it implies a discussed and controversial statement about the Court, not 
unanimously shared.  
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Leicester researchers, thus, confirm the existence of a “dominance of harmony” (Arold 
2007,16); recalling Lasser and combining his analysis of publicly argumentative model80 with 
Arold’s study, they further develop a frame suitable to describe the dynamics of legal culture 
within a complex institution such as the ECtHR. The publicity of separate opinion would mark 
a legal culture where the legitimacy of the Court “stands and falls in large measure on the logic 
and the argumentation of the signed judgment” (Lasser 2004, 338), thus echoing the notion of 
derivative legitimacy previously analysed. If the complexity and the presence of various reason-
ing-lines are read as the tangible proof that judges really delve into the specific complaint, it’s no 
surprising that pluralism and disagreement shape the ECtHR legal culture. 
It seems accurate to conclude that, in broad terms, heterogeneity and homogeneity coexist: 
judges share a common sense of identity and independence both from national States (White 
and Bossiakou 2009b, 186) and from other colleagues’ opinion, to the extent that “the disa-
greement which in turn generates separate and dissenting opinions” (Ibidem) is favoured.  
Another feature that permeates ECtHR legal culture is the high degree of judicial creativity. 
Judges of the ECtHR perform a creative role both when they interpret the Convention follow-
ing theories different from the literal tenure81 and when they are called to confront upon frames 
not envisaged by original drafters (Mowbray 2005, 58). These two elements are intertwined, and 
it’s far more likely that a purposive interpretation arises when a doubtful case is at stake.  
A relevant theoretical frame whereby literature studies judicial creativity is the continuum be-
tween self-restraint and activism; as Mowbray notes “judicial activism is a label used to refer to a 
judicial approach which seems to extend or modify existing law, especially in cases where policy 
choices are before the Court” (Ivi, 52); restraint, on the contrary, is used to refer to a judicial 
approach which “focuses upon the judge applying case law and avoiding developing the law be-
yond its clearly established parameters” (Ibidem). When studying ECtHR behaviour scholars 
generally apply this continuum to position judges but it’s worth highlighting that, as Wildhaber 
suggested, these labels  
 
need a little bit of elaboration. […]. Following judicial precedent is likely to be a sign of self-
restraint as breaking new ground is the sign of judicial activism. That works only within lim-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Lasser defines the publicly argumentative model as a model of deliberation inspired by judicial trans-
parency, by the publicity of individual opinions and by their accountability to the legislative authority. 
81 Methods of interpretation adopted by the European Court of Human Rights are extensively discussed 
in chapter III. 
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its. This Court has four different Chambers and the Chambers have different personalities. 
One of the judges may move ahead and when the composition of the Chamber is favoura-
ble, the majority may do something very activist. If you then follow the precedent, you are 
bound to follow that outcome of judicial activism. As a result, you can be on the side of ju-
dicial self-restraint and at the same time you want to change precedent. […] Court is not a 
simple continuum (Judge Wildhaber in Bruinsma and Parmentier 2003,187).  
 
Furthermore, “judges have their individual personal mentality. I cannot speak about categories. 
In one case a judge may […] be conservative and in another case may be more liberal. They 
[judges of the ECtHR] have their own experiences, their own beliefs, convictions, etc. There-
fore […] a conservative judge may be liberal in some cases and the other way around” (White 
and Boussiakou 2009b,175). From the words of other judges the professional background, a 
teaching experience, the involvement in national bureaucracies, or in human rights’ organiza-
tions affect judicial definition of the proper degree of activism; all these elements go beyond 
formal judicial role and bring personal, social, moral, and political hints into the ECtHR (Ivi, 
174-177). Most interestingly, White and Boussiakou conclude that although judges could have 
different views concerning Articles 2 and 3, when the right to life and not to be subject to inhu-
man and degrading treatment are at stake, judges are likely to find a common interpretation; on 
the contrary, such dissimilarities became more evident in complaints concerning family rights, 
on which internal legal culture displays many dissimilarities.  
It appears more problematic to assess the adequate criteria to determine which judicial out-
comes are activist and which restrained. This operation implies the analysis of how methods 
and doctrines of interpretation are used and several researches show their political implication 
(Carozza 1998; Benvenisti 1999; Letsas 2004; Johnson 2014).  
As extensively illustrated in chapter III, the ECtHR is not bounded to an exclusive method but 
it enjoys a considerable margin of discretion to work out its own methodology, on the condition 
to be coherent and in accordance with fundamental principles of the Council of Europe. Three 
are the main doctrines of interpretation whose application can concretely convey a judicial rea-
soning informed by extra-legal elements: the margin of appreciation left to each State, the analy-
sis of whether a consensus on a specific issue exists within the Coe members and the degree to 
which the Convention should be looked as a “living instrument, […] interpreted in the light of 
the present-day conditions” (Tyrer v UK, §.31). 
At this stage it seems worth stressing that internal legal culture of the ECtHR embodies not only 
theoretical perspectives but also methodological approaches, and a specific interpretation of 
doctrines, which concretely shapes the combination of interpretive models.  
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Lastly, the ECtHR internal legal culture strictly recalls the ability of the Court to promote 
change. As Helfer and Voeten ask, is the ECtHR an “agent of change or do their decisions re-
flect pre-existing social and political trends?” (Helfer and Voeten 2014,105). Although this re-
search does not focus on the efficacy of ECtHR jurisprudence, I suggest that judges might be 
influenced when deciding whether adopting a restrained or activist approach, by knowing the 
ultimate impact on national legal systems. Conducting an extremely detailed quantitative analy-
sis Helfer and Voeten find evidence that “even where international judges take social trends in-
to considerations they nonetheless retain considerable discretion and can encourage policy 
change by noncompliant countries under the right domestic, political and institutional condi-
tions” (Ibidem). Therefore, despite the permeable, continue, and dynamic exchange between 
social and legal sphere, the ECtHR internal legal culture is likely to affect political and social 
culture, whether reinforcing emerging trends or legitimating more conservative positions. 
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2.3. Gendered and Heterosexist Jurisprudence 
 
In this paragraph I address legal feminism, gay and lesbian studies, and queer theory, analysing 
how these trends differently challenge the existence of a law shaped upon the interests of white, 
middle-class, and heterosexual men. The critique to legal neutrality stands at the foundations of 
feminist and lgbt thought while social, political, and economical inequalities play a fundamental 
role in triggering feminist and lgbt movement. 
All mentioned trends are extremely complex and highly differentiated, and it’s almost impossi-
ble to produce a comprehensive and exhaustive account, if not at expenses of the clarity and the 
coherence with other parts of the research.  
It’s necessary, therefore, to identify a number of criteria to narrow the field. Firstly, I focus on 
feminist issues that have been reappraised and reinterpreted by Gay and Lesbian Studies and 
Legal Queer Theory, with the aim of uncovering the ways through which gendered and hetero-
sexist supremacy, judicial interpretation and the production of knowledge have mutually co-
constituted82. 
Consequently I interrogate aforementioned theories on a cluster of questions, namely: what 
does the expression heterosexist and gender-biased law mean? According to which mechanisms 
can prejudice be conveyed throughout legal provisions and judicial decisions? How do rights 
discourses create normalized legal subjects to which men and women have to conform? Which 
aims are pursued through a critical analysis of jurisprudence? Finally, which risks, entrenched in 
human rights, do feminist and lgbt activists highlight, and do these rights serve as instruments of 
liberation and emancipation? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The original passage refers to the aims pursued by Feminist Standpoint theory, focused on developing 
a critical account of natural and social sciences, and it recalls the need to “identify ways that male su-
premacy and the production of knowledge have co-constituted each other”, further exploring how “here-
tofore unrecognized powers might be found in women’s lives that could lead to knowledge that is more 
useful for enabling women to improve the conditions of our lives” (Harding 1997, 382-383). 
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2.3.1 Feminist Jurisprudence 
 
Feminist jurisprudence embraces an extremely wide range of theories, practices, methods, and 
strategies, whose main common point lies within a critical analysis of the existing legal order, 
from a perspective moulded upon women’s needs and interests. 
Neither theories, nor methods, or epistemological assumptions are unanimously shared, and 
also the trajectory of feminist legal jurisprudence can be described from a variety of perspec-
tives, depending on the chosen yardstick83. 
The majority of feminist legal scholars do not dispute the existence of achievements due to the 
logic of (human) rights, though disagreeing about their width and breadth, about the nature of 
interactions among gender, law, and oppression (Fineman 1995; Bartlett and Kennedy 1991), 
or about which should be the proper role of legal activism in the overall feminist platform 
(Smart 1992).  
If the departing premise concerns the existence of a prejudice against women that has been 
conveyed throughout law, according to which dynamics is this relation structured? And which 
are the core conditions for a feminist definition of law? To this questions feminist jurisprudence 
gives different answers.  
Olsen’s proposal to analyse law through the lens of “dualistic system” (Olsen 1990, 199) seems 
quite convincing. She upholds that, from Plato onwards, Western thought reinforced around 
multiple series of opposed dualisms or “opposing pairs”: rational/irrational; active/passive; 
thought/feeling; reason/ emotion; culture/nature; power/sensitivity (Ibidem). Not only in each 
binomial a part excludes the other, but they are also hierarchically defined, in that they present 
a positive element coupled with a negative or corrupted one. For centuries, indeed, reason, ra-
tionality, power, and restraint have been proposed by philosophy, theology, and natural scienc-
es as correct, superior and valuable. As Olsen notes “dualisms are sexualized” for “men have 
identified themselves with one side of dualism and have projected the other side upon women” 
(Ibidem); quite predictably the resulting hierarchical structure confers to maleness all positive 
element, whereas femaleness is associated with inferior traits. 
Thus, law works as a vehicle of enforcement and crystallization of such unequal anthropology, it 
structures rights upon biased premises; from this angle, differentiation, hierarchy, and sexualiza-
tion constitute the unstated and hidden premises of modern legal systems. Women’s secular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 For a historical introduction to different feminist legal theories see Cavarero and Restaino (1999); 
Gambaudo (2007, 93-108); Thomas and Boisseau (2011); Facchi (2012). 
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exclusion from civil and political rights strengthened their image of unequal subjects and, most 
importantly, it legitimized the assimilation whereby genital peculiarity would affect also one’s 
personality, her behaviour, and her inclinations, justifying consequently a differentiated legal 
treatment. Moreover, though female difference has been variously glorified in an ‘ideal’ world84, 
formal and informal society constricted women in the private realm, because they were as-
sumed to lack of the fundamental virtues to enter the public and political arena, among which 
the first was to be a man. 
Such a distorted conception justifies a binary and stereotyped definition of both men and wom-
en and, despite the traditional iconographic depiction of justice as a blind woman, the founda-
tions of legal system rest upon traits attributed to men: “law is supposed to be rational objective, 
abstract and principled like men; it is not supposed to be irrational, subjective, contextualized or 
personalized like women” (Olsen 1990, 201). 
Women have been long denied civil and political rights, precisely because of their alleged ‘natu-
ral’ inferiority; as in a self-fulfilling prophecy, legal provisions enforced different education paths 
for boys and girls, who were substantially denied both to access prestigious schools and to join 
civil society. Women were taught to behave accordingly to the image that men had about them 
and, for the most, they interiorized male gaze, not showing interest for other activities that those 
considered appropriate.  
Every aspect of public and private life was filtered through the lens of opposing pairs, but the 
resulting conception of world was treated as objective and neutral, as if it described the inherent 
human reality from an external standpoint.  
Hostility and paternalism historically affected Courts’ opinion on female witnesses and a wide 
stream of literature shows that judges often remaindered to sexual difference in order to justify 
their positions (Schafran 1986; Rensik 1992; Martin, Reynolds and Keith 2002).  
In various occasions women were indeed put under a pressure not existing in confront of men. 
MacKinnon, for instance, claims that in general laws against rape depart from a sexist perspec-
tive, in that they assume both that forced and coercive sex can occur with consent and that rape 
mostly means genital penetration. Consequently, Western jurisprudence is overrun with de-
bates about how to establish the appropriate criteria to assess the line above which consent can’t 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 “This hierarchy has been somewhat obscured by a complex and often insincere glorification of women 
and the feminine. While men have oppressed and exploited women in the real world they have also 
placed women on a pedestal and treasured them in a fantasy world. And just as men simultaneously ex-
alt and degrade women, so, too, do they simultaneously exalt and degrade the concepts of feminine side 
of dualisms.” (Olsen 1990, 200). 
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be presumed, how to prove a “sufficient evidence of force” (MacKinnon 1989, 173), or about 
which sexual acts should amount to rape, even though not involving ‘traditional’ intercourse. 
Moreover, women who denounce rapes are often questioned about their moral credibility - 
now less frequently than in the past- since the common prejudice spread in juries and Courts 
labels women who enjoy of a free sexuality as inclined to promiscuous sex and, thus, presumes 
that their dignity results little offended (Calhoun 1988; MacKinnon 1989; Rotschild 1993; 
McPhail 2002; Grubb and Harrower 2008). 
As such, feminist critique combines heterogeneous arguments to describe the influence of sexist 
prejudices on legal systems; more in detail, feminist jurisprudence, that is the specific branch of 
legal theories adopting a feminist theoretical, philosophical, epistemological, methodological 
standpoint, offers multiple approaches, aiming at grasping the several hidden levels of discrimi-
nation, and at developing a critical thinking about law. 
Feminist jurisprudence is an extremely wide field, for the general common goal -the production 
of a feminist knowledge about law and the achievement of feminist reforms- can be variously 
pursued. Moreover, even when focusing on a single author, it’s likely that throughout her works 
she will study several themes, changing perspective and engaging with very different arguments. 
Only by generalizing the outcomes it’s possible to identify common tracks and, hence, to distin-
guish the main approaches internal to feminist jurisprudence. 
West distinguishes between a “patriarchal jurisprudence” and a “reconstructive jurisprudence” 
(West 1988, 60-61), disentangling perspectives which are often presented in the same author’s 
work. ‘Critical’ could be a synonym of patriarchal, in that West’s target is to unmask and decon-
struct the structures of power lying beyond alleged natural law.  
Reconstructive jurisprudence is oriented at mainstreaming a feminist perspective and it proves 
essential in publicly unveiling claims articulated under the ‘patriarchal’ perspective, and in con-
veying a counter-dominant knowledge. Feminists who adhere to this cluster are generally com-
mitted at rendering “feminist reform rational” (Ibidem) and at showing that women’s claim are 
not irrational as they might appear to traditional legal science. 
As West suggests, from mainstream/male point of view, feminist efforts result invariably irra-
tional, since “the moral questions feminist pose are always incommensurable with dominant 
moral and legal categories” (Ivi, 68). To avoid such a misconception, feminist jurisprudence is 
called to undercover the experience of women, in order to “reconstruct the reforms necessary 
to the safety and improvement of women's lives in direct language that is true to our own expe-
rience and our own subjective lives” (West 1988, 70). 
A further distinction identifies a narrative and an interpretive approach. The former implies a 
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description of justice, the state of nature or of the ‘human being’ which aims for some de-
gree of generality if not universality, and then tells either a narrative story about how human 
beings thus described come to agree on the Rule of Law or, alternatively, a phenomenologi-
cal description of how it feels to be a person within a legal regime (Ivi, 62).  
 
Such phenomenological perspective marks the narrative approach, and many authors develop 
complex theoretical frames which scratch beyond the formal neutrality of Western laws. I re-
call, for instance, Fineman’s research, which shows how vulnerability affects the social and legal 
understanding of women’s roles as mothers and workers (1990; 1991; 2013), and several 
MacKinnon’s works, although as argued hereafter a number of her works falls within the inter-
pretive perspective. Embracing a radical standpoint, MacKinnon critically reviewed US laws and 
jurisprudence on rape, arguing their inadequacy to women’s needs (1983; 1989; 2006); she un-
derstood sexual harassment and abortion within a broad social frame, moulded upon hetero-
sexual men’s desire (1987), and she extensively denounced the systematic, subtle, and informal 
ways whereby sexist violence is extremely spread in contemporary society, affecting women of 
all social, economic, and ethnic condition (1987; 1989). 
The interpretive approach, on the other hand, aims at providing a legal analysis departing from 
women’s perspective: whereas the narrative is generally more abstract and philosophically ori-
ented, the interpretive one tackles existing legal provisions and decisions, in order to “show how 
patriarchal doctrine constructs, defines and delimits women. […] The interpretive critique […] 
aims to articulate what that something else might be. The interpretive critique is a lot like shin-
ing a light on darkness, or providing a negative” (Ivi, 67). Despite their different outcomes, Gil-
ligan Minow, Tronto, Stang Dahl, and post-feminists fall in this cluster.  
Also many MacKinnon’s works are interpretative; most notably her battle to modify US laws on 
pornography and to introduce severe sanctions against sexual harassment are an example of 
how feminist legal theory can inform policy proposals, and promote legal change by departing 
from women’s perspective. 
To separate among the many authors of this multifaceted cluster, a number of criteria can be 
used. The prominent one distinguishes radical and cultural feminism, where culturalism in-
volves “showing how legalism devalues women by not valuing what women value” and radical-
ism means to account for “how law objectifies sexual peculiarity, translating in legal terms the 
sexual passive role attributed to women by patriarchal culture” (West 1988, 68). 
Cultural feminisms stresses that women do have a “different voice” (Gilligan 1982), namely a 
perception of social reality and a orientation towards relational and legal dynamics informed by 
inclusion, care, mutual responsibility, and the maintenance of interpersonal networks. 
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Such peculiarities should not be discouraged - the culturalist argument goes- but, on the contra-
ry, it would legitimate the quest for a legal system that takes into account women’s peculiar sen-
sibility. Even though this standpoint has not led to relevant legal reforms (Facchi 1999, 137), the 
increasing interest in familiar mediation and solutions alternative to judicial litigation may be 
considered as partially informed by Gilligan’s perspective. On the contrary, radical feminists 
contest the oppressive tendency of law on the ground that it would be the institutionalization of 
secular asymmetric assets of power, and that it would instil false consciousness based on gender 
inequality. The core realm where inequality is produced pertains to sexual roles and, precisely, 
to the assumption that women have to be compliant and passive, in sexual and other environ-
ments. MacKinnon is the most eminent radical feminist and she combines a strong theoretical 
post-Marxist frame with an outstanding and passionate activism for legal reform. Despite nowa-
days many national and international legal provisions fail to recognize women’s needs and to 
enforce existing fundamental rights, MacKinnon strongly argues for legal reforms and, thus, de-
votes her work to an “immanent critique” (Lacey 1998, 170), which “takes jurisprudence and 
the legal sphere on their own terms, and then holds up their actuality to contrast them with their 
own professed standards and ideals” (Ibidem). 
The debate opposing radical and cultural feminists is probably the best known, but feminist ju-
risprudence encloses also nuanced perspectives that enrich the overall stream of thought. 
Stang Dahl, for instance, shares radical definition of law as an expression of male domination, 
but she ascribes such feature to social and historical reasons, rejecting the image of law as an in-
trinsic vehicle of oppression (Verza 2007, 282). Grounding on accurate sociological analyses 
Stang Dahl and the Oslo School of Women’s Law scrutinize every branch of law, to identify the 
origins of inequality, to analyse how it descends from the enforcement of alleged neutral provi-
sions, and to focus on those legal areas that are most relevant for improving women’s life condi-
tion (Stang Dahl 1988, 240). As Smart highlights (1989, 24), Stang Dahl also questions the real 
benefits of gender-specific legislations drafted without embracing a “perspective from below” 
(Stang Dahl 1988, 240). She, indeed, cautions that even if “law is gender-specific in its formula-
tions need not mean that it is significant for women’s position in law or society. The same ap-
plies to the directives found in sex discrimination legislation” (Ivi, 24) and she stress that in 
place of traditional law feminists should claim reforms in the fields of government administra-
tion, in the placement of welfare benefits, and in the decision-making processes related to bu-
reaucratic arenas and labour policies (Ibidem). 
Minow’s works are ground-breaking in debunking prejudices underpinned to legal norms and 
judgments, as well as at deconstructing traditional legal concepts, and this author embraces a 
peculiar mix of radical and cultural elements. Not only does she propose a nuanced origin of 
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women’s oppression, not confined to sexual sphere, but she notably endorses an original read-
ing of the bound between law and difference. In her famous essay Justice Engendered Minow 
overcomes the dualistic dimension of difference, suggesting that legally relevant differences are 
originally biased and partial: “Difference is only meaningful as a comparison […] Such assump-
tions work in part through the very structure of our language, which embeds the unstated 
points” and which can also reflect the dominant institutional arrangements” (Minow 1987, 70). 
Marginality and oppression derive from a plurality of historically and socially biased practices, 
often conveyed throughout norms and judicial reasoning; Minow’s mastery of critical legal 
method, as hereafter detailed, allows her to uncover prejudices entrenched in the US Supreme 
Court; in questioning judicial reasoning she adopts a frame that refuses the existence of a single, 
impartial and unified truth, arguing:  
 
Only by admitting our partiality can we strive for impartiality. Impartiality is the guise partial-
ity takes to seal bias against exposure. It looks neutral to apply a rule denying unemploy-
ment benefits to anyone who cannot fulfil the work schedule, but it is not neutral if the work 
schedule was devised with one religious Sabbath, and not another, in mind. The idea of im-
partiality implies human access to a view beyond human experience, a “God’s eye” point of 
view. Not only do humans lack this inhuman perspective, but humans who claim it are un-
truthful, trying to exercise power to cut off conversation and debate (Minow 1987, 75).  
 
The concept of difference under a socio-legal perspective is also central to Tronto who, reap-
praising Gilligan, develops a legal theory revolved around the “ethics of care”, namely an ap-
proach that “elevates care to a central value in human life” (Tronto 2001, 64) and that departs 
from the perspective that all human beings need care and give care to the others. Mutual care 
would be the ground of every human relation and, as such, Tronto argues that it should be ex-
tremely valued both in the political and legal realm. The core of Tronto’s political proposal 
rests on the claim that traditionally disdained roles and works related to care deserve to be eco-
nomically, formally and informally, much more appraised and that both men and women 
should be educated to an ethics based on caring. The ethics of care would offer space for en-
dorsing a wide range of policies, summarized as follows “1) everyone is entitled to receive ade-
quate care throughout their lives; 2) everyone is entitled to participate in relationships of care 
that give meaning to their lives; 3) everyone is entitled to participate in the public process by 
which judgments about how society should ensure these first two premises are framed” (White 
and Tronto 2004, 449). Despite on the one hand Tronto recognizes that ethics of justice carry 
values grounded on liberal principles of autonomy, rationality and individualism, on the other, 
 106	  
she rejects the frame of two alternative and opposed ethics, perceiving them as complementary 
(Facchi 2012, 124).  
Differences are at the core of also post-feminist theory, which deconstructs the very notion of 
gender and critically engages with feminist theories analysed so far. Beyond the universalist lan-
guage, both radical and cultural feminist would shape their approaches on a situated subject, 
namely on the interests and needs of white, middle-class, and heterosexual women. The secular 
oppression to which women have been exposed all over the world would not create a bond of 
sisterhood and, as such, Western feminists would not be entitled to claim to fully understand 
neither women outside Western culture nor those women which stand at the peripheries of 
Western culture. Feminists must pay attention to oppressive dynamics that would reproduce 
those unequal structures they scathe, for instance by silencing racial minorities, lesbians, single 
mothers, marginalized women, and by depicting as universal experiences which are, instead, 
deeply contingent85. 
At the crossroads between radicalism and post-feminism, Smart offers a compelling analysis of 
various standpoints that allow to delve into inequality. 
Broadly, Smart shares criticism against the idealized Woman, though not denying the possibility 
to use law to fight gender-based oppression; she indeed endorses a theoretical perspective 
strongly informed by Foucaultian models of domination, power and knowledge (Smart 1989, 4-
25) and stresses the existence of a “congruence between law and what might be called masculine 
culture” (Ivi, 4). Therefore, law appears as a “system of knowledge […] a discourse which is able 
to refuse and disregard alternative discourses and to claim a special place in the definition of 
events” (Ivi, 162). Hence, everything in legal systems, from epistemology to the structure of tri-
als, has been shaped to dismiss women’s experience, to convey a knowledge based upon heter-
osexual patriarchy and, most importantly, to instil mental clusters where entrenched subtle hints 
of domination are always present. Both domination and liberation affect the law; unlikely 
MacKinnon, Smart does not identify legal reform as the principal strategy to promote equality 
or to dismantle patriarchy, warning against the “siren call of law” (Ivi, 160). Quoting Smart “in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85  On the risk embedded by the endorsement of an almost indefinite declination of subjectivities, 
MacKinnon sharply warns: “ironically, and how postmodernism loves an irony, just as women have be-
gun to become human, even as we have begun to transform the human so it is something more worth 
having and might apply to us, we are told by high theory that the human is inherently authoritarian, not 
worth having, un-transformable, and may not even exist - and how hopelessly nineteenth-century of us to 
want it” (MacKinnon 2000, 710-711). 
For an introduction to post-modern feminism see Frug (1992, 1045-1075); Levit and Verchick (2006); as 
regards black feminist movement, see Carby (1982, 212-235); Crenshaw (1989, 139-169); on lesbian 
feminism see Rich (1980); Butler (1990); Calhoun (2000). 
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accepting law’s terms in order to challenge law, feminism concedes too much” (Ivi, 5), the acti-
vation of law is problematic as well, since it “legitimates law even while individual legal statutes 
or legal practices are critiqued” (Ivi, 161), thus reinforcing an androcentric standard and favour-
ing a juridogenic effect. In order to have an impact on law actors resorting to law have to “talk 
law’s language, use legal methods and accept legal procedures” (Ivi, 160), and often “rights can 
be claimed only if the claimant fits the category of persons to whom the rights have been con-
ceded” (Ivi, 161-162). Consequently, legal cure might prove bad as the original abuse, and fem-
inist movement should de-centre legal activism, “think of non-legal strategies and to discourage 
a resort to law as if it holds the key to unlock women’s oppression” and, ultimately, to “resist 
the temptations that law offers, namely the promise of a solution” (Ivi, 165). In recent years 
Smart has revised her sharp criticism, clarifying her perspective and giving rise to a quite con-
troversial debate about the legacy of Feminism and the Power of Law. In 2010, Smart read fam-
ily law as a creative kinning practice, thus suitable to meet the demand of recognition arising 
from lgbt and feminist community (Smart 2009, 20); in response some authors asserted that 
Smart would consider family law as offering Utopian possibilities (Carr and Hunter 2012, 105) 
and that she would be more enamoured with law than in the past (Auchmuty 2012, 65 and fol.). 
Although admitting that “law seem to be playing catch up to keep abreast of social and cultural 
changes in family relationships” (Smart 2012, 165), Smart’s standpoint is far more articulated 
than this. On the one hand, she suggests not to exclusively focus on the disciplinary power of 
law or on its side-effects, and she upholds that “law (especially at the levels of both formulating 
legislation and case law) provides a vital site for the contestation of ideas and values. It provides 
an opportunity to voice feminist values and concerns, and even possible alternatives” (Ivi,164). 
However, in her own words, law “does not respond automatically to all demands” [and] in de-
ciding which relationships to recognise and give legal standing to, law is also empowering differ-
ent parties in relation to each other” (Smart 2009, 20). Law remains a slippery field, which has 
to be carefully treated so to avoid theoretical and methodological traps coming from a long 
stand oppressive tradition. 
Feminist jurisprudence applies to several legal fields, from anti-discrimination statutes to admin-
istrative laws, form welfare provisions to family-law, to human rights. By discussing the theoreti-
cal background and the pragmatic enforcement of human rights theories, feminist debate has 
also shed light on the bias and the contradictions entrenched within alleged universal rights dis-
course, aiming to question processes by which these rights are defined and to discuss the sub-
stance of what is thereby secured (Binion 1995, 513).  
Human rights law is indubitably a tricky and ambivalent realm, for on the one hand it provides 
an extremely powerful language, a political and epistemological code legitimized at most rele-
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vant international venues, but, on the other, its historical roots “were not intended to include 
women” (Brems 1996, 137). 
The necessity to adopt a specific Convention addressing crimes perpetrated against women 
(Cedaw 1979), the incessant drafting of UN resolutions and the promotion of international 
Conferences tackling the issue of women human rights demonstrates both the frailty of women 
in contexts of war, famine, or poverty and the basic practical inadequacy of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights (MacKinnon 2006). 
Under this perspective, Binion’s and Smart’s doubts on the radical transformative power en-
trenched to law appear fully justified, and applicable also to other minorities, such as lgbt peo-
ple; Binion further stresses that “women’s experience would suggest that reliance on Courts, 
judges, and lawyers to transform the society is folly” (Binion 1995, 514) and Smart doubts on 
litigation utility to women’s purposes.  
The crucial element is neither to deny to human rights any innovative and liberationist feature 
nor to deny the inconsistencies underpinned to them, but to advocate for a conscious approach 
to the potentials and to the side-effects entrenched in the ideal of a universal, common rights 
discourse. 
Human rights bear a weighty and malleable symbolical potential, at the same time. Disadvan-
taged and oppressed minorities are enabled to frame their claims according to the logic of hu-
man rights, and to articulate them coherently with the international legal asset; as such, funda-
mental rights are a strategic arrow in the quiver of marginalized ones, and it empowers them to 
leave peripheries of law and to break into the centre of the system. 
Moreover legal provisions are generally expressed in vague terms, referring to values and prin-
ciples, leaving considerable space to define them by taking into account local experiences and 
sensibilities (Dworkin 1963; Dembour 2006; Carozza 1998). 
On a closer look, human rights framework may be considered problematic when it “construes 
the civil and political rights of individuals as belonging to public life while neglecting to protect 
the infringement of those rights in the private sphere of familiar relationships” (Romany 1993, 
87). Reformist feminism discloses and deconstructs the “roads of apologia and utopia”, false 
and misleading ones, arguing that the actual frame of human rights stands on a normative order, 
whose main function is to legitimize a specific political asset. Therefore law can perform an 
apologetic function and amount to a “paradigmatic site of power” (Ivi, 91); echoing Reilly, 
Romany explains the bound among neutrality, legitimacy, and the construction of power: “in 
claiming autonomy from the political framework law gives legitimacy to the social constructions 
of that framework” (Ibidem), and the foundations of such legitimacy are shifted from a political 
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and questionable realm to the moral venue of universal values, depicted as neutral and, conse-
quently, indisputable.. 
Hence, legal reasoning would purport to silence any critical dissent.  
Traditionally, women constitute a fragile social category and abuses against them are concen-
trated for the most in the familiar sphere, only recently addressed by international human 
rights. 
Also the partition of civil, political, and social rights, and the hierarchical prominence of the 
former two is heavily called into question, for it would not serve women’s needs adequately. 
Bunch recalls that although women’s rights touch civil and political liberties, gender based vio-
lence “is part of a larger socio-economical web that entraps women, making them vulnerable” 
(Bunch 1990, 488). Furthermore, private violence can’t be prosecuted on the ground of inter-
national human rights, because their enforcement is generally left to the autonomy of domestic 
authorities. 
Romany sharply addresses the issue and suggests to systematically deconstruct the public/private 
distinction, so to favour a flourishing reformulation of international spheres of competency. Pa-
triarchy is anything but reinforced from legal doctrines considering the private realm as intangi-
ble or sacrosanct (Romany 1993, 103). Although positive law depicts the regulation of private 
sphere as illegitimate intrusion, a combination of the two realms exists in other branches of in-
ternational law86. It is not utopian hoping for a radical rethinking of human rights foundations, 
but this embeds a significant change in the dominant attitude towards women’s and minorities’ 
interests and perspectives. 
Bunch calls for a “feminist transformation of human rights” (Ivi, 496), and suggests five innova-
tions. Firstly, in order to avoid an assimilationist perspective, it’s not sufficient aspiring for a real 
enforcement of already existing human rights, but it’s compelling to depart from women’s expe-
riences. Secondly, women’s rights must be perceived as human rights and women-centred ap-
proach has to mainstream every legal field. It’s necessary, of course, to keep on tackling the in-
efficiencies and the lack of enforcement of those rights to which women are already entitled, for 
instance condemning for instance female sexual slavery, forced marriage, compulsory hetero-
sexuality, female mutilation, and the exclusion from economic and cultural resources (Ivi, 497). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 “The division public/private, particularly in the realm of state responsibility, is variously declined and 
enforced. There are guarantees which exclude state responsibility for private interferences. Second, 
there are provisions which clearly contemplate state responsibility for private infringements of protected 
interests. Third there are provisions creating rights which by their very nature incorporate state responsi-
bility for failure to ensure their respect by private actors” (Romany 1993,119-120). 
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A similar effort, however, has to be coupled with a trajectory informed by the awareness that 
many issues are at the moment dismissed as not really related to human rights. Recalling 
Bunch, the most contested area is the ascertaining of which rights fall within the bracket of hu-
man rights87, since it requires to broke the “barriers […] between public and private, state and 
nongovernmental responsibilities” (Ibidem).  
Alternative counter narratives, combined with a critical genealogy of human rights, should be 
combined to a genealogy of legal discourse itself (Romany 1993, 92). Through “exploring legit-
imacy stories […] a feminist critique can begin to unveil the hidden accounts, the silenced voic-
es” (Ibidem). 
Liberalism would leave the promise of liberal humanism unfulfilled, and a proper feminist cri-
tique should address the imaginary of coherence promised by international law. By challenging 
the structure of international legal argument and by exposing its “artefactual nature” it is possi-
ble to uncover “how such construction serves to perpetuate the alienation of women within in-
ternational law” (Ivi, 94). 
To this aim, the notion of “embodied objectivity” (Ibidem) is crucial. Presented as an instru-
ment suitable to find common denominators in multicultural and globalized societies, it stands 
upon a twofold assumption. Firstly, it is asserted the “impossibility of reaching abstract objectivi-
ty” (Goetz 1991, 151); secondly, partial knowledges are valued insofar they are also conscious, 
and insofar “the knower conscious takes responsibility for her claims and her enabling practic-
es” (Ibidem). Dynamism and a strong commitment to immanent critical spirit would decon-
struct the stability and hierarchy of positive international law, opening up to a constant discus-
sion and revisions of identities and of the artificial criteria underpinned; “embodied objectivity 
[…] requires that women engage in a dialogue where the intersections between patriarchy and 
other sites of oppression come to the fore, where each claim to knowledge is open to revision” 
(Romany 1993,122). 
Thus, even in the realm of human rights, legal theory should depart from below and filter ma-
joritarian paradigms and assumptions by assuming the women’s perspective, or that of other 
oppressed groups. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Bunch takes the example of women of Plaza de Majo, in Argentina, who “did not wait for an official 
declaration but stood up to demand state accountability for these crimes [disappearances]. In doing so 
the helped to create a contest for expanding the concept of responsibility for deaths at the hands of par-
amilitary or right-winged death squads which, even if not carried out by the state, were allowed by it to 
happen”. (Bunch 1990, 497). 
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Heterogeneity is a distinctive feature of feminist legal methodology as well. Even though much 
of feminist literature focuses more upon theoretical, epistemological, political, and social issues 
than on methodological questions (Bartlett 1989, 830), methodologies matter. They do because 
methods are the lens through which reality is perceived, analysed, and challenged; they do be-
cause, depending on the chosen perspective, also the goals change; finally, they do because if 
feminism really aims at proposing an alternative legal critical theory, it ought to pay attention not 
to uncritically abide to methods developed within conventional legal doctrine.  
Precisely because of the already explored biased historical origins of legal systems, some femi-
nists, a minority indeed, upheld that a inherent tension would oppose traditional legal theory 
and feminist legal activism (Whitman 1988; Fineman 1995). Fineman for instance argues that 
dominant discourses would threaten to transform feminism, reconnecting it to the majoritarian 
perspective (Ivi, 17) while Whitman rhetorically challenges MacKinnon’s juridical activism, by 
asking “must you choose a language of neutrality, which provides credibility but disables you 
from saying those things you most need to say, and a feminist language, which allows you to say 
those things at the cost of being believed?” (Ivi, 86). The adoption of alternative methods to the 
traditional ones may have also significant side-costs, as concerns the perceived legitimacy of 
feminist lawyers but, as Abrams suggests “to assume a chronic tension between ‘feminist meth-
od’ and ‘legal method’ that ultimately condemns the former to failure seems both pessimistic 
and oddly static” (Abrams 1991, 375). Moreover, such a sharp dichotomy risks to misdescribe 
both conventional and feminist perspectives, creating thus an artificial and misleading segrega-
tion. From this standpoint core differences could indeed  
 
relate less to differences in principles of logic than to differences in emphasis and in under-
lying ideals about rules. Traditional legal methods place a high premium on the predictabil-
ity, certainty, and fixity of rules. In contrasts feminist legal methods, which have emerged 
form the critique that existing rules over-represent existing power structures. value rule-
flexibility and the ability to identify missing points of view (Bartlett 1989, 832).  
 
Generally, legal feminists resort also to conventional methods, though originally declining them, 
for instance by rejecting the actual hierarchy of legal fonts or processes to ascertain relevant facts 
and arguments; as Bartlett notes “feminists do what other lawyers do” (Ivi, 836): they examine 
the facts, they identify the essential features, they determine what legal principles should guide 
the resolution of the dispute, and they apply those principles to the facts. The difference against 
other legal orientations lies in reinterpreting all described phases so to unveil the mechanisms 
that convey women’s oppression and to reshape them according to feminist frames.  
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This procedure involves a number of steps, ascribable to three main methods: “asking the 
woman question88”, adopting a “practical reasoning” and resorting to “consciousness-raising” 
techniques (Ivi, 836-7). 
The woman question exposes “how the substance of law may silently and without justification 
submerge the perspectives of women and other excluded groups” (Ivi, 836). Many questions 
are gathered under this conceptual umbrella, including multiple realms and angles whence scru-
tinizing the same field. On this issue Wishik enlists a number of useful questions, that may ori-
ent a critical legal analysis:  
 
what have been and what are now all women’s experiences of the ‘Life situation’ addressed 
by the doctrine, process, or area under examination? what assumptions, descriptions, asser-
tions and/or definitions of experience […] does the law make in this area? What is the area 
of mismatch, distortion, or denial created by differences between women’s life experiences 
and the law’s assumptions or imposed structures? What patriarchal interests are served by 
the mismatch? What reforms have been proposed in this area of law or women’s life situa-
tion? how will these reform proposals, if adopted, affect women both practically and ideo-
logically? In an ideal world, what would this woman’s life situation look like and what rela-
tionship, if any, would the law have to this future life situation? How do we get there from 
here? (Wishik 1985, 72-75).  
 
Another commenter identifies three key aims implied by the woman question: “i) to identify bi-
as against women implicit in legal rules and practices that appear neutral and objective ii) to ex-
pose how the law excludes the experiences and values of women and iii) to insist upon applica-
tion of legal rules that do not perpetuate women’s subordination” (Clougherty 1996, 7). 
Quite predictably, asking in Courts the woman question does not necessarily require a judg-
ment favourable to women, while it urges judges, legislators, and policy-makers to take into ac-
count gender perspective. 
A criticism raised against this method (Bartlett 1989, 844) suggests that it would be just a mask 
covering political and ideological intents. From the recalled passage a strong ‘political’ dimen-
sion effectively emerges, and it seems combined with a clear scepticism about the feasibility of a 
neutral legal system. However, if political is used as a belittling synonym of situated and not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Bartlett acknowledges the first use of this term to Simone De Beavuoir in her masterpiece The Second 
Sex. 
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neutral, hence also traditional legal doctrine can be considered political and, moreover, as the 
expression of a majoritarian perspective.  
For such reasons I share Bartlett’s argument, according to whom  
 
the substance of asking the woman question lies in what it seeks to uncover: disadvantage 
based upon gender. The political nature of this method arises only because it seeks infor-
mation that is not supposed to exist. The claim that this information may exist […] is politi-
cal but only to the extent that the state for implied claim that it does not exist is also politi-
cal” (Ivi, 847). 
 
With the increasing attention to the plurality of differences also the woman question has been 
converted into “asking the suppressed question” (Ibidem), which turns extremely useful to ad-
dress various inequalities, that may even not imply a gender dimension. The peculiar element 
of such shift, more than just a terminological one, is that multiple issues create new identities, 
which have to be investigated through ad hoc questions. The woman question, therefore, serves 
as a model to mould new ones, to address other marginalized matters, with the intent to avoid 
general and universalist definitions. 
The second methodological cluster involves the recourse to ‘feminist practical reasoning’, 
whose departing assumption involves the recognition of a discrepancy in the ways by which men 
and women respectively perceive reality and approach reasoning. 
Emphasis is placed on the practical reasoning observed from women experience, in contrast to 
the abstract conventional legal doctrine. 
Authors who adopt this method perceive problems as dilemmas with multiple perspectives, 
contradictions, and inconsistencies (Ivi, 851). Univocal solutions would be utopian and unrealis-
tic, since they would presume the existence of situations substantially interchangeable; reality, 
on the contrary, would be “unique, not anticipated in their detail, not generalizable in advance” 
and, thus, it should be treated as “generative, [arising] practical perceptions and [informing] de-
cision makers about the desired ends of law” (Ibidem).  
The casuistic approach and the focus on Courts judgments typify feminist practical reasoning 
and, although addressing a wide range of issues, it tends to prove useful in deconstructing gen-
der dynamics within existing legal rules.  
As a significant range of literature shows (Freedman 1983; Littleton 1987; MacKinnon 1987; 
Minow 1987; Taub and Schneider 1982), thanks to particle reasoning feminist jurisprudence 
has unveiled assumed neutral rules and procedures which, instead, tend to drive underground 
the ideologies of the decision-maker, which do not serve women’s interests. 
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Lastly, Bartlett highlights consciousness-raising method, described as an “interactive, collabora-
tive process of articulating one’s experiences and making meaning of them with others with oth-
er who also articulate their experiences” (Ivi, 863-4). One of the most interesting implications 
by the interplay between experience and theory, “reveals the social dimension of individual ex-
perience and the individual dimension of social experience” (Schneider 1986, 603. Conscious-
ness is not confined to tiny informal groups but, on the contrary, it has meaningfulness also in 
public contexts. Specifically Bartlett describes different paths leading to a more sensitive attitude 
towards inequalities such as “bearing witnesses to evidences of patriarchy when they occur, 
through unremitting dialogues with and challenges to the patriarchs, and through the popular 
media, the arts, politics, lobbying, and even litigation” (Bartlett 1988, 9-10). 
Given the complexity of judgments and the variety of possible implications arising from a criti-
cal analysis of whatsoever legal institute, legal feminists generally combine all methods de-
scribed, precisely as traditional jurists resort to multiple techniques on the same issue.
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2.3.2. Gay and Lesbian Studies, Queer Legal Theories 
 
Legal theories flourished within homosexual community are more recent than feminist debate, 
but they display a similar degree of complexity, internal divisions, and critical attitude. 
Where feminists challenge gendered law, lgbt activists address heterosexist law, focusing on the 
legal institutions that, directly or indirectly, require heterosexuality as a compulsory feature in 
order to enjoy of civil, political, and social rights. 
The most compelling contribution concerns the deconstruction of biased mechanisms operat-
ing underneath legal surface: Western legal history, indeed, has been characterized both by the 
criminal prosecution of gay men, and by a multitude of subtle ways proposing heterosexuality as 
the only legitimate sexual model. 
This section provides a detailed review of the debate between Gay and Lesbian studies (hereaf-
ter GL studies) and Legal Queer theories (hereafter LQ theories), reappraising some hints pre-
sented in chapter I. Both approaches move a harsh critique against conventional doctrines that 
oppress homosexual people; therefore, the notion of heterosexism recurs throughout all per-
spectives, transcending internal differences and serving as the premise to denounce the heavy 
stigma imposed upon gay, lesbian and transgender people, who are often treated as second-class 
citizen. The normative environment, indeed, often labels homosexuality as deviant and, conse-
quently, legally assimilates lgbt people to criminals, mentally ill, perverted, degenerated, and 
weak figures. Beside social oppression, cultural stereotypes give rise to legal disadvantages, such 
as the exclusion of gay men from military because assumed to be abnormal, with disrupting be-
haviours, or as the practice not to hire homosexual teachers, because presumed to harass pupils 
(Ewing, Stukas and Sheehan 2003; Rabelo 2013). 
Heinze also refers to the “normative-heterosexual” paradigm of social and political organiza-
tions, meaning the combination of neutral rules with the unstated assumption that all members 
are heterosexuals, further noting that it provides theoretical canons informing the drafting of 
several international Covenants, Conventions and Declarations (Heinze 1995,31-37).  
Both GL studies and LQ theories reject this moral, legal and political frame, though displaying 
relevant elements of dissimilarity.  
GL scholars often expose their arguments when engaging in debates on specific complaints; 
consequently, general standpoints have to be subsumed from commentaries, notes and essays 
which combine a deep reflection with suggestions related to immediate jurisprudential prob-
lems. 
As already described in chapter I, equality, non-discrimination, and a general commitment to 
political liberalism are shared values of GL authors.  
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Moreover, the comparison between sexual orientation and other personal features legally con-
sidered immutable is quite frequent. In his valuable analysis of international rights, Heinze 
states that “sexual orientation […] counts among the most determinative forces of human per-
sonality and social organization. Those facing the entire range of human rights violations due to 
their […] sexual orientation rank on par with those facing racism, sexism and other internation-
ally forms of prosecution” (Heinze 1995, 21). Also Wintemute suggests that the immutable sta-
tus argument is a “relative objective concept” (Wintemute 1995, 248), though conceding that in 
the actual international judicial frame sex-discrimination89 and fundamental choice90 arguments 
have an enormous potential and, hence, suggesting that lawyers should decide case by case 
which instrument resort to. 
Despite queer authors contend that a similar stance would reiterate a passive, inferior, and sub-
altern image of homosexuality -namely the idea that since one can’t change her sexual orienta-
tion she has to be secured by law, as if her condition were a permeant disability- , the real theo-
retical frame is much more complex. Wintemute, for instance, leans towards essentialist argu-
ments but strongly rejects the idea that even if sexual orientation were changeable, lgbt people 
would prefer to be heterosexual. Also other GL scholars attach to homosexuality a positive val-
ue, but they are far more concerned in defining and empowering strategies which are more like-
ly to achieve positive judicial and legislative results91, than questioning the side-effects of essen-
tialist readings of sexual orientation (Heinze 1995). 
On the other hand, the main critique against LQ theories focuses on their supposed scarce effi-
cacy; commenting queer stances on same-sex marriage Richards rhetorically asks “postmodern-
ism arguments may be even less weighty [in overcoming discrimination regarding same-sex mar-
riage]. Why should any gay or lesbian couple be forbidden marriage on grounds that it would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The sex-discrimination argument states the illegitimacy of a differentiated treatment grounded on sex-
ual orientation since “the acceptability of a person’s emotional-sexual attraction or conduct depends on 
their own sex, sexual orientation discrimination may be a kind of sex discrimination like sexual harass-
ment or pregnancy discrimination” (Wintemute 1995, 17). The most well-known European case where 
lawyers resorted to this reasoning-line is Grant v South-West Trains, C-249/96, in which the applicants 
claimed that had she been a man, she would have not suffered any discrimination for having a female 
partner. However, the European Court of Justice rejected such argument, determining its rapid decline. 
90 Fundamental choice argument suggest that “because every person’s sexual orientation is chosen and is 
extremely important to their happiness, it may be a fundamental choice (or right or freedom), like reli-
gion or opinion, and come wholly or partly within a specific fundamental right such as the freedom of 
expression, association or religion, or a residual and more general right of privacy or right to respect for 
private life” (Wintemute 1995, 17). 
91 For a review of cases where lawyers resorted to “essentialist” arguments see Wintemute (1995) and 
Johnson (2014). 
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reasonably be rejected as compelling reasons for forbidding straight couples form marriage?” 
(2001, 28-29).  
It may be argued, however, that LQ theories do not oppose to legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage but, rather, they contest its prominence in the lgbt international political and legal 
agenda. For instance, Stychin clearly acknowledges that, despite the normalizing dynamics en-
trenched in the universalist rhetoric of human rights, “the discourse of universal human rights 
can and has been used successfully by local gay rights activists” (Stychin 2003, 951). 
Therefore, Richards plea to maintain “the distinction between the different standards applicable 
to our political and constitutional morality and those relevant to our personal moral lives” 
(Ibidem) appears misguided, for he attributes to LQ simplified stances.  
Reappraising and paraphrasing92 Heinze's analysis of human rights tasks, it could be upheld that 
reformist Gay and Lesbian approach intends, firstly, to name and articulate rights relevant to 
lgbt people and to decline existing ones, following a lgbt friendly frame; secondly it encourages 
to denounce violations and it seeks redress both in international and domestic venues, resorting 
to strategic litigation, political lobbying, and educational campaigns. Then, GL studies strongly 
support consciousness-raising processes to contrast homophobe informal practices, and they 
foster equal-opportunity policies as an essential step in achieving a sufficient level of human 
rights enforcement. 
In his masterpiece Sexual Orientation and Human Rights Wintemute tersely expresses the legal 
perspective typically endorsed by GL studies; his focus regards the multiple discriminations suf-
fered by lgbt people93 and, as such, the main problem with human rights would apparently con-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 “Today human rights law has four principle tasks. Its first task is to articulate those rights which are 
fundamental human rights. […] Its second task is to identify and condemn violations and if and however 
possible to seek redress. Its third task is to seek to create conditions in which human rights can be more 
fully realized and violations not simply condemned but also prevented. Its fourth task is to enlighten 
people about rights through education and open discussion” (Heinze 1995,11). 
93 The proposed definition of discrimination is extremely comprehensive and suggests Wintemute’s ef-
fort to provide the widest theoretical frame: “one person may discriminate directly against another per-
son either because of the sexual orientation of the other person or because of the sexual orientation of a 
specific instance of emotional -sexual conduct in which the other person has engaged. This will involve 
treating the other person less favorably than persons of other sexual orientation or than persons who 
have engaged in a specific instance of emotional-sexual conduct of another sexual orientation. One per-
son may also discriminate indirectly against another person by applying a neutral requirement with 
which a disproportionate number of person of the other person’s sexual orientation are unable to com-
ply and which cannot be justifies” (Wintemute 1995,10). This wording depicts the choice to subscribe a 
“neutral” notion of discrimination, since he never mentions homosexuality and the clauses above men-
tioned could be equally applied to heterosexual subjects. Though this choice might be criticized for not 
tackling the fact that concretely heterosexuals are not discriminated against because of their sexual pref-
	  
 118	  
cern only their effective enforcement. Throughout the book he argues that fundamental rights 
provide an adequate theoretical frame to secure lgbt people, and he suggests to target all efforts 
in claiming their enforcement. Even admitting that “greater attention under constitutional and 
international human rights law would not be a panacea for the problems of gay, lesbian, and bi-
sexual persons” (Wintemute 1995, 254) Wintemute adduces their “tremendous symbolical val-
ue” to justify the support the juridification of lgbt movement. 
Despite stating that “at first glance sexual orientation does not fit neatly into a list of other tradi-
tional grounds of discrimination” (Ivi, 250), he doesn’t fear eventual normalizing and discipli-
nary effects of legal system, suggesting, on the contrary, that it is possible to develop new in-
struments and to adapt the existing ones so to efficaciously enforce substantial equality under 
the already ratified human rights law. 
The explicit working legal canon for GL studies is the international human rights law (Heinze 
1998, 38) and they share a positivist perspective, without calling into question the foundations of 
international and rights system. 
By this I do not sustain either that reformist proposals are too mild or that they convey social 
ideals indifferent from dominant ones; it’s however indisputable that they operate to reform the 
existing legal system and, depending on the observatory’s perspective, this could be both a van-
tage or a limit. Reformist strategies have more chances to win in Courts, since they have been 
fashioned according to a detailed legal knowledge, and structured with intellectual acuteness 
and strategic awareness; on the other hand, however, GL scholars may risk to consider only ju-
ridical and judicial realms, paying scarce attention to political, social, and cultural elements that 
still affect the daily life of lgbt community. 
The analysis of GL studies on same-sex marriage provides a useful example to describe the in-
ternal multiplicity of reformist standpoints concerning the role of law and risks entrenched in 
human rights language. 
Bamforth, for instance, identifies the arguments of justice suitable to support same-sex marriage 
by departing from the assumption that in “liberal societies […] individual laws must have a 
sound normative justification in order to be regarded as morally legitimated” (Bamforth 2001, 
27). The author recalls that coercion might be used to enforce the right to marry a same-sex 
person, for instance by obliging clerks to duly compile licenses and certificates, or to stress the 
necessity to ground lgbt claims to a “defensible normative justification” (Ibidem). To this pur-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
erences, the absence of a dual, static, and binary definition of sexual orientation might also avoid to crys-
tallize the differences, leaving room for nuances and refraining from victimizing lgbt people. 
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pose, the most indisputable argument of justice would recall the concept of “autono-
my/empowerment” (Ivi, 41), which would serve practical goals, and which would prove as 
stronger than the arguments based on equality and respect for privacy. Conventional notions 
could be, then, shaped to serve reformist ends, and Bamforth confronts with opponents to 
same-sex marriage on their same theoretical ground, arguing that the very concepts of “autono-
my” and “dignity”, as fashioned in Western thought, require legal protection for lgbt individuals 
and couples. 
Bamforth shares with other GL authors the intent to morally legitimize homosexuality and, on 
this point, contests the idea that legal tolerance does not entail public recognition. Reappraising 
Nussbaum’s famous argument94, if being denied to enter one of the most sacred institutions of 
our time demands a symbolic and cultural price, the possibility to enter it necessarily conveys 
the moral acceptance towards homosexual couples. Not only Bamforth, but also authors as 
Feldblum and Corvino stress quite convincingly that the legislator will vote in favour of recog-
nizing same-sex marriage, only if she is persuaded that gay and lesbian relations are qualitatively 
equivalent to heterosexual ones95; therefore in GL studies the liberal approach calling for a dis-
tinct division between morals and law is abundantly surpassed, for both public discourses and 
judicial arguments are soaked with references to the meta-juridical realm96.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Nussbaum highlights the symbolical meaning of marriage, focusing on social and psychological costs 
that lgbt couples have to bear when denied to enter the wedlock: “Marriage is both ubiquitous and cen-
tral. All across our country, in every region, every social class, every race and ethnicity, every religion or 
non-religion, people get married. For many if not most people, moreover, marriage is not a trivial mat-
ter. It is a key to the pursuit of happiness, something people aspire to—and keep aspiring to, again and 
again, even when their experience has been far from happy. To be told ‘You cannot get married’ is thus 
to be excluded from one of the defining rituals of the American life cycle” (Nussbaum 2009, 668). As it 
emerges from the passage, she refers primarily to the Us context but similar conclusions can also draw 
from all those Countries where public authority holds the keys of wedlock and discriminates on the 
ground of sexual orientation. 
95 See Feldblum (2001, 55-75). 
96 In the case for same-sex marriage, reformists advocate the right to marry not only recalling constitu-
tional principles but also stressing the similarity between heterosexual and homosexual couples as con-
cerns the capacity to care, love, and commit to another person. The core element of marriage would lie, 
indeed, in the long-term, publicly expressed, exclusive, and dignified commitment and, as such, no rele-
vant difference would oppose heterosexuals and homosexuals. Corvino (2005, 503) for instance strives 
to “deliberately […] eschew the kind of reductivist thinking about sex that separates its physical from its 
emotional (or more broadly, personal) aspects”; Macedo pushes the moral valence of same-sex marriag-
es further: he firstly acknowledges that the institutional wedlock distinguishes between valuable and not-
valuable relationships (Macedo 1996, 29) and shows support to public policies that aim at encouraging 
better lifestyles without resorting to criminal laws (Ibidem). He distances himself, then, from the strict 
liberal conception of marriage, while endorsing the “attachment of benefits to the status of marriage on 
the ground that we have good reasons for encouraging people to settle down in long-term relationships” 
(Ivi, 43). Finally, he conceives marriage as an instrument to promote and persuade people to live accord-
ing to moral principles, also noting that “extending marriage to gays and lesbian is a way of allowing that 
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Other authors reach similar result though supporting a different perspective. The concept of au-
tonomy would fail to capture the relevance of social and collective dimension97 (Cooper 2001, 
77); similarly the moral status eventually conferred to gay and lesbian couples could marginalize 
those who do not fit into that model; put another way, reformist strategy might favor normative 
dynamics also in the lgbt community, rewarding those who engage in monogamous relation-
ships. Cooper, most notably, articulates a critical response that, however, does not embrace 
queer and radical positions.  
To the classic paradigm of individual equality, she substitutes the concept of “equality of pow-
er”, defined as the assumption whereby “all people should have the same level of capacity to 
shape their environment, whether discursively, by means of resources, or by recreating or dis-
rupting disciplinary structures” (Ibidem). Interestingly Cooper aims homosexuals to be included 
in “systemic forms of power based on position and location in relation to […] the law and fami-
ly, as well as discourses which legitimate or rationalize current social relations” (Ivi, 78). Such 
position significantly clashes with LQ positions on the relation among rights, power, and disci-
plinary. 
According to Cooper, the lgbt liberal perspective might imply the risk to extend dominant 
norms to minorities and, as such, to endorse diffused mechanisms of normalization.  
The anti-systemic attitude of radical lgbt movement, as well as sexual and affective experiments 
alternative to the monogamous couple, are likely to result discouraged and labelled according to 
the negative prejudice that actually targets same-sex couples. Against this hypothesis, Cooper 
develops three main strategies. It is often argued that when a right is recognized to a new catego-
ry of subject, its content will necessary acquire a different meaning, leading to a change both in 
the legal and in the social realm. For instance, ECtHR judgments against the criminalization of 
same sex acts favoured the social acceptance of homosexual relations, introducing a less hetero-
sexist perspective within ECtHR jurisprudence. With reference to same-sex marriage, Cooper 
contends that it is possible to advocate for it while refusing to undermine other kinds of rela-
tionships or personal statues. As she highlights, the rejection of hierarchy between different set 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the natural lawyers are not totally wrong: promiscuous sex may well have the essentially masturbatory 
and distracting and valueless character […]. We should offer [marriage] to all those whose real good can 
thereby be advanced: we offer [it] to the elderly and sterile, to gays and lesbians and not only to fertile 
heterosexuals. We provide everyone with help to stabilize and elevate their sexual relationships, and so 
to achieve the benefits that natural lawyers rightly claim for marriage” (Ibidem). 
97 “Liberal equality paradigms with their emphasis on the individual as both the object of equality and au-
thor of its achievement tend to divorce equality demo society. Extracting agency from the social liberal 
individualism does not deal with why someone would want to marry, treating it simply as a personal taste 
preference” (Cooper 2001, 77).  
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of interpersonal networks neither embraces the postmodernist ideal of a permanent deconstruc-
tion of subjectivities, nor does it expand “the borders of what counts as being in its proper 
place, for an equality strategy also needs to consider the implications of promoting certain sta-
tuses or practices on other aspects of social” (Ivi, 89). 
The core of her proposal implies the transformative and innovative potential that would flow 
from the entrance of gay and lesbians in the wedlock. As Cooper asks “do lesbian and gay men 
enter these spaces through marriage an commitment ceremonies in too sober and respectful 
manner? Would greater levity, parody, or the explicit incorporation of non-heterosexual ele-
ments help to sustain same-sex marriage as spaces that are not proper places?” (Ivi, 90). 
Though Cooper does here refer to queer politics, it’s hard to say whether these coloured and 
alternative representations would overcome the constricting power of a secular institution. It’s 
possible that many gay and lesbian couples share common conventions about wedding ceremo-
nies and would feel diminished by a ‘queer’ ceremony. Moreover, as Cooper notes, if straight 
people didn’t fraternize with lgbt couples, such behaviours would origin two separate paths 
where the homosexual one would presumably still appear as inferior. Precisely for this reason 
Cooper calls for an alliance with radical heterosexuals, in order to transversally dismantle the 
asset of marriage. To sum, all considered strategies aspire to reform institutions from their in-
side, legitimizing the foundational structure of existing social asset.  
GL studies highly evaluate intersectionality and difference; the disembodied image of man de-
picted by the UNHR must become embodied and, to this purpose, GL scholars promote both 
the extension of subjects secured by international human rights and the specification of the cata-
logue of human rights. 
Legal activists are aware of the power of law to define, legitimize, and shape social reality, and 
they also recognize that the normative content has to be carefully analysed, since it could vehicle 
marginalizing and oppressing dynamics. However, they contend that a critical perspective, high-
ly responsive to lgbt community and its internal constellations, should suffice to pursue libera-
tion through human rights. 
Such stream of thought attaches to law an emancipatory function and it is confident that strate-
gic litigation contributes to vehicle standpoints and practices that will reshape the meaning of le-
gal provisions and public opinion’s attitude towards lgbt issues. 
Effectively recent Us jurisprudence concerning sexual orientation has led to relevant changes: in 
the last few years gay and lesbian have been admitted to openly serve in the army, and in 2015 
the US Supreme Court rejected the ban on homosexual marriages (Obergefell v Usa, n. 576 
US_2015).  
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The presence of gay men and lesbian women in the army may facilitate a more respectful cul-
ture; same-sex marriage, on the other side, is a site to experiment a different organization of 
roles, neither gendered nor hierarchical, that could well affect also straight marriages. To such 
arguments LQ answer that regardless of all innovations, marriage and army would still lead ho-
mosexuals to adopt majority’s behaviours and patterns of thought, instead of changing them. 
From a LQ perspective heterosexism, discipline, and normativness are tightly related; indeed, 
drawing on Foucaultian theory, law itself is a disciplining system, a set of rules and practices en-
forcing, promoting, and crystallizing social conventions, political identities, and power relations. 
As concerns sexuality, law both represses unconventional drives and regulates the others, “con-
stituting and maintaining coherent sexualities” (Stychin 1995, 1), to the extent that, as it has 
been suggested, “the representation of same-sex genital relations within the particular social 
medium of law, […] of legal practices that generate the specific social meaning that shape, invest 
and are given such a persistent voice through the medium of law” (Moran 1996, 8). 
The working canon preferred by LQ authors are the discourses of parties involved, whether 
written or spoken (Stychin 1995; Moran 1996; Morgan 2001; Grigolo 2003; Johnson 2014; 
Gonzales 2014a; Gonzales 2014b). 
Stychin, for instance, exposes a perspective endorsed by many other legal queers, according to 
which “legal discourse is an important site for the constitution, consolidation and regulation of 
sexuality and, in particularly, of the hetero-homo sexual division. Sexuality is socially construct-
ed and law participates in this process. That is, sexual subjectivity comes to be naturalized 
through a matrix of different discourses.” (Stychin 1995, 7). 
Similarly, Moran unveils processes which create the category of the “legal homosexual subject”, 
with the aim to produce a detailed knowledge of mechanisms that regulate sexual sphere and to 
critically address them. If he were convinced of the inherent and immutable rotten nature of 
law, his long and passionate involvement in legal stances would appear hardly justifiable; in fact, 
he reconnects the value of descriptive analysis to the task of promoting a renewed engagement 
with law (Moran 1996, 201), in accordance with the famous principle by which “knowledge is 
not made for understanding, it is made for cutting” (Foucault 1990, 154). 
Stychin and Morgan highlight the duplicity of law and argue that beyond oppression spaces of 
resistance and self-definition remain opened. Most notably, Stychin suggests that when law dis-
criminates between deviant and normal sexual identities, it also determines the rising of unpre-
dicted, but positive, effects: firstly, it’s reasonable to presume that marginalized ones will devel-
op their own linguistic, social, and relations codes, a structure, a common identity; consequently 
these communities will explore practices and identities that escape strict legal canons and that 
provide a tangible alternative to dominant models (Moran 1996; Stychin 2003). 
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Ultimately “legal prohibitions can inadvertently create discursive space for the articulation of the 
identity of the excluded ‘other’ in a field of legal and political contest” (Stychin 1995, 7). 
If disciplinary power is entrenched to rights talk, such disciplinarity is never totalizing: law has 
some value to liberationist tasks and the main task of LQ theories is precisely to establish a 
bridge between legal doctrine and queer theoretical perspective, exploiting all positive resources 
offered by legal system. 
Stychin defines law as a “dynamic and unpredictable” locus of struggle (Stychin 1995, 140) and 
further suggests that “law and legal reasoning can inadvertently contribute to the development of 
a queer political stance and identity. In this regard, legal discourse often inscribes sexuality in a 
queer fashion and […] legal reasoning itself becomes a queer phenomenon.” (Ibidem). 
Moreover the inconsistencies in legal reasoning, the contradictions in common law and judges’ 
opinions offer a unique occasion to study and approach law from a queer perspective. 
On this point Johnson, whose standpoint stays in the middle between GL studies and LQ theo-
ries, investigates the social construction of the homosexual subject within the ECtHR jurispru-
dence looking at the “sedimenting effect” that reference to judicial arena has had on discourses 
of sexuality, heavily influencing public opinion about the alleged innate nature of sexual orienta-
tion or reassessing borders between private and public spaces (Johnson 2014, 9-10). 
Clashes with Gay and Lesbian studies variously recur, on several issues. For instance the ‘essen-
tialist’ argument endorsed by reformist movement has been widely criticized on the basis that it 
would remain into a normative binary and that would thereby justify a hierarchy casting off 
those who do not fit into either heterosexuality or homosexuality (Moran 1996)  
Though admitting successes gained by lgbt community, LQ Morgan understands human rights 
as mostly normalizing devices, in that they would “take the abuses suffered by those who assert 
difference and colonize their experience to make them conformable to the structures and im-
peratives of the mythological national state” (Morgan 2001, 212).  
Morgan’s polemic target is represented by the so-called ‘humanist’ framework endorsed by 
Heinze and Wintemute, based on the idea that legal institutions convey a benign point of view. 
Effectively both authors stress the gaps, problems and bias preventing the human rights law to 
properly function and they suggest to enlarge the already existing frame, assuming its inherent 
positivity for minorities’ claims. 
According to Morgan, GL studies would not support an extensively bottom-up discussion about 
pillars of human rights, but they would examine minorities’ claims without completely detaching 
from a majoritarian perspective, placing a misguided ‘faith’ (Ivi: 213) in human rights, ignoring 
“the fact that [they] are shaped by governments and sit to their interests rather than the interests 
of citizens” (Ibidem).  
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One could however contend, as Bamforth does (1996, 227 and fol.), about practical effective-
ness of LQ and, though admitting its philosophical and theoretical perspicacity, doubting 
whether such approach could lead to real and tangible improvements in human rights law. 
Morgan points out three strategies that should translate queer perspectives about law into prac-
tice. Firstly, academics should pay attention to “the ways in which identity is constructed in legal 
texts […]. It means attempting to refuse the fixity of sexual categories, to argue about identity 
borders, and to refuse to define what sexuality and any sub-category of it is” (Morgan 2001, 
222). Then, “instead of focusing on these status questions concerning individuals labelled gay or 
lesbian, focus could be placed on questions of power, i.e. how law regulates differently individ-
uals who claim outsider identities, how law assumes and privileges heater nuclear families” 
(Ibidem).  
Thirdly, it is necessary to open a discursive field in academic, lobbying and litigation enterprises 
in order to uncover and dismantle hierarchies of oppression, also avoiding ‘minoritizing’ dis-
courses in coalition strategies both around same-sex marriage and families. 
An excellent example that sheds an interesting light on the GL/LQ debate is offered by 
Stychin’s commentary on Grant v Southeast Railways, a complaint lodged with the European 
Court of Justice by a woman alleging she had been discriminated against for being lesbian by 
her employer, who had denied her benefits provided to married and cohabitant heterosexual 
couples.  
In Grant lawyers tested the sex discrimination argument but Stychin’s main concern regards the 
context wherein certain rights were claimed98.  
Most notably, he follows two sharp intuitions that tie together the notions of politics of recogni-
tion, politics of redistribution, marriage, and capitalist economy.  
At first glance the applicants, although lesbian, did respect the image of a typical working couple 
and, as such, Stychin argues that they “nicely fit into the parameters of EU laws” (Stychin 2003, 
82); reasons of Grant’s dismissal have to be searched elsewhere. Government submissions 
catches an insightful glimpse, for they do not really dispute the entitlement of Grant to that cir-
cumscribed benefit but they express concern for potential consequences in the event state pen-
sion and social security schemes were extended also to lgbt couples. Therefore, he suggests the 
existence of a negative correlation between recognition and redistribution, in that States are like-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Discussing the variety of approaches towards fundamental rights Stychin describes himself as “critical 
pragmatist” and evaluates rights according “to their pragmatic uses depending upon the precise context”, 
also suggesting that “rights struggles should not be divorced form broader social, political and economic 
movements for progressive change” (Stychin 2003, 78). 
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ly to easier recognize lgbt rights when they do not involve a significant revision of redistributive 
policies. Furthermore, since generally social policies favour married couples, Stychin aptly sug-
gests that “maintaining the attractiveness of the institution of marriage and marriage-like rela-
tionships requires costly social engineering” (Ivi, 85). The relevance of holding delimited spaces 
for recognized relations would hinge non only on heterosexist assumptions but also on econom-
ical ones, namely on the idea that only a situation with a clear private/public division and 
asymmetric family roles is functional to successfully maintain capitalist economy. Stychin quite 
sharply addresses GL studies, by suggesting that “activists and academics should pay greater at-
tention to whether that rendered economy is challenged by lesbian and gay legal struggles or al-
ternatively whether the lesbian or gay subject is normalized within the political economy 
through the claiming of rights.” (Ivi, 84). 
It seems clear that where GL studies pursue substantial equality and orient their strategies in 
order to mainstream lgbt claims within legal systems, LQ theories aim at a comprehensive, mul-
tiple-issues oriented critique, which interlaces libertarian, egalitarian, anti-liberalist criteria and 
highlights the political fashion of a similar legal theory (Stychin 2003, 76; Grigolo 2003, 1024-
1028). 
Valdes, for instance, clearly expresses such aspirations, in a sort of Legal Queer manifesto: 
 
Queer legal theory must traverse the dangers of our culture and avoid replicating the andro-
sexism and racism that is endemic to […] society as a whole. […] Queer legal theory can set 
an affirmative example of inclusive and expansive egalitarianism for the sexual majority to 
learn from and to follow. At the very least, Queer legal theory must be recognized as benefi-
cial and urgent both to sexual minorities and to the sexual majority because it can help to 
ameliorate the sex/gender structures that delimit everyone’s critical legal thought, can help 
to uncover the hidden assumptions and arbitrary determinants of legal rules and actions, 
and thereby help to implement overarching ideals regarding equality and no-discrimination 
(Valdes 1995, 377). 
 
Obviously also GL studies do have political relevance, since they push for legal reforms impact-
ing on the policy agenda, but the meaning of political is differently declined by LQ authors. To 
the latter indeed ‘political’ is defined as the simultaneous a) involvement in the public arena, b) 
adoption of strategies and tactics borrowed from socio-political movements, c) endorsement of 
the altering of the social and cultural status quo, and d) empowering of a broad discussion bot-
tom-up about which should be targets of lgbt movement, aimed at exploring claims regardless of 
their chance to be transposed in the legal system.  
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To sum, LQ perspective promotes the experimenting of new relational bonds, the expansion of 
spaces opened by the jurisprudence, the empowerment of all grey legal areas to dismantle the 
existing order, the rejection of any moral ‘quality medal’ conferred by public power, and the 
subversion of the actual hierarchy of values. 
According to GL studies, on the other hand, Western imprinting of human rights could be 
weakened by the combination of several steps, among which I recall: a) the fostering a global re-
flection on liberties and entitlements worth to be secured (Thoreson 2009), b) the specification 
of subjects entitled (Wintemute 1995) c) the amending of Conventions and Covenants, so to 
address the issues that affect specific groups or minorities (Heinze 1995), and d) the endorse-
ment of an intersectional paradigm in all decisional venues (Johnson 2014). 
There are however a number of authors who combine suggestions from both approaches; 
Grigolo discusses how the ECtHR constructed the notion of homosexuality and he upholds that 
essentialist narratives introduced within ECHR interpretation have been functional to ‘privatize’ 
lgbt claims and reconnecting them solely to Article 8, ensuring the right to respect for private 
and family life (Grigolo 2003: 1027-1029). The assumption that sexual orientation is a private, 
innate human trait would, hence, allow judges to link the recognition of eventual same-sex cou-
ples to such realm, leaving untouched the notion of marriage secured by Article 12 (Ivi, 1039 
and fol.). Grigolo’s conclusions have been deepened and widened in Johnson (2014), who lo-
cates the main limit of the ECtHR jurisprudence in the timid and gradual acknowledgment of 
the public dimension conveyed by many lgbt claims (Ivi, 210 and fol.). Gonzales further dis-
putes over the ECtHR jurisprudence concerning transsexuals, “challenging the fixity of catego-
ries such as sex, gender and sexuality” (Gonzales 2014a, 799) and exposing normalizing effects 
of categories shaped by the Court by considering exclusively biological assets. According to 
Gonzales the refusal to approach transsexual issues independently from the medical gender re-
assignment would reinforce “the binary genders and heterosexuality. […] Those transsexuals 
who have not yet undergone surgery are still not recognized, but this is portrayed as merely a 
temporary situation, since trans people are conceived as necessarily wishing genital surgery.” 
(Ivi, 828). From a queer perspective it might be far more desirable that the ECtHR recognized 
transsexuals claims to be treated as males in certain realms and as women in others, regardless 
of their genitalia (Ivi, 829). 
However, it’s not utopian imagining a strategic litigation informed by queer stances, but a simi-
lar perspective surely requires an effort targeted both at exploring new theoretical paths and at 
paying attention to the side-effects of reformist tactics. 
In conclusion, the quarrel involving GL studies and LQ theories leaves some space for dia-
logue. They confront over the same ground, which addresses the right to respect for family life, 
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to marry or to adopt but they carry specific reflection and, thus, enrich the overall debate on 
lgbt rights, allowing activists and academics to explore each claim from a multifaceted perspec-
tive.  
According to both, law directly and indirectly conveys heterosexuality as the only desirable sex-
ual model. Whereas GL studies solve this problem focusing on how to reform human rights 
law, LQ interrogate the law itself to unveil the fields where biased perspectives are proposed as 
neutral and natural. Thus, GL studies do positively value the conventional legal categories, but 
they decline them according to a minoritarian perspective, shaped by lgbt interests. LQ, instead 
consider themselves as part of a broader critical stream, focused on political activism, legal criti-
cism and social dismantling of sedimented practices and beliefs. According to LQ theories, lgbt 
community should reject all promises of equality that carry normalizing and disciplining effects, 
and pretend policies able to really take into account their difference(s) as positive elements. It 
may be suggested that the fight against inequalities does not imply a levelling of differences; LQ 
do not dispute that such frame is ideally possible, but concretely the recognition of rights to lgbt 
people usually requires to fit into conventional lifestyles, while the majority rarely openly trans-
poses linguistic or social practices borrowed from lgbt experience. Indeed, reformist public dis-
courses usually place the accent on how gay and lesbian people are similar to heterosexual 
ones 99  (Sullivan 1995), while such comparison is rarely presented with reversed terms.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 One of the most famous reformists who embraces such perspective is Sullivan, who discredits radicals, 
libertarians, and queers by proposing a defense of same-sex marriage on liberal and conservative argu-
ments. See Sullivan (1995). 
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2.4 Key Concepts of Documental Analysis  
 
In this paragraph I draw from reviewed literature the qualitative criteria that delimit the frame of 
documental analysis.  
Adopting a pragmatic perspective, I infer questions and categories useful to deconstruct situated 
standpoints and bias entrenched within ECtHR jurisprudence.  
On a closer look, I focus on three concepts: the notion of heteronormativity, the dilemma of 
difference(s), and the distinction between private and public. They are relevant twice. Firstly 
they touch exposed nerves and problems internal to Feminist Jurisprudence, Gay and Lesbian 
studies and Legal Queer theories; secondly these realms attain to processes of neutralization, 
marginalization, and normalization of minorities and, as such, it’s relevant to assess whether and 
how they affect judicial reasoning, especially when human rights are at stake. 
 
2.4.1 The Concept of Heteronormativity 
 
The term heteronormativity broadly remainders to a normative asset revolving around the 
normative enforcement of heterosexuality, but its borders as well as its content appear blurred. 
Effectively, heteronormativity stands at the intersection of multiple reasoning-lines internal to 
feminism and lgbt critique; as such, in defining its core features one could focus on different 
peculiarities.  
Moreover, when discussing the normative implication of heterosexuality, political, philosophi-
cal, social and legal elements come into play; in order to subsume an ‘operative’ definition suit-
able to analyse ECtHR jurisprudence, I identify a number of essential elements for purposes of 
the present research, after an overview of relevant literature. 
Heteronormativity relates to the normative imposition of heterosexuality within a specific envi-
ronment. It affects beliefs systems (Ingraham 2006, 309), social practices, legal and political in-
stitutions and, more diffusely, it pervasively conveys the “heterosexual culture’s exclusive ability 
to interpret itself as society” (Warner 1993, xxi), casting off any possible alternative understating 
of interpersonal relations. Consequently, a similar perspective is able to affect and seep through 
every space of public and private life. 
The basic assumption implied by heteronormativity is twofold. Not only does heterosexuality, 
defined both as the sexual coupling with a person of different sex and as the subordination of 
women to men’s supremacy, constitute the essential criterion to structure the relation between 
males and females, but it also justifies hierarchy as a core feature of our society. Reappraising 
Ingraham, heteronormativity “is the basis for the division of labour and hierarchies of wealth 
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and power stratified by gender, racial categories, class, and sexualities. It also underlies ideologi-
cal struggles for meaning and value” (Ingraham 2006, 309). Effectively gender hierarchy, cou-
pled with the alleged normality and naturalness of heterosexuality, transcends other distinctions, 
to the extent that gender and lgbt bias affects ethnic, religious minorities and disadvantaged 
groups. 
Another tangible effect entails the marginalization, criminalization, and the silencing of alterna-
tive sexual orientations and gender identities; any deviation from the conventional model of 
heterosexuality is deprived of dignity, it is disqualified in its own social meaning, it is filtered ac-
cording to the majoritarian perspective and labelled as quasi-human (Warner 1993; Stychin 
1995).  
The emergence of the concept of heteronormativity dates back to the second wave of feminism 
and particularly to the reflection of radical groups who begun to challenge the heterosexual 
norm, depicted as “primary source of women’s oppression” (Ingraham 2006, 313).  
If in the early ‘70s the debate mainly revolved around activism and self-consciousness groups, 
from the half of that decade onwards the discussion flooded within academia; in 1975 Bunch 
firstly developed a critical theoretical approach to heterosexuality, distinguishing between the 
ideology and the institution of heterosexuality, and arguing that they both affected society, mu-
tually strengthening and legitimizing each other. She applied such a frame to delve into wom-
en’s economical marginality, stating also that labour market and social institution ideologically 
assumed that in the name of heterosexual model women had to be subjected to men (Bunch 
1975, 34 and fol.).  
It’s however Rich’s notion of ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ that is unanimously recognized as 
the main predecessor of heteronormativity. Whereas Bunch challenged heterosexual norm as 
the origin of women’s oppression without paying attention to marginalized sexualities, Rich fo-
cused on lesbian existence which had been traditionally erased from history (Rich 1980, 135) 
and she enriched the critical reflection against the heterosexual norm. Rich’s departing point is 
significantly sharp in respect of traditional feminist reflection: “any theory or cultural/political 
creation that treats lesbian existence as a marginal or less 'natural' phenomenon, as mere 'sexual 
preference,' or as the mirror image of either heterosexual or male homosexual relations is pro-
foundly weakened thereby, whatever its other contributions” (Ivi, 131). Drawing on historical 
sources, Rich addressed the presumed normality of heterosexuality, disclosing the oppression 
imposed on lesbians and deconstructing the notion of heterosexuality as inevitable and prefera-
ble:  
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if we think of heterosexuality as the natural emotional and sensual inclination for women, 
lives such as these are seen as deviant, as pathological, or as emotionally and sensually de-
prived. But when we turn the lens of vision and consider the degree to which and the meth-
ods whereby heterosexual 'preference' has actually been imposed on women, […] we under-
stand differently the meaning of individual lives, [realizing that] heterosexuality has been 
both forcibly and subliminally imposed on women (Ivi, 138). 
 
When this paradigm is applied also to gay men, heterosexuality becomes a compulsory, con-
trived, constructed, and taken for granted institution.  
By stressing the artificial process of naturalization of sexuality, Berlant and Warner provide 
what has become the mostly quoted account of heteronormativity, understood as the “institu-
tions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not 
only coherent but also privileged” (Berlant and Warner 1998, 11). Moreover such normative 
paradigm permeates popular imaginary, minutely instilling “a way of thinking which conceals 
the operation of heterosexuality […] and closes off any critical analysis of heterosexuality as an 
organizing institution” (Ingraham 1996, 169); in view of this suggestions it could well be suggest-
ed that the principle of social union according to Western political though is the heterosexual 
couple itself (Warner 1993, xxi). 
As mentioned in chapter I, Duggan recently coined the concept of ‘homonormativity’, namely a 
set of neoliberal politics that “do not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and insti-
tutions but uphold and sustain them while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay con-
stituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” 
(Duggan 2002, 179). 
Homonormativity stands within radical queer legal theories, it is soaked with libertarian stances 
and it is informed by the intersectional glance typical of these approaches. However, I consider 
this concept not suitable to address the ECtHR jurisprudence for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
as far as progressive, lgbt friendly, and favourable to evolutive interpretation judges may be, they 
are not entitled to rewrite the Convention or to fully detach from the individualist and liberal 
paradigm that inspired original drafters. Secondly, it’s important to remember the content of 
claims lodged with the Court: in the vast majority they pretend equal treatment and the removal 
of discriminations; moreover they do not put forward queer arguments or libertarian stances, 
probably because they fear that such line would incur into a rejection.  
Broadly speaking, the ECtHR is delimited by the wording of the Convention and the Court has 
jurisdiction only on a limited cluster of rights. Furthermore, if applicants filed an application 
whose content, normative or substantial, fell beyond ECtHR competencies, it would be deemed 
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inadmissible. Of course judges enjoy a margin of discretion in deciding admissible issues and 
arguments, but they move within a process of enlarging or restricting the gaps and flaws of the 
Convention, rather than operating a radical subversion of the Convention itself.  
In contrast, a critique against heteronormativity is useful to deconstruct the moral assumptions 
of the ECtHR jurisprudence, because it does not pretend to criticize judges’ reasoning accord-
ing to parameters that judges actually can’t meet, but it shows the disciplinary feature of existing 
legal system, unveiling and deconstructing the assumption of neutrality. As Morgan suggests, 
heteronormativity “entails understanding various ways in which law exercises power over indi-
viduals and communities” (Morgan 2001, 211); with reference to the ECtHR the emergence of 
lgbt litigation, indeed, questioned the prominence of heterosexual norm and, as Johnson ar-
gues, “in responding to complaints about heteronormative law, these judgments are examples of 
how judicial ‘ways of thinking’ are implicated in both the reproduction and disruption of heter-
onormative social relations” (Johnson 2011, 351). 
Heteronormativity comprises a variety of shades and while some authors, such as Berlant, 
Warner, Rich stress the role of heterosexual norm in shaping cognitive structures by which we 
organize and evaluate the reality, others, such as Stychin, Morgan, Moran, Johnson, and Smart 
study how political, criminological, social, and legal institutions reinforce a heteronormative en-
vironment. 
The relevance of law is unique and fundamental, for “practices, processes and doctrines of law 
are one of the most important mechanisms for ensuring the ‘privilege’ of heterosexuality” 
(Johnson 2011, 350). Law, indeed, distributes legal benefits through rights and at it clearly be-
stows valuable or not-valuable meanings to social and individual behaviours (Nussbaum 2009; 
Zanetti 2015). Smart famously wrote about the effortless privilege of heterosexuality (Smart 
1996, 173): whereas culture and social environment lay the argumentative foundations for het-
eronormative society, it is precisely the legal system that proposes such normative framework as 
effortless, by marginalizing, prosecuting, ignoring other sexualities, and enforcing a “[a] hege-
monic discursive/epistemic model of gender intelligibility that assumes that for bodies to cohere 
and make sense there must be a stable sex expressed through a stable gender (masculine ex-
presses male, feminine expresses female) that is oppositionally and hierarchically defined 
through the compulsory practice of heterosexuality” (Butler 1990, 151). 
Focusing on international human rights law, it is essential to examine judicial standpoints that 
structure the reasoning and the wording, thus critically uncovering contending discourses that 
ofer different and contrasting conceptions of the same concept (Morgan 2001, 218). 
The notion of heteronormativity also provides a frame to discuss discourses that, though tolerat-
ing homosexuals, depict them as ‘others’, hence crystallizing their difference to better identify 
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heterosexual ones. On this point I share Morgan’s argument, according to whom tolerance “is a 
common technology of liberalism, effective in maintaining an otherizing and subordinating hi-
erarchy at the same time as it grants rights from its position of passionless neutrality” (Ivi, 220). 
The problem here implied is that tolerance results too often associated with negative judgments: 
“you don’t tolerate something which is good (you celebrate it), you only tolerate things you 
would rather didn’t exist. Tolerance is a practice of oppression” (Ibidem). 
The European Court of Human Rights has a jurisdiction extended over 800 millions of people; 
even though the Court in each judgment addresses directly only the respondent State, it is ex-
tremely likely that at equal conditions the same interpretation of the Convention would be ap-
plied to other States. Moreover, ECtHR statements recurrently have a general impact, at least 
theoretically, and they have the authority to broaden the field of application of a specific norm, 
irregardless of the specific respondent State. As such, the ECtHR is increasingly treated as a 
policy institution (Johnson 2014; Hodson 2014; Anagnostou 2014) and because of its essential 
role in giving substance to ideals expressed in the ECHR, it can be considered as a vehicle in 
developing a “common soul of Europe” (Coleman 1999, 19) 
Reappraising anti-formalist stances and Friedman’s theories, judges are embedded within a so-
cial and institutional context that orients how they interpret their role and how they perceive the 
claims which they are called to judge. As Johnson suggests, in a socio-legal perspective 
 
a useful way of thinking about how individual motivations may underpin forms of reasoning 
and decision-making is through a consideration of how the standpoints that individuals oc-
cupy influence both their comprehension of, and orientation to reality. Standpoints are not 
understood to result from ‘will’ but, […] from our experience of the social relations in which 
we are situated” (Johnson 2011, 353). 
 
Heteronormativity, thus, provides a theoretical and practical instrument to problematically ad-
dress traditional heterosexual model, by analysing how it is pervasively conveyed throughout 
formal and informal rules, behaviours, and social expectations. It enables to denounce the 
normative character entrenched within conventionally undisputed codes of living and to reject 
the idea that such an understanding of sexuality or family would represent only an objective de-
scription of reality.  
 133	  
2.4.2 The Dilemma of Difference(s) 
 
I already variously recalled the problematic issue of how to frame, claim and treat difference, 
and I explored the multifaceted and passionate debate internal to lgbt and feminist movement. 
Difference, indeed, emphasizes a dissimilarity, and although it can be positively asserted, it al-
ways traces a distinction. In fact, post-modern feminist and queer stream of though stress the 
multiple declination of this concept, and argue it should be better to discuss of differences, so to 
comprise silenced identities built on the intersection of several marginal experiences.  
The strain between ‘feminism of sameness’ and ‘feminism of difference’ lies at the foundations 
of feminist legal theory and it entails how to deal with existing differences. The answer to this 
question implies an in-depth evaluation of the concept of difference itself, for it brings to con-
sider whether differences related to gender really exist or if they are socially and culturally de-
rived.  
Until 1970s, liberal feminism argued for the removal of all formal obstacles that denied gender 
equality and, most significantly, it placed emphasis on the sameness between men and women, 
denying that the latter went through social and cultural experiences which had to weight in the 
public sphere. Liberal feminists denied difference because Western justification for the subor-
dination of women traditionally resorted to their peculiarity, with the aim to allege their unsuit-
ability for public life. 
During 1970s and 1980s a new claim of difference emerged, and younger generations of femi-
nists reassessed the meaning of difference, arguing that it’s not fair to pretend that women com-
pete within a society shaped by male values and rules, since such paradigm implicitly takes male 
model as the reference one and constricts women to adhere to it. Within the boundless femi-
nist literature on this point I consider Young, Tronto and Scott extremely enlightening, both for 
their critical reflection over difference/sameness debate and for the direct implications of their 
work on lgbt issues. In Justice and Politics of Difference (1990) Young highlights the relation 
among the ideals of equality, difference and, respectively, the politics of assimilation and the 
politics of emancipation. The ideal of equality would imply  
 
[a] strategy of assimilation, [that] aims to bring formerly excluded groups intro the main-
stream. So assimilation always implies coming into the game after it is already begun, after 
the rules and standards have already been set and having to prove oneself according to those 
rules and standards. In the assimilationist strategy, the privileged groups implicitly define the 
standards according to which all will be measured (Young 1990, 164).  
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As Young argues:  
 
An emancipatory politics that affirms group difference involves a reconception of the mean-
ing of equality. The assimilationist ideal assumes that equal social status for all persons re-
quires treating everyone according to the same principles, rules, and standards. A politics of 
difference argues, on the other hand, that equality as the participation and inclusion of all 
groups sometimes requires different treatment for oppressed or disadvantaged groups. To 
promote social justice, I argue, social policy should sometimes accord special treatment to 
groups (Ivi, 158). 
 
Scott describes a similar trap, and she warns that “when equality and difference are paired di-
chotomously, they structure an impossible choice. If one opts for equality, one is forced to ac-
cept the notion that difference is antithetical to it. If one opts for difference, one admits that 
equality is unattainable” (Scott 1988, 43).  
With reference to lgbt claims the riddle revolves around the fact that homosexuals can’t claim 
legal protection without comparing their experience to heterosexuals’ one, traditionally assumed 
as normal. Since neither equal nor special treatment could effectively overthrow the normative 
assumption of heterosexuality as the departing point from which differences should be meas-
ured - the argument goes- the equality-difference dilemma does not entail a substantial criticism 
to heterosexual norm, which remains, on the contrary, the milestone both for the comparison 
and for the evaluation of minority claims:  
 
the relatively powerless have to persuade the powerful to allow them to enter into the circle 
of power that already exists. In trying to make such a persuasive case, the powerless have on-
ly two options available to them to change the distribution of power […]: to claim that they 
should be admitted to the centre of power because they are the same as those already there, 
or because they are different from those already there, but have something valuable to offer 
to those already there. Thus […] the strategic problem of trying to gain power from the mar-
gins necessitates the logic of sameness or difference in order to persuade those with power 
to share it. Once this framework for analysis is accepted, then there is no logical way to es-
cape from many dimensions of difference dilemma. The outsiders, who must on some level 
accept the terms of the debate as they have been historically and theoretically constructed by 
those in the centre of power, must choose from that starting point one of two positions on 
the question of difference (Tronto 1993,15). 
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From the perspective of traditionally oppressed groups, dealing with difference is also extremely 
complex, both on a descriptive and on a normative level. 
Operatively, how can judicial response be critically analysed? Among the many approaches, I 
will focus on Minow’s reflection of legal traps that, though maintaining an aura of neutrality, rel-
egate minoritarian groups at the margins of the society First of all it’s necessary to stress the 
complexity posed by the so called ‘dilemma of difference’ (Minow 1987, 157), namely the risk 
that either by ignoring or by recognizing the alterity judges pose a burden on different ones and 
subtly reinforce a majoritarian understanding of reality100. Secondly, depending on how Courts 
perceive differences, judges might endow perspectives not entirely soaked with dominant as-
sumptions; this chance requires, however, to admit that differences are relational (Minow 1987, 
32). 
“Is difference an objective, verifiable matter rather than something constructed by social atti-
tudes?” asks Minow (Ivi, 34) and even if some objective differences existed, do they justify dif-
ferent legal treatment? If so, which differences are worth of legal relevance? To all these ques-
tions Minow answers lingering on the social constructed meaning of difference. In the vast ma-
jority of cases, indeed, legal practice identifies, names, and shapes differences, giving them 
normative, moral, political, and social poignancy. Even when addressing an objective difference, 
for instance the fact that men do not become pregnant, it’s easily rebuttable whether such fea-
ture should suffice to justify a legal frame enforcing women’s domestic reclusion.  
As a general and superficial overview of Western jurisprudence shows, judges rarely adopted a 
similar critical standpoint, assuming on the contrary differences to be intrinsic, stable, objective 
and indisputable (Minow 1985; 1987). 
Treating someone differently implies however a comparison101 and “when differences are dis-
cussed without explicit reference to the person or trait on the other side of the comparison an 
unstated norm remains” (Minow 1987, 39). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Minow argues “the dilemma of difference has three versions. The first version is the dilemma that we 
may recreate difference either by noticing it or by ignoring it. […] The second version of the dilemma is 
the riddle of neutrality. Of the public schools must remain neutral toward religion, do they do so by bal-
ancing the teaching of evolution with the teaching of scientific arguments about divine creation - or does 
this accommodation of a religious view depart from the requisite neutrality? […] The third version of the 
dilemma is the choice between broad discretion which permits individualized decisions and formal rules 
that specify categorical decisions for the dispensing of public - or private- power” (Minow 1987, 12-13). 
101 “Legal treatment of difference tends to take for granted an assumed point of comparison: women are 
compared to the unstated norm of men, minority races to whites, handicapped to able-bodied, and mi-
nority religions to majorities. Such assumption work in part through the very structure of our language, 
which embeds the unstated points of comparison inside categories that but their perspective and wrongly 
imply a natural fit with the world.” (Minow 1987, 13) 
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A critical analysis of jurisprudence is, thus, called to uncover unstated premises and to investi-
gate their impact. A further question, descending from the alike theoretical frame, considers the 
mechanisms by which judges mantle their standpoints with natural assumptions. 
It’s appropriate to explicit that often assumptions covering biased standpoints are used not con-
sciously and judges might be convinced to work without prejudice. 
According to a quite common expectation, judges would be able to “see without a perspective” 
(Ivi, 45). Starting from the premise of static and objective differences, it logically follows that a 
versed legal judge could recognize untainted facts and to judge accordingly. But such aspira-
tions, as Minow suggests, remains just that, since “it may suppress the inevitability of the exist-
ence of a perspective and thus make it harder for the observer or anyone else to challenge the 
absence of objectivity” (Ivi, 45-46).  
In the argumentative model endorsed by the ECtHR, the Court generally pays attention to the 
applicants’ position and deals to ascertain if it falls under the ECHR jurisdiction. They, thus, 
aim at weighting argumentations and, therefore, they apparently do not take into account any 
prejudiced suggestion. 
However, if considering the judge as a person influenced by cultural, social, political, and legal 
variables, it is likely that when sensitive issue about conventionally marginalized groups are at 
stake, the majority of judges will consider other's perspective “irrelevant” (Ivi, 50).  
Other's perspective could be ignored, simplified, twisted, misinterpreted or, more probably, 
understood through the interpretive and cognitive lens of majoritarian assumptions. The most 
trivial way to neutralize the other’s perspective is to openly rejects it, while the most sophisticat-
ed includes an apparent evaluation of minoritarian positions, insofar they can be reconnected to 
the majority and normalized. 
As Gilman suggests, stereotyped thinking deals with anxieties and desires for control (Gilman 
1985, 23), it nullifies the individuality of the person, enclosing it in a predefined category and 
making the reality familiar and unsurprising. 
The main consequence of a similar reasoning line is assuming that “the status quo in natural, 
uncoerced and good” (Minow 1987, 54). Prescriptions and practices inscribed in the tradition 
are generally justified precisely because of their historical roots, held as an inheritance from our 
ancestors which ensures social cohesion and mutual networks. As Minow considers, these 
propositions are “rarely stated” and deeply “entrenched”, to the extent that status quo and sta-
bility are generally seen as synonyms of a positive continuity with the past, even when resulting 
inadequate to the present context (Ibidem). 
 137	  
When studying legal texts, these questions help to study what lies beyond asserted neutrality, to 
promote a conception of human rights devoted to complexity and sensitive towards a depiction 
of the judiciary as filled of competing interests. 
Rephrasing Minow’s conclusions about engendered justice, judges are sensitive about sexual 
orientation when they “admit the limitation of their own viewpoints, […] reaching beyond those 
limits by trying to see from contrasting perspectives and when [they] seek to exercise power to 
nurture differences to to assign and control them” (Ivi, 95). 
Finally, I share Minow’s urging for stressing judicial partiality 
 
through deliberate attention to our own partiality we can begin to acknowledge the dangers 
of pretended impartiality. […] Admitting the partiality of the perspective that temporarily 
gains official endorsement may embody resistance to announced rules. But only admitting 
that rules are resistible and by justifying to the governed their calls for adherence can justice 
be done in a democracy (Ibidem). 
 
The notion of difference rests on the comparison between at least two terms; likewise, also judi-
cial review strongly refers to comparison, especially in non-discrimination issues. In similar cas-
es judges are called to decide whether two or more groups deserve to be treated as equal and, to 
this purpose, they have to decide which similarities different groups share, first, and then to 
weight them with dissimilarities, if any, and finally to judge whether differentiated treatments 
amount to discrimination.  
As such, it proves useful going beyond the final judicial outcome, to discuss canons whereby dif-
ferences have been defined, typified and incorporated in the interpretation of law.  
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2.4.3 Between Private and Public 
 
‘The personal is political’ declaimed a common feminist political slogan during the1970s, 
meaning that the social asset typical of private realm conveys oppressive dynamics that have to 
be uncovered and publicly addressed102. The distinction between private and public, the de-
nounce of risks associated with the former, and the critique of the latter as moulded on majori-
tarian ideals have characterized all contemporary social and political movements, from Femi-
nism to Race theory, from marginal studies to lgbt theory (Minda 1995, 83-167). 
When discussing legal rights, the question becomes even more harder, for Western thought has 
generally sanctified the private sphere as intangible, by appointing a legal system targeted at en-
forcing such separation, and at withdrawing from any regarded as galling behind private walls.  
The asymmetric division of familiar roles was legitimized by family statutes that denied women 
the right to vote, to inherit, to have properties, or even to work without their husbands’ con-
sent103.  
Privacy amounted, therefore, to a chain that constricted women and, at the same time, that ren-
dered their experience, desires, and claims socially invisible and politically irrelevant. 
Okin devoted much of her work to challenge the private/public distinction (Okin 1979, 1989, 
1999), arguing that this binomial would be the origin of most gendered inequalities and abuses 
and that its very existence would require “the division of labour among the sexes” (Okin 1999, 
118). Upholding an historical perspective she also highlights the entrenched patriarchal nature 
of liberal rights, in that  
 
from the seventeenth century beginnings of liberalism both political rights and rights pertain-
ing to the modern liberal conception of privacy and the private have been claimed as rights 
of individuals […] assumed to be adult, male head of households. Thus the rights of these 
individuals to be free from intrusion by the state […] were also these individuals’ rights not 
to be inferred with as they controlled the other members of their private sphere - those who 
whether by reason of age, or sex, or condition of servitude were regarded as rightfully con-
trolled by them and existing within their sphere of privacy. (Ibidem).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102  For an introduction to the feminist critique of ‘privacy’ see Hanish (1969), available at 
http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html; Pateman (1988); Olsen (1993, 319- 327); MacKin-
non (1987); Landes (1998) 
103 For an introduction to Us jurisprudence on this issue see Hoff (1991). An accurate history of europe-
an women’s condition is offered by Duby and Perrot (1994); See also Scott and Tilly (1975, 36-74); Si-
monton (2006). 
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In respect of sexual orientation, the binary between private and public has developed quite dif-
ferently from that based on gender issues, and also the current debate over this binomial identi-
fies advantages and disadvantages, both in stressing the privacy and in focusing on the public 
dimension of sexual orientation. 
Historically criminal sanctions against same-sex acts infringed the private realm and denied that 
individuals should enjoy a space where to decide with whom having sexual relationships. 
Unsurprisingly, thus, homophile movement and early advocacy groups challenging criminal 
laws pledged to the recognition of a private individual sphere. For instance, in the famous Us 
case Bowers vs Hardwick, gay applicants alleged that police should refrain from prosecuting 
them for engaging in homosexual acts within the walls of their bedroom; the majority of the 
Court, however, denied that “Constitution confers a right of privacy that extends to homosexual 
sodomy” (Bowers v Hardwick 1986, White opinion) . In 2003 Us Supreme Court overturned 
this doctrine in Lawrence v Texas, recognizing both the lgbt right to sexual privacy and their 
freedom in choosing to engage in homosexual acts.  
Also in the UK, in France and in other Western countries where homosexuality was prosecut-
ed, the privacy argument proved extremely useful and it favoured the decriminalization of such 
sexual behaviours (Wintemute 2001). 
Yet, on a closer look, the appeal to privacy leads to problematic outcomes, potentially collaps-
ing over the famous figure of the ‘closet’, namely the metaphor to indicate the phenomenon of 
people who publicly pretended to be heterosexual and then, with few intimates and friends, 
admitted their orientation (Stychin 1995, 140 and fol.).  
Whereas heterosexuality has always had a strong public value, until recent times homosexuality 
has been presented as a private and dishonourable matter. As Grigolo prods  
 
it must be clear […] that this private choice must find a parallel recognition in the public 
sphere. Indeed ‘private’ is simply the choice of assuming a sexual identity or engaging in 
sexual behaviour; […] the right to choose sexual activity and sexual identity starts, but does 
not end, within one’s private life” (Grigolo 2003, 1040). 
 
In a similar situation lgbt people would be only tolerated, but certainly not equally valued to 
heterosexual ones.  
Moreover, the intangibility surrounding the institution of family has legitimized informal sanc-
tions against lgbt members, the spreading of homophobe education and, until very recently, 
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Western legislators did not even discuss the necessity to provide safe familiar cultural and social 
environment for lgbt young people, exposed to a higher risk of suicide and attacks.  
Non-discrimination claims pledge for the public relevance of homosexuality, as a personal fea-
ture that deserves to be protected; until domestic or international authorities insist that the only 
enforceable rights concerns the right to privately engage in same-sex acts, this implies that any 
public display of one’s own sexual orientation might threat her security. Just to quote a famous 
example, the Us ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy did not consider homosexuality in the army as a 
crime, only requiring that gay and lesbian soldiers kept this feature secret. Any public disclosure 
of an alleged private feature justified the expulsion from the army104. As Valdes recalls “the im-
plementation of the Gays-in-the-Military compromise illustrates [that] current conceptions of 
privacy can be used by dominant forces both as a shield and a sword against sexual minority 
equality claims” (1995, 370).  
Between 1993 and 2010 hundreds of gay and lesbian soldiers were forced to wear a public 
mask, to dissimulate their identity according to a psychological mechanism named passing, 
which bears negative consequences for subjects’ stability (Belkin 2003). 
Furthermore, I consider Valdes critique valuable also to describe risks connected to an exces-
sive ‘privatization’ of (homo)sexuality:  
 
the misuse of privacy is wholly incompatible with dignity and acceptance because the ap-
pearance of equality is granted only at the price of a secrecy not borne by members of the 
sexual majority. […] the insistence that only lesbian, gay, and bisexual service members keep 
their sexuality private (and secret) works like a sword that beats back the expression of sexu-
al minority identity while, at the same time, the privacy of the sexual majority is waved as if 
shielding legitimate concerns and social justice (Valdes 1995, 370-371). 
 
The entrance in the public arena, on the contrary, allows lgbt to proudly claim their difference, 
to pretend equal rights, to fight for statutes against discrimination and for the legal recognition 
of families they choose. 
There’s little to argue about the relevance of dismantling all legal differences, and also LQ theo-
ries support strategic litigation, especially when concerning work field, assistance and health 
care. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See also Belkin and Bateman (2003); Zanetti (2015). 
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Furthermore, I would distinguish between entering the public arena and engaging in strategic 
litigation, or endorsing political compromises. Queer theory, indeed, is all about going public, 
about dismantling the closet, puzzling heteronormative division of spaces, and invading the pre-
sumed desexualized public space with queer practices and discourses.  
Queer strategies, thus, are both public and political, in that they pursue the aim to break the 
fundamental assumptions about sexuality, and to seep through spaces not entirely covered by 
oppressive and regulatory legal power105.  
Strategic litigation might be a part of the aforementioned frame, insofar it supports a deep criti-
cism of private/public binary; as concerns human rights law, the overwhelming majority of activ-
ists criticizes the ‘privatization’ of fundamental rights concerning sexuality, though welcoming 
the ensuring of private spaces where living same-sex sexuality. One of the main problems that 
threatens the effective empowerment of human rights related to sexual orientation and gender 
identity is bound, indeed, to the fact that international Courts often confine the existence of lgbt 
pretences to a narrow sphere, without fully taking into account consequences that lgbt persons 
have to face in everyday public life. Furthermore, States not tolerating homosexuality argue that 
sexual policies fall within domestic sovereignty, and often adduce cultural or religious particular-
ist justifications, adding difficulty to the global affirmation of gay rights. 
Further narrowing the perspective on Western context, the binary public/private has been prob-
lematize from a plurality of perspectives. 
With reference to Us jurisprudence Wintemute delved into the already mentioned Bowers v 
Hardwick case, questioning whether if the applicant’s claim had been recognized the Court de-
cision would have amounted to a “watershed decision, like Brown vs. Board of Education” 
(Wintemute 1995, 47).  
The argumentative reasoning followed by Hardwick’s counsel and endorsed by a minority of 
judges was anchored on mild claims; against the threat that Hardwick case might open to anti-
discrimination statutes or same-sex marriages, his counsel suggested that the applicant “claimed 
no right whatever to have any homosexual relationship recognized as marriage” (Ivi, 48) further 
highlighting that even if the Court upheld Hardwick complaint, such judgment would “not cast 
doubt on any administrative programs that states might fashion to encourage traditional hetero-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 “Queerness challenges the boundaries through which constraints have been imposed upon sexual ex-
pression, for crucial to a sexually radical movement for social change is the transgression of categorical 
distinctions, between sexuality and politics, with their typically embedded divisions between public, pri-
vate and personal concerns. […] The challenge to sexual boundaries offered by many queers in the 
1990s also included sexual practices themselves.” (Stychin 1995, 152). 
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sexual unions” (Ibidem). The fact that the Us Supreme Court did not entail work discrimina-
tion or family laws effectively demonstrates how Wintemute concerns about the constraints of 
shaping lgbt claims upon ‘privacy right’ were well grounded. He raised similar criticism also in 
respect of the ECtHR, stressing the tendency to frame every lgbt complaint under Article 8, 
which secures the right to respect private and family life. More recently Johnson (2014) con-
ducted a careful research on ECtHR jurisprudence, further enhancing previous conclusions. 
On the one hand he admitted the Court’s reluctance to consider claims about freedom of as-
sembly, freedom of speech, or in respect of human dignity, emphasizing that  
 
the Court still relies upon a public/private binary when interpreting the Convention in re-
spect of sexual orientation complaints […] leav[ing] unaddressed a range of discrimination 
experienced in public sphere” (Ivi, 212). On the other, however, he optimistically identified 
many reasons to positively evaluate the potential of Court’s jurisprudence in expanding the 
protection available to lesbian and gay people under the Convention (Johnson 2014, 210). 
 
The picture Johnson suggests is that of a system wherein lgbt applicants are expanding existing 
spaces and creating new ones, suitable to respond to their own demands. 
The ultimate assumption lies in the belief that judges, however slowly and gradually, embody a 
crucial bastion for equality all across Europe. 
Such optimism is not entirely shared by Grigolo, whose compelling ECtHR criticism is essential 
for any work that aims at discussing the bound between judicial reasoning and sexual orienta-
tion. In particular, the qualification of lgbt rights as ‘exceptional’ and equated to minorities’ 
rights favours a “minoritization” (Ibidem) of lesbian and gay people, who become a stable 
group, defined according to majoritarian perspectives and not to their own self standards. In-
deed, in human rights law field “in order to achieve recognition, the homosexual legal subject 
has been presented as the legal counterpart of the heterosexual within a sexual diary logic” 
(Grigolo 2003: 1027) and, furthermore, “homosexual rights are […] eventually obtained in the 
light of social changes but necessarily in terms of their acceptability in relation to the predomi-
nant moral and behavioural standards of heteronormativity” (Ibidem).  
Against such frame Grigolo suggests to critically investigate how this ideal of a heterosexual legal 
subject capillary permeates the frame of fundamental rights, in order to dismantle this hierarchy 
and to support the creation of a universal sexual legal subject.  
Among critical legal queer I finally recall Morgan, who though displaying an extreme suspicious 
attitude in respect of human rights, does not ignore their potential. In even more abrupt terms, 
he label privacy rights as discourses that maintain the 
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notion of good citizen, who keeps sexual matters hidden. This silences sexual differences. 
[…] A sexual rights discourse based on tolerance and privacy amounts to no more than het-
ero law makers simultaneously assimilating a perceived threat by extending ‘rights’ (toler-
ance), whilst maintaining the subordination of those perceived as the threat (by validating 
heteronormativity). (Morgan 2001, 220-1). 
 
While Johnson, Wintemute and, to some extent, Grigolo imply that framing lgbt claims as pub-
lic demands would probably lead both to a significant bettering of lesbian and gay life’s condi-
tions and to an internal redefinition of conventional institutions, Morgan endorses a radical per-
spective, informed by Stychin, Moran, and Valdes, suggesting that only within a queer perspec-
tive the publicity of human rights could really liberate lgbt people without forcing them to ac-
cept disciplining policies. 
Both Gay and Lesbian studies and Legal Queer theory, as well as Feminist jurisprudence, how-
ever, share an essential assumption, whereby public and private are instruments to mainstream 
inequality and marginality. Maleness and heterosexuality are generally paired with public realm, 
while femaleness and homosexuality remain closed in the narrow private space; moreover law is 
associated with public, while regulation of private is generally left to informal practices and tradi-
tions. Moreover, when reference to privacy does not imply the protection of individual prefer-
ences, but it imposes the restriction of certain acts or expressions on the grounds they would 
presumably offend majority, it can be argued that ‘privacy’ just becomes a synonym for oppres-
sion and intolerance.  
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2.5. Critical Discourse Analysis: Going Beyond Judicial Neutrality 
 
As far as compelling, the criteria described above are in between theory and practice and, as 
such, it’s necessary to ground my research by referring to a rigorous methodology. 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) offers a valuable frame. Quite interestingly it has been gener-
ally applied to politics, press, public speaking, and business discourses, but there’s a gap on le-
gal texts and judicial reasoning. 
Critical discourse analysis arose as a branch of Critical Linguistics (CL), but it soon became a 
distinct stream of qualitative analysis. Van Dijk and Wodak offer a first, general definition of 
such method, as a “perspective on doing linguistic, semiotic or discourse analysis” (Van Dijk 
1993, 131), where language is considered “as social practice and takes into consideration of the 
context of language use to be crucial. Moreover, CDA takes particular interest in the relation 
between language and power” (Wodak 2002,1-2). 
Critical attitude, interdisciplinary, and heterogeneity of perspectives mark this field and, among 
the authors who embrace it, I will refer only to those who appear most suitable for my work106.  
The notion of critique has been variously declined: Krings defines it as “the practical thinking of 
social and political engagement with a sociological informed construction of society” (Krings 
1973, 808) while Fairclough recalls the aim of making visible the “interconnectedness of things” 
(Fairclough 1985, 747) that would remain otherwise covered and go unnoticed. 
The idea of unveiling what usually remains hidden is central also to Wodak, according to whom 
CDA should analyse “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, dis-
crimination, power and control as manifested in language […] it aims to investigate critically so-
cial inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use” 
(Wodak 2002, 2). Also Van Dijk endorses a similar perspective, further suggesting that “CDA is 
a critical perspective on doing scholarship: it is […] discourse analysis with an attitude. It focuses 
on social problems and especially on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction 
of power abuse or domination” (Van Dijk in Wodak and Meyer 2002, 96). Furthermore, he 
stresses the importance to depart from marginalized perspectives, in order to support their 
struggle against inequality (Ibidem). 
I particularly share Van Dijk’s intertwined frame between methods and politics, since it seems a 
suitable method to delve beyond the alleged neutrality of judicial discourses. Unlikely other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 For an introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis see Van Dijk (1984); Fairclough (1989); Wodak 
and Meyer (2002); Wodak (2008). 
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scholarship CDA “does not deny but explicitly defines and defends its own socio-political posi-
tion. That is, CDA is biased and proud of it.” (Ibidem). 
If bias means a connection among different realms, then biased methodology such as CDA is 
not necessarily bad research, but it simply refuses the conventional tradition that would address 
each realm as separated and isolated from the others. 
On the contrary, CDA is a rigorous field of work, where theoretical elements must account for 
complexities bounding discourse and social structures. As Meyer notes, CDA is not a single 
method but rather an approach shaped to critically investigate social reality (Meyer 2001, 14). 
Hence, political arguments and anti-discriminatory yearnings are distinctive and entrenched to 
such method:  
 
CDA scholars play an advocatory role for groups who suffered from social discrimination. It 
[…] is evident that the line drawn between social scientific research, which ought to be intel-
ligible, and political argumentation is sometimes crossed. […] it is a fact that CDA follows 
explicit power relationships which are frequently hidden and thereby to derive results which 
are of practical relevance” (Ivi, 15). 
 
Language is considered as a social factor as well, thus, recalling the Foucaultian idea that vocab-
ularies, rules, meanings, and concepts are socially constructed and, at the same time, that they 
build social roles, behaviours and expectations by themselves. 
Discourse, hence, can be defined as a “linguistic action, be it written, visual or oral communica-
tion, verbal or nonverbal, undertaken by social actors in a specific setting determined by social 
rules, norms and conventions” (Wodak 2008, 5). 
Judicial reasoning, consequently, is a typical example of written discourse, undertaken by 
Courts within the specific setting of rules and norms defined both by relevant sources and by 
rooted practices of its judges.  
I also borrow Wodak considerations about the genre of European resolutions, and apply them 
at ECtHR judgments; she highlights, indeed, the conjunction of declarative models, the vague-
ness of the text, the presence of many abstract terms combined with prestigious words and 
grammar metaphors that endorse a strong feeling of impersonality (Ivi, 18). 
Whether written or spoken, CDA treats discourse as a communicative event where cognitive 
elements play an important role. More specifically, Van Dijk defines cognition as “involving 
both personal and emotions and any other mental or memory structures, representations or 
processes involved in discourse and interaction” (Van Dijk in Wodak and Meyer 2002, 98) 
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and, thus, he aims at going beyond asserted neutrality, objectivity and equality of a chosen 
communicative event, disclosing power and bias which secretly shape it. 
Quite obviously a complete discourse analysis, especially when there’s a large corpus of texts, is 
impossible and, consequently, a choice is unavoidable; departing from CDA standpoint it’s 
therefore necessary to identify the structures and the properties that are relevant for inquiring a 
set of theoretical issues.  
I consider prominent Van Dijk's observations concerning the levels and the dimensions of dis-
course. Firstly, topics can be structures as “semantic macrostructures”, that represent “what the 
discourse is about globally, embody most important information […] and explain overall coher-
ence of text and talk” (Ivi, 102).  
Semantic macrostructures gather global meanings common to users and they identify abstract 
principles, constituting the ideal and “high-level” concepts-based structure of a whole dis-
course107 (Ibidem).  
Next, it’s necessary to further detail the macrostructures into “local meanings” (Ibidem), which 
investigate the cluster of lexical elements such as adopted words, the structure of propositions, 
and the relation among them.  
Far from being just a linguistic operation, local meanings reflect, partially and even indirectly, 
mental models of writers and their socially shared beliefs (Ibidem), tracing a useful path to dis-
cuss assimilative and marginalizing discursive dynamics. 
For instance, when screening the text, it could be useful to search for those local structures that 
polarize the imaginary into in-groups and out-groups. Strategies of simplification and strategies 
of stereotyping positive and negative poles have to be detected, with the intent to unveil the rela-
tion among the choice of words and specific ideological standpoints; also the excessive focus on 
presenting “our good things when their good things are de-emphasized” (Ibidem), and the logi-
cal flow by which events are presented at the reader are categories helpful to reconstruct mental 
models of writers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Van Dijk offers an accurate example how to identify semantic macrostructures. Drawing an example 
from a text drafted by the Centre for Moral Defense of Capitalism, he quotes a petition in defense of 
Microsoft and divides it into 7 semantic macrostructures, very schematic but entrenched with abstract 
and high-level concepts: “M1: antitrust laws threaten the freedom of enterprise. M2: Successful busi-
nessmen are being represented as tyrants. M3: the suit against Microsoft is an example of this trend. M4: 
The government should not limit the freedom of the market. M5: Microsoft has the right to do with its 
products what it wants. M6: innovators should not be punished. M7: we call that the case against Mi-
crosoft be dismissed” (Van Dijk in Wodak and Meyer 2002, 102). Thus, he suggests to firstly divide the 
text into macro-structures and, then, to delve into microstructures for each macro-level, so to delve more 
in depth into documental details. 
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Thanks to this method it is also possible to study the eventual recurrence of assimilative mech-
anisms, which might arise when including new subjects in the enjoyment of existing rights, for 
instance by framing a minority according not to its specificities but solely on the ground of ele-
ments that appear acceptable from the majority’s point of view. 
Another relevant example of local meanings entails the study of “many forms of implicit or in-
direct meanings” (Van Dijk 2002, 104). Implications, presuppositions, allusions, and vagueness 
descend from mental models applied to the text, although not directly expressed; as Van Dijk 
argues “implicit meanings are related to underlying beliefs, but are not openly, directly com-
pletely or precisely asserted, for various contextual reasons, including the well-known ideologi-
cal objective to de-emphasize our bad things and their good things” (Ibidem).  
Local meanings could be understood as functional to develop “discourses […] saturated with 
categories and images that for the most part rationalize and justify in myriad subtle ways the ex-
isting social order as natural, necessary, and just” (Gordon 1981,16). 
Besides semantic macrostructures and local meanings, it’s also important to analyse so-called 
event models, namely the boundaries that shape, limit and orient the comprehension of facts 
called into question, to the extent that “it is not the facts that define coherence but rather the 
ways the facts are defined or interpreted by language users in their mental models of these facts. 
These interpretations are personal, subjective, biased, incomplete or completely imaginary (Van 
Dijk in Wodak and Meyer 2002, 111). 
Such hypothesis recalls Pound’s and anti-formalists stances against the traditional legal doctrine 
and it further reinforces the double law/society dynamic above described.  
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2.6 Conclusive Remarks 
 
In this section I highlight how my theoretical and methodological frame is informed by issues 
previously analysed. 
The aim of this research is to go beyond asserted neutrality of the ECtHR reasoning; hence I 
propose a sociological approach to the ECtHR jurisprudence endorsing a comprehension of 
judicial system as a site of power (MacKinnon 1989, 237 and fol.), as an arena where interests 
clash, where policies are challenged, and where dynamics of power shape the final outcome. 
Reappraising Durkheim, law is a mechanism for the embodiment of primary moral relations of 
organic societies (Durkheim 1997, 43); in the context of the ECtHR judges are called to give 
meaning to flaunting signifiers, to draw the exact line below which States violate the Convention. 
If judicial discretion is openly recognized, Feminist jurisprudence, Gay and Lesbian studies and 
Legal Queer theory argue that also political, moral, religious perspectives, as well as prejudices, 
heavily affect the substantial asset of human rights law. 
As Johnson suggests (2014, 14 and fol.), Courts perform a crucial role in reinforcing or disrupt-
ing heterosexist and biased judgments; throughout their reasoning, they can refer to scientific 
and social evidence, they are enabled to recur to experts’ opinions, to question and challenge 
conventional assumptions or, otherwise, to close off any space for a critical reading of the status 
quo. 
I look at law from a perspective that aims to mediate between positivist reformism à la Heinze 
and queer authors, such as Morgan, who ultimately focus only on the global dimension of hu-
man rights and who stress the urgency to entirely debunk conventional political and philosophi-
cal foundations of law.  
Human rights, for instance, are product of a Western, male-oriented and liberal philosophical 
tradition; nevertheless, they still provide a practical and symbolical instrument to challenge exist-
ing inequalities and to promote minorities’ claims. Metaphorically speaking, human rights are 
an arsenal to handle with care, for only through an accurate analysis of the risks and the side-
effects entrenched, they prove useful in pursuing equality and freedom of oppressed ones. 
From feminist perspective, the foundations of contemporary legal systems share negative atti-
tudes towards women and both juridical provisions and judicial procedures are understood as a 
site where power relations are moulded and inequality is enforced. Consequently, judicial inter-
pretation relates as to the production of knowledge as to heterosexist or gendered stereotypes; 
on the one hand, indeed, the Courts often perceive and judge through the lens of a heterosexu-
al male model, usually backed and not even discussed while, on the other, judgments have long 
produced a biased legal knowledge, legitimizing, conferring veracity, and developing a jurispru-
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dence prescribing different criteria to treat men and women, heterosexuals and homosexuals. 
Thanks to their authority and to the adoption of a highly formal language, knowledge arising 
from judicial review has been portrayed as neutral and objective, as if it gave a privileged and 
impartial reading of broad society. 
In such a frame, I study judicial discourses following Smart’s and MacKinnon’s approach, 
whereby reasoning about the law display concepts moulded by the existing balance of power, 
enhancing a system of knowledge not only about law, but concerning also the broad society. 
Quoting MacKinnon, “law is a particular potent source and badge of legitimacy, and site and 
cloak of power” (MacKinnon 1989, 237) and it presumes a strict bound between juridical legit-
imacy and social power, for the former underpins legitimacy while the latter conceals the power 
(Ibidem).  
As MacKinnon passionately argues, without a critical perspective aimed at disentangling poten-
tially oppressive mechanisms, law and jurisprudence tend to crystallize inequality and to pro-
mote the introjection of a male/heteronormative perspective “through legal mediation, male 
dominance is made to seem a feature of life, not a one-sided construct imposed by force for the 
advantage of a dominant group” (Ivi, 238); Courts’ jurisprudence may well represent an essen-
tial moment in the construction of mirror-imaged inversions as truth. 
When, for instance, judges uphold the criminalization of same-sex acts, they construct a specific 
jurisprudential approach and label homosexuality as socially undesirable, as unjust, and as infe-
rior to heterosexuality. 
However, as explored in previous sections, judicial review can also foster, defend, and endorse 
changes targeted at building a fairer and a more equal socio-legal environment, providing mi-
norities or disadvantaged groups with legal and symbolic resources to improve their life condi-
tions and to modify the several bias hanging over them. 
With reference to sexual orientation, Courts are enabled to justify either a traditional or a pro-
gressive conception of sexuality and family: judgments favourable to lgbt claims disrupt conven-
tional jurisprudence and, likewise, they confer legitimacy to the set of values proposed by the 
applicants, sometimes adjusting them to the existing narratives and sometimes drawing ap-
proaches which overcome previous interpretations.  
Either way, judges actually choose between contrasting narratives of events and, when sensitive 
issues are concerned, also between alternative systems of values, that impact on the interpreta-
tion of law and on the symbolic attribution of meaning to concrete events. 
As such, I propose a reading of the ECtHR jurisprudence informed by the description of dia-
chronic changes within ECtHR jurisprudence and focused on the judicial role in legitimizing 
values and endorsing certain life models as the most desirable.  
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Social and political inputs are translated according to human rights language and logic to be, 
then, channeled in the ECtHR system, where judges decide whether they are admissible and, if 
so, adjudicate such claims on the ground of the ECHR provisions. 
The passage from social meaning to juridical concepts, values, arguments and language, may 
occur through three steps, at least, that can also overlap: firstly, judges have to identify relevant 
facts and essential features; then, they are called to ascertain which values and, consequently, 
which Articles can be applied to the present case; thirdly, in case the ECHR has been breached, 
it’s up to ECtHR judges providing legal outputs, namely jurisprudential answer. As Pound ar-
gues, each phase opens for a variable degree of discretion.  
Given the peculiar nature of the ECHR, the distinction between law-declaring and law-making is 
extremely blurred, for it may be suggested that when human rights are concerned, any decision 
could however hide a relevant amount of judicial law-making.  
Paraphrasing Friedman, I uphold that the opinions about gender identity and sexual orientation 
mold the law. Law is not impartial, nor is it gender-neutral or does it traditionally treat hetero-
sexuals and homosexuals equally; it is not value free but, rather, it reflects the existing distribu-
tion of powers and social forces (Friedman 1975, 178).  
Since in the last decades lgbt movement has become a relevant social force, committed to pro-
mote legal change through strategic litigation, legal system has increasingly integrated a less bi-
ased perspective; thanks to the activation of law at the hands of lgbt groups, previously unstated 
heterosexist prejudices have been called into question, to the extent that nowadays in the Us 
system lgbt people are regarded as a quasi-suspect category108 and also in Europe the burden of 
proof rests on those who support a differentiated treatment, instead than on those claiming 
equal rights. 
As such, Courts still endorse situated interpretations of law and, whether favorable to lgbt claims 
or not, judges perform law-making functions, in accordance with hypothesis of Pound and 
Friedman. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 In Windsor v United States, n. 12-2335, the 2nd Court of Appeal stated that the Defense of Marriage 
Act required “heightened scrutiny” (§ 24) to assess whether it discriminated against same-sex couples. 
More in detail, the Court upheld that homosexuals met all four criteria established by US jurisprudence 
to identify suspect classes “ A) homosexuals as a group have historically endured persecution and dis-
crimination; B) homosexuality has no relation to aptitude or ability to contribute to society; C) homo-
sexuals are a discernible group with non-obvious distinguishing characteristics, especially in the subset of 
those who enter same-sex marriages; and D) the class remains a politically weakened minority” (25, 8-
14). The Supreme Court, however, has not clarified yet whether sexual orientation fits into an identified 
suspect class. See Zanetti (2015, 91-95). 
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Judicial discretion can be thorough investigated thanks to the concept of internal legal culture, 
which precisely stresses subjective elements shaping judicial attitude towards law. 
According to both Friedman and Cotterrell, the legal culture of a given institution, such as the 
ECtHR, can’t be considered as monolithic but, rather, it has to be treated as the outcome of in-
ternal forces that confront over legal, institutional, and value-oriented perspectives. 
More in detail, ECtHR judges adopt, interpret, and apply doctrines though being influenced by 
extra-legal perspectives, or by assumptions not strictly related to the case; thus the link between 
judicial interpretation and legal doctrine leaves room for discretion and creativity. 
I borrow from Cotterrell the notion that “legal ideology […] can be regarded as made up of val-
ue elements and cognitive ideas presupposed in, expressed through and shaped by the practices 
of developing, interpreting and applying legal doctrine within a legal system” (Cotterrell 2006, 
89). As previously pointed out, however, I prefer the concept of legal culture, for it embraces 
also elements which can’t be fully judged in accordance with the notion of ideology, such as 
those which concern judicial beliefs about ECtHR tasks without directly entailing sexual orienta-
tion. 
On a closer look, I refer to the explanatory notion of legal culture, whereby I aim to assess and 
describe the correlation between social elements and legal doctrines/methods (Nelken 2004, 
10). 
How can the analysis of ECtHR judgments prove useful to delve beneath the neutral and objec-
tive surface of these discourses? And how it is possible to go beyond the primary task of judicial 
reasoning to account to legislative power (Friedman 1975, 388 and fol.)? 
I suggest a twofold approach, taking into account separate opinions and possible bifurcations 
they create (Rivieré 2004). 
Separate opinions provide evidence of internal pluralism and allow the researchers to evaluate 
the nature of eventual disagreement109; they testify the actual existence of discretion and, at the 
same time, they represent the “repressive alternative interpretations” mentioned by Gordon 
(1988, 17). 
Were opinions only concurring, it might be suggested that, although offering various reasoning-
lines impacting on the adjudication of the case, ECtHR judges would unanimously share a cer-
tain interpretation of ECHR and, as such, it might be contended that the only ground of disa-
greement would revolve around how to meet criteria imposed by ECtHR derivative legitimacy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 It’s possible to draw similar conclusions for the European Commission of Human Rights, which oper-
ated as gatekeeper in respect of applications lodged within the ECtHR, until its destitution in 1998. For 
an extensive analysis of this issue see chapter III. 
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Dissenting opinions, instead, open a quite different scenario, for judges disagree also on the 
substantial interpretation of the ECHR and, thus, on the meaning to attach to specific human 
rights. Given the same wording, the same language, and a quite cohesive legal culture (White 
and Boussiakou 2009a; Arold 2007), judges still develop opposite legal answers, therefore legit-
imating the doubt of extra-judicial elements underpinned to their reasoning. 
Both concurring and dissenting opinions can be investigated by distinguishing the bifurcations 
they create; Rivieré proposes an interesting qualitative classification of the ECtHR jurispru-
dence, based on the reason of disagreement; more in detail, she selects among a) disagreement 
addressing the foundation of judicial reasoning b) those involving a criticism on the consistency 
with the ECtHR case-law, c) opinions concerned with admissibility issues and fact-finding, d) 
those concerned with substantive rights, e) opinions motivated by an alternative methods of in-
terpretation, literal or purposive, of the ECHR. (Rivieré 2004, 464). 
Thanks to this proposal, it’s possible to further delve into the open argumentative model en-
dorsed by the ECtHR and to effectively shed light on internal ECtHR contending narratives, 
questioning the hierarchy of values and the legal image of homosexual subject here endorsed. 
By combining Friedman and Rivieré I aim at applying a socio-legal critical frame to the struc-
ture of judicial reasoning. 
As to the criteria to delve into the content of ECtHR judgments, I draw on Gay and Lesbian 
studies, Legal Queer theory, and Feminist jurisprudence; as to the methods I refer to Feminist 
jurisprudence and Critical Discourse Analysis. 
I identify three main guidelines, namely the notion of heteronormativity, the treatment of dif-
ferences, and the relation between public and private sphere. 
Through the concept of heteronormativity I intend to delve into the ECtHR role in upholding 
and in dismantling the normative understanding of heterosexuality. More in detail, I strive to 
identify past and present mechanisms whereby judges adhere to or, on the contrary, critically 
review the idea of heterosexuality as the exclusive legitimated sexual and social model. Most no-
tably, how are judges eventually affected by a heteronormative understating of the ECHR? Do 
they convey throughout their judgments a legal and symbolical heteronormative conception of 
sexuality, affectivity and family? Looking at the changes occurred in the ECtHR case-law over 
time, which trends can be identified? And which frame emerges if one adopts a synchronical 
approach? Whether and how do ECtHR judges adhere to a heteronormative perspective? 
How did/does the ECtHR read and conceptualize claims proposing different and innovative 
paradigms of family? Is the Court likely to innovate the interpretation of the ECHR or, on the 
contrary, is it likely to arrange original claims in order to coherently integrate them into existing 
and normalizing narratives? 
 153	  
Furthermore, given that the notion of heteronormativity implies a strict division of men’s and 
women’s duties, and it supports the image of women as mostly devoted to the private realm, to 
caregiving, nurturing and motherhood, does the ECtHR endorse different approaches in re-
spect of applications raised respectively by gay men or lesbian women, especially on parenting? 
Focusing of the dilemma of differences, I reappraise Minow’s partition to discuss the ECtHR 
positioning when dealing with minorities who claim legal relevance. As she and other scholars 
suggest (Bobbio 1995), apart from criminalization there are a myriad of sophisticated ways 
whereby the majority deals with minorities and, at the same time, it conveys mechanisms of 
domination, marginalization, and oppression. 
Which majoriatian traps mark the ECtHR jurisprudence concerning sexual orientation? Name-
ly, how is difference recognized and treated? Is it merely tolerated or positively evaluated, simi-
larly to features such as personal beliefs, race, ethnicity or gender? To what extent does majori-
tarian labels about specific issues bind minorities to structure their claims, to shape them in or-
der to result feasible with unstated legal premises? How do premises shape judicial review of 
relevant facts and admissible arguments? 
Moving to mechanisms whereby social inputs are transformed in judicial outputs, how is other’s 
perspective treated? Does it remain irrelevant or is it taken into question, either gradually or en-
tirely? Do judges critically reason about the traditional interpretation of the ECHR or do they 
simply depart from it, leaving its premises unstated? How do judges filter other’s claims, how 
do they deduct relevant arguments from the many put forward? Are these simplified, twisted, or 
understood though the interpretive and cognitive lens of majoritarian assumptions? Whether 
and how does the ECtHR consider status quo as uncoerced, natural and good (Minow 1987, 
54)? To what extent does the ECtHR critically engage with assumptions developed by jurispru-
dence, both diachronically and synchronically? 
Lastly, turning to the distinction between private and public sphere, and looking at how it affects 
judicial framing, how does the ECtHR deal with these two dimensions? Does the ECtHR con-
fine lgbt claims in the private realm, for instance by mainly upholding arguments which remain-
der to this realm, by reframing lgbt demands, or by rejecting positive obligations aimed at tack-
ling lgbt public inequality? 
How has the ECtHR evolved in respect of claims entailing public sphere? Whether and how 
does the separation between private and public emerge throughout judicial review? Does the 
ECtHR jurisprudence verify the criticism, shared by most Feminist jurisprudence and legal lgbt 
scholars, whereby the powerful majority monopolizes - legally, politically and symbolically- pub-
lic arena while it binds oppressed groups into private and invisible spheres? 
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For sake of clarity, I have displayed different questions separately, but in documental analysis it 
is extremely likely that such concepts will result intertwined, since they are much more similar 
to three fibers composing the same thread, than to three concepts sealed off from each other. 
Among feminist methods I reappraise the ‘woman question’, which in this case can be defined 
as the ‘lgbt question’, with the intent, paraphrasing Clougherty (1996,7), to i) delve into the bi-
ased substantive arguments, procedural rules and jurisprudential doctrines that, at first glance, 
appear neutral and objective, ii) to expose how the ECtHR jurisprudence excludes the experi-
ence and the values of lgbt applicants and, iii) to shed light on doctrines and practices which fa-
vor and perpetuate unequal treatment against homosexuals.  
Chief queries, deducted from the broad variety of ascribable to ‘lgbt question’, are: what as-
sumptions, descriptions, assertions and/or definitions of experience does the ECtHR make in 
the area of lgbt claims? What is the area of mismatch, distortion, or denial created by differ-
ences between lgbt life experiences and assumptions of the law? (Wishik 1985, 72-75; see p. 47) 
Although not developed within feminist stream of thought, CDA offers a valuable method to 
treat texts following a logical path. 
As explored in section 2.6 CDA considers discourses according to a frame strongly informed by 
critical and anti-formalist stances. Hence, language is put in relation with power (Wodak 2002) 
discourse is considered as a social fact, a venue where interests and power converge and con-
front, and one of main aims of CDA is precisely to make visible the “interconnectedness of 
things” (Fairclough 1985: 747), which otherwise would remain hidden and undisputed. 
I intend CDA as a guideline to identify most significant passages and to understand which signi-
fiers could be linked to the presence of biased standpoints; the main focus of the research does 
pertain to values, arguments and reasoning displayed by judges of the ECtHR and within this 
perspective I evaluate the structure, the grammar or linguistic forms of judgments.  
Consequently, I refer to semantic macrostructures, chosen words and clusters of lexical ele-
ments (Van Dijk in Wodak and Meyer 2002, 102-104) to unveil the relation among linguistic 
outputs, interpretive approaches and shared beliefs of the Court.  
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CHAPTER III. METHODS AND DOCTRINES OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EU-
ROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
“Europe is threatened, Europe is divided,  
and the greatest danger comes from her divisions. 
Human dignity is Europe’s finest achievement, 
 freedom her true strength.  
The union of our continent is now needed  
not only for the salvation of the liberties we have won,  
but also for the extension of their benefits to all mankind. 
Upon this union depend Europe’s destiny and the world’s peace.” 
Message to Europeans, 1948 
 
 
 
3.0 Foreword 
 
This chapter critically addresses the legal features embodied in the judicial system built by the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and it discusses the jurisprudential methods devel-
oped by the European Court of Human Rights. In paragraphs 3.1-3.2 the most relevant traits 
concerning the machinery established by the ECHR will be outlined, highlighting the drafters’ 
aims, describing the values which underpin the Convention, and detailing the institutions aimed 
at enforcing the ECHR. Then, in paragraphs 3.3-3.4, I move on to critically consider the theo-
retical standpoints as well as the doctrines developed by the judge, with particular attention to 
eventual inconsistencies and problematic aspects. 
Among the possible perspectives, I consider the ECHR as the outcome of a precise political, 
diplomatic, and legal compromise. As a consequence, I look at its methods and doctrines of in-
terpretation as a crucial instrument, by which the ECtHR pursues both the enforcement of hu-
man rights and answers to extra-judicial demands derived from national authorities and interna-
tional institutions. 
Most notably, the ECtHR appears bound to prove its impartiality, to attest its ability to manage 
unstable political balances, and to get out of a possible reading of the ECHR as a constitutional 
charter.  
This chapter makes use of the ECtHR’s official documents, of opinions and notes delivered by 
the ECtHR’s judges, and of essays and articles written by scholars and non-judicial actors, which 
place the analysis in the context of the Council of Europe. 
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3.1 The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights was opened for signature in Rome on 4 Novem-
ber, 1950, and it entered into force three years later. 
According to the provisional text, the validity of the ECHR was subordinated at the ratification 
of the Convention by at least ten States, with the threshold being reached in 1953.  
Though nowadays it is actually recognized and celebrated as a safeguard against abuses and 
crimes perpetrated by public actors (Wildhaber 2004, 83 and fol.), the drafting process was far 
from simple and the project seemed about to fail on numerous occasions.  
It’s worth recalling such debate, for it dismantles the myth of a Convention as the outcome of 
an uncritical legal and political vision. Indeed, as it may already be known, when interpreting 
the ECHR, the judges frequently resort to the notion of the original ratio, as if the drafters had 
endorsed a unitary perspective on human rights. 
By so doing, the Court abolishes the harsh divisions out of which the ECHR arose, and it sup-
ports the image of a ‘seamless’ theoretical background. Moreover, it’s often suggested that the 
judges should read the ECHR in light of the original goals, while dismissing creative interpreta-
tions as potentially inappropriate, politically-twisted, or contrary to the ECHR ratio. For in-
stance, former judge Mahoney, quite cryptically argues that “evolutive interpretation does not 
permit the judicial creation of new rights or freedoms, rights and freedoms not already protect-
ed by the text. The only matter which can be evolutionally interpreted - and perhaps expanded 
into unforeseen fields of applicants- is a matter which is already explicit or implicit in the text” 
(Mahoney 1990, 66). The argument behind such reasoning is that States should not be bound 
by obligations exceeding the Convention they signed -as discussed below- however, the clash be-
tween activist and traditional legal conceptions marked the ECHR’s history from its very origins. 
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3.1.1 The Historical Background 
 
The drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights took place in a rapidly changing 
environment, shaken by international political tensions and marked by new legal paradigms 
(Mowbray 2007; Bates 2011; Madsen 2011). The course of the Second World War, the crea-
tion of the United Nations, and the beginning of the Cold War heavily affected Western socie-
ty, and they marked the theoretical and pragmatic horizon wherein the members of the new-
born Council of Europe (1949) began to evaluate the proposal of a regional alliance, aimed at 
protecting human rights.  
The impact of the Second World War on Western thought is widely addressed and I do not 
intend to analyze it in detail, yet I will simply stress that the “copernican revolution” (Bobbio 
1990, 55) from duties to rights was finally carried out in reaction to the atrocities perpetrated in 
those years110: as a consequence, natural law theories shaped the national Constitutions ap-
proved in late 1940s and the contemporary legal paradigm of human rights. 
The League of Nations had proved completely useless in preventing Hitler’s power, and it was 
clear that in the absence of supranational mechanisms of enforcement, any legal system aiming 
to limit national discretion would result totally ineffective. 
To overcome previous outdated international institutions, the newly created United Nations 
took the first step towards the foundation of contemporary human rights law, drafting the Dec-
laration of Human Rights, proclaimed on 10 December 1948. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 “Con una metafora usuale, si può dire che diritto e dovere sono come il retto e il verso di una meda-
glia. Ma qual è il verso e quale il retto? Dipende dalla posizione da cui guardiamo la medaglia. Nella sto-
ria del pensiero morale e giuridico questa medaglia è stata guardata più dal lato dei doveri che da quello 
dei diritti. Non è difficile capire il perché. Il problema di ciò che si deve fare o non fare è un problema 
prima di tutto della società nel suo complesso piuttosto che dell’individuo singolo. I codici morali e giu-
ridici vengono posti originariamente a salvaguardia del gruppo sociale nel suo insieme piuttosto che dei 
suoi singoli membri. La funzione originaria del precetto di non uccidere non è tanto quella di proteggere 
il singolo individuo quanto quella di impedire la disgregazione del gruppo. Prova ne sia che questo pre-
cetto, cui si attribuisce un valore universale, vale di solito solo all’interno del gruppo, non vale nei ri-
guardi dei membri di altri gruppi. Affinché potesse avvenire il passaggio dal codice dei doveri al codice 
dei diritti occorreva che fosse rovesciata la medaglia: che si cominciasse a guardare il problema non più 
soltanto dal punto di vista della società ma anche da quello dell’individuo. Occorreva una vera e propria 
rivoluzione. La grande svolta ebbe inizio in Occidente dalla concezione cristiana della vita […]. La dot-
trina moderna del diritto naturale, quale fiorì nei secoli XVII e XVIII, da Hobbes a Kant, ben diversa 
dalla dottrina del diritto naturale degli antichi, e che culmina nel kantiano «sii persona e rispetta gli altri 
come persone», può essere considerata per molti aspetti come una secolarizzazione dell’etica cristiana 
(«etsi daremus non esse deum»)” (Bobbio 1999, 433-434). 
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Here, the individual human being stands at the core of the entire architecture: it is recognized 
that States play a fundamental role in enforcing the Declaration, but the final aim was to estab-
lish a procedure allowing individuals to claim satisfaction against their own governments too. At 
least officially, the Westphalian model of international relations had been replaced by the UN 
model (Stirk 2012); the former envisaged States as the exclusive legal actors of international law, 
it recognized the complete autonomy of national authorities, and ultimately pursued the global 
balance of national interests. According to the latter, national sovereignty was restricted by hu-
man rights law, to the enforcement of which all States were actively involved (Pariotti 2013, 48). 
In addition, the idea of armed conflicts as “the continuation of politics by other means” (von 
Clausewitz 1884, 87) was replaced by an outset of peaceful procedures targeted at dispute reso-
lution; the foundations for a new environment based on diplomacy and mutual respect were 
thus laid down111 (Cassese 1990; Falk 2000; 2008; Pariotti 2013). 
In May 1948, movements in favor of European unification gathered at The Hague for an inten-
sive congress, presided by Winston Churchill, and they carefully discussed the challenges that 
the Countries had to face. The congress finally approved a legal and political manifesto, which 
reflected both fears and hopes which were relatively widespread throughout Western Europe: 
“Europe is threatened, Europe is divided and the greatest danger comes from her division”, the 
speech proclaimed, further warning “our disunited Europe marches towards her end. […] 
Without a freely agreed union our present anarchy will expose us tomorrow to forcible unifica-
tion whether by the intervention of a foreign empire or usurpation by a political party” (Message 
to Europeans, 1948). 
This message not only implied the possibility that an authoritarian party could gain power again, 
but it also gave enormous emphasis to a nameless foreign empire that could destroy European 
values, among which “human dignity is Europe’s finest achievement [and] freedom her true 
strength” (Ibidem). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 The extent to which international law manages to affect national authority is widely debated: the line 
between Westphalian and UN model is blurred and, perhaps, these two models actually coexist. States 
still perform an essential role in enforcing or infringing human rights, and none of existing international 
bodies is equipped to effectively ensure human rights without cooperating with local institutions. Moreo-
ver, also narratives about Westphalian have been challenged, on the ground that it would convey a myth, 
giving excessive emphasis to national sovereignty and not taking into proper account the horizontal rela-
tions that marked contacts among States before the UN Charter. See Gross (1948); Morgenthau (1985); 
Krasner (1995); Beaulac (2000); Osiander (2001). 
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The fear that a free Europe could be overrun by Communists favored a sense of anxiety and 
uncertainty, which ultimately encouraged Western governments to pursue their dream of Euro-
pean integration. The Greek civil war, the Prague coup, and the installation of communist re-
gimes in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria worsened the urgency felt 
by Western governments to contrast Soviet dictatorship, in the field of of principles and rights 
too. As Paul-Henry Spaak, one-time President of the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assem-
bly, joked “the person who did the most to create the Council of Europe was Joseph Stalin” 
(Robertson 1963, 4). 
Within this dazzling context and despite the different interests pursued by each State, govern-
ments opted to support the image of a cohesive Europe, able to stand for democratic values and 
to go beyond mere economic solidarity. 
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3.1.2. The Drafting Process of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
In the above mentioned Message to Europeans, the European movement called for the adop-
tion of a “Charter of Human Rights guaranteeing liberty of thought, assembly and expression as 
well as the right to form a political opposition” and for the establishment of a “Court of Justice 
with adequate sanctions for the implementation of this Charter” (Message to Europeans, 1948). 
Though vague, these provisions aimed to foster European unity, based on a common heritage 
of values and, above all, focused on the defence of liberal democracy. Elsewhere, the message 
highlighted the economic disadvantages due to European division, and it promoted the free-
dom of movement; yet the core element remained the suggestion of a Charter and a Court em-
powered to enforce human rights. 
This project gave pre-eminence to civil and political freedoms: human dignity and liberty were 
considered to mainly develop through political rights and by means of a considerable margin of 
autonomy from public power. 
The following year, the European movement transmitted a draft of the aforementioned Char-
ter, named “the European Convention on Human Rights” to the European Committee of Min-
isters, supplied with explanatory notes on possible criticisms. At first, the Committee ignored 
the invitation of the European movement to debate the issue, to the extent that Churchill had to 
force the hands of the Committee, by sending them a detailed request, signed by fifty eminent 
international figures, to discuss issues related to human rights (Bates 2011, 22).  
Quite predictably, no State desired to be the ‘one’ who prevented free debate over such a deli-
cate topic: therefore unanimous consent was finally achieved, and the draft of the Convention 
reached the European Assembly.  
As Simpson notes, this episode demonstrates that the “majority [of the governments] in the 
Council of Europe were, whatever their pretensions in public, unenthusiastic at the prospect of 
international European human rights protection” (Simpson 2001, 667).  
The first draft of the Convention was minimalist and fully deferent to national authorities; the 
so-called freezing clause provided that “each signatory would undertake to maintain intact the 
rights and liberties selected for protection under Art 1, to the extent that [they] were secured by 
the constitution, laws and administrative practice existing in each country at the date of the sign-
ing of the Convention” (Article 6).  
States were only obliged not to breach the pre-existing human rights laws and not to refuse their 
implementation. In the Commentary, the authors vaguely suggested that, in the long term, the 
aim was to create a substantial European Convention but, at the same time, they recognized this 
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project to be extremely ambitious, if not unrealizable, and therefore they declared themselves to 
be satisfied with preventing backlashes from the status quo.  
The underpinned concept was to establish an ‘alarm bell’ against authoritarian threats112 and, at 
the same time, to build a “Conscience of Europe” (Ibidem), aimed at securing, fostering, and 
empowering European values. 
However, the Assembly soon resulted divided between two main trends: the first, expressed by 
Fyfe, and supporting a strict minimalist Convention; the second, led by Teitgen, and consider-
ing the drafting of the Convention as the first step towards a wide process of European integra-
tion, a milestone in the creation of a common Bill of Rights. To further complicate this situa-
tion, a fierce group envisaged the project, alleging that European countries already secured hu-
man rights. Perhaps exaggerating, Teitgen reassured national representatives about the limited 
power of the Convention, ensuring that “what we are going to ask these States, is to undertake 
to respect these freedoms and they shall not be dragged—if I may use this vulgar expression—
before a Commission or a Court, unless they have, in an obvious way, broken these fundamen-
tal, essential and restricted undertakings” (Teitgen 1976, 29).  
Consequently, the no-Convention proposal was defeated and the main issue became the asset 
of the Convention-to-be. 
Despite his ambitions, Teitgen understood that a European Convention could be approved on-
ly as a result of a compromise with moderate trends; the final proposal, was thus restricted to 
the fundamental freedoms essential to ensuring personal independence and a dignified way of 
life. Most notably, the Teitgen Report upheld the fundamental principles of democratic regimes 
as “the obligation on the part of the Government to consult the nation and to govern with its 
support, and that all Governments be forbidden to interfere with free criticism and the natural 
and fundamental rights of opposition” (Ibidem). 
During the drafting process, the internal fractures revolved around the possible inclusion of 
three rights, namely the right to free elections, the right to property, and the right to education. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 The Teitgen Report clearly defines this perspective as a guarantee, demonstrating “the common desire 
of the Member States to build a European Union in accordance with the principles of natural law, of 
humanism and of democracy, it will contribute to the development of their solidarity; it will fulfill the 
longing for security among their peoples; it will allow Member States to prevent—before it is too late—any 
new member who might be threatened by the rebirth of totalitarianism from succumbing to the influ-
ence of evil, as has already happened in conditions of general apathy. Would fascism have triumphed in 
Italy if, after the assassination of Matteotti, this crime had been subjected to an international trial?” 
(Teitgen 1949, 218) 
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 As for the right to free elections, the UK and France were still colonialist nations and discour-
aged any hint that could encourage already rising nationalist movements; the Dutch and Belgian 
government, also worried about their trembling possessions, backed the opposition against a 
too inclusive right to free elections113. 
Worries about property however, did reflect the fears of a Communist threat. On one hand, 
property was broadly recognized as the precondition for individual independence, and dele-
gates were aware that authoritarian regimes usually began their rise by confiscating private prop-
erties; on the other hand, the general protection of the right to property would have delegiti-
mized the policies of nationalization launched by European socialist governments, such as the 
British one. 
Education had been focal for Nazism, which had indubitably built a tremendous machine to 
indoctrinate pupils, and in its aftermath, Western Countries strictly supervised that public 
schools did not to spread communist theories. Nevertheless, an eventual provision ensuring 
families the right to education, against the State’s possible interference, opened problematic 
margins of autonomy to religious and philosophical groups114. 
Another feature that nowadays appears striking, is that social rights were not significantly con-
sidered, neither in the debate nor in the final ECHR.  
Despite the fact that national legislations and Constitutions were increasingly recognizing socio-
economic claims as essential to democratic systems, the approach of the European Commission 
towards this issue is well exemplified by a passage from the above mentioned Teitgen Report:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 The original text of the ECHR did not include the right to free elections. In 1952, however, the issue 
was discussed again and broadly disciplined by Protocol 1. Article 3 of Protocol 1 reads “The High Con-
tracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions 
which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”.  
114 Both rights were addressed in the above mentioned Protocol 1. As to education, Article 2 recognizes 
that “no person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes 
in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such educa-
tion and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions”. As to private 
property, Article 1 solemnly states: “every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems nec-
essary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of 
taxes or other contributions or penalties”. 
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professional freedoms and ‘social’ rights, which have in themselves a fundamental value, 
must also, in the future, be defined and protected; but everyone will understand that it is 
necessary to begin at the beginning and to guarantee political democracy in the European 
Union, and then to co-ordinate our economies, before under-taking the generalization of 
social democracy (Merrills and Robertson 2008, 8). 
 
I would read this tendency in light of two main reasons: firstly, social rights were associated with 
Communist ideology and deemed as dangerous; in addition to that, the recognition of social or 
economic human rights would have posed positive obligations upon States, namely to remove 
inequalities or to provide services, causing an increase in public expenditure. It can be easily 
imagined that a similar chance would have provoked a massive refusal to sign the Convention, 
ultimately leading to the complete ineffectiveness of the ECHR itself. 
The quest to balance political interests with peculiar understandings of human rights, and the 
urgency to define a common language affected the specificity of rights ensured; for instance, 
concepts such as ‘right to life’ and ‘human dignity’ were not further defined, leaving room for a 
progressive enlargement of their meaning and leaving certain points to national discretion, for 
instance as far as death penalty was concerned. Exemption clauses were also introduced with 
regard to many rights, as explored in paragraph 3.1.3. 
Teitgen’s dream of a common Bill of Rights seemed defeated; looking at coeval commentaries, 
however, Tyfe's image of an alarm bell also appears quite exaggerated, as the ECHR was widely 
considered as a simply programmatic, useless, declaration of intents. 
During the opening for signature at Palazzo Barberini in Rome, the Consultative Assembly’s 
President commented “it’s not a very good Convention, but it’s a lovely Palace” and the follow-
ing year Green expressed a shared but trenchant opinion of the ECHR: 
 
In view of the wide exception clauses tending to negate the value of the Declaration of 
Rights, and the difficulties attached to the inception of the Commission and the Court— dif-
ficulties which no State appears willing to overcome—and the unwillingness of the members 
of the Council of Europe to ratify the Convention, one is tempted to apply the words of 
Horace to this document: ‘parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus’ (Green 1951, 444). 
 
Perhaps original drafters did not fully capture the potential entrenched in the ECHR, probably 
because European leaders were still bound to the Westphalian paradigm, and hence they were 
sure that the ECHR would have functioned as a State versus State institution. In fact, given that 
in 1953 the control of the enforcement of the ECHR rested with the Committee of Ministers -
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for the ECtHR only became effective in 1959, - the whole human rights system was subject to 
political, or at least, quasi-judicial influence (Bates 2011, 35). 
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3.1.3 The Essential Features of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The literature on the history of the ECHR, on its features, and its functioning is almost bound-
less, and it embraces several perspectives; from the legal to the political perspective, from the 
philosophical to the sociological one (MacDonald 1993; Turner 1993; Dembour 2006; Letsas 
2006; Mowbray 2007; Madsen 2013; Harris, Boyle, Bates and Buckley 2014; Kauppi 2014). 
Hence, I will only touch upon the most relevant aspects, further detailing other implications if 
required. 
The Preamble openly recalls the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and identifies it as the 
theoretical referent of the entire Convention. Section I comprises of eighteen articles and it rep-
resents the core of the ECHR, for it determines which rights are fundamental, and thus it gives 
voice to the “common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law” 
named in the Preamble115. 
The subjects mentioned by the Convention are the individuals, who are entitled to the rights 
declared, High Contracting Parties, who bear the duty to apply the Convention, and the ECHR 
institutions, entrusted with the task of supervising national compliance with ECtHR’s judgments. 
The concrete tone of the obligations imposed on public authorities can be grasped by referring 
to Article 1; it significantly detaches itself from previous international treaties, for it mentions 
the primary duty to secure rights, which implies that Contracting members are called neither to 
undertake nor to commit
 
to enforce human rights, but to immediately secure them. Such a 
wording stresses the significance of legal obligations arising from the ratification of the ECHR, 
to the extent that “a State which ratified the Convention was required to ensure that its domestic 
law was consistent with the Convention’s substantive obligations” (Bates 2011, 34).  
Though the Convention only expressly binds governments, the ECtHR has also clarified that, in 
the event of private actors directly infringing upon a fundamental right, provided that public au-
thorities do not adequately satisfy the victims, a Contracting Party could be found in breach of 
the ECHR (Young, James and Webster v UK, nos. 7601/76 and 7806/77; Ziemele 2009, 3). 
As for the content of Section I, the Convention includes both absolute and qualified rights. 
Only four articles do not admit derogation, not even in time of emergency: the right not to be 
tortured and not to be inhumanly or degradingly treated or punished, Art. 3; the right not to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Section II addresses the establishment of the ECtHR and Section III addresses miscellaneous provi-
sions. 
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held in slavery or servitude, Art. 4 section 1; the right not to be convicted of conduct which was 
not an offense at the time it occurred, and the right not to have a heavier penalty imposed than 
the one applicable at the time the offense was committed, Art 7.  
Interferences with the right to private and family life may be admissible if “in accordance with 
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Article 
8, section 2). What’s more, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 9), freedom of 
assembly (Article 10) and freedom of association (Article 11) admit limitations, which attain to 
the lawful nature of the interference, to the protection of national security, to ensure public or-
der, or to the prevention of harm to morals, health, and reputation of others. The right to mar-
ry, secured by Article 12, is the only right that, instead of “everyone” or “no one”, addresses 
“men and women of marriageable age.” As explored in the next chapter, such dissimilarity 
stands at the core of crucial lgbt complaints.  
A variable margin of discretion is thus afforded to national authorities, and most importantly, 
domestic institutions are made aware of the criteria to meet in order to interfere with human 
rights, without violating the ECHR. 
In order to understand the careful interplay between the national and the ECHR system, it’s 
necessary to refer to the principle of subsidiarity. 
This principle implies that “in a community of societal pluralism, the larger social unit should 
assume responsibility for functions only insofar as the smaller social unit is unavailable to do so” 
(Petzold 1993, 41); the legal principle of subsidiarity marks Western doctrine from early mod-
ern times (Ibidem), and it formalizes a long-standing organizational principle, rooted in several 
social and political groups. 
Narrowing the field to the ECHR system, the principle of subsidiarity indicates what may be 
termed as a procedural relationship, involving national authorities and ECHR institutions 
(Ibidem). Subsidiarity is not explicitly stated in the Convention, but this omission is simply due 
to the fact that all parties took for granted that the ECHR to-be would have functioned accord-
ing to a multi-level paradigm. 
Evidence supporting this argument recurs throughout the Convention: the aforementioned Ar-
ticle 1 binds the States to secure the ECHR, but it does not suggest uniform solutions. Wide 
margin is left to Contracting States to autonomously determine how to implement human rights 
and how to comply with obligations undertaken. As Petzold remarks, “what is essential is that 
the law of Contracting States secures in substance those rights and freedoms to everyone within 
their jurisdiction regardless of the form in which they choose to do so” (Ivi, 44). Strictly related 
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to this, Article 13 provides that everyone whose rights are violated “shall have an effective rem-
edy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by per-
sons acting in an official capacity”; Article 35, section 1, (ex. art 26) reads “The Court may only 
deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally 
recognized rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which 
the final decision was taken”. The combined reading of these provisions attests that the entire 
ECHR comprises of a legal vision imbued by the notion of subsidiarity. 
Therefore, before lodging a complaint, applicants must look for remedy at a domestic level; the 
ECHR is complementary to national laws and it functions as a last resort guarantee, which can 
be activated only when the others have failed. It’s noteworthy that the ECHR is not only subsid-
iary to national legislation, but also that the Court can’t deliver judgments without being seized, 
not even when provisions appear to be manifestly in breach of human rights. 
Under Articles 13 and 36, Contracting Parties are obliged to guarantee the availability of reme-
dies, through an accessible, impartial, and effective judicial system. In other words, the existence 
of such remedies must be effectively certain: in the event of formal remedies which in practice 
turn to be inaccessible or ineffective, the ECtHR may well accept the complaint. 
The ECtHR stressed this aspect in several judgments, among which I recall Vallianatos v 
Greece, nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, concerning the alleged violation of Articles 8 and 14 
about the legal treatment of same-sex couples:  
 
The Court reiterates that the rule concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies […] is 
based on the assumption, […] that there is an effective domestic remedy available, in prac-
tice and in law, in respect of the alleged violation […]. It observes that the rule of exhaustion 
of domestic remedies requires applicants – using the legal remedies available in domestic 
law in so far as they are effective and adequate – to afford the Contracting States the possi-
bility of putting right the violations alleged against them before bringing the matter before 
the Court […]. The existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theo-
ry but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness; 
it falls to the respondent State to establish that these conditions are satisfied […] (Vallianatos 
v Greece, § 50-52). 
 
Lastly, Article 53 also (ex. art. 60) conveys the influence of the notion of subsidiarity, stating 
“nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contract-
ing Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party”.  
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Therefore, it’s up to national authorities to increase human rights legislation, but if a Contract-
ing Party fails to enforce them, or applies them according to discretional and discriminatory cri-
teria, the ECtHR is legitimate to find a violation (Petzold 1993, 45). 
The principle of subsidiarity also affects the methods of interpretation adopted by the ECtHR, 
analyzed in paragraph 3.4, and it raises crucial questions, such as where to draw the line be-
tween an appropriate national declination of human rights and a violation of the ECHR.
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3.1.4 The Enforcement of Morals 
 
One of the most debated themes concerns the bound established between morals and human 
rights and the autonomy of Contracting Parties in justifying an interference on this ground. 
As already hinted, Articles 8-11 expressly mention the protection of morals116 among the legiti-
mated exemption clauses. More specifically, in Articles 8 section 2, Article 9 section 2, and in 
Article 11 section 2, the ECHR admits derogation “for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of rights and freedom of others” while in Article 10, the expression reads slightly 
differently: “for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or rights of others”.These dissimilarities, however, do not com-
promise the overall meaning and, therefore, I will treat them jointly.  
First of all, the meaning of morals and its consequent field of application has to be assessed. 
Though Articles 8-11 do not state this explicitly, the specific realm which the ECHR refers to is 
that of public morals. How to define, characterize, and delimit this notion is widely debated; 
furthermore the ECHR’s blunt words remain vague and, most problematically, opened to really 
different, if not opposite, interpretations. 
It could be argued that Article 8 section 2 requires the enforcement of morals, identified as the 
aggregation of majoritarian moral preferences on specific behavior. 
Under such legal understanding, people would only be entitled to the rights which are not en-
visaged by social majority; in other words, majoritarian moralistic judgments would represent a 
reasonable justification to restrict individual liberty.  
As Letsas remarks, this majoritarian paradigm fails to protect the rights of minorities and, there-
fore, to serve one of the basic characteristics of human rights law: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 I am aware of the difference between the term ‘protection’, adopted by the ECHR, and that of ‘en-
forcement’, adopted in the title of this paragraph. While the former refers to the provision of “legal or 
other formal measure intended to preserve liberties and rights” (Oxford Dictionary), the latter means 
“the act of making people obey a particular law or rule” (Ibidem) and, with reference to morals, it is 
generally associated with Devlin’s argument, extensively recalled in chapter I, paragraph 1.2. I suggest 
that in the context of the ECHR the line between protection and enforcement is extremely blurred; un-
der certain conditions and in respect of a limited number of provisions, the ECHR admits that national 
authorities may legitimately restrict citizens’ rights precisely to protect morals. By this, Contracting Par-
ties are entitled not only to protect and positively sanction a situated moral perspective, but also to active-
ly enforce it, by providing legal sanctions for those who do not behave accordingly. Hence, I refer to the 
concept of enforcement precisely to highlight and problematize the latter aspect. 
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Given that rights have an anti-majoritarian dimension, it makes no sense to allow the majori-
ty itself to decide what rights individuals have in controversial legal cases. […] If we insist that 
the majority must respect individual rights we cannot then ask the majority itself to decide 
whether it has indeed respected them. For it’s natural to assume that the majority will often 
judge itself to have done so, even when this is not the case. (Letsas 2007, 119)  
 
Pluralism and tolerance lie at the core of the ECHR, and the drafting process highlights the will 
to develop a democratic model based on the supremacy of individual liberty and autonomy. 
Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity surely implies heterogeneity, but at the same time, it 
relates to institutional and procedural aspects concerning national sovereignty, not majoritarian 
preferences. The ECtHR itself recognizes the intrinsic value of “pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society” (Handyside v UK, n. 5493/72, 
§ 49). 
Is this majoritarian moral model compatible with human rights? 
From a critical perspective, I recall Letsas’ argument, according to whom to shape human rights 
on the moralistic preferences of the majority “is the greatest insult to values of liberty and equal-
ity”, since “rights [should] block moralistic preferences; they do not give effect to them” (Letsas 
2009, 122).  
Such reading of morals attaches total deference to the feelings expressed by the majority, with-
out taking minority rights into account, thus discrediting pluralism, tolerance and broadmind-
edness.  
A completely contrasting interpretation rests on a liberal and egalitarian interpretation of public 
morals. Nowlin argues that morals do not necessarily clash with liberal theories of human rights, 
and he draws on Millian’s notion of moral rights, in order to reach an understanding of morals 
“consistent with modern constitutional thinking and human rights jurisprudence that conceptu-
ally link the protection of civil or human rights to the promotion of certain democratic values” 
(Nowlin 2002, 265). In Utilitarianism, Mill identifies the core criteria that would allow us to dis-
tinguish between moral and immoral behavior, the latter consisting of “depriving a person of a 
possession, or in breaking faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, or worse 
than other people who have no greater claims” (Mill, 1969, 247). As Nowlin notes, Mill links 
the notions of fairness and honesty; hence immorality should only be legally prosecutable in the 
event that the moral rights of others are violated, for “it is confessedly unjust to break faith with 
any one: to violate an engagement, either express or implied, or disappoint expectations raised 
by our own conduct, at least if we have raised those expectations knowingly and voluntarily” 
(Mill 1969, 242-243). 
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Letsas reaches similar conclusions, and maintains that the protection of morals should neither 
directly interfere with civil rights nor deprive people of the opportunity to decide their own plan 
of life, even when socially considered disgraceful on inferior, nor treat someone as if she was 
less worth than others (Letsas 2006, 118-119). 
Though sympathizing with the thesis on the incompatibility of majoritarian morals with the hu-
man rights foundations, I think that the drafters’ choice to separately express the notions of 
“protection of morals” and “rights of others” does not override the suspicion that the drafters 
endorsed a majoritarian frame. 
As Nowlin admits, if morals are interpreted as the moral rights of others, then reference to 
‘rights of others’ appears either contradictory or repetitive, and in any event, it leaves room for 
contrasting interpretations. 
There is another implication I would like to highlight, somehow disclosing themes analyzed 
hereinafter. The majoritarian perspective does not always imply a conservative mind, and there-
fore, a similar conception of morals could also bring to the enhancement of human rights; alt-
hough the outcome might be regarded as desirable, its foundations remain theoretically prob-
lematic. 
Even if leading to progressive outcomes, the majoritarian approach is embedded with the risk 
that the field of application of human rights and the degree of protection of minorities might 
vary in accordance with the preferences of the majority, without guaranteeing stable safeguards 
to whichever minoritarian party. 
Over the years, the ECtHR has avoided clearly choosing between a moralist or a liberal concep-
tion, although interpretive doctrines developed by the judges of the ECtHR refer to majoritari-
an premises, as analyzed in paragraph 3.3. 
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3.2 The European Court of Human Rights  
 
The European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights are 
born from the same complex and the prolonged debate that led to the drafting of the ECHR. 
Both the Court and the Commission are the result of a compromise between original drafters; 
therefore by tracing how the ECtHR and the EComHR have developed, it’s possible to uncover 
problematic issues, still relevant in current discussions about the role of the ECtHR. 
 
3.2.1 The Debate on the European Court of Human Rights 
 
In the drafting process, two visions of what the ECtHR to-be should represent clashed, in a con-
flict that recurs throughout the several phases of the evolution of the ECHR. One side support-
ed a quasi-constitutional Court, invested with the primary aim of moulding a frame based on 
the communal respect of human rights, whereas the other mainly hoped for a strictly limited 
Court, whose jurisdiction could neither overcome national authority nor orient domestic poli-
cies (Madsen 2007; Lester 2011). 
The proposal of a European Court of Human Rights dates back to the aforementioned Mes-
sage to Europeans, but the plan was not further detailed until the following year. Accordingly, 
the ECHR had to be secured through the institutionalization of a Commission and a Court, 
namely the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights. The Commission was 
conceived as a gatekeeper, targeted at skimming through inadmissible and admissible com-
plaints, and at transmitting the latter to the Court, which was entitled to deliver the final judg-
ment. 
According to this proposal, the ECtHR should have been entitled to choose the members of 
the European Commission of Human Rights and its jurisdiction would have resulted compul-
sory; in addition to this, the right to individual petition should have been guaranteed to every 
citizen of Contracting Parties, and States not enforcing ECtHR’s judgments could have been di-
rectly reported to the Council of Europe (Kjeldgaard-Petersen 2010, 5).  
No doubt both the ECtHR and the EComHR were supposed to have the effective authority to 
concretely enforce human rights, and to that end, it was essential to introduce access to the 
Court and to individual and corporate bodies (Ivi, 6). 
However, as previously mentioned, a significant minority raised doubts on the very necessity to 
establish a Court; as Bates recalls “it was said to be too ambitious,
 
and unnecessary for the Eu-
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ropean nations where human rights were already well protected. All that was required, was a 
European Commission on Human Rights, especially if, as was contended, the aim of the Con-
vention was simply to prevent a return of totalitarianism in Europe” (Bates 2011, 26). Though 
the no-Court proposal was finally defeated, the Consultative Assembly was harshly divided on 
two aspects, namely “who may appeal to the Court when a guaranteed right of liberty has been 
violated” (Ivi, 7) and how to define the jurisdiction of the ECtHR.  
To be more specific, nine Countries - Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Sweden and Turkey- were prepared to include the right to individual petition in the 
Convention whereas Greece, the UK, and the Netherlands strongly opposed it. Seven Coun-
tries, among which stood the UK, opposed the creation of the Court while only four did not 
raise any objections. The only feasible option appeared to be to propose an optional Court, 
based on the idea that Contracting Parties could subscribe to the ECHR without accepting its 
jurisdiction and/or the individual right to petition. The UK and the Netherlands argued against 
it, fearing that in the event of a majority in favor of a powerful ECtHR, there would have been 
growing pressures towards the uniform recognition of the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. In this re-
spect, the UK representative Ungoed-Thomas polemicized “We are not a federation here. We 
are not at the moment a small League of Nations. We have not a federal constitution. We have 
not therefore any need for a federal Court” (Ivi, 9). 
The most relevant counterbalance was offered by French support to the Court proposal. France 
desired to build a Court neither influenced by Western colonial policies nor involved in secur-
ing native rights; however, the prevailing opinion agreed upon the ideal of a European Court 
targeted against political totalitarianism and not involved in foreign policies. 
The final jurisdiction of the ECtHR mediated among these divergent interests; the so-called co-
lonial option was introduced, which limited the competence of the ECtHR by giving the op-
tional faculty to declare to Contracting Parties, “at the time of its ratification or any time hereaf-
ter” that the Convention extended “to all or any of the territories for whose international rela-
tions is responsible” (Art. 63). 
With regard to the individual right to petition, disagreement was even deeper and the unfavora-
ble ones singled out that this procedure amounted to a lethal menace to national authority 
(Kjeldgaard-Petersen 2010; Bates 2011; Madsen 2011).  
Various compromises were therefore examined in order to grant a higher degree of consensus 
towards the European system of human rights protection.  
As Teitgen highlighted, the individual access to the ECtHR was essential and represented  
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the only mean we have of persuading the men and women of Europe that something new 
has been done and that an advance has been achieved. We must say to them that even if the 
States take no further interest in them, and even if no one takes action on their behalf, they 
may, by virtue of their dignity as men, avail themselves on their own behalf of an interna-
tional organ of protection. (Kjeldgaard-Petersen 2010,10).  
 
To forestall the risk that the optionality of the individual right to petition weakened the effec-
tiveness of ECHR, a further opting-out clause was proposed, whereby States should be allowed 
to opt out of the right to individual petition rather than opting in (Bates 2011, 31). 
In the end however, such amendment remained ignored and Contracting Parties obtained the 
chance to ratify the ECHR without recognizing the jurisdiction of the ECtHR or/and the indi-
vidual right to petition.  
At the outset, the exchange between national authorities and the ECtHR was unbalanced, since 
every member State was entitled to elect one judge, sitting for nine years, regardless of the 
State’s position regarding the optionality of the ECtHR. 
In accordance to the rules of the ECHR, the ECtHR comprised of one member from each 
State, it elected its own President every three years, and worked in Chambers of 7 members. 
Quite predictably, the asset of the ECtHR has evolved over the years and nowadays neither its 
jurisdiction nor the right of individuals to size the Court are optional. 
From the second half of the 1960s to the late 1980s, the number of Countries recognizing the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR and granting the right to individual petition increased; in 1990 and 
1998 respectively, Protocol 9 and Protocol 11 definitively modified the rules governing the 
ECHR system, to the extent that one requisite to enter the Council of Europe is to ratify the 
ECHR and to recognize the jurisdiction of the ECtHR over the interpretation of the Conven-
tion (Caflish 2006; Harmsen 2011). 
Another significant change that heavily affected the ECtHR, regards the abolition of the 
EComHR and the provision of a Grand Chamber targeted at judging hard cases. 
Given the gatekeeping role performed by the EComHR, I further examine the core features of 
this institution in the forthcoming paragraphs. 
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3.2.2 The European Commission of Human Rights 
 
The ECHR established a permanent European Commission of Human Rights, composed of 
members elected by the ECtHR, whose task was to screen the complaints in order to identify 
admissible ones and to transmit them to the Court (Art 48). 
A Committee of three people, not necessarily judges, determined the admissibility of filed peti-
tions; in more complex cases, however, a Chamber consisting of seven Commissioners handled 
the situation. 
In the event of admissible complaints, the Commission examined the facts and looked for an 
amicable agreement. If such an option could not take place, the Commission issued a report 
and displayed its opinion on whether a violation had occurred or not. 
The Commission was given no independent power of publicity, nor did its reports or decisions 
bind the ECtHR. 
As it may be imagined, the EComHR enjoyed a considerable margin of discretion; not only was 
it entitled to judge on the existence of formal deficiencies or manifest ill-founded claims, but al-
so to substantially review the arguments put forward by each part.  
The EComHR was fully entitled to draft reports in order to point out the most important issues 
to the ECtHR and, quite interestingly, if one reads the EComHR’s admissibility decisions, the 
reasoning-lines adopted by the ECtHR itself will often be found to follow those outlined in 
EComHR documents. 
In other words, the Commission skimmed through the possible approaches to the facts at stake, 
tracing interpretative paths that the Court would be likely to follow. To mention a relevant ex-
ample concerning sexual orientation, consider X v Federal Republic of Germany, n. 5935/72, 
where the applicant claimed that the criminalization of same-sex consensual acts, involving a 
man over 21 years and a boy below the age of 18, infringed upon the right to respect for private 
life, secured by Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The applicant maintained to be a victim of discrimination based on sex, because only male 
homosexuality constituted a criminal offense (X v Federal Republic of Germany, § 52). Though 
admitting that a person’s sexual life is indubitably “part of his private life of which constitutes an 
important aspect”, the EComHR did not leave the task of determining whether German laws 
legitimately interfered with private realm to the ECtHR, but it engaged in substantial interpreta-
tion. Having recalled the Government’s perspective, by which criminal laws were necessary to 
“prevent homosexual acts with adult having an unfortunate influence on the development of 
heterosexual tendencies in minors”, the EComHR acknowledged “the danger to which an ado-
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lescent is exposed as a result of homosexual relations with an adult in a subject of controversy in 
several countries. […] The fact remains that the action of the German legislature was clearly in-
spired by the need to protect the rights of children and adolescents […]. This need is broadly 
admitted in a large number of member states of the Council of Europe” (Ivi, § 55).  
Hence the Commission dismissed the claim of a violation of Article 8 and it also adopted a sim-
ilar perspective in respect to the alleged discrimination. Most notably, commissioners recalled a 
previous judgment of the ECtHR and applied it to the present complaint. Therefore, a criterion 
firstly developed to assess the existence of a violation in respect of the ECHR, here became a 
parameter for the purposes of admissibility, abundantly exceeding the features imagined by 
drafters of the EComHR to-be. 
In practice the EComHR not only acted like a first instance Court and determined the perspec-
tive by which reviewing the complaint, but it also discussed the legitimacy of German laws at 
length. In particular, commissioners judged the interference with sexual freedom for social pro-
tection as a “reasonable criterion” and established that  
 
the existence of a danger making it necessary to protect a social category must be based on 
various concerning analyses of the position and […] those of psychologists, sociologists and 
specialists in social protection. […] They have led to convincing conclusions as to the exist-
ence of a specific social danger in the case of masculine homosexuality. This danger results 
from the fact that masculine homosexuals often constitute a distinct socio-cultural group 
with a clear tendency to proselytize adolescents and that the social isolation in which the lat-
ter is involved is particularly marked (X v Federal Republic of Germany, § 56).  
 
Similar features emphasize the multifaceted gatekeeping role of the EComHR, which affected 
the ECtHR in at least three ways: firstly, commissioners skimmed through applications deter-
mining which could be evaluated by the ECtHR; secondly, the EComHR was entitled to de-
clare a complaint partially admissible, thus restricting the issues the ECtHR had to judge on; 
thirdly, the reports of the EComHR generally amounted to the highly contested point of depar-
ture for the subsequent ECtHR’s review. 
Consequently, the EComHR crucially shaped the interpretive process at the hands of the EC-
tHR, by fixing the timing for judicial review on specific issues and by influencing the ECtHR in-
terpretive approach. 
Evidence of this statement can be traced by analyzing the complaints concerning sexual orienta-
tion filed to the EComHR between 1955 and 1975. All the complaints were deemed inadmissi-
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ble; this outcome prevented the ECtHR from reviewing these issues, and prolonged the crimi-
nalization of same-sex acts across Western Europe. 
A detailed reading of the decisions of the EComHR highlights a biased perspective on two ac-
counts, namely a negative attitude against homosexuality and the belief that ultimately, the issues 
related to sexual orientation could not really be ascribed to human rights. 
In early complaints, the absence of a critical perspective is striking, and it might be due to the 
typical heteronormative inclination of closing off any critical analysis of heterosexuality (Ingra-
ham 1996, 69). 
In W.B. v Germany117, n. 104/55, the EComHR didn’t even consider the possible legitimacy of 
the arguments adduced by the applicant, filing quite a trenchant and flat motivation which estab-
lished a bound among morals, law, and the prevention of homosexuality, without further argu-
ments: “the Convention permits a High Contracting Party to legislate to make homosexuality a 
punishable offence; the law relating to private and family life may be the subject of interference 
by the laws of the said Party dealing with the protection of health and morals” (W.B. v Federal 
Republic of Germany, 1). 
In K.H.W. v Federal Republic of Germany, n. 167/56, and G.W. v Federal Republic of Ger-
many, n. 1307/61, the EComHR established an even stricter relationship between the concepts 
of health, morals, and homosexuality118, by framing the existence of criminal laws against male 
homosexuality as being incompatible with public morals and by labeling homosexuals as a pub-
lic threat for national health; national authorities were thus left with complete discretion in po-
licing sexual behavior. 
At least until the end of 1970s, the role of the EComHR remained quite undisputed, mirroring 
the preference expressed in the drafting process to reduce ECtHR caseload and, at the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 This was the first case lodged under the ECHR against criminal laws persecuting homosexuals; the 
applicant alleged a violation of Articles 2, 8, 14, 17 and 18 of the ECHR and filed an extremely rich 
complaint, still relevant in many aspects. See Johnson (2014, 22-23). 
118 The applicant had been arrested twice by the Gestapo because of homosexual acts, and on those oc-
casions, photographs and records of his fingerprints were taken. Although the final sentence was re-
duced after the war, the applicant’s criminal records had not been deleted. For these reason the appli-
cant was banned from Bremen bar and decided to lodge a complaint with the ECtHR. The EComHR 
however, legitimized national authorities, on the ground that “keeping the records including documents, 
photographs, and fingerprints relating to criminal cases of the past is necessary in a modern democratic 
society for the prevention of crime and is therefore in the interest of public safety” (G.W. v Federal Re-
public of Germany, § 5). 
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time, to expand the tasks of the EComHR, with the intent of cutting the number of complaints 
reaching the final review.  
As explored in the following paragraph, from the mid-1970s onwards, the role of the ECtHR 
evolved in the framework of the European institutions and the debate on human rights also de-
tached itself from the rigid logic of the Cold War, leading to a reassessment of the usefulness of 
the EComHR. 
The main criticism of the Commission entailed both the barrier effect performed and the con-
sequent lengthening of the whole judicial process, due to such two-stage machinery.  
Moreover, as the ECtHR strengthened its legitimacy, the rates of admissible complaints signifi-
cantly grew, leading to redundant and expensive trials. 
The existence of the EComHR was increasingly put into question and the approval of Protocol 
11, which entered into force November 11998, marked the dissolution of this institution, re-
placed by a reorganized and permanent ECtHR (Madsen 2011; Harmsen 2011; Cameron 
2013). 
The Preamble of Protocol 11 recalled the aforementioned problems and referred to “the ur-
gent need to restructure the control machinery established by the Convention in order to main-
tain and improve the efficiency of its protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
mainly in view of the increase in the number of applications and the growing membership of 
the Council of Europe” (Protocol 11).  
The admissibility test however, remains a prerequisite to reach the ECtHR; once a complaint 
has been properly filed to the ECtHR119, the Court first examines whether the case complies 
with procedural and substantial requirements set out in the Convention. If the application is de-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Article 35 states preliminary admissibility criteria that applicants are required to meet: “The Court 
may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the general-
ly recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the 
final decision was taken. The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under Article 34 that a) 
is anonymous; or b) is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or 
has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and con-
tains no relevant new information. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application sub-
mitted under Article 34 if it considers that: a) the application is incompatible with the provisions of the 
Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual appli-
cation; or b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as 
defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the 
merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by 
a domestic tribunal. The Court shall reject any application which it considers inadmissible under this Ar-
ticle. It may do so at any stage of the proceedings.” 
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clared fully or partially admissible, the ECtHR will transmit the case to one of its sections, which 
will either deliver a final judgment or relinquish the case to the Grand Chamber. The latter hy-
pothesis only occurs under exceptional circumstances, when serious doubts regarding the inter-
pretation of the Convention are raised or when there is a concrete risk of inconsistency with 
previous judgments. The parties are also entitled to request a referral to the Gran Chamber, 
and if such demand is accepted, the Grand Chamber might overturn the initial judgment.  
The decision to replace the EComHR was mainly justified by technical matters and by the aim 
to improve the capacity of the ECtHR to handle cases. ; by 1998, after almost 40 years of activi-
ty, the ECtHR had achieved a valuable degree of political legitimacy and, the perspective of a 
more active Court did therefore not threaten Contracting Parties as it did during the drafting 
process (Harmsen 2011, 121 and fol.).  
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3.2.3 International Politics and the European Court of Human Rights 
 
As already discussed, over the decades the relation between the ECtHR and the national States 
has been multifaceted and deeply affected by international political dynamics. 
The drafting of the ECHR, the appointment of the EComHR, and the introduction of the op-
tional clauses can’t be understood without referring to the political worries about national sov-
ereignty and autonomy spread in the 1950s in Western Europe. 
Likewise, the judicial attitude of the ECtHR was also variously affected by political dynamics, 
with particular reference to the processes of decolonization, to the easing of politics in the Cold 
War, and to the consequent attention paid by public opinion to human rights issues (Madsen 
2007). 
“The ECtHR cannot be understood as a static institution” argue Madsen and Christoffersen 
(2011, 3), further identifying four stages the Court has undergone since its entry into force, in 
1959: the first phase, named legal diplomacy, was marked by the ECtHR’s deference to nation-
al authorities and by the effort to build a solid judicial legitimacy, proving a sound comprehen-
sion of European politics. Later, the ECtHR turned towards a progressive trend, expanding its 
jurisprudence and developing interpretative techniques, concepts, and methods that still orient 
its review. Following the end of the Cold War, the ECtHR became the prominent guarantor of 
human rights in both Western and Eastern Europe, gathering members from new entries in the 
Council of Europe and widening the issues on which it was called to judge. Lastly, in 2004 the 
ECtHR entered a fourth phase, characterized by significant structural reforms, by the increased 
attention to the effectiveness of the ECHR in domestic law, and by the urgency to cope with the 
overwhelming caseload. 
The phase of legal diplomacy marked the first decade of the ECtHR’s existence, and it was 
characterized by two main historical dynamics which constituted the lens through which the EC-
tHR filtered human rights issues: the Cold War and the nationalist revolts which were happen-
ing all over European colonies. 
Political instability, economic uncertainty, and the decline of European supremacy favored 
quite a conservative spirit in leading Parties, who looked to maintain a solid sovereignty, at least 
within the borders of Europe.  
“Human rights were more a question of politics than law”, suggests Madsen (2011, 48), also 
stressing the jarring clash between the programmatic declarations of the ECtHR and the imperi-
alist policies endorsed by the UK, France, and the Netherlands.  
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As a result, the ECtHR had to demonstrate its ability to disentangle interwoven political and le-
gal issues without disregarding national interests, to the extent that it may be argued that in this 
period, the enforcement of human rights remained significantly in the backdrop, while judicial 
review seemed to be the extension of traditional diplomatic strategies. 
Two complaints tested the capability of the Court to counterbalance the interests at stake. In 
1956, the Greek government filed an interstate complaint against the British repression of Cyp-
riot nationalist rebels, claiming a violation of the ECHR. The British government quite predict-
ably did not welcome the likelihood that the ECtHR might develop legal grounds against its 
empire. Moreover, it feared that before deciding about the admissibility of the complaint, the 
EComHR would conduct examinations on the political situation in Cyprus and on the abuses 
perpetrated by British authorities; consequently, UK diplomacy strongly pursued an extra-
judicial tactic, which finally led to two diplomatic agreements, known as London and Zurich 
Agreements, with the consequent withdrawal of the complaint. The ECtHR not only welcomed 
this solution, but it also expressed relief not to be faced with such a conflict, as the words of 
Rollin, President of the ECtHR, starkly show: “I am the first to admit the paradox - and person-
ally I regret it- that by a chance of fate the first government to be brought to the bar by another 
government is the United Kingdom, which governs a country which surely, more than any other 
in Europe, has always shown concern for human rights” (Simpson 2004, 322). 
Hence, political concerns exceeded the legal ones, and Rollin took the side of the UK perspec-
tive, implying that because of its history and its opposition to Nazism, the UK deserved sympa-
thetic consideration, regardless of the arguments of the counterpart.  
Shortly after, another complaint shook the ECtHR system, by calling into question the practice 
of detention without trial, common in Ireland to contrast IRA, and in the UK and in France to 
repress nationalist rebellions. In Greece v UK, the applicant was surprisingly an Irish citizen, 
and the resort to diplomacy was not possible so the EComHR, decided to maintain a cautious 
approach, finally deeming the complaint admissible and transmitting it to the Court. The final 
judgment was an acute diplomatic balancing act: despite finding Irish practices in violation of 
Article 5, the Court did not recognize any breach and it accepted derogation through Article 15, 
stating that “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High 
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to 
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are 
not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”. 
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The showdown opposing the IRA and the Irish government might be effectively regarded as an 
emergency situation, yet the definition of concepts like ‘war’ or ‘public emergency’ remained 
loose120, leaving national authorities room to justify contestable practices of detention. 
To summarize, in this decade, a slight number of complaints passed the admissibility test of the 
EComHR, and the ECtHR found a breach in even fewer complaints; I would explain this trend 
by referring to multiple dynamics. The ECHR was not only interpreted as securing a minimum 
standard of human rights, but the memories of Nazi atrocities were still vivid, and they repre-
sented the implicit basis for the comparison of alleged violations. Moreover, the Communist 
menace pushed to strengthen internal political order; to prevent the fall of democratic regimes, 
the ECtHR also allowed quite a questionable constriction of individual civil rights. 
Owing to legal diplomacy, the ECtHR achieved great legitimacy among member States, which 
in turn led to a significant increase in the number of ratifications of the ECHR and to the exten-
sion of the individual right to petition. In 1966, the UK accepted the optional clause of jurisdic-
tion and the individual right to petition, followed by Italy and Switzerland in 1973. France re-
mained the only democracy not allowing its citizens to size the ECtHR: it was not until Pompi-
dou’s death that the French government ratified the ECHR and accepted its jurisdiction. It was 
with Mitterrand’s election that France finally accepted the individual right to petition. Finally, 
Spain and Portugal signed the ECHR in 1976 and 1977, following the end of both authoritarian 
regimes121 (Delmas-Marty 1992, 171 and fol.). 
The easing of East-West contraposition, the end of decolonization fights, combined with the 
civil rights movement concerning the Vietnam War and the establishment of dictatorships in 
Latin-America, led to a new understanding of violations perpetrated outside Western Europe. 
In fact, in the early 1970s, most human rights activism was directed at non-democratic regimes 
outside the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, such as the Greek colonels, Spain under Franco and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 “The natural and customary meaning of the words other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation is sufficiently clear; whereas they refer to an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which af-
fects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the 
State is composed; whereas, having thus established the natural and customary meaning of this concep-
tion” (Lawless v Ireland, n. 332/57, § 28) 
121 Greece was one of the first Countries to join the Council of Europe, in 1949; in 1969 however, the 
dictatorship of Colonels reacted to international pressure against its anti-democratic methods - climaxed 
in a complaint lodged with the ECtHR by the Swedish government- by denouncing the Convention and 
exiting from the Council of Europe. After the Regime of Colonels collapsed, in 1974, the newly elected 
government re-ratified the ECHR. A complete time-line of Countries ratifying the ECHR is provided by 
the official website of the European Convention on Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/  
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Portugal under Salazar. However, by the mid-1970s, Greece, Spain, and Portugal had begun a 
transition towards democracy and the main issue was not how to deal with European authoritar-
ian regimes but, rather how to ensure a common frame of rights. Therefore, the ECtHR arose 
as a landmark in merging the heterogeneous legal sensibilities and integrating them into a co-
herent European human rights system.  
In the late 1970s, the ECtHR delivered several landmark judgments, widening and deepening 
its doctrine: in Tyrer v UK, n. 5856/72, and Marckx v Belgium, n. 6833/74, judges developed a 
dynamic and integrationist approach; in Airey v Ireland, n. 6289/73, and Golder v UK, n. 
4451/10 they further specified the content of obligations arising from the ECHR. 
As it has been suggested, these decisions resulted in tensions between the Court and the mem-
ber States, but they contributed to enhance the Convention as a genuine source of law, as a 
force to reckon with and respect. 
At the present moment, the legitimacy of the ECtHR is under discussion again, mainly due to 
the proposal of the UK to introduce a British Human Rights Act, which would override the ju-
risdiction of the ECtHR and challenge the supreme role of the Court in adjudicating human 
rights .  
In 2015, the British conservative government proposed major changes to amplify national dis-
cretion, for instance by removing prisoners from Countries where they are likely to be tortured, 
proposing a further modification of the machinery of the ECHR: only complaints which were 
not properly addressed by national Courts could be reviewed by the ECtHR; in any event, the 
judgments of the ECtHR should only be complementary to national decisions. 
The majority of Contracting Parties, however, has not endorsed a similar perspective and it 
does not seem applicable at length. 
In addition, the efficiency of the ECtHR is challenged, mainly by the enormous backlog of 
complaints, to the extent that the Prime Minister of the UK, David Cameron, recently pro-
posed the so-called ‘sunset clause’ to strike out all the complaints which are not judged by the 
ECtHR within a period of one to two years. 
What’s more, Eastern Countries barely sustain the ECtHR and their compliance with its judg-
ments is frequently limited mostly to the formal level (Pomeranz 2011, 17; Emmert 2012). For 
instance, a sharp duplicity marks the Russian attitude to the ECHR since its accession to the 
Council of Europe: on one hand, Russian complaints constitute a great part of the overall case-
law, whereas, on the other, the Court has repeatedly chided Moscow for failing to secure hu-
man rights. Despite the fact that national Courts refer to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on 
various occasions when dealing with civil and social issues, Russian political parties are actually 
upholding a nationalist language that overshadows the institutions of the ECHR.  
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In December 2015, the 84th Steering Committee for Human Rights gathered to study “the 
long-term future of the systems of the European Convention on Human Rights” and it carefully 
detailed the main problems of the ECHR system, without pointing out a clear pragmatic solu-
tion122. 
According to the 2010 Interlake Declaration, the Committee of Ministers has to decide before 
the end of 2019 whether structural changes are necessary and whether the adopted procedure 
of pilot judgments, described in the following paragraph, proves useful. 
Moreover, new international events are shaking global politics and redefining legal, diplomatic, 
and military alliances, also affecting the relation among the Contracting States and among Eu-
rope and other emerging Countries.  
As a consequence, it is likely that the ECtHR will soon enter a new phase, whose features are 
extremely hard to forecast, but which will be the outcome of the ongoing conflict between na-
tionalist and integrationist Countries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 The outcome of the 84th Steering Committee is mostly programmatic. Four problematic areas are 
addressed: the inadequate national implementation of the Convention, the overwhelming case-load of 
the ECtHR, the necessity to maintain the authority of ECtHR judgments and the implementation of 
Convention mechanisms in the European and international legal order. As far as the first issue is con-
cerned, good practices should be internationally identified and implemented, and specialized ‘contact 
points’ should be created in each State; moreover governments should promote a deeper knowledge of 
the ECHR, in order to mainstream human rights issues. In the backlog, the Committee encouraged the 
Court “to examine further possibilities of streamlining its working methods” in order to separate priority 
cases from non-priority cases. Applicants and lawyers should also be made aware of the scopes and lim-
its of the ECHR, in order to reduce the current number of filed applications. Finally, the Committee of 
Ministers is urged to find political mechanisms suitable to challenge large-scale violations and to imple-
ment the pilot-judgment procedure. The 84th Report on “the longer-term future of the system of the 
European Convention on Human Rights”, adopted by the Steering Committee for Human Rights, can 
be accessed at http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/CDDH/REFORMECHR/  
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3.2.4 The Enforcement of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
According to the guidelines set out in the ECHR, the execution of the ECtHR judgments fol-
lows a complex process, with several possible outcomes. As I will exhibit throughout this para-
graph, the ECHR institutions are entitled to adopt severe measures in order to force Contract-
ing States to comply with the ECtHR judgments, but the cornerstone of the entire machinery 
still lies with the voluntary implementation of the Convention.  
A non-compliant Country is generally obliged to pay sanctions until the judgments are enforced, 
but, as one can easily imagine, cases where national authorities prefer this option rather than 
adopting incisive reforms are not rare. 
Diplomatic and economic costs to force a State to abide by the ECtHR judgments are high, and 
the Committee of Ministers risks starting a judicial contrast which might also lead to economic 
or political tensions; therefore, the safeguard of human rights is combined with significant ef-
forts targeted at encouraging voluntary compliance. 
Each judgment is binding and final, meaning that the judgments not subject to any appeal or 
other authority (Abdelgawad 2008, 7) and judges are entitled to admit economic and/or extra-
patrimonial remedies, in the form of liability, compensation, and annulment (Verhoven 1984, 
278). 
Not only political executives and governments, but also all public authorities of any level, are le-
gally bound to enforce the ECtHR judgments; as already stated, the Court refuses to clearly in-
dicate the policies or the measures whereby executing a judgment, only stating the right which 
must be secured. The subsidiary nature of the ECHR system prevents the ECtHR from over-
coming national authorities and, as it has been acutely suggested, “the Court is in no position to 
make such an assessment, which presupposes a relatively detailed knowledge of the domestic 
system in question” (Abdelgawad 2008, 7). The Court, however, enjoys a discreet margin in re-
stricting the range of possible means, for instance by detailing crucial goals so to implicitly sug-
gest the necessary reforms. 
The obligation to achieve a result under the ECHR gives rise to three main duties, in respect of 
the legal principle of restitutio ad integrum: a) the obligation to end the violation; b) the obliga-
tion to make reparation; c) the obligation to avoid future breaches. 
Regarding point a), in most severe cases, the ECtHR is also entitled to impose economic com-
pensation, but it generally prefers to consider the violation itself as just satisfaction. 
Points b) and c) can be fulfilled by three main means. Besides pecuniary sanctions, individual 
and general measures are frequently invoked. Instruments targeted at single applicants include 
 186	  
the re-opening of judicial proceedings and the re-examination of proceedings when it’s not pos-
sible to re-open them. Acts of clemency and ‘positive actions’, though rarer, also recur; for in-
stance, in 2001 after Stefanov v Bulgaria, n. 32438/96, the Bulgarian government adopted a 
general amnesty in regards to Jehovah’s witnesses who had refused to do military service. Vogt v 
Germany, n. 17851/91, and N. v. Finland, n. 38885.702, fall within the latter group, for the 
Court stated respectively to reinstate Mr. Vogt who had been illegitimately suspended from civil 
service, and to grant Mr. N. a continuous residence permit, because the national authorities had 
threatened him with a possible expulsion to the Republic of Congo.  
General measures may also entail changes in national case-law or alterations to judicial rules. As 
Abdelgawad recalls “significant reforms have also been made to the organisation of the courts, 
especially in Spain, Portugal and Italy, in order to reduce the length of proceedings, and to the 
administrative courts in the Nordic countries” (Ivi, 28). 
As far as the ECHR is concerned, the Committee of Ministers supervises the execution of 
judgments; in practice, this reality has become much more complex, also involving the Court 
and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
As several authors note (Abdelgawad 2008; Marmo, 2008), the process of supervision does not 
directly involve the applicant; furthermore, NGOs and third parties are only allowed to submit 
reports highlighting a lack of national compliance, with informative purposes. 
Though not dealing with procedures of supervision, I consider it interesting to enlist the in-
struments of coercion, in order to show how they require political and diplomatic cohesion. 
Interim resolutions are the blandest, and they consist of a public reprimand of non-compliance 
or of the declaration that the Contracting State has only partially fulfilled its obligations, and 
they merely threaten the state with further sanctions.  
On the contrary, Article 8 of the Statue of the Council of Europe reflects the original will to se-
cure human dignity and to prevent torture at any costs; according to such provision,  
 
any member of the Council of Europe which has seriously violated Article 3 may be sus-
pended from its rights of representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers to 
withdraw […]. If such member does not comply with this request, the Committee may de-
cide that it has ceased to be a member of the Council from whichever date the Committee 
determines. 
 
Precisely because of the severity of the dread solutions and wide-ranging consequences, Article 
8 has never been used. Turning to recent developments, the ECtHR is increasingly accepting of 
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the clarification of the scope of its judgments, stressing the shortcomings of national rules, or 
recommending the adoption of targeted measures. 
In 2004, the ECtHR delivered its first pilot judgment, defined as “a technique of identifying the 
structural problems underlying repetitive cases against many countries and imposing an obliga-
tion on States to address those problems” (ECtHR 2015, 1). If the Court receives several appli-
cations that share a root cause, it can select one or more for priority treatment; in pilot judg-
ments, the Court’s task is not only to decide whether a violation of the ECHR really occurred, 
but also to identify the systemic problem and to clearly point out the remedial measures re-
quired. Therefore, the same judicial technique will be applied in repetitive cases, and all Con-
tracting Parties are made aware of how to enforce the ECHR with reference to that issue. 
Finally, Protocol 14 introduced two new remedies at the hands of the ECtHR. The Court is 
able to assist the Committee of Ministers, both in interpreting the scope of a judgment and in 
enhancing its enforcement if the respondent State fails to execute it; at the moment, however, 
these measures appear programmatic and not pragmatically oriented. 
To date, the interplay between politics and the asset of the ECtHR has, on the whole, ensured a 
positive degree of compliance; thus meaning that flaws in the execution of judgments do not 
pose a serious threat to the existence of the Court. As Abdelgawad emphasizes, constant vigi-
lance is necessary and no definitive achievement can be taken for granted; the ECHR system is 
peculiar and differentiated from that of the European Court of Justice - which is mainly reliant 
on infringement proceedings coupled with daily fines and an elite model of accountability (Ab-
delgawad 2008, 71). Surprisingly, the Council of Europe opted for a very different approach 
from the beginning, based on persuasion, on the coordination among various national and in-
ternational institutions, and on the accountability of the authorities at different levels, in keeping 
with the participatory model of accountability.  
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3.3 Doctrines and Methods of Interpretation 
 
Autonomy and empirical research constitute the theoretical pillars of the interpretive methods 
developed by the ECtHR. 
Under Article 32, the Court is the only legitimate interpreter of the Convention, and it draws 
the meaning of the concepts recalled in the Convention from its own jurisprudence. Both the 
interpretation of rights and their enforcement depend on the ECtHR itself and, even though 
other institutions of the Council of Europe can facilitate or informally press for the enforcement 
of the ECtHR judgments, they are not appointed with the authority to propose alternative inter-
pretations of the Convention, nor are they enabled to advise the Court. Third parties are admis-
sible, nevertheless, they do not bind the Court. 
In reference to the empirical approach, the ECtHR incrementally developed its own methods; 
rules governing the Convention are concise and the Court expanded them in a number of 
judgments, therefore not tersely separating between the process of adjudication and the defini-
tion of internal procedures (see among the others Loizidou v Turkey, n. 15318/89; Bosphorus 
Airways v Ireland, n. 45036/98; Tyrer v UK). 
Methods of interpretation are the instrument whereby abstract provisions are turned into con-
tingency; under a socio-legal perspective, the interpretation of the ECHR also fulfills one of the 
essential requirements pending on the ECtHR, namely to connect judicial review with the word-
ing of the ECHR, and to show deference to the rules established by previous jurisprudence 
(Friedman 1975, 237). 
Hence in the next paragraph, I account for the legal sources that inspired the ECtHR, critically 
analyzing the most relevant paradigms and the doctrines of interpretation adopted by the Court 
thus far. 
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3.3.1 The Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Laws and Treaties  
 
The ECHR is a treaty of international law, and consequently, its general interpretation is orient-
ed by Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the interpretation of Laws and Treaties, 
signed in 1969123. 
The Vienna Convention does not single out precise paths, nor does it state a hierarchy among 
different doctrines; rather, it defines legitimate methods whereby covenants and treaties have to 
be interpreted, and it ratifies a number of practices already rooted in international judicial prac-
tice.  
Article 31 reads:  
 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes: a) any agreement relating to the treaty which 
was made between all parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; b) any instru-
ment which has been made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. Therefore, 
the following factors shall be taken into account, together with the context: a) any subse-
quent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the appli-
cation of its provisions, b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which es-
tablishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation, c) any relevant rules of in-
ternational law applicable in the relations between the parties. A special meaning shall be 
given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
 
Article 32 provides: 
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 The Vienna Convention took place nineteen years after the adoption of the ECHR and it was not in-
tended to have retroactive effects. However, scholars agree that reference made by ECtHR judges to the 
Vienna Convention is fully justified, since that treaty did not establish new obligations, nor did it support 
innovative doctrines, but it merely systematically formalized and reviewed practices already spread in in-
ternational law practice. See Mahoney 1990; Matcher 1993; Mowbray 2007. 
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resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning, when the interpre-
tation according to Article 31: a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or b) leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
Before analyzing the problematic relation between these provisions and the ECHR, it’s worth 
noting that the language itself of Articles 31-32 leaves room for discussion.  
Two main interpretive approaches emerge, namely the originalist and the purposive, or teleo-
logical, one (Letsas 2010, 512). 
The former assumes that the Convention has to be read as a frozen-in-time document, which 
binds the present interpreters to the past: more specifically, originalist textualists depart from 
the meaning attached to the rights at the time of their enactment. Paraphrasing Letsas on 
LGBT claims, rather than asking whether the right to family-life secured under Article 8 ECHR 
applies to homosexual relations, we should ask, would the public at large in 1950 apply the 
concept of family-life to gay and lesbian relationships124? 
Instead, Originalist intentionalists argue that it should be necessary to abide by the aims and the 
intentions of drafters; in the aforementioned example, the main question would be, did the 
original drafters intend to include homosexuality cases within Article 8 ECHR? This perspec-
tive starkly appears imbued by a sharp historicist standpoint, coupled with the defense of West-
phalian order and with a restrained conception of the role of the ECtHR. 
The purposive approach aims to adapt original provisions to the present socio-economic frame, 
hence the main fear against such reading concerns the quest for international certainty; as judge 
Fitzmaurice argued “the parties cannot be expected to implement what would be an important 
international obligation when it is not defined sufficiently to enable them to know exactly what it 
involves” (judge Fitzmaurice in Golder v UK, § 30). 
I wish to stress the connection between the notion of ‘ordinary meaning’, the expression ‘terms 
of the treaty in their context’, and the phrase ‘light of its object and purpose’: all signifiers are 
comprised of the same line and they are presented as equally legitimate. The notion of ‘ordi-
nary meaning’, thus seems neither absolute nor grounded on how a single problem was per-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 “Rather then ask ourselves whether the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment 
under Article 3 ECHR applies to circumstances of extreme poverty, we should ask Would the public at 
large in 1950 apply the concept of inhuman and degrading treatment to poverty cases?” (Letsas 2005, 
513). 
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ceived at the time of its enactment but, rather, it may well require a balance with the overall spir-
it of the treaty. 
Therefore, I share Van Dijk and Van Hoof’s caution that  
 
The rules of the Vienna Convention do not provide clear-cut solutions to all problems of 
treaty interpretation. […] Those rules themselves are not unequivocal. Depending on many 
factors […] a Court may be inclined towards an interpretation which is focused on the ordi-
nary meaning of the terms of the treaty or conversely towards an ‘object and purpose’-
oriented interpretation. (Van Dijk and Van Hoof 1998, 72). 
 
Even though the ECtHR mentioned the Vienna Convention in a limited number of cases, judg-
es preferred to develop their own methods, referring to Articles 31-32 only as a general frame. 
Not only do the Vienna provisions appear rather unclear but, as a former judge of the Court 
stressed, the ECHR can’t be assimilated to traditional treaties of international law:  
 
human rights treaties have a unique character. They are not concerned with the mutual rela-
tions and exchange of benefits between sovereign States. Instead they proclaim solemn 
principles for the humane treatment of the inhabitants of the participating States. […] What 
was in former times considered to be part of unfitted domestic jurisdiction and within the 
exclusive competence of the sovereign State has become the subject of international protec-
tion and supervision (Bernhardt 1988, 65-66). 
 
From such a standpoint, Fitzmaurice’s argument can be challenged, since in human rights the 
essential task is not to bind Parties to a narrow field of obligations, but, on the contrary, it is to 
lead them to entrust a third institution with the authority to progressively set legitimate rules, 
procedures, and limits to national policies, in order to effectively enhance the enforcement of 
human rights.  
In Golder v UK, the ECtHR extensively debated over the textualist approach, finally dismissing 
it, and it laid the foundations of teleological doctrine. The applicant, a prisoner serving his sen-
tence, applied to the ECtHR claiming that he was denied the right to consult a solicitor, and 
thus alleged a violation of Article 6.  
Article 6 did not encompass the right to access court and the British government maintained 
that the right to be given a fair trial did not include the preliminary right to enter the Courts, 
given that had the drafters intended so, they would have chosen another language.  
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For the first time, the ECtHR mentioned the Vienna Convention and it stated how it should 
operatively guide the interpretation of the ECHR: “In the way in which it is presented in the 
general rule in Article 31 of Vienna Convention, the process of interpretation of a treaty is a 
unity, single combined operation: this rule, closely integrated, places on the same footing the 
various elements enumerated in the four paragraphs of the Article” (Golder v UK, § 30). 
Therefore, the Court had to assess an ordinary meaning adequate to the overall aims of the 
Convention itself. If the right to access to Courts were not guaranteed, the substantial value of 
the right to a fair trial would be threatened, since Contracting Parties could bypass the ECtHR’s 
review by simply preventing certain categories from the judiciary. Consequently, the ECtHR 
found a violation and upheld that the ECHR secures ‘unenumerated rights’. 
By fully rejecting the textualist presumption, an essential question remained opened: how does 
the Court define the concepts enlisted in the ECHR so to detach from domestic laws? 
Once again, the answer can be found in a judgment, precisely in Engel v Netherlands (nos. 
5100/71, 51001/71, 51002/71,5354/72, 5370/72), concerning the legitimacy of sanctions pro-
vided for military infringements. 
Dutch laws did not consider military penalties as criminal offenses, and claimed that the EC-
tHR review should limit itself to secure “civil rights and obligations” affected by criminal provi-
sions.  
Once again, the Court stated its preeminence over domestic laws, and it sustained that it was up 
to the ECtHR to define its guidelines; had the Court accepted the distinctions moulded by re-
spondent States, it would have implicitly restricted its power of review in an unfeasible way. In-
deed, in such a scenario, judges would bound themselves to a-critically accept qualifications and 
distinctions made by respondent States, assessing only whether the enforcement of certain pro-
visions infringed upon the ECHR, without questioning the definitions made by national authori-
ties. For instance, in the Engel case, the ECtHR could not have rejected the distinction between 
military penalties and criminal offences. 
In other words, the ECtHR is the ultimate institution entrusted with the authority to define the 
rights secured by the ECHR; in less than fifty years, the Court has appointed autonomous defi-
nitions of concepts such as ‘criminal charge’, ‘civil rights and obligations’, ‘possession’, ‘associa-
tion’, ‘victim’, ‘lawful detention’, ‘ home’, and ‘civil servant’ (Letsas 2004, 283). 
Yet, it would be misleading to think that the ECtHR automatically rejects any national meaning 
assigned to the ECHR; domestic decisions are overturned if they do not meet certain criteria. 
Most notably, at least two steps are required to trigger autonomous definitions: firstly, the appli-
cants have to contest the national legal meaning assigned to a given concept and, secondly, na-
tional authorities have to fail to prove that the alleged right is properly secured. Only under the-
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se circumstances is it likely that the ECtHR will uphold applicants’ request to conceive an au-
tonomous qualification of the point at issue. 
To conclude this overview, the ECtHR has significantly endorsed a purposive approach, devel-
oping new interpretations. Bearing in mind the specificities characterizing human rights field, 
this orientation appears neither surprising nor unjustified: the Court is concerned whether re-
spondent States honor the spirit of obligations under the ECHR and ultimately, whether na-
tional authorities really do secure minorities against eventual majoritarian dictatorships. 
Throughout the ECtHR jurisprudence, judges sway between diverse interpretations and, some-
times, the ECtHR opts for a more originalist or restrained tendency. In Witold Litwa v Poland, 
n. 26629/95, for instance, the majority implied the possible preeminence of literal meaning, 
stating “the sequence in which […] elements are listed in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
regulates, however, the order which the process of interpretation of the treaty should follow. 
That process start must start form ascertaining the ordinary meaning of the terms of a treaty” 
(Witold Litwa v Poland, § 72). In the majority of cases however, the Court does not preliminary 
state its position on this issue and the departing approach has to be subsumed in the overall in-
terpretation. 
The absence of precise paths, the empirical and the factual nature of the ECtHR, and the nec-
essary balance between the autonomy of the Court and the sovereignty of Contracting Parties, 
progressively pushed the Court to advance peculiar instruments, whereby interpreting the Con-
vention and reviewing domestic legislation, which are discussed hereinafter.  
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3.3.2 The European Convention on Human Rights as a Living Instrument 
 
The reading of the ECHR as a living instrument goes back to Tyrer v UK, and it descends from 
a purposive approach to the text.  
Interpretive autonomy is indeed required, to elaborate a set of pragmatic strategies whereby 
concretely adjudicating single applications and interpreting the Convention.  
Reappraising the famous Tyrer judgment concerning whether the punishment of pupils by 
birching infringed Article 3, the ECtHR stated “the Convention is a living instrument which […] 
must be interpreted in light of present-day conditions. In the case now before it, the Court can-
not but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal pol-
icy of member States of the Council of Europe in this field” (Tyrer v UK, § 31). 
The metaphor of a ‘living instrument’ was borrowed from constitutional debates and it recalled 
the thoroughly investigated alternative between originalist and evolutive interpretations. Though 
the ECHR does not fit the category of constitutional law, the similarity between the latter and 
human rights allows us to trace a parallelism. Whereas originalists argue that the ECHR embod-
ies a set of values immune to ephemeral political changes, evolutive interpreters approach the 
legal text beyond its wording, admitting the regulation of issues which are not originally foreseen 
and also treating them according to a perspective different from the one that the drafters would 
have chosen or from the one the drafters implied in preliminary stages (Letsas 2011, 106). 
The ECtHR often resorted to the living instrument doctrine, and to this day, judicial review of 
the ECHR can’t prescind such a method; there is, however, a sequence of judgments which 
marks the development of the living instrument doctrine, namely Sigurdur v Iceland, no. 
16130/90, Young, James and Webster v UK, Loizidous v Turkey, Matthews v UK, no. 
24833/94, and Selmouni v France, no. 25803/94. The interesting element in the former two 
complaints is that the ECtHR endorsed an interpretation which detached itself from the draft-
ers’ intentions, in that preliminary debates proved that the drafters did not want to grant protec-
tion for the situations put forward by the applicants.  
Both James and al. and Sigurdur claimed a negative right to association, related to trade unions 
and professional associations; even though Article 11 only mentioned the positive right of asso-
ciation and despite the fact that the complaints at stake did not entail criminal law but domestic 
industrial relations, as Golsong suggests (1990,15) the ECtHR finally found the UK and Iceland 
to be in breach of ECHR by adopting the “living doctrine” and by mentioning the need “to in-
terpret the ECRH in light of present day conditions” (Sigurdur v Iceland, § 35).  
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In Loizdous v Turkey and Matthews v the UK, the Court applied this doctrine to procedural 
and institutional elements which were not originally envisaged, and which were quite in contra-
diction with the legal diplomacy of the origins. In the former, a Cypriot citizen complained of 
Turkish interference with her property, located in northern Cyprus; the Turkish Government 
contended that it had only ratified the ECHR recognizing the competence of the original Court 
in respect of actions taking place within Turkish boundaries, in accordance with Articles 25 and 
46 of the ECHR. Nevertheless, the ECtHR maintained that the evolutive interpretation applied 
“not only […] to substantive provisions of the Convention, but also […] to those provisions, such 
as Articles 25 and 46, which govern the operation the Convention’s enforcement machinery. It 
follows that these provisions cannot be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of 
their authors as expressed more than four years ago” (Loizdous v Turkey, § 71). 
The Court reiterated this concept in Matthews, stating that the inability of Gibraltar citizens to 
vote for the EU parliament could not be justified by the fact that the ECHR did not address the 
issue of overseas territories; on the contrary, to prevent the Convention from becoming a death 
letter, the Court found a breach of Article 3 of Protocol 1, on the right to free elections in the 
choice of legislature, concluding  
 
the mere fact that a body was not envisaged by the drafters of the Convention cannot pre-
vent that body from falling within the scope of the Convention. To the extent that Contract-
ing States organise common constitutional or parliamentary structures by international trea-
ties, the Court must take these mutually agreed structural changes into account in interpret-
ing the Convention and its Protocols. (Matthews v UK, § 39). 
 
In Selmouni v France, the ECtHR took into account the possibility to innovate the definition of 
torture, and further widened the field of application of the living instrument doctrine. The ap-
plicant denounced a series of sexual and physical abuses at the hands of police officers during 
his detention, and in contrast with the French authorities’ submissions, whereby those activities 
could neither be classified as torture nor would the drafters have held sporadic police violence 
under such a frame, the ECtHR took the view that under the living instrument  
 
certain acts which […] classified in the past as inhuman and degrading treatment as opposed 
to torture could be classified differently in the future. […] The increasingly high standard be-
ing required in the area of protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspond-
ingly, inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of 
democratic society (Selmouni v France, § 101).  
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Throughout the decades, the ECtHR has consistently applied the living instrument doctrine in a 
multitude of cases, which can’t be recalled here, but this doctrine has raised consistent doubts 
on how far the ECtHR is entitled to go, and to what extent judges can detach themselves from 
the drafter’s intentions. 
Three limits mainly restrict the ECtHR review, namely the arguments disciplined by specific 
Protocols, the rights on which international consensus does not exist and, finally, those rights 
which can’t be directly linked to any Article and whose legitimacy is hotly debated. 
In Soering v UK, no. 14038/88, and Ocalan v Turkey, no. 46221/99, the applicants claimed 
that the death penalty violated Article 3, since it allegedly amounted to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. Although by 1989 the overwhelming majority of Contracting Members had de iure 
abolished the death penalty, and although by 2003 the legal position of the Council of Europe 
was against the death penalty, in both cases the ECtHR decided that essential conditions re-
quired to creatively interpret the ECHR were not met. The existence of a dedicated Protocol 
addressing the death penalty, proved the will of the Contracting Members to discipline such an 
issue through a “normal method of amendment of the text […] and to do so by an optional in-
strument allowing each State to choose the moment when to undertake such an engagement” 
(Soering v UK, § 103). 
Consequently, a first limit against judicial over-creation concerns the supremacy of eventual 
Protocols testifying the intention to review the rights secured by the ECHR through a delibera-
tive process. 
Secondly, the ECtHR resorted to extreme prudence in deciding on sensitive issues about life 
and death, especially if there’s no clear international consensus. In Pretty v UK, no. 2346/02 a 
British woman, suffering from a motor neurone disease, lodged a complaint with the ECtHR, 
claiming that the impossibility to mercy-kill herself infringed upon her rights, and further de-
nouncing that in the UK assisted suicide amounted to a criminal offense. Both the legal and so-
cial British opinion were highly divided on the issue; the fear that an activist perspective, as 
compassionate as it might appear, would be critiqued as performing an act of judicial policy-
making, pushed the ECtHR to dismiss the application. Moreover, Pretty demanded positive ob-
ligations and the ECtHR feared this could lead to a dangerously slippery-slope125.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 “While the Court must take a dynamic and flexible approach to the interpretation of the Convention, 
which is a living instrument, any interpretation must also accord with the fundamental objectives of the 
Convention and its coherence as a system of human rights protection. […] The Court cannot but be 
sympathetic to the applicants apprehension that without the possibility of ending her life she faces the 
prospect of a distressing death. […] Nonetheless, the positive obligation on the part of the State which is 
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A third limit regards the pretenses not yet internationally classified under human rights law; in 
Hatton v UK, n. 36022/97, the Court refused to deduce environmental rights from the ECHR, 
stating that “environmental protection should be taken into consideration by Governments in 
acting within their margin of appreciation and by the Court in its review of that margin, but it 
would not be appropriate for the Court to adopt a special approach in this respect by reference 
to a special status of environmental rights” (Hatton v UK, § 122).  
It could be observed that besides claims whose bound with the ECHR is clear and without mar-
gin of uncertainty, any other alleged violation implies a questionable distinction among: a) issues 
which have been actually forecasted by the drafters, b) issues which deserve, at present time, 
protection under the ECHR, though not foreseen or manifestly dismissed at the origins, and c) 
issues which display a weak and inadmissible bound with the text and the intents of the ECHR. 
From the background of the undertaken analysis, the doctrine of living instrument appears 
more as an orienting guideline to the ECHR rather than an operative method. Further interpre-
tive instruments are required to read the ECHR in light of present conditions and, to this pur-
pose, the ECtHR has justified two fundamental methods, widely addressed in forthcoming par-
agraphs: the consensus doctrine and the margin of appreciation.  
Broadly speaking, the living instrument perspective assesses the direction of judicial review, 
whereas the joint recurse to the margin of appreciation and consensus builds the concrete path, 
case by case. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
invoked in the present case would not involve the removal or mitigation of harm by, for instance, pre-
venting any ill-treatment by public bodies or private individuals or providing improved conditions or 
care. It would require that the State sanction actions intended to terminate life, an obligation that cannot 
be derived from Article 3 of the Convention” (Pretty v UK, § 54-5). 
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3.3.3. Consensus and the European Convention on Human Rights  
 
In the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, consensus analysis plays an important role, to the extent that 
almost every evolutive interpretation recalls such a method. 
Consensus could be roughly defined as that interpretive method whereby judges endorse teleo-
logical interpretation only if common legal trends emerge on particular matters. The theoretical 
reference of this doctrine is comparative legal analysis, which, as it can be easily imagined, poses 
a number of problems. 
The origin of the doctrine is embodied in Tyrer v UK, and precisely in the same passage as that 
firstly interpreted the ECHR as a “living instrument”. In paragraph 31, the judges stated that the 
definition of present life conditions “cannot but be influenced by the developments and com-
monly accepted standards in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe”. 
Consensus analysis has been adopted in some of the most relevant judgments, and its role in 
LGBT issues proved essential. After Tyrer, the ECtHR famously resorted to comparative legal 
analysis in Marckx v Belgium, to find a breach in national laws discriminating against children 
born outside marriage and their mothers: “the Court cannot but be struck by the fact that the 
domestic law of the great majority of member States of the Council of Europe has evolved and 
is continuing to evolve, in company with the relevant international instruments towards full ju-
ridical recognition of the maxim mater sempre certa est” (Marckx v Belgium, § 40). 
Despite the scarcity of theoretical argumentations at the hands of the ECtHR, it’s possible to 
connect the birth of consensus analysis to at least three main legal grounds.  
Firstly, the Preamble of the ECHR considers the governments of European countries “like-
minded and hav[ing] a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of 
law”. As Brems aptly observes (1996, 276-77), the very notion of commonality generally pre-
sumes a comparative approach; theoretically speaking, the ECHR is aimed at securing common 
standards concerning human rights, which have to be pragmatically defined by comparing na-
tional legislations and searching for shared elements. 
Consensus analysis thus appears as the concrete instrument abiding to the comparative perspec-
tive implied in the Preamble.  
Secondly, an even more substantial justification is provided by the subsidiary nature of the 
ECHR. 
As previously outlined, the ECHR machinery presupposes a multilevel structure, oriented by 
the principle that domestic institutions are best placed to answer to social, legal, and political 
needs; in this way, the quest for a common denominator throughout the Council of Europe is 
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combined with the promotion of pluralism and with the existence of many national sensibilities. 
Therefore, when restricting a Parties’ autonomy, the ECHR may find useful to justify its inter-
pretation on the grounds that a relevant number of Coe Countries is consistent with its ap-
proach. 
The spirit of realpolitik moulds the third ground of consensus analysis. Several authors high-
light the essential role played by voluntary compliance: “judgments can be ignored, the Conven-
tion could be even denounced” (Carozza 1998, 1227; Forst 3005; Von Staden 2012). Hence, 
it’s far more convenient to enhance national compliance and eschew the threat of Contracting 
Members withdrawing from the ECHR, and also to prevent a possible delegitimization of judi-
cial work (Helfer 1993; Stone Sweet and Keller 2008). 
If the ECtHR’s efforts and resources were mainly targeted at prosecuting non-compliant States, 
the effective ability of the Court to act as the “conscience of Europe” (Council of Europe 2014) 
would result negatively affected, since the judiciary could be charged with overreaching judicial 
activism and of leaning towards politics, at the detriment of its own legitimacy.  
With regard to this point, especially when sensitive issues are involved, “the actual practice of 
the Member States helped it establish its political legitimacy over time and helps it maintain le-
gitimacy in the midst of expanding the scope of the ECHR scope” (Carozza 1998,1228).  
Consensus analysis also counterbalances the autonomy of the ECHR; it is the instrument 
whereby the ECtHR mantles its interpretation with the attributes of necessity and determinacy, 
and whereby it dissimulates possible political features. Though not suggesting in any way that 
the ECtHR openly and directly engages in political questions, I share Carozza’s view, according 
to whom the ECtHR’s judgments are a choice among competing visions of the requirements of 
human dignity and of the common good, with unavoidable political consequences (Ivi,1236). 
The connection between legitimacy and inter-state comparison not only accounts for the origins 
of consensus, but also provides an acceptable theoretical justification to a doctrine that, as ex-
plored hereinafter, raises complex and unsolved questions.  
The ECtHR has been famously described as the “crown jewel of one of the world’s most ad-
vanced international system” for securing human rights (Helfer 2008, 125), a global beacon of 
hope (Letsas 2007) and its most significant feature is globally identified in the high compliance 
with its judgments (Helfer and Voeten 2008). Since comparative standpoint leads to a cohesive 
effect among Contracting Members, and, at the same time, it mitigates the tension between 
Universalist aspirations and pragmatic considerations, the frequent resort to consensus is not 
surprising. Had the ECtHR judges opted for a more universalist method, the Courts itself 
would have not emerged as the only international judicial institution effectively enforcing hu-
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man rights, and the probable outcome would have been the complete disgregation of the 
ECHR, or the withdrawal in favour of a State-based approach. 
However, the pragmatic necessity of consensus does not erase relevant problems regarding the 
justifications of this doctrine. 
Theoretically speaking, the comparative perspective jars with the normative features embedded 
in the ECHR, for they lay on realms enlivened by different values, aims, and ideals. Reapprais-
ing Carozza “what comparative law cannot do is precisely what the European Court’s jurispru-
dence implicitly claims for it” (Carozza 1998, 1219); consensus is not tailored to clearly estab-
lish normative international standards, but rather it constitutes a casuistic, incremental, changing 
doctrine which “cannot give […] the normative basis for making judgments about when com-
mon standards ought to be enforced and when diversity should be given freer play” (Ibidem). 
Consensus is established on here and now and it necessarily relativizes the very notion of hu-
man rights. 
Hence, tension between Universalist and pluralist stances leads to two main questions.  
From the side of the minorities or the oppressed, why should the recognition of human rights 
depend on what other States decide? Why should the protection of the weakest social groups 
descend from the policies implemented in other Countries? Democracy provides safeguards 
against tyranny, but even when human rights are involved, legislative and policy outcomes are 
necessarily shaped by majoritarian preferences and values, to the extent that, as Benvenisti po-
lemically argues, consensus “stops short of fulfilling the crucial task of becoming the external 
guardian against the tyranny by majorities” (Benvenisti 1999, 852). 
Similarly, the case of a minority of States providing a high standard of ECHR enforcement 
against a majority endorsing a downward regulation may well occur; in this event, if applying 
consensus analysis, the common denominator would probably refer to the latter cluster of 
States, and the final ECtHR would result prevented to uphold the achievements of the former 
Countries. 
If undertaking the perspective on national sovereignty instead, why should a majority, even a 
super-majority, bind other States? If the ECHR system endorses the pluralism of values (Ma-
honey 1990; Letsas 1998; Popovic 2009), why should such pluralism be defined according to 
majoritarian criteria? 
One could answer by recalling the Preamble of the ECHR and the notion of common heritage, 
but at least two aspects remain problematic: on the side of the minorities, it might be suggested 
that the ECtHR should deal with such commonality by means of normative arguments with erga 
omnes effect, rather than gathering general principles from particular and contingent frame-
works. From the opposite perspective however, Carozza points out that a temporal confusion 
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might occur, in that it’s not clear why “should the obligations a State has assumed under interna-
tional treaties be based on what some number of other states have chosen to do at any given 
time?” (Carozza 1998, 1228).  
A possible, though not entirely satisfactory, solution is to interpret the notion of heritage as a 
dynamic concept, informed by a socio-legal approach to reality and opened to new interpreta-
tions carved upon changing needs and legal sensibilities in the ECtHR’s legal culture; neverthe-
less, beside theoretical criticisms, methodological questions persist. 
How to measure consensus? Either a strict majoritarian criterion or a definition based on 
emerging legal trends are suitable, and in fact, the ECtHR has consistently adopted both. 
Yet, the two are not the same; the former requires a large majority and implicitly favors ECtHR 
self-restraint, while the latter opens up to judicial creativity.  
Moreover, as Wildhaber, Hjartarson and Donnelly note, the definition of majority is flawed, for 
the number of States required to find consensus is not univocally defined, but will vary accord-
ing to the context; relevant factors, including “the nature of the Convention right in issue, its 
importance for the individual and the nature of the activities concerned” (Wildhaber, 
Hjartarson and Donnelly 2013, 257). If, on the one hand, the strict majority of 47 Contracting 
Members appears somehow lacking in strength and credibility, on the other, it’s very complex 
to translate the principle whereby “comparative research should be as comprehensive as possi-
ble” (Ivi, 258) into practice. Quite a heterogenous frame emerges: 
 
in about 56% of post-1998 judgments which discuss consensus in the 47 European member 
States, the number of legal orders may be qualified as representative; in about 12.3%, rough-
ly half of all States are taken into consideration (and are indicated separately); in about 7%, 
the comparative research is less than representative, and in about 24.6%, the "new" Court 
remains content to follow the example of the "old" Court, indicating that it recognizes, or 
fails to recognize consensus, without any further details or simply speaking of a "majority of 
States” (Ibidem).  
 
Thus, the ECtHR enjoys a considerable space for discretion in defining and measuring consen-
sus; for instance, one could hypothesize that the more an issue is regarded as sensitive, the 
more the ECtHR will adopt super-majoritarian criteria in order to justify European heterogenei-
ty, with the intent of guaranteeing national authorities wide discretion at least until they remain 
almost the only Country to adopt a certain policy. 
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Consensus analysis can lean towards traditional or restrained interpretation, and comparative 
enquiry may also curb the enhancement of human rights, especially when complaints address 
minority issues which are slowly being affirmed in national political agendas. 
To better analyze the different outcomes of consensus, so-called transsexual cases provide a 
useful example: between 1986 and 2002, the ECtHR judged three major complaints, filed by 
UK citizens against British laws, which denied the right to legally change their gender identity. 
Despite the fact that in 1986, legal and social European framework already appeared to be quite 
dynamic and heterogeneous, the ECtHR only found a violation in 2002. 
Whereas in Rees v UK, n. 9532/81, the Court accepted the justifications of the Government, 
on the grounds that the majority of Contracting Members had not recognized such a right to 
transsexuals (Rees v UK, §37). Tension between consensus doctrine and Universalist intents 
starkly emerges in Cossey v UK, n. 10843/84. Here, the majority upheld that, though the Euro-
pean context displayed a trend in favor of the applicants and regardless of EU Resolutions and 
Recommendations to harmonize laws and practices in this field, the UK Government was not 
in breach of the ECHR126. 
The strain between these two different approaches to human rights is well captured by four dis-
senting opinions, gathering eight judges out of a total of eighteen. Interestingly, the core of the 
disagreement lies precisely in whether Contracting Members shared sufficient consensus to en-
dorse creative interpretation. Most notably, while the ECtHR found only “certain develop-
ments” (Cossey v UK, § 40), judges MacDonald and Spielmann dissented “we consider that 
since 1986 there have been, in the law of many of the member States of the Council of Europe, 
not certain developments but clear developments” (Joint dissenting opinion, Cossey v UK, § 2). 
What’s more, judges Palm, Foighel and Pekkanen mentioned the legal status quo amongst Eu-
ropean Countries, contending that the UK authorities failed to adequately justify their own posi-
tion, and departing from the EU Parliament’s resolutions and recommendations, concluded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 “There have been certain developments since 1986 in the law of some of the member States of the 
Council of Europe. However, the reports accompanying the resolution adopted by the European Par-
liament on 12 September 1989 (OJ No C 256, 9.10.1989, p. 33) and Recommendation 1117 (1989) 
adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 29 September 1989 - both of 
which seek to encourage the harmonization of laws and practices in this field - reveal […] diversity of 
practice as obtained at the time of the Rees judgment. Accordingly this is still […] an area in which they 
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (see the Rees judgment, p. 15, para. 37). In particular, it cannot at 
present be said that a departure from the Court’s earlier decision is warranted in order to ensure that the 
interpretation of Article 8 (art. 8) on the point at issue remains in line with present-day conditions (see § 
35 above)”(Cossey v UK, § 40). 
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“the decisions of these representative organs clearly indicate that, according to prevailing public 
opinion, transsexuals should have the right to have their new sexual identity fully recognised by 
the law” (Joint dissenting opinion, Cossey v UK, § 3). 
In Cossey alone, three meanings of consensus arise: the Court’s meaning, not further specified, 
MacDonald and Spielmann’s variation, based on the concept of trend, and Palm, Foighel and 
Pekkanen’s version, which takes into account legislative communitarian documents.  
In Goodwin v UK, n. 28957/95, the ECtHR resorted to a further meaning of consensus, which 
refers to the trajectory of enacted legislations and not to detailed measures, also implying refer-
ence to international trends:  
 
the lack of such a common approach among forty-three Contracting States with widely di-
verse legal systems and traditions is hardly surprising. In accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, it is indeed primarily for the Contracting States to decide on the measures nec-
essary to secure Convention rights within their jurisdiction and, in resolving-within their do-
mestic legal systems-the practical problems created by the legal recognition of post-operative 
gender status, the Contracting States must enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. The Court 
accordingly attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a common European ap-
proach to the resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than to the clear and un-
contested evidence of a continuing international trend in favor not only of increased social 
acceptance of transsexuals, but also of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-
operative transsexuals. (Goodwin v UK, § 45). 
 
In conclusion, though consistently applied, consensus doctrine is far from clearly defined, and it 
still conveys many grey and uncertain areas.  
By adding new meanings and by reviewing the existing ones, the ECtHR creatively disrupts pre-
vious understandings of this doctrine, to the detriment of the predictability of the ECtHR; in 
reference to the issue, Helfer notes that ambiguity marks the ECtHR jurisprudence, and he 
calls for a rigorous definition in order to reduce contrasts over one of its main interpretative 
methods (Helfer 1993, 28). 
Solving such an intertwined debate would go beyond the scope of my research; I simply remark 
that this disagreement arises from two conflicting perspectives; an idealist and a pragmatic one, 
and that this contrast may be harsher in theory than in practice. From a pragmatic perspective, 
it’s possible to address limits and inconsistencies embedded within consensus doctrine, to ask 
for a more coherent and systematic doctrine, but at the same time to uphold consensus doc-
trine as the most feasible in the ECHR system. Conversely, though considering consensus as 
policy-oriented and value-driven and though sympathizing for an idealist and Universalist doc-
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trine, one could admit that the comparative gaze is one of the main strategies whereby the EC-
tHR achieves significative compliance, and thus complies with the protection of human rights.
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3.3.4 The Margin of Appreciation 
 
Broadly speaking, the margin of appreciation grants Contracting Members a space of maneuver 
when applying or transposing the ECHR in respective national legislations. 
The breadth of such a space is quite variable, and it has been variously defined as the “latitude 
to national deference” (Yourow 1996, 13). Letsas distinguishes between substantial and struc-
tural margin of appreciation (see infra), and Benvenisti proposes a definition which clearly re-
lates margin of appreciation to public morals and to the balance between majorities and minori-
ties: “This doctrine [margin of appreciation] which permeates the jurisprudence of the ECHR, 
is based on the notion that each society is entitled to certain latitude in resolving the inherent 
conflicts between individual rights and national interests or among different moral convictions” 
(Benvenisti 1999, 843-844). 
Yourow suggests the most comprehensive definition of this doctrine, as  
 
the freedom to act; maneuvering, breathing or elbow room; or the latitude of deference or 
error which the Strasbourg organs will allow national legislation, executive, administrative 
and judicial bodies before it is prepared to declare a national derogation from the Conven-
tion, or restriction, or limitation upon a right guaranteed by the Convention, to constitute a 
violation of one of the Convention’s substantive guarantees (Yourow 1995,13). 
 
Before critically evaluating the theorization and the application of margin of appreciation, let 
me review the origin and the evolution of such doctrine, and the rationale behind it.  
 It stands upon two legal pillars: administrative and international law. With regard to the former, 
Takahashi reconnects theories of administrative discretion to that developed by the ECtHR; 
yet, administrative and ECHR margin are divided by a significant difference, namely the diverse 
institutional architecture on which they insist. While administrative discretion indeed entails 
domestic realm only, by involving “inter-governmental distribution of power in terms of discre-
tion given by the judiciary to administrative agents” (Takahashi 2011, 64), the ECHR produces 
effects on a vertical level, dealing with downwards deference granted by the Court to national 
authorities.  
As far as the ECHR is concerned, international treaties usually admit a clause of derogation to 
undertaken obligations mainly in the event that domestic authorities resort to the so-called 
emergency clause of derogation. Likewise, margin of appreciation firstly emerged as a simple 
derogation clause; in Greece v UK, Lawless v Ireland, and Ireland v UK, n. 5310/71, the Court 
and the Commission conceded respondent governments a margin of discretion, due to the ex-
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istence of serious threats for national security, on the assumption that “the interest which the 
public itself has in effective government and in the maintenance of order justifies and requires a 
decision in favor of the legality of the Government’s appreciation” (Benvenisti 1999, 845).  
From the 1960s however, the Court developed a distinct doctrine, enlarging its field of applica-
tion and altering its paradigm. Until the Handyside case, margin of appreciation remained quite 
experimental (Takahashi 2011, 66), appearing more as a sporadic interpretive device than a 
constitutive method of interpretation127. 
Conversely, in Handyside, the Court displayed the first systematical dissertation of margin of 
appreciation, a theoretical frame which, despite its reiterated application, has not undergone 
relevant alterations. Paragraph 48 reads: “state authorities are in principle in a better position 
that the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well 
as on the necessity of a restriction or penalty intended to meet them.” (Handyside v UK, § 48). 
In this passage, judges no longer refer to delicate emergency situations but, on the contrary, they 
justify the principle of national discretion in quite general terms, thus legitimizing appreciation 
doctrine as an ordinary instrument to interpret the ECHR. Most notably, after Handyside, 
judges increasingly developed margin of appreciation with reference to Articles 8-11, when as-
sessing whether conditions under exemption clauses did take place. 
Effectively, ECtHR jurisprudence overwhelmingly resorts to margin of appreciation with refer-
ence to Article 8-11, although relevant examples also address Articles 13-14 and Protocol 1; 
over the decades the margin of appreciation has percolated into a broad cluster of issues, which 
can’t be grasped in few lines, affecting almost every complaint alleging a violation of the afore-
mentioned Articles. 
By going against its original rationale, this method has acquired new features and includes deli-
cate aspects as well.  
As Benvenisti notes, the shift of paradigm  
 
reflected an altogether different philosophy, one which is based on notions of subsidiarity 
and democracy and which significantly defers to the wishes of each society to maintain its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 As Takahashi notes (2011, 66), the Court firstly departed from the traditional understanding of margin 
of appreciation in Iversen v Norway, n.1468/62; in that case it draws a similarity between public emer-
gency mentioned in Article 15, and the shortage of dentists in a sparsely populated region. In addition, 
to the Belgian linguistic case consisting of six applications submitted between 1962 and 1964, the Court 
implied the notion of domestic discretion, though not stating or clarifying it. For a reconstruction of early 
cases involving the margin of appreciation, see also Letsas (2006). 
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unique values and address its particular needs. In more practical terms, the extension of the 
doctrine […] has been explained on the ground of judicial politics (Benvenisti 1999, 846).  
 
Judicial politics constitute one rationale of margin of appreciation; former judge MacDonald 
indeed justifies the choices of the ECtHR, by describing it as a doctrine giving “the flexibility 
needed to avoid damaging confrontations between the Court and Contracting States over their 
respective spheres of authority and enables the Court to balance the sovereignty of Contracting 
Parties with their obligations under the Convention” (MacDonald 1993,123). 
Subsidiarity underpins appreciation doctrine, hence demonstrating how all methods developed 
by the ECtHR revolve around this concept, and it’s fair to suggest that since the original drafters 
aimed to safeguard national sovereignty by stating the supplementary nature of ECHR, the mar-
gin of appreciation is also consistent with the overall ECHR structure.  
Regarding consensus analysis, this doctrine has not even been systematically addressed, ex-
plained or accounted for by the Court. As a result, basilar trends and features have to be 
grasped throughout ECtHR jurisprudence and casuistic reasoning. Takahashi’s advice not to 
look for a “fixed benchmark in moral space” (2001, 104) aptly describes a situation where judi-
cial outcomes vary according to the final balance reached between the need to protect rights 
and the presence of competing values. 
Academic literature has however, gleaned noteworthy elements from ECtHR jurisprudence. 
Takahashi identifies five situations where margin of appreciation is likely to recur: 1- the pro-
cess of fact-finding and ascertainment of facts; 2- the process of interpreting national laws; 3- the 
evaluation of human rights norms in the ECHR; 4- the process of balancing individual persons’ 
rights and public interest grounds; 5- the balance between competing rights and freedoms (Ivi, 
69-77).  
When dealing with hypotheses at points 1 and 2, the ECtHR generally endorses an extremely 
cautious review: on one hand, judges are enabled to ascertain both facts and laws put forward, 
but on the other hand, deference to national authorities is extremely pronounced. The ECtHR 
has thoroughly clarified, that any departure from respondent State’s ascertainment of facts or 
any autonomous interpretation of national laws must indeed remain confined to cases where 
domestic assessment are manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or without reasonable foundation. 
The evaluation of norms enshrined in the ECHR is obviously the realm where judges enjoy the 
widest discretion and autonomy. 
Nevertheless, the indeterminacy of human rights actually enlarges the spaces for ambiguous in-
terpretation, allowing the ECtHR to mold interpretive doctrines, according to extra-legal values 
as well (Ivi, 74).  
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The balance between individual and public interests, or between competing rights, is insightfully 
addressed by Letsas, who introduces a very useful distinction to disentangle the multiple stand-
points comprised under the conceptual umbrella of appreciation doctrine and to better frame 
problematic issues.  
According to Letsas, two margins of appreciation would exist; the substantial margin of appreci-
ation “addresses the relationship between individual freedoms and collective goals” (Letsas 
2006, 806), while the structural one “addresses the limits or intensity of the review of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in view of its status as an international treaty” (Ibidem).  
Substantial margin of appreciation acts like a cloak, for it formally pays deference to national 
authorities but, at the same time, it hides the practical tools to extensively review the decisions, 
the laws, and the values of respondent governments; reappraising Singh’s reflection128, Letsas 
suggests that, here, “the idea of margin of appreciation is not used to express a general point of 
view about the limitability of rights, but to express a final determination as to whether the state 
has violated a right in some particular case” (Ivi, 712). 
With reference to Articles 8-11, the ECtHR developed a multi-layered process and gradually 
clarified a number of criteria which national authorities have to meet. Each phase is analyzed 
independently, but they form a sequence and respondent States are required to fulfill every 
step; it is not rare for national authorities to only partially satisfy the ECtHR tests , and that the 
Court decides to restrict domestic discretion accordingly.  
The stratification of judicial approach is distinctly clear when Articles 8-11 are considered: as 
already recalled, exemption clauses consider those interferences with individual rights legitimate 
if they are in accordance with the principles of legality, legitimacy, and necessity in democratic 
regimes. Consequently, the ECtHR review involves a four-stage test: at the beginning, judges ex-
amine whether the impugned legislation, policies, or actions interfered with the ECHR; then 
they consider whether this interference was prescribed by national laws and, thirdly, whether it 
pursued one of the legitimate aims enlisted in the exemption clauses. Lastly, the Court decides 
whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, and whether it answered to 
pressing social needs. As academic literature suggests, the ECtHR has extensively engaged in 
determining the meaning of aforementioned concepts, with particular reference to necessity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 British judge Singh critically observes that margin of appreciation would “obscure the true basis on 
which a reviewing court decides whether or not intervention in a particular case is justifiable. As such it 
[would] preclude courts from articulating the justification for and limits of their role as guardians of hu-
man rights in a democracy” (Singh 1999, 4). 
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(Matscher 1993; Yourow 1996; Greer 2000; Letsas 2005; Takahashi 2011). The ECtHR estab-
lished a strict relation between necessity and proportionality, so that the latter may well be in-
corporated in the definition of the former and characterized “as a corrective and restrictive of 
margin of appreciation” (Matscher 1993, 79). The Court has also clarified that national authori-
ties are not required to show evidence that no other policy or action was possible to tackle that 
situation: if they pass a proportionality and necessity test, they are considered as best placed to 
determine how to deal with internal issues. 
The margin of appreciation also recurs in complaints alleging a violation of other Articles, such 
as Article 12, Article 13, Article 14 and Protocol 1. In this event, the line of reasoning of the 
Court does not formally proceed following the aforementioned criteria, and judges’ interpretive 
mind aims at fairly balancing the eventual existence of international consensus with national 
sovereignty. In this way, consensus tempers appreciation doctrine, to the extent that they appear 
as two sides of the same coin. 
On a closer look, appreciation doctrine reveals a problematic relation with ECtHR discretion. 
It’s up to the judges to decide both how much they wish to interfere with the ECHR, and which 
interferences are legitimate, as well as to specify the meaning of the concepts listed in different 
Articles. It’s not surprising then, that throughout its jurisprudence, the ECtHR shows significant 
heterogeneity on both aspects: from the definition of inhuman and degrading treatments, to the 
duties connected with habeas corpus, to the positive obligations and sexual rights, the ECtHR 
has changed its interpretation according to present life-conditions hence modifying the degree 
of discretion left to national authorities. 
Substantial margin of appreciation enables the ECtHR to review national laws without appear-
ing intrusive, and at the same time, the progressive strengthening of this doctrine favors the lay-
ing of legal, theoretical, and pragmatic foundations of a more creative approach.  
On the contrary, structural margin of appreciation limits judicial review and responds to the 
classic conception of appreciation as expressed by international law. 
In this case, the ECtHR simply refers to the subsidiary nature of the Convention, calling itself 
out from settling the dispute. Therefore, structural appreciation grants the ECtHR a secondary 
role, both temporally and procedurally, raising troublesome issues: Letsas remarks, that from a 
chronological perspective, structural appreciation could simply imply what Article 35 already 
states, by which all complaints, before being lodged with the ECtHR, must first be judged by na-
tional Courts. In jurisprudential practice, however, judges have shaped a normative meaning, to 
the extent “that national authorities are not only the first ones to deal with complaints regarding 
the Convention rights and provide remedies but also the ones who have either more legitimacy 
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or are better placed than an international bodies to decide on human rights issues” (Letsas 
2006, 722).  
If the rationale of the ECHR is to secure individuals against abuses perpetrated by their own 
governments, how can normative priority be consistent with the effective enforcement of human 
rights? In the event of a complaint raising manifestly ill-questions, the ECtHR simply declares it 
inadmissible; therefore, structural margin of appreciation recurs in cases where the Court finds 
that a complaint has some ground, and that it affects one or more of the rights secured by the 
ECHR, and yet it decides to entrust national authorities with complete discretion to rule the 
matter.  
If applied liberally, structural margin would undermine the whole ECHR system, for it would 
presume the legitimacy of any decision endorsed by domestic authorities. The ECtHR has ex-
tensively resorted to this interpretive device when faced with public morals and politically sensi-
tive issues (Ivi, 723), such as the functioning of censorship over sexual material, the assessment 
of the best interests of the child, the definition of the right to property, and the specification of 
planning policies (Ibidem). To counterbalance possible side-effects, judges generally couple 
structural margin with consensus doctrine, and tend to favor the former if there is a lack of 
common policy-lines; given the inconsistencies of the pragmatic measure of consensus, it is a 
tricky terrain. Moreover, the ECtHR does not apply structural margin in a blind way, but it 
weights doctrines of interpretation with extremely relevant starting assumptions. As far as public 
morals are concerned, in the Sunday Times v UK, n. 6538/74, the ECtHR stated “the require-
ment of morals […] varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era and 
State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opin-
ion on the exact content of these requirements” (Sunday Times v UK, § 59). It logically follows 
that precisely in areas where disagreement is bitter, conflicts are heated, and clashes recurrent, 
the ECtHR withdraws from its adjudicatory role, hence legitimating national decisions which, in 
these events, are likely to be based on majoritarian perspectives only.  
The imbalance of powers between majorities and minorities, and the recognition and the pro-
tection of the former represent the core of the discussion on structural margin of appreciation.  
Benvenisti’s well known critique explores the multifaceted and intertwined aspects of this is-
sue129. In modern, democratic societies, minorities exist and are generally equipped with poor 
political and economic resources, and with a weaker political voice than majoritarian groups. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Benvenisti does not distinguish between structural and substantial margin of appreciation. However, as 
explored throughout this paragraph, his critiques mostly entail the structural meaning of appreciation. 
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Their different culture, identity, and loyalty are often questioned, they are looked upon as a 
scapegoat, and historically, minorities have had to face both “absent political influence and […] 
prevalent resentment” (Benvenisti 1999, 848). Under these circumstances, the best way may 
seem to be applying to the judiciary to protect their rights and to claim other demands, but 
judges might have interiorized the interests of the majority, failing to adequately protect others. 
In such a frame, the ECtHR becomes the last resort, where national interests should result less 
compelling. On these premises, structural margin of appreciation leads to the preeminence of 
national interests, and it fails to address the fundamental task of human rights law, which is the 
protection of minorities and individuals.  
Letsas further reinforces such perspective, recalling that the ECtHR has variously defined na-
tional moral conception of the majority as “vital forces of the country” (Letsas 2006, 729), and 
critically suggests that “no one has the right to impose her own ethical belief on others, or co-
erce others into abandoning their ethical views on the basis that they are inferior or degrading” 
(Ivi, 729-730).  
To overcome such risk, Benvenisti radically upholds that margin doctrine should only be justi-
fied in matters that affect the general people in a given society (Ivi, 847), such as on restrictions 
to hate speech, or on limitations of actions in tort. Conversely, no deference should be left to 
national institutions where conflicts between majorities and minorities are at stake, since the risk 
of restricting the rights of the few would be too high.  
It could be argued that also when distinguishing between issues where discretion should be al-
lowed and cases where it shouldn’t, the Court enjoys a space for discretion which might still 
prove deferent to national interests - for instance by developing the tests where collective goals 
expressed by national majorities are evaluated more than the claims produced by minorities.  
As previously analyzed, academic literature attests that the entire ECHR machinery is permeat-
ed by autonomy, and thus a conception of appreciation doctrine which does not require judicial 
interpretation is unrealistic.  
From an opposite perspective, former judge Mahoney contends that harsh criticism against ap-
preciation doctrine is misconceived (1990, 81); deference to national authorities would be theo-
retically entrenched in the ECHR itself and politically required to ensure the distribution of 
powers between the ECHR institutions and the national authorities. In addition to the already 
analyzed wording, Mahoney stresses the relevance of philosophical grounds surrounding the 
ECHR. Most notably, he suggests that the ECHR implies the idea whereby “democracy is the 
best system of government for ensuring the respect of fundamental freedoms and human rights” 
(Ibidem). Consequently, democracies would share the belief that the best guarantee “of the sur-
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vival of the society is located in decision making by freely elected representatives of the people 
in majoritarian processes” (Ibidem). 
Though not abdicating to their role of international supervisors, judges should pay some defer-
ence to the choices and wishes of national majorities; Mahoney also recognizes the need to im-
prove such doctrine, and he encourages the ECtHR to better clarify general criteria behind this 
method, abiding to the principle of due deference in spheres where there is legitimate scope for 
difference in opinion (Ivi, 88). 
The call for a renewal is widely shared: all considered authors support an in-depth revision of 
current ECtHR reflection on margin of appreciation, be it aimed at clarifying inconsistencies or 
at altering the existing procedural dynamics. 
From a restrained approach, MacDonald complains about the lack of a theoretical vision within 
European legal order, and to that end, suggests that the margin of appreciation should be un-
derstood as not allowing “the Court’s evasion to responsibility to articulate the reasons why it’s 
intervention in particular cases may or may not be appropriate” (MacDonald 1993, 124). Mac-
Donald does not hold that the ECtHR should expand its judicial powers, but simply hopes for 
more transparent and exhaustive judgments.  
From a moderate standpoint, Takahashi suggests facing criticism against the margin of apprecia-
tion by “clarifying the normative nature of margin of appreciation doctrine, structurally locating 
the doctrine’s place in the ECHR constitutional normative order […] and identifying robust sub-
stantial rationales that underlie the application of a margin of appreciation” (Takahashi 2011, 
82). 
Finally, Letsas only justifies substantial margin of appreciation, as the structural one is embed-
ded with an unjustified preeminence of majoritarian preference over minorities, and it would 
contrast with the main features of the ECtHR, by preventing the Court from behaving as a su-
pranational institution and from acting on behalf of the oppressed.  
In conclusion, the common element underlying the different proposals pertains to overcome 
the casuistic approach hitherto applied, and requires the ECtHR to structure a reasoned and 
coherent theoretical framework, where multiple problems are faced and substantial elements 
are clearly defined. 
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3.4 Conclusive Remarks 
 
The ECHR is an extremely complex system, under both a theoretical and a pragmatic perspec-
tive. With regard to the former, it incorporates the tension between universal standards and par-
ticularist stances entrenched in human rights law, and it carries a problematic relation between 
doctrines of interpretation and the protection of minorities. As to the latter, the ECtHR review 
has to take into account the broad political situation, because of its derivative legitimacy (Fried-
man 1975, 237) and of its peculiar institutional asset.  
There is no doubt that, the ECHR represents a beacon for human rights all over the world, as 
several researchers show (MacDonald 1993; Lester 2011, 104; Johnson 2014; Helfer and 
Voeten 2014); furthermore, in more than 60 years, it has redressed a variegated cluster of viola-
tions, challenging national policies and building a specific approach to human rights, which still 
embodies the fundamental common values underpinned to the very European dream. The pil-
lars of this system are the subsidiarity nature of the ECHR, its interpretation as a living instru-
ment, the doctrines of margin of appreciation, and consensus analysis to determine the breadth 
of national discretion. 
Academics and jurists argue about how to better implement the ECHR, and about how the EC-
tHR should deal with various issues, but no-one suggests it might be better to erase the Conven-
tion or the Court. Therefore, the whole debate entails disagreement over the reshaping of the 
ECHR, but its core value and significance still hold strong.  
It could be contended that the ECtHR mostly performs ratification procedures, since it general-
ly innovates the ECHR interpretation when certain developments are already spread among a 
sufficient number of jurisdictions. 
To some extent, this argument appears convincing, but I wish to stress that this institution re-
mains strategic: surely consensus and margin of appreciation reduce the potential for innova-
tion, but judicial reasoning fulfills an essential role in conveying a gradual, yet incremental, en-
largement of rights secured. 
The ECtHR has expanded the meaning of almost every right, and its judgments bind reluctant 
States to sharpen their enforcement of human rights. Certainly, the risk that the ECtHR might 
either loosen its revision or defend majoritarian stances persists, and it is due to the judges’ cas-
uistic approach as well as to the absence of fixed interpretive bounds. 
The opening wording of the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudential doctrines leaves significant 
room for creativity and law-making. Quoting Mahoney, indeed “decision making is no longer 
perceived as purely rational and deductive exercise” (1990, 57); in addition to the inherent in-
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fluence of extra-legal elements, interpretive methods emerge as rather unclear and embedded 
within an ongoing process. 
The current findings of breaches depends on the margin left to national authorities, and they 
significantly vary according to the parameters by which judges measure international consensus; 
it may be argued therefore, that these doctrines are sometimes treated like “empty vessels” 
where the judge can “pour nearly everything he will” (Hand 1930, 12). It is thus unclear wheth-
er judges choose interpretive methods only on the ground of the correct meaning that they at-
tach to ECtHR duties, or whether the interpretive approach results informed by the outcome 
that the Court considers a priori as the most desirable. 
As thoroughly explored, until 1978, the ECtHR supported legal diplomacy and carefully man-
aged not to alter the delicate international balance; after that phase, though enhancing a more 
activist role, the Court still tried not to uphold positions that put its legitimacy under threat. 
Blurred institutional features certainly do not help, and the ECHR is caught between its nature 
of international treaty and its quasi-constitutional significance.  
Consequently, the entire methodology adopted by the ECtHR is molded by the desire to avoid 
critiques of illegitimate activism, and it responds to the majoritarian perspective justified by Ma-
honey.  
The influence of social conditions and moral beliefs is enshrined in Articles 8-11 of the ECHR, 
and it is further codified in the living instrument approach. 
The intertwining among the doctrinal, social, political, moral and institutional determinants is 
extremely complex: in broad terms, it is possible that when endorsing a specific interpretive 
path, the ECtHR formally develops a reasoning consistent with its case-law and mantles any in-
fluence of extra-legal factors under the labels of consensus and appreciation, according to the 
same mechanism described by Letsas with reference to substantial margin of appreciation. 
In the frame of the undertaken research, it’s worth recalling that Articles 8-11 admit derogations 
from the ECHR aimed at securing public morals, a concept that, as argued in previous para-
graphs, implies majoritarian tones and can’t be fully understood in liberal terms. As a result, the 
ECtHR has to condescend to national public morals, which notwithstanding the lackof harm to 
third parties, might positively sanction certain models of life as desirable or superior to the oth-
ers.  
From the background of the analysis conducted in this chapter, it can be argued that the EC-
tHR has quite an ambivalent potential. On one hand, the emergence of strong lgbt claims in all 
Contracting States might push the ECtHR to recognize a relevant ‘trend,’ but on the other, the 
heterogeneous legal framework might also ensure a wide discretion to Contracting States. At the 
same time, the inclusion of sexual orientation among personal characteristics secured by the 
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principle of non-discrimination might encourage the Court to reduce national margin of appre-
ciation, while reference to public morals might lead to the attachment of normative legitimacy to 
the traditional familiar and sexual model. 
Therefore, throughout the following documental analysis, it is relevant to ascertain whether in-
terpretive doctrines prove useful to lgbt claims, and whether lgbt applicants have achieved re-
sults thanks to or despite the interpretive methods created by the ECtHR. 
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CHAPTER IV. DOCUMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENTS OF 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
“Humans, including judges, are inclined to label positions with which they disagree as palpably un-
acceptable […]. However, it is precisely where we face our ideas that we abhor or despise that we 
have to be most careful in our judgment as our personal convictions can influence our ideas about 
what is actually dangerous” 
Judge Andreas Sajo, separate opinion, Féret v Belgium 
 
 
4.0 Foreword 
 
This chapter presents the results of the documental analysis conducted on ECtHR’s judgments, 
according to socio-legal and feminist criteria analysed in chapter II. 
The complaints are based on the grounds of the applicants’ claims; in doing so, it is possible to 
see the intertwining between the social and legal sphere, to highlight the arguments produced by 
the ECtHR, to emphasize the applicants’ most compelling needs, to trace how the ECtHR has 
dealt with them, and how the judges have shaped, enlarged, or restricted them. 
Judicial reasoning is, then, scrutinized so as to determine the role of the Court in reinforc-
ing/disrupting a heteronormative conception of sexuality, in attaching a positive meaning to dif-
ference, and in dismantling the model of the closet. 
Methodologically, such a perspective allows the researcher to both maintain argumentative co-
hesion, and to focus on the combined effect of the multiple dimensions of the same prejudice. 
In more detail, the reasoning of the lgbt advocates is analysed by emphasizing the connection of 
legal claims with the wider agenda of the lgbt movement. Therefore, attention is paid as to 
whether the applicants are part of organizations, whether they demand policy change or just re-
quest personal redress, and whether their legal standpoint is shaped by previous ECtHR’s juris-
prudence. It is extremely likely that judicial outcomes mould successive complaints either/both 
by denying or accepting to frame some behaviour under certain articles of the ECHR, or/and 
by inducing the applicants to select the claims which are most likely to be successful.  
Hence, socio-political demands, first emerging in national contexts, could be narrowed down 
and restricted when translated into legal terms. 
Particular importance is also attached to the legal sources, social elements, political trends, and 
the cultural phenomena recalled in the ECtHR’s reasoning, insofar as it being relevant to its in-
terpretation. 
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Judicial reasoning is also scrutinized in order to study the legal culture and internal fractures, to 
assess its creative or restrained character, to evaluate the role of consensus analysis, and that of 
the margin of appreciation. 
While in this chapter, I tackle the analysis in thematic clusters, in the next, and last, one I pre-
sent more general considerations, both according to a diachronic and synchronic standpoint.  
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4.1 An Overall reading of ECtHR Jurisprudence in Respect to Sexual Orientation 
 
Judicial litigation in respect to sexual orientation can be framed according to various approach-
es, each of which emphasizes a distinct feature embedded in the applicants’ perspective and in 
the judicial review. 
When considering the studies of the legal recognition of homosexuality, if restricting the field to 
those focusing on the judicial realm, a first approach may be that of considering the branch of 
law being addressed by the complaints; a general distinction could be drawn between the claims 
against criminal sanctions and those demanding recognition of civil, political, and social rights.  
Looking in more detail, the latter cluster can be further articulated according to the subject 
bearer of the rights. In doing this it’s possible to distinguish between the claims enhancing indi-
vidual rights, those related to couple’s rights, and those supporting the recognition of parental 
rights to LGBT people (Waaldijk 1994, 51-54). 
In addition, the ECtHR’s law case on sexual orientation may be analysed by following a dia-
chronic sequence, by considering the arguments displayed by the parties (Wintemute 1995), or 
by considering the Articles on which applicants’ rely (Johnson 2014).  
I have thoroughly considered how to frame the complaints in order to be consistent with the 
socio-legal theoretical background previously outlined in chapter II, and I consider it useful to 
start out from the depiction I made of the ECtHR based on Friedman’s theories.  
Both derivative legitimacy and internal legal culture are dynamic concepts; in the context of an 
institution such as the ECtHR, they do not, of course, only change over time, but they assume 
specific and distinct features also in the same amount of time, depending on other determinants 
which may well have an extra-judicial origin (Pound 1923c, 950). 
The ECtHR is always bound to be coherent with its law case and doctrines, but the tenure of 
the reasoning, the nature of the arguments, or the kind of interpretive devices will vary in ac-
cordance with both the claims and arguments put forward by the various parties. Likewise, dis-
parate claims entail distinct theoretical perspectives, they involve peculiar interests, they require 
a distinct balance of rights, and, hence, they pose specific substantial, functional, and institution-
al questions to the ECtHR, which are likely to demonstrate a distinct attitude towards each of 
them. Therefore, a thematic partition of claims advanced, not only allows us to disentangle and 
investigate the arguments put forward by the judges, but it also enables the evaluation of how 
the internal legal culture of the ECtHR may vary in respect to the multiple rights claimed on the 
grounds of sexual orientation. 
I proceed by structuring the analysis as such by mixing the framings sketched at the beginning of 
the paragraph: the first distinction is made between the rights claimed by individuals (par. 4.2; 
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4.3; 4.4), couples (par. 4.5), and families (par. 4.6); in each cluster there are subsections on the 
grounds of the right claimed, and great attention is paid to the legal branch addressed, namely 
to the distinction between criminal and civil law. 
Not only does the core nature of the alleged violations vary, but also the argumentative reason-
ing of both the applicants and judges significantly differ from one category to another. Freedom 
of public authority’s interference generally relates to negative obligations, for example to repeal-
ing laws sanctioning certain offenses and to quashing judgments related to them; on the contra-
ry, when dealing with citizenship’s rights, public institutions may tend to lean towards positive 
obligations, such as the introduction of a new legislation regulating same-sex partnerships.  
As for the symbolical meaning of the law, it could be suggested that while liberty from criminal 
prosecution conveys a liberal conception of the law, without implying any endorsement of ho-
mosexual acts, being granted citizenship’s rights carries a recognition of value, whether equal or 
different to that given to heterosexuals.  
A significant trajectory also emerges in respect to the subjective referents of rights. Individual 
rights can be advanced on liberal grounds, by contending that each person should be able to 
freely express and develop her personality, whether in a private space, at work, or in the public 
arena. 
Yet, legal tolerance of homosexuality does not necessarily imply any kind of endorsement; at 
the most it carries respect for core freedoms to which every human being is entitled under the 
ECHR and the UDHR. 
Legal recognition and protection of an affective bond, whether through wedlock or other civil 
arrangements, can be read as a positive sanction in respect to specific relationships: it’s not by 
chance that one of the most resorted arguments in favour of same-sex marriage recalls the value 
of lgbt relations, and it claims that no relevant difference stands between them and heterosexual 
ones. Quite predictably, full equality can only be achieved by means of same-sex marriage, for a 
civil partnership providing the same rights of married couples would still enforce a symbolical 
and prejudiced ‘separate but equal’ system, still denying that same-sex and different-sex rela-
tions can be fully compared. 
However, it has to be pointed out that lgbt legal activists, on one hand, ultimately target recogni-
tion of same-sex marriage but, on the other, they also pragmatically prod the ECtHR to incre-
mentally reduce the margin left to Contracting Parties as how to recognise same-sex civil unions.  
Rights connected to parental status involve even more issues: besides evaluating whether sexual 
orientation negatively affects one’s capacity to foster a child, judges are required to assess 
whether the child’s best interest can be substantiated in living with one or two homosexual par-
ents. Furthermore, even when judges are not biased against homosexual applicants, they might 
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still lean towards the principle of precaution - a principle frequently adopted when counter-
conceptions of life and good are at stake- with the consequent quashing of applicants’ claims.  
The cluster of individual rights comprises in the highest number of complaints and it addresses 
the widest set of claims, gathering the largest heterogeneity of judicial interpretation cases ana-
lyzed spread over more than three decades; even as far as temporality is concerned. 
Under the concept of sexual freedom, I refer to the freedom to engage in private, adult, con-
sensual same-sex acts, without incurring criminal sanctions not valid for heterosexual acts130 (par. 
4.2). 
Secondly, I scrutinize the complaints grounded on the right not to be subjected to inhuman and 
cruel treatment; in this section both cases of violence perpetrated in restricted regimes of indi-
vidual liberty and cases concerning the claim to obtain the status of refugee are considered (par. 
4.3). Although the two issues are not necessarily related as to the demands advanced, lgbt asy-
lum seekers complain that if deported to their homeland they might face torture or inhuman 
treatment, and they generally appeal to Article 3. 
Then, I go on to analyze the complex realm of civil liberties and non-discrimination claims (par. 
4.4), which includes the right to serve in the army (par. 4.4.1), the freedom of expression (par. 
4.4.2), and the freedom of assembly and manifestation (par. 4.4.3). 
Since the ECtHR has only recently been dealing with cases of couples and family rights, the 
case-load is quite restricted, but it proves extremely relevant from a qualitative standpoint. 
In the cluster of couple’s rights (par. 4.5) I include cases where certain social rights are de-
manded on the grounds of the homosexual tie between the applicants (par. 4.5.1), cases where 
the applicants ask for the legal recognition of same-sex relationships, either by claiming the right 
to marry (par. 4.5.2) or the right to be legally recognized (par. 4.5.3). 
Finally, under the label of family rights (par. 4.6) the ECtHR’s reasoning to determine whether 
homosexual parents are safe in their care duties by the Convention is investigated, and if Con-
tracting Parties are allowed to restrict the right to adopt on the grounds of sexual orientation. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 In all considered complaints, adults having an affair with adolescents risked criminal conviction and, 
even though they claimed a discrimination against their sexual orientation, I still consider prominent the 
criminal nature of corresponding legal sanctions. 
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4.2 Sexual Freedom 
 
Under the concept of sexual freedom I am referring to a specific cluster of claims, expectations, 
placed in a clearly defined legal frame; namely, I consider the complaints alleging to the human 
right to engage in homosexual, consensual, sex and not to be criminally prosecuted because of 
it.  
Hence, the branch of national laws on which these complaints insist, is criminal law, and the 
right claimed aims at establishing negative obligations upon the State, to oblige public authori-
ties not to interfere with one’s own private life.  
There are three realms addressed: consensual same-sex acts, age of consent, and sadomaso-
chist/group same-sex acts. 
Until 1975, the EComHR maintained an originalist interpretation of Article 8, dismissing all 
complaints against the criminalization of homosexual acts, thus preventing the ECtHR from 
judging the issue. The Commission reiteratively showed a stark heteronormative understanding 
of sexuality and human rights: the blunt text of decisions testifies an unconditioned endorse-
ment of the moral and legal status quo as the most natural and positive frame, also denying ho-
mosexual men the enjoyment of a private space, which public authority was not entitled to dis-
cipline. Commissioners used to depict such criminal laws as necessary in order to protect 
“morals, health and the rights of other”, thus being fully in accordance with the ECHR (W.B. v 
Federal Republic of Germany; X. v Federal Republic of Germany; H.K.W v Federal Republic 
of Germany).  
For the first time, in 1975, the EComHR deemed a complaint demisable challenging the UK 
prosecution of same-sex private acts and the unequal age of consent. 
In X v UK Report, n.7215/75, the majority of commissioners leaned towards finding a viola-
tion, offering a majoritarian reading; the preferences freely expressed by elected representatives 
were entitled to restricting one’s own behaviour, even if it did not cause any harm to third par-
ties (X v UK, § 144), likewise, given the uncertain social menace posed by homosexuals, it was 
preferable to adopt the principle of precaution (Ivi, § 143). 
X v UK did not reach final judgment, as the applicant passed away a few years later and, conse-
quently, the ECtHR struck the case out. 
The following year another complaint was lodged with the ECtHR, by Mr Dudgeon, a UK citi-
zen complaining of Northern Ireland’s laws prohibiting male homosexuality: his case finally 
gave rise to the first judgment on the issue. 
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4.2.1 Consensual, Private, Adult, Homosexual Activities 
 
In the turn of the decade the ECtHR completely dismissed the EComHR’s understanding of 
Article 8, developing a more tolerant interpretation of private life, evaluating homosexuality as 
being worthy of some kind of protection, and giving gay citizens the human right to engage in 
strictly private sexual activities. In Dudgeon v UK, n.7525/76, Norris v Ireland, n.10581/83, and 
Modinos v Cyprus, n.15070/89, the ECtHR gradually built its approach, following a definite, 
linear, and incremental interpretive path.  
During this phase, however, the Court did not challenge the unequal age of consent, and it dis-
played a reasoning with lights and shadows.  
The applicants shared subjective features, and also the legal condition of their countries was 
similar. As for the latter, national legislations prosecuted male homosexual acts but these provi-
sions were no longer consistently applied. In Northern Ireland, the Criminal Offences Acts had 
not been amended by the British Sexual Offences Act 1967; nevertheless, from the late 1960s 
onwards no one had been prosecuted for an act which could “clearly not have been an offence 
if committed in England or Wales” (Dudgeon, § 30). Also in Ireland the police and the Direc-
tor of Public Prosecution were tolerant in cases concerning same-sex acts, as long as they did 
not offend public sensibility in any way. In Cyprus the situation was more turbulent, and there 
were still a few convictions for homosexual acts between consented adults, up until 1981 (Mod-
inos, §12).  
As for the subjective history of the applicants, no one had effectively been charged with criminal 
offences; this feature marks an important distinction between those who had filed analogous 
complaints between 1955 and 1975, who, for the overwhelming majority, were serving a sen-
tence because of their sexual orientation. 
In January 1976 the police searched Mr Dudgeon’s address under the Misuse of Drugs Act, 
and they finally arrested another person with whom the applicant had had contact; in that event 
personal papers, diaries in which homosexual activities were described, were found and seized. 
As a result, he was asked to go to a police station where he was questioned about his sexual life 
for about four and half hours. 
The police investigation file was sent to the Director of Prosecutions, who almost a year later 
decided not to proceed against Mr Dudgeon and to return his papers to him. Consequently, Mr 
Dudgeon sought redress by lodging the complaint with the ECtHR and denouncing unjustified 
interference with his right of respect for his private life. 
Mr Norris claimed that Irish legislation had breached his rights granted by Article 8 on three 
grounds: firstly, the criminalization of same-sex acts stood at the core of the deep depression 
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from which he had been suffering since he became aware of his tendencies; secondly, he feared 
that his partner, who normally lived outside Ireland, could face criminal sanctions for being with 
him. Thirdly, he linked the verbal abuse, which he had incurred after participating in a national 
television program where he admitted to being homosexual, to the very existence of criminal 
sanctions against same-sex acts (Norris, §10). 
Similarly, Mr. Modinos stated to have suffered “great strain, apprehension and fear of prosecu-
tion by reason of the legal provisions which criminalize certain homosexual acts.” (Modinos, § 
7). 
All three men were heavily involved in respective national gay liberation movements (Dudgeon, 
§ 32; Norris, § 9; Modinos, § 7); thus, their claims can be framed within the broader effort en-
couraging a more lgbt sensitive international jurisprudence. 
Most notably, Norris and Modinos represent a typical example of strategic litigation and their 
decision to seize the ECtHR had probably been triggered by Dudgeon’s judgment. Not only did 
Norris and Modinos file their complaints a few years later the Court having adjudicated Dudg-
eon, but, when considering the ways in which national authorities had restricted their personal 
life, it seems that Modinos and Norris aimed at enlarging the hints firstly developed in Dudg-
eon, and at obtaining the most comprehensive judicial protection against criminal provisions. 
It’s interesting to note that from the very beginning the ECtHR understood the activist meaning 
implied in Dudgeon’s litigation, framing his complaint as “directed primarily against the exist-
ence” of certain offences in Northern Ireland laws (Dudgeon, §13). 
Surprisingly, the ECtHR considered all three applicants as victims, even though Norris and 
Modinos had not suffered the same interference as Dudgeon, therefore validating the assump-
tion whereby even the existence of criminal laws interfered with one’s right of respect for his 
private life (Modinos, § 45). 
Had the ECtHR narrowed the threshold required to claim the status of victim, either the inter-
pretation of Article 8 would have been different, or, at least, the importance of Dudgeon would 
have been significantly reduced. 
The recognition of ‘victim’ status caused internal fractures, both in Dudgeon and Norris. In the 
former, Judge Walsh disparagingly labelled Mr. Dudgeon’s case as being “a class action” 
(Walsh in Dudgeon, § 4) while judge Matscher and judge Zekia did not consider his sufferance 
credible. 
Furthermore, the dissenting opinion in Norris uncovers the heated debate between an activist 
approach, favourable to general interpretation, and a restrained one, supporting a casuistic and 
extremely narrow judicial review. Six out of fifteen judges stated, that it was “not wise to call in 
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question the authority of the Dudgeon judgment as to the merits”, because it would damage the 
ECHR system:  
 
To interpret too widely the word "victim" would risk appreciably altering the system laid 
down by the Convention. The Court might thus be led, even in respect of complaints from 
individuals, to adjudicate on the compatibility of national laws with the Convention irrespec-
tive of whether those laws have in fact been applied to an applicant whose status as a victim 
would be no more than very potential and contingent. An actio popularis would then not be 
far off. (Norris, dis. op judge Valticos, judge Golcuklu, judge Matscher, judge Berhardt, 
judge Carrillo Salcedo) 
 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR accepted the status of victim claimed by the applicants and quashed 
the preliminary objections filed by the respondent Governments.  
Within the undertaken theoretical frame, the ECtHR was able to give legal relevance to the ap-
plicant’s perspective, who had acted on behalf of a sexual minority. Opposing the dissenting 
judges and also the submissions by national authorities, who pledged the Court not to review 
the Convention in abstracto (Norris, § 28), the Court departed from the minority’s perspective 
and distanced itself from the heteronormative burden that had been imposed on lgbt applicants 
up to that moment. 
When defining the meaning of the interference experienced by Dudgeon, the ECtHR noted 
that the risk to which he was exposed was not solely linked to the possibility of being prosecuted 
if engaging in sexual intercourse with other men, but it also embraced the subjective distress 
caused by “refraining from engaging […] in prohibited sexual acts to which he is disposed by 
reason of his homosexual tendencies” (Dudgeon, § 41). Moreover, in Norris the ECtHR reap-
praised a minority opinion of the Irish Supreme Court, and it specified that the direct risk of 
being affected by the legislation in question had to be assessed by also taking into account the 
misapprehension, the general prejudice, the anxiety, the depression, and the guilty feeling that 
similar provisions reinforced (Norris, § 33). The ECtHR neither disputed the truth of such suf-
fering, nor did it dismiss it as not being serious enough to claim a breach of the ECHR, but it 
maintained the approach shown in Dudgeon, on which I focus the qualitative analysis. 
Mr Dudgeon challenged the entire system maintained by the Northern Irish authorities; which 
were showed the inability of the local Parliament to amend Northern Irish legislation, Dudgeon 
alleged that there were substantial reasons for the ECtHR to overthrow political decisions. First-
ly, the blanket prohibition of homosexual acts illegitimately interfered with one’s own liberty, 
violating the core principle of modern liberalism. Then, he contended that “the higher age of 
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consent was illegitimate, the same as that for heterosexual and female homosexual relations that 
is, 17 years under current Northern Ireland law.” (Dudgeon, 62), and that, accordingly, he had 
been suffering from an illegitimate discrimination under the meaning of Article 14.  
He also claimed to be a victim of discrimination, in that he had been subjected to greater inter-
ference than heterosexuals and female homosexuals, in Northern Ireland, and male homosexu-
als in other parts of the UK (Ivi, § 65). 
The majority of the ECtHR denied both the urgency to equalize the age of consent, and the ne-
cessity to compare the condition of Mr. Dudgeon with that of heterosexual and lesbian people. 
As for the former, judges stated that it fell “in the first instance to the national authorities to de-
cide on the appropriate safeguards of this kind required for the defence of morals in their socie-
ty and, in particular, to fix the age under which young people should have the protection of the 
criminal law” (Dudgeon, § 62). 
Judges also approached Dudgeon’s requests from a disputable angle, insisting that the primary 
task of the ECtHR was to assess whether the applicant had suffered a breach of his human 
rights arising from Article 8, and that there was “no useful legal purpose to be served in deter-
mining whether he has in addition suffered discrimination as compared with other persons who 
are subject to lesser limitations on the same right” (Ibidem). The attempt to establish a relevant 
analogy under the ECHR between heterosexuals and homosexuals, therefore, failed. 
Dissenting judges Evrigenis and De Enterria offered an alternative approach, arguing that “the 
difference of treatment in Northern Ireland between male homosexuals and female homosexu-
als and between male homosexuals and heterosexuals ought to have been examined under Ar-
ticle 14 read in conjunction with Article 8, [since] it would be difficult to assert that these condi-
tions were not plainly satisfied in the circumstances” (Dudgeon, dis. op., judge Evrigenis and 
judge Garcia de Entierria). They also critically addressed the impact of this perspective on the 
entire judgment, warning that by adopting such a restrictive definition of Article 8, “[the] judg-
ment deprives this fundamental provision in great part of its substance and function in the sys-
tem of substantive rules established under the Convention” (Ibidem). 
Also the reasoning which ultimately led to the ECtHR innovating the interpretation of Article 8 
underpins a heteronormative image of sexuality, and it involves limited tolerance for those who 
do not conform to the heterosexual model, still considered as being the best choice. 
When faced with the necessity of assessing whether the aforementioned laws fall into the ex-
emption causes of Article 8, the ECtHR applies a three-step test; “an interference with the exer-
cise of an Article 8 (art. 8) right will not be compatible with paragraph 2 (art. 8-2) unless it is ‘in 
accordance with the law’, has an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under that paragraph and 
is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the aforesaid aim or aims” (Dudgeon, § 43). Neither 
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the applicants nor national authorities disputed that the first requirement had been met; as to 
the aims pursued, Dudgeon did not concede their legitimacy, arguing that  
 
the law reflected a historical attitude of fear and prejudice. Any argument seeking to justify 
such a total prohibition was a rationalization of this attitude and unjustified on objective 
grounds. Even if the law were changed, any more restriction of the homosexual freedom of 
homosexuals as opposed to that of heterosexuals, was a compromise with the underlying ir-
rational hostility. […] The restriction thus reflected no legitimate end” (Dudgeon Report, § 
50).  
 
The ECtHR, however, replied that Northern Irish laws pursued the legitimate aim of securing 
both the morals and rights of others, and it did not even mention the arguments put forward by 
Mr Dudgeon, moving on to consider whether the impugned legislation complied with the crite-
rion of “necessity in a democratic society”.  
According to the doctrine already set out, an action or norm might be regarded as being neces-
sary if the Government proves the existence of “a pressing social need” (Ivi, § 51), and if the in-
terference with individual rights is proportionate both to the aims sought and to the quality of 
activities involved (Ivi, § 52). 
In the assessment of these two criteria, the ECtHR displays a number of significant considera-
tions which mitigate the heteronormative tenure described up to this point. 
Firstly, the Court frames same-sex acts as falling under “the most intimate sphere of private life” 
(Ibidem), and, thus, requires from the UK Government “particularly serious reasons before in-
terferences” (Ibidem). The inclusion of homosexuality in the traditional realm of civil liberties, 
widens the relevance of this judgment: the Court presents homosexuality as being entrenched in 
individual privacy, implying that any criminal interference with this sphere must be justified on 
strict terms. As far as the emersion of the private realm raises some issues in respect to possible 
reiteration of the ‘closet’, it also disrupts the heteronormative understanding developed in past 
EComHR decisions, whereby gay sexuality was not worthy of any safeguard under the ECHR.  
Secondly, the Court establishes an essential bond between the democratic spirit and the toler-
ance of minoritarian perspectives, somehow contradicting the same judgment, as explored here-
inafter. Article 8, indeed, admits interferences with the private and family life, if necessary in a 
democratic society, and on this point the ECtHR concisely elevates tolerance and broadmind-
edness as the “hallmarks of democratic regimes” (Dudgeon, § 52). As such, democracy encour-
ages national authorities to embed pluralism but, at the same time, it allows political authorities 
to shape the national legal system according to majoritarian preferences: the two criteria are 
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clearly inspired by different theoretical perspectives - the former reinforcing the supremacy of 
the individual and the latter enforcing a communitarian social and moral vision. Hence, it the 
job of the ECtHR to strike a balance compatible with democracy and respectful to national sov-
ereignty. 
Accordingly, the ECtHR denied the UK Government fully meeting any of these criteria. The 
refraining of public authorities from concretely prosecuting same-sex private and consensual 
acts, and the fact that this policy has not led to “public demand for stricter enforcement of the 
law” (Ivi, § 60), demonstrated that an eventual decriminalization would not seriously harm the 
moral standards of the Northern Irish people. Therefore, no pressing need could be claimed 
by the Government. Not even the “strong body of opposition stemming from a genuine and 
sincere conviction […] that a change in the law would be seriously damaging to the moral fabric 
of society” (Dudgeon, § 57) provided adequate justification; the ECtHR reiterated that the legit-
imate aims pursued were outweighed by the detrimental effects for individual privacy and that 
“although members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be shocked, of-
fended or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual acts, this cannot on its 
own warrant the application of penal sanctions when it is consenting adults alone who are in-
volved.” (Dudgeon, § 60).  
To comprehend the innovativeness of such reading, it’s necessary to refer to dissenting opin-
ions. As far as the final outcome may be regarded as being minimalist and, to some extent, bi-
ased, four judges still filed extremely powerful dissenting opinions, where the majority is la-
belled as ‘pro-gay’. The starting assumption is a moral one, which testifies that the main terrain 
of internal disagreement is extra-judicial, namely the moral contrast on how to qualitatively 
evaluate homosexuality and on which symbolical significance the ECtHR should convey.  
Judge Zekia, judge Matscher, and judge Walsh labelled same-sex practices as “unnatural” 
(Dudgeon, dis. op., judge Zekia, judge Matscher, judge Walsh § 2), recalling the Christian, Jew-
ish and Muslim condemning of such behaviour. Judge Zekia, indeed, noted that “all civilised 
countries until recent years penalised sodomy and buggery and akin unnatural practices” and 
Walsh defined homosexual acts as “abnormalities” and “handicaps” (Ivi, § 13). 
Under these premises, dissenting judges further held that the criminalization of gay males was 
essential for the protection of morals and for the rights of others; in addition, they contended 
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that the ECtHR had to avoid symbolically attaching any value to homosexuality, for it had to be 
clearly qualified as being deviant and distinct from heterosexuality and lesbianism131. 
Dissenting opinions criticized the ECtHR for not respecting the majoritarian ethos of the 
Northern Irish community; to my reading, on the contrary, the ECtHR both detaches from and 
endorses majoritarian statements. 
The previously described dismissal of further comparisons between homosexuals and hetero-
sexuals and between gay males and lesbians embed a belittling of the perspective held by the 
applicant. Before the ECtHR, Mr. Dudgeon recalled the equal value and the identical legal dig-
nity of every sexual orientation but, nonetheless the Court did not even discuss the point, plain-
ly leaving the issue up to national discretion. The ECtHR also justified the higher age of consent 
on the grounds that it was necessary “to provide safeguards against the exploitation and corrup-
tion of those who are especially vulnerable by reason, for example, of their youth” (Dudgeon, § 
62). From this statement a moral evaluation is implied, which shows homosexuality as repre-
senting a potential threat to minors or for those who are not mature enough to understand all 
the consequences of a similar choice. When referring to heterosexual activities, it would sound 
strange to consider the sexual desire of young people as the outcome of corruption and exploi-
tation; the only case where this association would be acceptable, would inhere to non-
consensual acts or to a specific asymmetric relationship where a young, weak-minded person is 
circumvented. The applicant, in fact, was not asking for a general lowering of the age of consent 
- whose existence might have been defended on the grounds of its necessity to prevent corrup-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 The definition of gayness fluctuates between the pathological and the criminal label. Walsh endorses 
the former perspective, stating that “a distinction must be drawn between homosexuals who are such be-
cause of some kind of innate instinct or pathological constitution judged to be incurable and those 
whose tendency comes from a lack of normal sexual development or from habit or from experience or 
from other similar causes but whose tendency is not incurable. […] Even assuming one of the two per-
sons involved has the incurable tendency, the other may not. It is known that many male persons who 
are heterosexual or pansexual indulge in these activities not because of any incurable tendency but for 
sexual excitement.” (Dudgeon, dis. op., judge Walsh, § 13) Also Zekia confusedly suggests that “if a 
homosexual claims to be a sufferer because of physiological, psychological or other reasons and the law 
ignores such circumstances, his case might then be one of exculpation or mitigation if his tendencies are 
curable or incurable” (Ivi, dis. op., judge Zekia, § 4). Matscher, on the contrary, adopts a hostile per-
spective also denouncing the outrageous hidden agenda of gay movement: “Of course, the applicant and 
the organizations behind him are seeking more: they are seeking the express and formal repeal of the 
laws in force, that is to say a "charter" declaring homosexuality to be an alternative equivalent to hetero-
sexuality, with all the consequences that that would entail (for example, as regards sex education”. Fur-
thermore, he finds appropriate the different treatment under criminal law between homosexual and het-
erosexual conduct “obvious”, since “the moral and social problems to which they give rise are not at all 
the same” (Dudgeon, dis. op., judge Matscher). Similarly, there would exist “a genuine difference, of 
character as well as of degree, between the moral and social problems raised by the two forms of homo-
sexuality, male and female” (Ibidem), which would justify the prosecution of the former only. 
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tion and exploitation - but only for its equalization. Given that UK laws assumed people aged 
over 16 to be mature enough to decide whether to engage in heterosexual or lesbian relation-
ships, the only reason why the same people were not supposed to freely determine if indulging 
in gay sex has to be linked to the more harmful nature of male homosexuality. 
Therefore, the ECtHR found a breach despite the different value attached to the applicant’s 
sexuality, not evaluating his homosexuality from a positive perspective but definitely seeing dif-
ference in a negative light. 
By appealing to Article 14, Dudgeon opened the space for the establishment of a legal compari-
son between heterosexuals and homosexuals: had the ECtHR accepted this analogy and de-
clared Dudgeon’s rights that were infringed on the grounds that he had been treated differently 
from heterosexuals, the Court would have implicitly affirmed a qualitative analogy between het-
erosexuals and gay men. Such an outcome would have led to relevant consequences, both legal 
and symbolical. The deeply-rooted prejudice of homosexuality as a deviation from human na-
ture would have been disrupted, to such an extent that lgbt people could have claimed individu-
al, couples, and families rights on the grounds that they were in a condition comparable to a 
heterosexual one. 
As explored hereafter, the ECtHR did not approve of this line of reasoning, supporting instead 
an ambivalent approach, which however did not prevent it from upholding the claims of Dudg-
eon. 
Moreover, the ECtHR endorsed a majoritarian conception of laws regulating individual free-
dom, stating that  
 
in assessing the requirements of the protection of morals in Northern Ireland, the contested 
measures must be seen in the context of Northern Irish society. The fact that similar 
measures are not considered necessary in other parts of the United Kingdom or in other 
member States of the Council of Europe does not mean that they cannot be necessary in 
Northern Ireland. […] As the Government correctly submitted, it follows that the moral cli-
mate in Northern Ireland in sexual matters, in particular as evidenced by the opposition to 
the proposed legislative change, is one of the matters which the national authorities may le-
gitimately take into account in exercising their discretion. There is, the Court accepts, a 
strong body of opposition stemming from a genuine and sincere conviction shared by a 
large number of responsible members of the Northern Irish community that a change in the 
law would be seriously damaging to the moral fabric of society. […] Whether this point of 
view be right or wrong, and although it may be out of line with current attitudes in other 
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communities, its existence among an important sector of Northern Irish society is certainly 
relevant for the purposes of Article 8 par. 2. (Dudgeon, § 56-57) 
 
The majority clearly distinguished between the legal and moral realm, rejecting an understand-
ing of human rights exclusively moulded on majoritarian premises, although throughout the en-
tire judgment a begrudged attitude towards homosexuality still emerges. 
It could be disputed that whatever the standpoint embraced, the ECtHR reached an outcome 
disruptive of its previous heteronormative outcomes. To my reading, this is only partially cor-
rect: the image of homosexuality as an unfortunate accident pledges some empathy to lgbt peo-
ple and the ECtHR willingly grants them minimum room of freedom; however, such tolerance 
accurately restricts the review of the Court, to such an extent that only the first claim of the ap-
plicant, i.e. the criminalization of same-sex, consensual, private and adult acts, is upheld. 
On one hand, the ECtHR apparently distanced itself from any moral evaluation of the issues at 
hand, stating that it “is not concerned with making any value-judgment as to the morality of ho-
mosexual relations between adult males” (Dudgeon, § 54) and assigning to the criminal law in 
this field “the overall function […] in the words of the Wolfenden report […] to preserve public 
order and decency [and] to protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious” (Ivi, § 49). 
On the other, when discussing the submissions of the UK Government, the ECtHR acknowl-
edged that “one of the purposes of the legislation is to afford safeguards for vulnerable mem-
bers of society […] against the consequences of homosexual practices” (Ivi, § 47), and, a few 
paragraphs later, it casted off any criticism of this, arguing that “there can be no denial that 
some degree of regulation of male homosexual conduct, as indeed other forms of sexual con-
duct” (Ivi, § 49). Despite the reference to a wider set of behaviour, the wording suggests that the 
element which has to be controlled does not strictly refer to the age of consent or to eventual 
non-consensual acts, but precisely inheres to the twisted nature of homosexual conduct, and to 
other, not specified, conducts equally disdained in Western societies.  
The ECtHR considers homosexuality as a controversial issue, perhaps even as self-harming be-
haviour, which can be lawfully prosecuted only when third parties are concretely harmed and 
on the grounds that “decriminalization does not imply approval” (Ivi, § 61); consequently, the 
main reason for the final outcome lies in the breadth, in the absolute character, and in the se-
verity of penalties provided, judged as “disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved.” 
(Ivi, § 61). In Dudgeon the ECtHR built its own notion of homosexuality, further reiterated in 
Norris and Modinos. Since the Court denied the comparison between heterosexuality and ho-
mosexuality, the latter is defined as a separate condition, whose essential elements and whose 
normative treatment under the ECHR had to be gradually defined. The implicit reference point 
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to which the ECtHR compared same-sex activities is that of heterosexuality, but the rights pro-
vided to homosexuals were the outcome of an ad hoc judicial examination. 
The core element is related to the essential right to be respected in those acts which represent 
“a most intimate aspect of private life” (Ivi, § 52).  
Although the applicant framed his own complaint on the grounds of the notion of ‘private life’, 
an in-depth analysis of his claims reveals the symbolical pretence of opening up a debate on the 
common evaluation of homosexuality.  
Mr. Dudgeon indeed challenged “the myths used to justify special restrictions on homosexuals” 
(Ivi, § 51) and considered that the decriminalization of buggery stood as the pre-requisite to 
both effectively respect everyone’s private life and to dismantle the prejudiced public discourse 
surrounding homosexuality.  
Johnson and other commenters (Johnson 2014, 100 and fol.; Moran 1996; Stychin 2003) have 
suggested that in Dudgeon the ECtHR shapes a binary distinction between private and public, 
which marks its future jurisprudence. 
Effectively, it’s worth noting that, the reiterated and combined reference to the concept of “pri-
vate life”, the inherent sexual disposition of homosexuals, effectively erased the possibility of 
discussing Dudgeon’s claims in a wider frame than the strictly private one. On this issue, it has 
been aptly suggested that the ECtHR constructed its approach not only to reach conclusions 
that in previous jurisprudence were unthinkable, but to make such conclusions “thinkable in 
such a way as to render any other solutions difficult, if not possible” (Moran 1996, 175).  
The overwhelming totality of commenters highlighted this element, attaching a different mean-
ing to it depending on their theoretical perspective; liberal jurists, such as Wintemute, contend-
ed that the ECtHR’s approach to homosexuality as an immutable condition offered positive fu-
ture developments, in that it suggested an analogy with other classes that are usually discriminat-
ed against which, in turn, might stretch and strengthen the legal protection and recognition given 
to homosexuals as well (Wintemute 1995; 2001 ). By analyzing the discursive power of juris-
prudence and the constructivist role performed by judges, Grigolo argued that in Dudgeon the 
ECtHR introduced the homosexual as a legal subject using “traditional essentialist narratives” 
and, hence, casting off any argument or premise not coherent or in accordance with such a 
premise (Grigolo 2003, 1027). 
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In other words, the ECtHR structured its reasoning, its logical premises, and its legal defini-
tions, so as to propose its innovations as it they had exhausted and fully fulfilled all the possible 
outcomes that were both logical and coherent with the ECHR. 
If filtering the definition of privacy set out in Dudgeon through Minow’s feminist methodologi-
cal proposal132, it appears that even though the Court did not compare Mr. Dudgeon’s condition 
to that of heterosexuals, the unstated norm which set the judges’ interpretive binary was the out-
come of an unbalanced comparison between the values attached to heterosexuality and those 
assumed to be conveyed by homosexuality. To support these arguments, I recall that the EC-
tHR upheld the necessity of “some control over homosexuality by means of criminal law” 
(Dudgeon, § 49) in choosing a strong expression and stating that “there can be no denial” 
(Ibidem) over the issue. Hence, the Court did not even remotely consider that such sexual poli-
cies might be controversial, problematic, or unjustified, just noting that homosexuality could be 
legitimately sanctioned for “particular sections of society as well as the moral ethos of society as 
a whole” (Ibidem).  
Hence, the final outcome may have breached the total exclusion of homosexuals’ from enjoying 
ECHR rights, but it surely has not gone beyond a limited and begrudging tolerance of uncon-
ventional sexualities. 
The perspective endorsed by the ECtHR in Dudgeon shaped Norris and Modinos' arguments: 
both of them did not acknowledge any violation of Article 14, only relying on the notion of pri-
vate life secured under Article 8.  
In addition, they did not dispute the legitimacy of the aims pursued, they rather considered that 
national authorities had failed to respect their private life. 
Despite the submissions being of a lower interest, if compared to Dudgeon, it is in Norris and 
Modinos that up to now the reasoning analyzed has loosened its casuistic character, acquiring a 
more general meaning and amounting to the essential foundations of the ECtHR jurisprudence 
on sexual orientation. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See chapter II, paragraph 2.4.2 
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4.2.2. The Age of Consent 
 
As previously highlighted, Dudgeon legitimatised the provision of unequal ages of consent, ad-
ducing the necessity to protect the young from the consequences of homosexual acts. Over the 
following years an increased number of complaints challenged the ECtHR approach, forcing 
the judges to critically review their own interpretations.  
The litigation at Strasbourg has to be read within the broader political context of those years: in 
the UK and in the other Coe Countries where a different age had been set, the pressure of the 
lgbt movement and the parties who supported the equalization managed to reach parliamentary 
assemblies. Reform proposals were debated and, between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
France and Germany equalized the minimum age of consent. In the UK a 1994 reform low-
ered the threshold for male homosexual acts to 18, from the previously stated 21, maintaining 
however a slight but relevant difference to heterosexuals. In Austria, any attempt at lowering the 
age was voted down by the conservative parties and it was not possible to reach full equality until 
2002. 
As explored hereafter, both British and Austrian public opinion paid attention to this issue and 
also the scientific community devoted great effort to testing the different perspectives.  
The ECtHR law case on the age of consent, to my reading, should be divided into two phases: 
the first one, including Wilde, Parry and Greenhalg v UK, n.22382/93, struck out by the 
EComHR, Morris v UK, n.31791/96, and Sutherland v UK, n.25186/94, judicial reasoning dis-
plays some extremely relevant substantial readings from a socio-legal approach. The second 
one, comprising of a number of cases against Austria, reiterates the same interpretation of the 
same claims, somehow taking the approach moulded by the first phase as being the ordinary 
one when dealing with issues related to the age of consent. 
As for the first phase, British citizens were all supported by Stonewall, an lgbt organization 
based in London, which provided them with legal advice; therefore their choices can be framed 
within the attempt to reform national laws. Wilde was lodged before the UK Parliament low-
ered the age for gay acts to 18, while Sutherland was registered while the reform was being de-
bated and Morris just after it. The whole activation of the law seemed to be targeted at increas-
ing the pressure on policy-makers and, as far as Sutherland was concerned, at overturning the 
political conservative majority who favoured the unequal treatment of gay acts. The activist 
meaning of this complaint can also be understood by the fact that while Wilde, Parry and 
Greenhalg refused to enter into any agreement with the UK Government, Sutherland and Mor-
ris did not object to the ECtHR’s intention of striking out their cases. While, indeed, the former 
case was considered by the ECtHR in 1995, when the Government had not presented any fur-
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ther proposal to reduce the age of consent, Sutherland and Morris were addressed in 2001, 
when Blair’s reform to equalize the age of consent had already been approved.  
Before discussing the innovations developed in Sutherland, I feel it appropriate to flesh out 
some of the remarks related to previous EComHR decisions, which had amounted to the im-
plicit reference point of the Court and the Commission in Sutherland.  
Both in X v UK and in Zukrigl v Austria, n.17279/90, the EComHR relied on the protection of 
young men’s “psychological development”, understood in absolute heteronormative terms. If 
one considers the personal development of a man aged 16-21 being linked to the expression of 
one’s character, and to the liberty in pursuing one’s aspirations, then the freedom to explore his 
sexuality appears totally legitimate. 
In fact, Mr. X had recalled the findings of Speijer’s Committee - a Dutch Committee which in 
1969 was entrusted with the task of examining the proposal to set an equal age of consent for 
same-sex acts- which, inter alia, contradicted the aforementioned assumption: 
 
it had not been proved that homosexual contact with young persons who have a heterosexu-
al propensity would lead them to acquire permanent homosexual inclinations. Nor it has 
been proved that such a contact would have a damaging effect on the minor concerned. On 
the contrary, homosexual contacts could often be of positive help to the young person with 
homosexual tendencies in so far as they might reduce or even eliminate sensations of stress 
and frustration (Speijer’s Committee quoted in X v UK, § 66). 
 
Effectively, the idea that a person’s well-being could be preserved by forcing him to deny and 
conceal his sexuality, only makes sense if the concept of development is defined as the adher-
ence and adaptation to a normative way of life. The heteronormative perspective therefore, 
prevented the EComHR from even considering the distressing condition of boys caught be-
tween their desires and the severity of the law. 
The other’s perspective remained totally hidden, fully unaddressed, and definitely seen through 
the lens of a moral majoritarian view. The EComHR commented that although the limit of 21 
could be regarded as being high and inconsistent in a legislation where men above the age of 18 
were allowed to vote and to fulfil other legal transactions (Ivi, § 152), it was still justified in order 
to avoid social pressure to which young men engaging in homosexual activities would be ex-
posed (Ibidem). 
In X v UK another significant element emerges, namely the role of political consensus. Besides 
substantial evaluations, the Commission recalled that since the UK Parliament had not accepted 
 235	  
a proposal of reform in 1977, it was not in its authority to replace domestic authorities (Ivi, § 
153). 
Sutherland, on the contrary, showed a different interpretation, which clearly sets him apart from 
previous ones; it has to be noted that the material on which the analysis has been conducted is 
the EComHR Report, as the ECtHR struck out the case before the Court could even deliver its 
judgment. Sutherland’s Report is nevertheless the documental source which moulds the future 
interpretive standpoints of the Court and, if Blair had not proposed the aforementioned pro-
posal, it is extremely likely that the ECtHR would have endorsed the Commission’s conclusion 
whereby, “by fourteen votes to four, […] in the present case there has been a violation of Article 
8 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 14 (Art. 8 + 14) of the Convention” 
(Sutherland, § 66). 
In this case specialist and scientific knowledge heavily entered into the judicial arena, amounting 
to the realm on which the EComHR based its interpretation of the Convention.  
The wide spread endorsement between physicians, psychiatrists and psychologists towards an 
equal age of consent was judged to be relevant enough to overcome national policies.  
By relying on extra-judicial opinions, the EComHR cast off the principle of precaution, and al-
so embraced a slightly different conception of homosexuality than that emerging in Dudgeon. 
Rather than normative, the EComHR depicted heterosexuality as the normal sexual model; at § 
54 same-sex intercourse is, indeed, described as being a “particular type of sexual behaviour”, 
and the main scientific realm to which the EComHR is related is the medical one. Such a 
standpoint might still convey a biased attitude against lgbt people, but it also reduces the moral 
condemning looming over homosexual citizens.  
According to the UK Government’s submissions, the setting of the age-limit at 18 years for gay 
men and 16 for heterosexuals and lesbians was legitimatised on the grounds of five correlated 
arguments: a) males aged in the bracket between 16-18 years are immature, and there is the 
“possibility that they will not be sufficiently mature to cope with the consequences of their ac-
tions”; (Ivi, § 42) b) the overwhelming majority of parents expect and hope their children to 
grow up as heterosexuals and, by imposing stricter conditions, those who are unsure of their 
sexuality could be encouraged to conform to the heterosexual model; c) if the minimum age 
were reduced to 16 years, it would “prove wholly unacceptable to public opinion” (Ivi, § 23); d) 
homosexual acts are undesirable and can be tolerated only above the age “by which a young 
man’ sexual pattern becomes fixed, so that the performance by him of homosexual acts […] 
would be unlikely to divert him from a heterosexual to a homosexual pattern of sexual behav-
iour.” (Ibidem); e) gay men are more exposed to the risk of being infected with HIV, gonorrea 
and other sexual transmitted infections (Ivi, § 84).  
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From an institutional perspective, the UK Government invoked the margin of appreciation, 
contending that since the Parliament was debating the issue still without having reached a defi-
nite outcome, it was not up to the EComHR or to the ECtHR to take their place (Ivi, § 42). 
The EComHR recognized a certain control of homosexuality as being necessary for the protec-
tion of morals, but refused to grant national authorities complete discretion or to review the 
case by means of the structural margin of appreciation.  
The initial assumption opened up to the comparison between heterosexuals and homosexuals, 
and the EComHR stated that “it is not contested that the applicant as a young man of 17 years 
who wished to enter into and maintain sexual relations with a male friend of the same age was in 
a relevantly similar situation to a young man of the same age who wished to enter into and 
maintain sexual relations with a female friend of the same age” (Ivi, § 52). The problem to be 
solved was no longer whether gays and heterosexuals were comparable, but if a reasonable pro-
portionality between the aims sought and the means adopted was respected. The EComHR 
was, therefore, required to state criteria whereby assessing the case, and replying to the UK 
Government, who relied on X v UK, stating that case as twenty-years old and suggested that it 
was necessary to orient its interpretation according to new and more updated parameters. 
In this respect, scientific knowledge became crucial. As to emphasize its reasoning-line and to 
justify the dismissal of X v UK conclusions, the EComHR mentioned the major changes that 
had occurred in professional opinions, especially in “medical professions” (Ivi, § 59), and it fur-
ther enlisted the support of the most relevant British associations supporting the reduction of 
the age of consent, such as the British Medical Association and the British Psychological Asso-
ciation. Only after stressing these findings, the Commission recalled the existence of a Europe-
an consensus against the UK position; the key to the Report however, to my mind is captured 
by the following statement “the Commission accordingly considers it opportune to reconsider 
its earlier case-law in the light of these modern developments, and more especially in the light 
of the weight of current medical opinion” (Ivi, § 60). 
When evaluating the arguments produced by the UK authorities, the EComHR referred to 
specialized how-know; commenting on the points described in a) and b), the Commission 
shaped its interpretation by reminding that “current medical opinion is to the effect that sexual 
orientation is fixed in both sexes by the age of 16” and that “as noted by the BMA [British Med-
ical Association] the risk posed by predatory older men would appear to be as serious as when 
the victim is a man or a woman and does not justify a differential age of consent”(Ivi, § 64).  
It could be critically argued that the focus of the medical evaluation of same-sex acts reinforced 
both the principle of precaution and the medicalization of sexualities not ascribable to hetero-
sexuality. It is true that the EComHR was faced with an international scientific opinion in favour 
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of reducing the age of consent and that it could no longer grant national discretion on the 
grounds that the academic community was internally divided; however, had the EComHR en-
dorsed a biased approach, or had it preferred to recall the principle of precaution, it would 
probably have attached more relevance to the political debate that was still ongoing in the UK.  
The EComHR could also have resorted to the principle of subsidiarity, without considering 
whether the UK Government’s argument was substantially justified.  
Instead, specialist opinions outweighed political ones, providing the EComHR with a perspec-
tive which could not be accused of being policy-oriented; both the idea that young boys lacked 
maturity and that they would be harmed by homosexual contact were precisely contested thanks 
to the position of the medical community.  
The EComHR conceded that “some weight should be attached to the fact that the issue has 
been recently considered by the legislature and that the reduction of the minimum age of con-
sent to 16 was rejected” (Ivi, § 62), but it still considered this argument as being neither decisive 
nor sufficient. 
How to interpret the perspective moulded by the Commission? I would frame it as raising 
some considerations on the legal balance between majorities and minorities. Most notably, the 
applicant’s perspective and the heterosexual condition are placed on the same footage, to such 
an extent that the EComHR sees no difference between the risks to which young boys and girls 
are exposed. Then, the EComHR marks a fracture with Dudgeon and other decisions, by criti-
cally approaching the arguments made by the respondent Government. Commissioners, in-
deed, criticize the line proposed by UK authorities, and extensively challenge their theoretical 
foundations by showing how they lack scientific evidence. Even though the EComHR does not 
specifically mention the necessity to protect minorities - this issue will be openly addressed in L. 
and V. v Austria- this concern is implied, to the extent that its choice causes fractures within the 
same Commission, as separate opinions highlight. Four Commissioners contend that the opin-
ion expressed by the majority of freely elected representatives could not be disregarded, and 
that, accordingly, it would be far more appropriate for the EComHR to restrict individual au-
tonomy, rather than disowning UK parliamentarians.  
It has to be emphasized that the Labour Party was favourable to the proposal and, therefore na-
tional political opinion could not be assumed as being completely contrary to claims advanced 
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by Sutherland; nevertheless, both Dudgeon and X v UK offered precedents that could have 
been recalled if the EComHR had chosen a more restrained perspective133. 
The intertwining between science and policy-making stands at the heart to when the EComHR 
shifts from a prescriptive to a descriptive model of heterosexuality. The EComHR still consid-
ers homosexuality as a normal human tendency, but, at the same time, it finds that “no objec-
tive and reasonable justification exists for the maintenance of a higher minimum age of consent 
to male homosexuals, than to heterosexual, acts” (Ivi, § 66). 
Sutherland led two important interpretive outcomes which, as shown hereafter, mark the EC-
tHR approach in the forthcoming cases. Firstly, the incomparability between heterosexuality 
and homosexuality was dismantled; then, the EComHR assumed that moral reasons could not 
restrict one’s freedom, not even if upheld by the majority of people and conveying the will to 
protect some vulnerable social sectors. Therefore, even though this decision did not give rise to 
any judgment, it still opened an initial space to further enhance lgbt claims, as indeed happened 
in the Austrian cases. 
By this term I refer to eight cases adjudicated by the ECtHR, all claiming the same demand and 
questioning the ECtHR on the amount of protection guaranteed to lgbt people. In order to 
properly frame them, it’s worth emphasizing that these cases are the outcome of a peculiar legal 
context and a particularly begrudging political attitude. Precisely because of the reiterated re-
fusal by policy-makers to comply with ECtHR judgments, this sequence of cases suggests the 
aim of altering the domestic status quo. Another hint of strategic litigation regards the involve-
ment of lawyers actively interested in advocating lgbt rights, such as Mr. Graupner; the Austrian 
cases, therefore, may constitute as being the example of the ‘judicial route’ triggered by political 
obstacles, described by Wintemute (1995, 2).  
All applicants, however, had also been convicted and some of them had also served their sen-
tence in prison; so there is also a component of claiming personal satisfaction, stronger than that 
outlined in previous examples. 
Until 2002, Article 209 of the Austrian Criminal Code read as follows “A male person who af-
ter attaining the age of 19 fornicates with a person of the same-sex who has attained the age of 
14 but not the age of 18 shall be sentenced to imprisonment for between six months and five 
years”. Instead, for heterosexual acts the minimum age required was fixed at 14. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 I recall X v UK passage where the EComHR suggested that “such type of different treatment may be 
regarded by the Commission as having an objective and reasonable justification in the criterion of social 
protection”, jointly read with Dudgeon where the ECtHR reiterated the legitimacy of some degree of 
control over homosexual behavior. 
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On 10th July 2002, following the Constitutional Courts’ judgment, the Austrian Parliament re-
pealed the aforementioned Article, setting a unique age of consent at 16 years, or 18 in the case 
of persons below 18 years old being inducted “to sexual activities in return for payment” (L. and 
V. v Austria, § 21). However, according to the transitional provisions, the amendment did not 
apply to criminal proceedings in which the judgment at first instance had already been given 
(Ivi, § 22). In the light of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the Sutherland Report, the provi-
sions however provided the subject with the possibility “of the application of the more favoura-
ble law, where judgment is set aside, inter alia, following the reopening of the proceedings or in 
the context of a renewal of the proceedings following the finding of a violation of the Conven-
tion” (Ibidem). These were the only two exceptions where the reform spread retroactive effects; 
for instance, criminal records could not be deleted, nor could proceedings, in which the definite 
judgment had already been decided, reopened and quashed.  
While L. and V. v Austria, n.39392/98 and 39829/98, and S. L. v Austria, n.45330/99, were 
lodged with the ECtHR before 2002, and therefore challenged the existence of Article 209, the 
other cases were presented after, contending that the applicants had been discriminated against 
when that provision was in force and that also after the amendment national authorities did not 
guarantee adequate satisfaction. 
From a socio-legal perspective, it’s interesting to note that from 2002 to 2014 - from the first to 
the last judgment- the Austrian government did not further amend its legislation, only approving 
a reform after the last complaint was filed to the ECtHR. Therefore, even though core issues 
involved procedural aspects, political authorities preferred to reimburse the applicants, rather 
than complying with Strasbourg’s review. As legitimate and highly-regarded the ECtHR may be, 
its effective ability to obtain immediate compliance is limited, for in this event it could only reit-
erate its own reasoning-line until the Austrian government proposed amending the Criminal 
Code again.  
As for the ECtHR perspective, L. and V. v Austria displays the most relevant approach. In this 
case the ECtHR reappraises Sutherland (Ivi, § 40, § 42), and clearly labels the maintaining of 
any criminal provision or procedure discriminating against homosexuals as inherently anti-
democratic, also rejecting the assumption that, as far as not being proportionate, the require-
ment of a higher age of consent theoretically pursued a legitimate aim:  
 
To the extent that Article 209 of the Criminal Code embodied a predisposed bias on the 
part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority. These negatives attitudes 
cannot of themselves be considered by the Court to amount to sufficient justification for the 
 240	  
differential treatment any more than similar negative attitudes towards those of a different 
race, origin, or colour. (Ivi, § 52). 
 
The following cases quote this judgment in different passages, with the effect of reiterating it 
and, consequently, of including within its consolidated jurisprudential resources the interpretive 
structure here developed. Furthermore, the absence of dissenting opinions on the conduct of 
Austrian authorities highlights a strong change in the ECtHR internal legal culture on the mat-
ter; in the turn of less than 10 years, the equalization of the age of consent no longer appeared 
as being a sensitive issue, but rather as an outdated legal problem. 
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4.2.3. Delimiting Private Spaces 
 
Another point not disputed in Dudgeon was the possibility to legally sanction types of homo-
sexual acts not prosecuted when involving persons of different sex. In more detail, the Court 
did not discuss the notion of privacy outlined by the UK Government, thus endorsing the exist-
ing criminalization of homosexual acts involving more than two people, whether group-sex in-
tercourse was taking place or a third party simply being witness to homosexual activity. 
UK laws were quite peculiar on the issue, and no other Coe Party had an analogous legislation; 
quite predictably both civil and common laws involved various offences against public morals or 
decency, which could be punished either with fines or convictions, but the 1956 Sexual Offenc-
es Act created a distinct offense for gay male sex, stating “an act which would otherwise be 
treated for the purposes of this Act as being done in private [ homosexual act] shall not be so 
treated if done: (a) when more than two persons take part or are present; or (b) in a lavatory to 
which the public have or are permitted to have access, whether on payment or otherwise”. 
The ECtHR was required to review similar provisions on various occasions, and in two cases it 
clarified the meaning of ‘private’ for purposes of Article 8, tracing a strict and problematic bina-
ry between private and public spaces.  
In Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v Uk, n.21627/93, 21628/93, 21974/93, and A.D.T. v UK, 
n.35765/97, the Court dealt with two sensitive issues, namely that of same-sex sadomasochist 
and of group intercourses; could gay men claim, under the ECHR, the human right to freely 
engage in the aforementioned activities? Did sexual acts involving more than two people fall 
within the notion of private life, secured by the Article 8?  
It might be objected that the importance of these two cases is not relevant, since they concern 
the specific UK peculiarity; the ECtHR, however, approached the issue by carefully considering 
arguments claimed by both parties, thus delivering considerations of broad relevance. 
In both cases the EComHR marks the first fracture with the previous law case, by declaring the 
complaints admissible and by recognizing that UK laws interfered with private life, and that, as 
such, they raised issues worthy of being discussed in Court. If compared to EComHR decisions 
made just a decade before Dudgeon, or even in the early 1980s, the Commission managed to 
critically approach the enforcement of heterosexuality and to admit that similar laws limited in-
dividual liberty; this does not imply that the Commission suggested a breach of the Convention, 
but it certainly showed a less begrudging attitude against homosexual issues. Whether the appli-
cants were right or not, the Commission considered it appropriate to leave the final decision to 
the ECtHR and, consequently, it enabled the judges to further specify the meaning of the Con-
vention. 
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In Laskey three men were charged with a series of offences, including “assault and wounding, 
relating to sadomasochistic activities that had taken place over a ten-year period.” (Laskey, § 8). 
During routine investigations on other matters, the police had come into possessions of several 
videos filmed during these encounters, “involving the applicants and as many as forty-four other 
homosexual men”(Ibidem). The seriousness of the acts performed was such that the Court con-
tented that, as far as aiming at obtaining sexual pleasure, they could well be compared to genital 
torture (Laskey, § 40). Even though none of the people involved had to go to hospital, had con-
tracted HIV or other infective pathologies, and though none of them was suffering from per-
manent damage, the Court was faced with the doubt as to whether sadomasochist activities 
could be protected without opening up to the theoretically complex issue of ‘consenting victim’.  
Could the Court justify activities where only adults were involved and where all parties gave 
their consent, regardless of the harm caused? The unanimity of the Court considered this out-
come unacceptable and, therefore granted UK authorities the discretion to criminally charge 
the applicants. The applicants proposed two distinguished arguments: the first discussed the 
possibility of admitting to ‘consensual violence’ or ‘violent pleasure’, while the second involved 
the definition of how to assess the privacy of sexual acts.  
I suggest that the Court mainly relied on the first issue and that the troublesome knot was given 
by the kind of activity, not by the homosexuality of the applicants. One could certainly discuss 
the paternalistic standpoint that the ECtHR endorses or, conversely, it could be emphasized 
that the potential slippery-slope towards the legitimization of ‘consenting torture’ that the Court 
would have legitimized, had it opted for a different outcome. The core of the judicial interpreta-
tion, however, stressed the degree of injury, wounding, and degrading treatment involved in the 
activities performed by the three men, denying that these fell into the cluster of merely sexual 
acts, but rather considering them as bodily offences. As it can be imagined, various commen-
taries have criticized the approach taken by the ECtHR on the issue, and also seven Commis-
sioners upheld that this peculiar sexual activity would create no more problems than boxing or 
other activities well permitted under UK laws; a further examination of the issue, however, 
would go too far from the aims of the present research. 
In several passages the Court’s reasoning on the division between legitimated and illegitimate 
acts is intertwined with reasoning on the meaning of ‘privacy’, leading to specifying a number of 
criteria, further developed in A.D.T. v UK. After recognizing that “there can be no doubt that 
sexual orientation and activity concerns an intimate aspect of private life” (Laskey, § 36), the 
Court tempered with this finding, by enlisting a number of features which, in their perspective, 
contrasted with the ideal definition of ‘private’ sexuality. 
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Most notably, in Laskey the Court referred to not strictly private acts on the grounds of four el-
ements: the involvement of “a number of people” (Ibidem), the recruitment of new “members” 
(Ibidem), the provision of equipped chambers, and the shooting of videotapes which were dis-
tributed among members.  
In the UK, domestic proceedings and this judgment were surrounded by lively discussion, 
among those who had optimistically thought that the ECtHR would have upheld the compliant 
on the grounds of the “privacy argument” and those who right from the start had warned us of 
the alleged “violence of exclusion” (Moran 1998, 82) entrenched in human rights. 
In particular, Moran wrote a trenchant critique of the arguments displayed by the ECtHR, con-
testing both their theoretical foundations and their interpretive outcome, but, as far as being 
provocative and compelling, his analysis can be critically challenged on the basis of two ideas, at 
least, also in light of subsequent ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
The ECtHR interpreted the applicants’ activities as “acts so evil that they are not only a threat to 
the individual but a threat to civilized society” (Moran 1998, 81) - Moran’s argument goes - and 
the Court would “reduce the viability of any challenge to the State’s determination of the nature 
of particular acts” (Ibidem). Further, he contended that the concurring opinion filed by judge 
Pettiti revealed the ECtHR’s reasoning, which provided the “clearest representation of terms of 
denial” (Ivi, 83), by framing the right of respect for private life as “the protection of a person’s 
intimacy and dignity, not the protection of his baseness or the promotion of criminal immoral-
ism” (Laskey, conc. op. § 39). To sum up, for Moran the ECtHR reasoning would protect the 
private realm only insofar as the acts committed are normalizing the canons of traditional sexu-
ality, while denying “the humanity” (Moran 1998, 83) of those who derive pleasure from the 
consensual giving and receiving of pain134. 
I contend, however, that a careful reading of the ECtHR’s arguments suggests that the concept 
of “criminal immoralism” was mostly upheld only by judge Pettiti, while the majority resulted 
far more concerned by the dilemma and the side-effects of the consenting victim. Judge Pettiti 
filed a concurring opinion in order to clarify that his reasoning differed from the majorities in 
several respects, especially on the moral evaluation of the facts at stake.  
Moreover, shortly after the ECtHR demonstrated that the realm of privacy secured under the 
ECHR, as far as being tight, did not necessarily impose a normalization of traditional categories. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Moran labeled the ECtHR reasoning as “the institutionalization of an ontological order as a moral 
based upon a violent hierarchy of sex, sexuality, and gender. These ontological hierarchical matters are 
given another form by way of the medicalization of the actors and the acts they perform” (Moran, 1998, 
83).
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A.D.T. v UK, instead, was entirely focused on the boundaries of privacy, and it legitimatised the 
human right to engage in homosexual group sex, an activity not completely positively valued by 
traditional morals. In 1996 police officers conducted a search under warrant of the applicant's 
home, seizing various items, including photographs and a list of videotapes. Mr. A.D.T. was in-
terviewed by the police, and he admitted that some of the videotapes contained footage of the 
applicant and up to four other adult men, engaging in sexual activities in his house. Consequent-
ly, he was charged with gross indecency, precisely in relation to the commission of group sex. 
As the ECtHR recalls, “the acts which formed the basis of the charge involved consenting adult 
men, took place in the applicant's home and were not visible to anyone other than the partici-
pants. There was no element of sadomasochism or physical harm involved in the activities de-
picted on the videotape.” (A.D.T. v UK, § 10). All material seized was destroyed and Mr. 
A.D.T. was sentenced to two years imprisonment, although finally discharged.  
Under the ECHR, he complained that his conviction constituted a violation of his right of re-
spect for his private life, protected by Article 8 of the Convention (Ivi, § 20). 
The respondent Government, instead, objected by drawing a distinction between intimate, and 
therefore acceptable homosexual activity involving two men only, and acts involving more than 
two men, which appeared potentially public and, therefore, unacceptable. The accepta-
ble/unacceptable distinction not only conveyed a moral judgment, but it also set the legal 
ground to define criminal provisions. 
Given that UK laws, as previously mentioned, did not include similar offences for heterosexual 
activities, the division between private/public supported a conception of law moulded on the en-
forcement of morals and on the idea of homosexuality as inherently disordered.  
The Court reviewed the parameters adopted to define what is private, and the final judgment 
combined innovative and restrained outcomes. On one hand, the Court found a breach of Arti-
cle 8, concretely recognizing the right to engage in private group-sex and further enlarging the 
space of tolerance identified in Dudgeon; on the other, however, the enjoyment of this right was 
subordinated to a number of criteria which significantly border the private realm. As explored 
hereinafter, these were quite tightening conditions, whereby privacy almost collapsed over the 
(in)famous model of the closet. 
As for the innovative implications, the ECtHR rejected both the Government’s opinion that the 
case would not give rise to interference with private life and it evaluated the final conviction as 
lacking proportionality with the offense committed by the applicant. Moreover, the Court re-
called Dudgeon, establishing a substantial link between the two cases and implying that the situ-
ation of Mr. A.D.T. was comparable to Mr. Dudgeon’s. 
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Hence, the wording does not convey an openly biased conception of homosexuality, to the ex-
tent that the Court does not reiterate the necessity to control homosexual acts, nor does it de-
pict sexual acts performed by Mr. A.D.T. with negative tones.  
Then, the Court concludes that the reasons submitted by the respondent Government are not 
sufficient in order to justify the legislation and prosecution.  
However, the Court also problematically delimited the space wherein an act can be legitimately 
labelled as private. The reason why the ECtHR recognizes an interference with the applicant’s 
private life, indeed, is mainly due to the fact that  
 
no evidence has been put before the Court to indicate that there was any actual likelihood 
of the contents of the tapes being rendered public, deliberately or inadvertently. In particu-
lar, the applicant's conviction related not to any offence involving the making or distribution 
of the tapes, but solely to the acts themselves. The Court finds it most unlikely that the ap-
plicant, who had gone to some lengths not to reveal his sexual orientation, and who has re-
peated his desire for anonymity before the Court, would knowingly be involved in any such 
publication. (Ivi, § 25) 
 
Had the applicant inadvertently rendered the videos public, or had he openly lived his homo-
sexuality, it’s possible to suppose that the ECtHR would have granted national authorities a 
greater margin of appreciation. The ECtHR’s evaluation of the applicant’s desire for privacy 
might be read from two different perspectives; if stressing the ECtHR’s concern for the act to 
remain private and the emphasis placed by the judges on the desire of anonymity, the ECtHR 
reasoning might be considered as “reproduc[ing] the social relations of the closet” (Johnson 
2014, 105). From this perspective, the applicant’s refusal to reveal his sexual orientation would 
be positively considered by the ECtHR, as if the sincerity of the applicant was proven, and at-
tested that there would be something wrong in living one’s own sexuality out.  
From a different perspective, it might be contended that the ECtHR had to weigh up the indi-
vidual’s desire for privacy as inherent to his right to respect for his private life. The quoted pas-
sage, hence, would not express any bias against the applicant, but it would reiterate that the in-
dividual private realm has to be greatly evaluated as a garrison against public interference and 
that, within its borders, everyone should be entitled to the human right to engage in whatever 
consensual, adult, and non-violent sexual activity.  
Effectively, had the ECtHR endorsed a prejudiced conception, it would have applied the same 
reasoning as Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown, or it would have not established a comparison be-
tween the case of Mr. A.D.T. and the case of Mr. Dudgeon.  
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In contrast with such a view, the ECtHR’s wording only takes into account the objective proba-
bility if the videotapes were rendered public, ignoring the subjective disposition of the applicant 
and suggesting a begrudging approach to his personal case.  
Yet, the ECtHR was reviewing the applicant’s intentions not to define the desirability of the acts 
he had performed, but to assess whether he had effectively committed homosexual acts which 
could be considered public under the relevant UK legislation; as a consequence, any specula-
tion over the ECtHR’s contempt against Mr. A.D.T. results would be difficult to prove. 
What instead is quite clear, is the restricted definition of private realm endorsed by the ECtHR, 
who challenged the assumption that Mr A.D.T. had breached the requisites under the Sexual 
Offences Act, but who did not discuss the appropriateness of similar criminal laws, enforcing a 
meaning of privacy which resembled that of invisibility.  
Effectively, as to the likelihood that the videotapes were rendered public, the Court only con-
sidered the objective probability of such an event, while completely ignoring subjective inten-
tions. The definition of private collapses over that of invisibility: according to the quoted reason-
ing of the ECtHR, homosexuals are entitled to claim protection under the Convention, only in-
sofar as they do not give any hint of the acts they perform to the public. 
When referred to heterosexual behaviour, the notion of privacy can be stretched, to some ex-
tent, into the public sphere; when addressing homosexuality, the borders are fixed: private life 
comprises all consensual, adult, same-sex acts performed in a way to be unintelligible to anyone 
not directly involved in those activities. 
In conclusion, it’s interesting to note that the ECtHR never referred to the fact that UK laws did 
not provide criminal sanctions for comparable heterosexual acts, just imposing a fine for mani-
festly public sexual acts. It’s true that the applicant had not claimed a breach of the principle of 
discrimination, Article 14, but when reasoning with the meaning of private life, the Court could 
have however attached some legal relevance to this differentiated treatment.  
The lack of a similar comparison recalls the perspective adopted by Dudgeon, Norris and Mod-
inos: the Court gradually shaped the legal category of homosexuality and gradually defines the 
rights which can be legitimately claimed, reinforcing a strict binary between private and public. 
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4.2.4 Conclusive Remarks 
 
Several socio-legal features emerge throughout the three issues addressed. 
Reappraising the image of the judicial arena as a site where litigants pursue their interests 
(Friedman 1975, 170), and where social inputs are formalized into legal outputs, I compare the 
set of demands put forward with the consequent answer given by ECHR institutions.  
Dudgeon claimed against the criminalization of homosexuality, by framing criminal laws against 
male same-sex acts as in violation of his right to private life, as discriminatory in respect to het-
erosexuals and lesbians, and as imposing an unjustified higher age of consent. He contended 
that homosexuality was a feature worthy of protection under Article 14 of the ECHR, since it 
fell within the notion of ‘sex’, and he extensively argued against the very legitimacy of any prose-
cution against same-sex acts. Mr. Dudgeon read UK laws as the product of secular prejudice 
against homosexuals, and his complaint pursued judicial law-making, beside law-declaring. Nor-
ris and Modinos shared this intention, but, at the same time, they did not frame their com-
plaints under the principle of non-discrimination anymore, since the ECtHR had previously 
ruled that gay men and heterosexuals/lesbians were not in a relevant comparable situation. 
Therefore, their demands aimed at reinforcing, enlarging, and grounding the principle whereby 
private life also protected the homosexual private realm. 
As for the age of consent, I have already outlined that Sutherland fully stands within a plan of 
strategic litigation pursued by the British lgbt movement in order to persuade political actors to 
lower the threshold to 16 years. The ‘Austrian cases’ present a stronger desire for redress, 
though they also can be read as promoting retroactive measures, namely the annulment of crim-
inal records of gay men who had had relations with boys aged between 16-18. 
Both Laskey and A.D.T. tried to stretch the breadth of private life, including the notion of a 
consenting victim, and requiring that the law did not interfere with the number of partners in-
volved. 
Turning to the judicial outputs, the interpretation of the ECtHR has focused on Article 8 and 
Article 14, clarifying which are the boundaries of homosexual freedom secure by the ECHR. 
Article 8, under the notion of private life, secures the human right to engage in homosexual ac-
tivities, as long as they are consensual, adult, and private. Public authorities are entitled to inter-
fere with lgbt sexual freedom, but throughout the mentioned cases the Court has clarified a 
number of strict criteria, which ultimately limit national discretion. Firstly, homosexuality can be 
restricted on the grounds of protecting morals, public health, and the rights of others, but do-
mestic authorities must demonstrate that it was not possible to achieve the same result with al-
ternative measures, that a pressing social need existed, and that the means adopted did not im-
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pose disproportionate interference. Moreover, the ECtHR can’t accept as legitimate laws which 
merely reflect moral disapproval, or which restrict one’s freedom on the grounds of the hypo-
thetical and uncertain harms he may cause to public health. Neither national laws are allowed to 
impose a different age of consent, nor are they enabled to restrict the number of partners.  
Hence, the margin left to Coe members in prosecuting homosexuality is extremely reduced, 
and the possibility to charge someone because of his sadomasochist encounters is related to the 
risk of harm caused to the other person or persons involved, not to the moral judgment of the 
act itself.  
The ECtHR has not really addressed Article 14, and the most relevant element concerned pre-
cisely what the Court did not assess. In judgments dealing with the first and the third cluster, the 
Court argued that it was not relevant to determine whether homosexuality fell into the notion of 
‘sex’ or ‘other status’, secured by Article 14; even when reviewing provisions on the age of con-
sent, on one hand, the Court upheld that heterosexual and homosexual young people are in a 
relevant comparable situation, but, on the other, such a statement was the result of a careful re-
view of international medical and scientific sources, which proved, beyond any reasonable 
doubt, that gays and heterosexuals aged between 16 and 18 were in an analogous mental condi-
tion. It, thus, seems that the comparison between different sexual orientations stood more as 
the result of a substantial reasoning, rather than the initial point of judicial reasoning. In L. and 
V. this perspective is mitigated by the recognition that the eventual higher age of consent re-
quired for homosexual activities embodies a bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a 
homosexual minority, thus amounting to a breach of the Convention. 
The demand of judicial law-making emerges from all cases considered, whether more or less 
prominent, and it’s interesting to evaluate how the ECtHR balanced its role of law-declaring 
with such pressures.  
Formally, the Court has adhered to the casuistic approach along all judgments analyzed; in 
Dudgeon judges remember that the ECtHR was not concerned with any general value-
judgment, (Dudgeon, § 54), and in A.D.T. they openly reject any abstract evaluation (Ivi, § 36). 
Expressions like “the present case” or “under these circumstances” emphasize the empirical 
approach of the Court, implying, thus, a present-oriented gaze and a law-declaring approach. 
The ECtHR has not ignored the applicants’ demand of law making, on the contrary scattering 
statements of primary and general relevance which have oriented, and still orient, the ECtHR 
perspective on alike issues. 
A number of arguments verify this assumption: in Dudgeon the ECtHR offers a comment im-
pacting on the wide relationship between morals and the law, denying the fact that legislation 
can be used to indicate the approval or disapproval of harmless behaviour (Dudgeon, § 62). 
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The Court also rejects the so-called argument of disgust, on the grounds of its inherent unac-
ceptability, setting an essential interpretive yardstick also for future law cases. According to the 
majority, indeed, the disturbance caused by the commission from others of private homosexual 
acts cannot, on its own, warrant the application of penal sanctions (Ivi, § 60). Furthermore, by 
comparing Dudgeon with L. and V. it’s possible to note how the attitude towards homosexuality 
changed between 1980 and 2003; in the former, the ECtHR plainly admits the necessity to con-
trol consensual homosexual conduct, implying a biased attitude, while in L. and V., the Court 
upholds a parallelism between sexual orientation and other features secured and positively 
evaluated by Article 14.  
The Court performs a law-making role, and it clarifies the interpretation of the ECHR, by spec-
ifying the standards to adopt when dealing with homosexuality, public morals, and age of con-
sent.  
Both in its adjudicatory and creative role, the Court’s reasoning line displays several features 
which enable the researcher to study ECtHR internal legal culture. Most notably, it is possible 
to uncover the ECtHR initial values and premises, as well as understanding structural and insti-
tutional determinants.  
I have already extensively stressed the peculiar outputs of each judgment, according to the con-
cepts of heteronormativity, dilemma of differences, and the binary public/private, emphasizing 
hence that extra-legal assumptions of the Court as far as sexual orientation is concerned play an 
essential role. 
The ECtHR shapes the homosexual subject as a personage with innate homosexual tendency, 
who discretely lives his sexuality, and whose moral status, is at first, quite uncertain (Dudgeon, § 
61). Furthermore, it can be argued that this discourse has been, and often continues to be, the 
basis on which public authorities in contracting states justify the mechanisms of social control 
designed to suppress the leakage of homosexuality into the public sphere. In any event, from 
Dudgeon onwards, the Court does not label him as criminally deviant anymore, rather assum-
ing heterosexuality to be the normal sexual drive. The EComHR, indeed, in Surtherland ap-
pears concerned about whether sexual orientation is already fixed in adolescents, as to suggest 
that same-sex acts imply tolerance only if they do not threaten to ‘corrupt’ young boys into ho-
mosexuality. Both the UK Policy Advisor Committee and the BPA opinions are quoted pre-
cisely to attest that “most researchers now believe that sexual orientation [is] usually established 
before the age of puberty in both boys and girls (Ivi, § 58). The Commission suggests that since 
at a certain age sexual orientation is already decided, a higher age of consent would not bring 
any public benefit. Hence, the reasoning is not moulded by an equal evaluation of heterosexual-
ity and homosexuality, for had the Commission shared this view, it would have considered the 
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very existence of legal separate regimes as being problematic, regardless of any consideration of 
the innateness of gay tendencies. 
In L and V. the ECtHR recalls the imperative to protect minorities from majoritarian prejudice, 
and it modifies its previous standpoint by referring to the principle of equality. Nonetheless, the 
emergence of rights to sexual freedom requires demonstrating that the lowering of the age of 
consent would not have detrimental effects, such a requirement has never occurred in relation 
to heterosexual consent.  
How can the reasoning of the Court be filtered through the dilemma of differences? The Court 
overturns the EComHR heteronormative approach, however endorsing the frame of tolerance, 
but not that of respect. The Court, indeed, avoids recognizing the equivalent value of hetero-
sexuals and homosexuals, rather progressively recognizing those rights whose foundations 
proved convincing to lgbt people. 
In conclusion, if the previous EComHR approach to homosexuality had considered the society 
as a garrison, to defend from moral deviations that would otherwise dismantle or criticize the 
status quo, the ECtHR now distances itself from such a normative reading of morals, imple-
menting the ideal of a pluralist, tolerant, and broadminded Europe.  
Focusing on internal disagreement, I addressed, in respect to each section, the perspective and 
the arguments claimed by dissenting and concurring judges; in more general terms, I propose 
two considerations: firstly, internal divisions are neither wide nor reiterated in time. Secondly, 
dissenting opinions display a multifaceted range of arguments, fluctuating between disagreement 
concerning extra-legal elements, namely moral, political or social values attached to the facts at 
stake, and over the method of how to interpret the Convention, to measure the consensus, or to 
evaluate the margin of appreciation.  
Most heated divisions occur in Dudgeon, Norris, and Sutherland, while in Modinos and in the 
‘Austrian cases’ either final decisions are unanimity, or separate opinions are on strictly proce-
dural terms and they are not qualitatively representative. Also in Laskey and A.D.T. the Court’s 
judgment does not record separate opinions. 
A twofold argument can explain this evidence: on one hand, Dudgeon and Sutherland strongly 
innovate the interpretation of the ECHR and, as such, they offer more room for disagreement; 
on the other, it’s appropriate to highlight that Laskey and A.D.T. occurred in 1998 and 2000, 
while the Austrian cases took place between 2003 and 2014, almost twenty years later than 
Dudgeon. The social and moral attitude of homosexuality had evolved, to the extent that pri-
vate sexual freedom was no longer debated, at least in Coe Countries; as a consequence, the 
ECtHR have probably mirrored such a change, also on the grounds of an internal changed per-
spective on the meaning of private life. In Norris, temporally contiguous to Dudgeon, the dis-
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senting opinion gathered two judges that had already dissented in Dudgeon; hence this case can 
be treated as the extension of the previous judgment.  
In Laskey, A.D.T., and L. and V. the Court adopted decisive wording, without recalling the 
general necessity to control same-sex behaviour, and plainly quoting Dudgeon as the established 
cornerstone of the ECtHR jurisprudence on the matter. 
It has to be acknowledged that the EComHR and the ECtHR interpreted Article 8, so as to in-
clude the human right to engage in same-sex acts, when the overwhelming majority of Coe 
members did not prosecute gay acts anymore; analogously, the Court endorsed an equal age of 
consent when the majority of Coe States had already quashed discriminatory laws, and it de-
clared the interference set out in A.D.T. as illegitimate in a context where such provisions did 
not openly occur. In conclusion, as far as Dudgeon innovated the interpretation of the ECtHR, 
I have read all judgments previously analyzed not as the result of a peculiarly activist and inno-
vative interpretation, but as the ratification of an established trend. 
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4.3. The Right not to be Subject to Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
 
This cluster addresses complaints where applicants have claimed either that they had been vio-
lated of their right to physical and psychological safety because of their homosexuality, or that 
they were facing the risk of suffering from treatment contrary to Article 3, if deported to their 
homeland. 
The first part of the paragraph focuses on cases in which the applicants were lawfully deprived 
of their personal freedom, and were either confined in prison or detained in centres of identifi-
cation. The actions contested inhered to rape, bodily assaults, and threats to the applicants’ safe-
ty, and the connection with the concept of personal security is quite plain.  
In the second part, I focus on cases challenging national refusal to grant refugee status to lgbt 
applicants, on the grounds of reasons already explained in paragraph 4.1. 
Unlike the applications against immigration policies for purposes of family reunification, which 
alleged a differentiated treatment between heterosexual and homosexual immigrants, here the 
core issue does not directly call for any comparison, rather claiming that the Court should ex-
pand its jurisprudence on refugees to consider homosexuality a weighty ground to be protected 
under the ECHR. 
In the first cluster, there are three principal cases investigated: Stasi v France, n.25001/07, 
Zontul v Greece, n.12294/07, and X v Turkey, n.24626/09; even though homosexuals have 
been claiming the violation of Article 3 since 1955, by arguing against their imprisonment, phys-
ical abuse whilst in confinement, and forms of verbal abuse in various social contexts, the 
Commission never deemed such complaints admissible. 
The ECtHR delivered these judgments between 2011 and 2012; hence, it’s possible to treat 
them as contemporary and to consider eventual differences as the outcome of a changed judi-
cial evaluation of the duties imposed on the respondent government, rather than as the conse-
quence of a temporal change in judicial attitude.  
At the time of the alleged breaches, Mr. Stasi and Mr. X were serving a prison sentence, while 
Mr. Zontul was detained in a Greek centre for illegal immigrants.  
Abuse, violence, and the infringement of human rights often mark the routine of prisons, cen-
ters of detention, and other structures where personal freedom is restricted, and where a large 
number of people are forced to stay in limited areas, as many sociological researches demon-
strate (Lockwood 1980; Man and Cronan 2002; Lahm 2008).  
The victims are not necessarily only lgbt people; on the contrary, the categories most at risk are 
those who infringe the conventional criminal code of honour, such as sexual offenders, paedo-
philes, and even murderers of women or children (Knowles 2002; Phillips 2001). It’s indisput-
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able, however, that gay men are exposed to the risk of bodily assaults when in prison, especially 
when forced to deal with inmates or policemen with homophobic feelings. According to the 
trivial prejudice spread in many prisons, the suspect of being homosexual is the worst insult to a 
man’s virility, and the punitive rape by other men not only aims at physically harming the other, 
but also at annulling his reputation, his dignity and his ‘maleness’. Hence, gay prisoners are of-
ten equated to subjects who do not deserve respect, who can be harassed for other’s pleasure, 
and who constantly try to seduce their heterosexual fellows (Hensley 2000; Kunzel 2002).  
Violence and rape may be perpetrated by other detainees, by policemen, or other representa-
tives of public institutions, and they can be targeted either at abusing someone because of his 
sexual orientation or at ‘punishing’ someone, regardless of his eventual homosexuality. 
I will focus on the former, only when the applicants openly claim protection under the ECHR 
because of their homosexuality, and they encourage judges to determine how to protect minori-
ties in regimes of restricted personal liberty. 
In Stasi v France and X v Turkey the applicants denounced that they had been threatened and 
abused by other inmates, and they claimed a violation of the ECHR on the grounds that prison 
administration had failed to properly manage the situation, for instance by further restricting the 
liberty of lgbt detainees and not that of those who had harassed them. 
Mr. Stasi had informed the director of Villefranche-sur-Saone prison that he had been the vic-
tim of acts of rape during his previous period of detention. He was thus placed alone in a cell 
on a corridor of the prison reserved for vulnerable prisoners.  
Nevertheless, between February and March 2007, the applicant was forced to share the cell with 
P., who “l’aurait frappé, brûlé entre le pouce et l’index, forcé à porter une étoile rose et aurait 
mangé ses repas. Il l’aurait également forcé à rester dans la cellule pour cacher les traces des 
coups” (Ivi, § 13). After Mr. Stasi reported these events and after he showed the intention of 
committing suicide, he was medically treated, his case was transmitted to social services, and he 
also stayed in a psychiatric hospital for seven days. When returned to prison, Mr Stasi was the 
victim of other acts, and medical certificates were issued attesting bruising. He was pushed down 
the stairs by an unidentified inmate and he injured his right leg; in 2008 a prisoner stubbed a 
cigarette under his left eye, and another inmate assaulted him in the shower.  
In response, the director “décida de le changer de cellule et de mettre en place un suivi particu-
lier, en le faisant accompagner par un surveillant dans ses déplacements et en lui permettant 
d’accéder seul aux douches.” (Ivi, § 21). On the day of his release he was admitted to the psy-
chiatric hospital of Saint-Cyr au Mont d’Or, when he remained until 14 January 2009. Relying 
on Article 3, Mr Stasi alleged that he had been the victim of ill-treatment by other inmates, dur-
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ing his two periods of imprisonment, and he alleged that the authorities had not taken the nec-
essary measures to ensure his protection and to safeguard his human rights. 
Also Mr. X was put into isolation because of the intimidation he had been suffering from other 
heterosexual inmates. He was subjected, however, to an even stricter regime than that provided 
for criminals convicted of sexual assaults, murderer or paedophilia: 
 
The applicant stated that the cell in which he had been placed measured 7 m², with living 
space of no more than half that. It had a bed and toilets, but no washbasin, was very poorly 
lit and very dirty and rat-infested. The […] ten other cells of the same type […] were intend-
ed for solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure or for inmates accused of paedophilia 
or rape. After he had been put in an individual cell on 5 February 2009, the applicant was 
deprived of any contact with other inmates and any social activity. He had not been permit-
ted any outdoor exercise and had been allowed out of his cell only to see his lawyer or at-
tend hearings held approximately once per month. (X v Turkey, § 10) 
 
After three months of such a regime, Mr. X started to suffer from psychiatric problems and he 
requested equal treatment like the other inmates. Both internal administration and domestic 
Courts dismissed his request; another homosexual detainee was put into the applicant’s cell for 
four months, up to December 2009, but then, Mr. X was forced again into confinement until 
February 2010, when he finally obtained a transfer to another prison and to be placed in a 
standard cell, with three other inmates where he was given the same rights as the other prison-
ers. According to his lawyer, Mr. X still suffered from depression and insomnia, on the account 
of his previous solitary confinement. Also Mr. X claimed a breach of Article 3, denouncing that 
“he had been placed in an individual cell for more than thirteen months. He also alleged that 
there had been no legal basis for placing him in a small individual cell, that he had been de-
tained twenty-four hours per day, deprived of any contact with other inmates and not allowed 
any outdoor exercise” (Ivi, § 29).  
Stasi and X raised the issue of which measures should Coe parties adopt in order to prevent the 
harassment of vulnerable prisoners, and what degree of discretion they would enjoy in deciding 
the most appropriate measures. Consequently, the main responsibility of the public authorities, 
if any, lied in the absence of an adequate response.  
In Zontul, however, the applicant reported to have been raped by a coastguard responsible for 
his supervision, and also pointed out the inadequacy of redressing afforded by the State. Mr. 
Zontul was a Turkish national who, in 2001, was intercepted by the Greek coastguard, while 
sailing to Italy with other illegal immigrants, and he was escorted to a port on the island of 
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Crete. Besides forcing the applicant and the other immigrants to live in inhuman living condi-
tions, two coastguards repeatedly threatened him, and one also raped him with a truncheon. 
Although he reported such violence, and although the command officer opened an inquiry, the 
final sentence was only delivered in 2006, and the rapist was condemned to pay a fine of 792 
euros. 
The ECtHR did not consider the French authorities in breach of the ECHR and it dismissed 
Mr. Stasi’s request; on the contrary, it found a violation of Article 3 in both Zontul and X.  
The element which could explain the different approach taken by the ECtHR refers to the role 
of national authorities and to the obligations which bind them to prevent ill-treatment. In Stasi 
the Court emphasized that, given the absolute character of Article 3, national authorities were 
required to adopt direct and indirect measures targeted at ensuring the dignity of anyone under 
their jurisdiction: “la nature du droit protégé par l’article 3, il suffit à un requérant de montrer 
que les autorités n’ont pas fait tout ce que l’on pouvait raisonnablement attendre d’elles pour 
empêcher la matérialisation d’un risque certain et immédiat pour son intégrité physique, dont 
elles avaient ou auraient dû avoir connaissance. Il s’agit là d’une question dont la réponse dé-
pend de l’ensemble des circonstances de l’affaire en question.” (Ivi, § 79). 
The ECtHR still held the view that “les autorités pénitentiaires ont pris toutes les mesures né-
cessaires pour le protéger” (Ivi, § 102), and that they had promptly considered Stasi’s com-
plaints. Moreover, taking into account the proceeding against Stasi’s former inmate P., the 
Court - five votes to two- concluded that “le droit interne assurait au requérant une protection 
effective et suffisant contre les atteintes à son intégrité physique” (Ibidem).  
A possible critical reading of this judgment initiates from the dissenting opinion jointly delivered 
by two judges. They contend that French authorities had not considered the peculiar fragile na-
ture of Mr. Stasi, as a detainee and as a gay man, and that they had not taken all possible 
measures to prevent him from undergoing violent acts, at least until the director decided to sur-
vey him even when going to the showers. Prison authorities should be required not only to deal 
with or to react to harm inflicted on the applicant, but also to dismantle the climate of hostility 
and silence which surrounded Mr. Stasi. Dissenting judges acknowledged that “les autorités ont 
pris certaines mesures pour protéger le requérant ; leur réaction a inclus certaines mesures pré-
ventives limitées dans le temps […], des mesures d’investigations […] et, du moins pendant un 
certain temps, le suivi médical régulier du requérant et un compte-rendu quotidien à cet égard 
[…]. La tendance suicidaire de l’intéressé n’a pas été ignorée […]” (Stasi, di. op. judge Spiel-
mann, judge Nussberger). 
 256	  
The same authorities, however, had mostly passively reacted to Mr. Stasi affirmations, without 
showing any active initiative to prevent such abuse, and, therefore, they lacked the “[volonté] du 
savoir” (Ibidem) and they did not challenge the “loi du silence” among the detainees.  
Therefore, such criticism contended that the French institutions had not really considered the 
other’s perspective, nor had they given credit to the fact that gay men were notably exposed to 
greater risks. On the contrary, they applied “une approche trop standardisée en attendant de la 
part du requérant qu’il se plaigne à chaque fois qu’il subissait des mauvais traitements” (Ibi-
dem).  
In this judgment the ECtHR did not convey a heteronormative approach; as previously fleshed 
out, during the 1960s the EComHR had dismissed some applications lodged by German and 
Austrian citizens against the regime of their detention, by arguing that no right could be granted 
on the grounds of sexual orientation, that the violence they alleged to have experienced did not 
reach the minimum threshold of seriousness, and that national authorities were entitled to de-
cide how to comply with prison arrangements. In Stasi’s case, however, the Court admits the se-
verity of the harm suffered by the applicant, and also frames it as dire enough to fall into the 
ambit of Article 3. Had Court adopted an openly restrained and biased approach, it would have 
contended that the applicant could have prevented such negative reactions, by simply conceal-
ing his sexual orientation. 
In light of these considerations, the ECtHR mainly suggests a perspective shaped by a loose de-
piction of obligations imposed on the respondent government; while dissenting judges imply 
that, precisely because of the core value of Article 3, domestic actors are required to do any-
thing possible and necessary, the majority draws a distinction between essential actions, which if 
not implemented give rise to a breach of the ECHR and those which, instead, are left to nation-
al discretion.  
Under this framing, in X , the Turkish government was found in breach of the ECHR because 
it failed to establish minimum safeguards against the infringement of both Article 3 and Article 
3 taken in conjunction with Article 14. Most notably, the ECtHR stressed that when the appli-
cant had turned to national judges, expressively requesting equal treatment like other inmates by 
means of measures capable of protecting him from bodily harm, the post-sentencing judge had 
simply observed that the prison authorities had a discretionary power to decide such matters. 
Given that sexual orientation impacted on “intimate and vulnerable sphere of an individual’s 
private life”, the Court held the opinion that the ECHR imposed on the domestic authorities 
the duty to “take all possible measures to determine whether or not a discriminatory attitude 
played a role in adopting the measure totally excluding the applicant from prison life” (Ivi, § 
55).  
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Homosexuality was, hence, positively evaluated, and competent authorities were considered to 
be under the obligation to ensure the protection of the lgbt prisoners’ human rights without 
causing them perhaps more serious harm, and they had not to impose the burden of prejudice 
on the victims 
In Zontul the ECtHR reiterated this approach, endorsing arguments of general relevance, by 
framing even a single act of rape as torture, and not just as mere ill-treatment. 
The Court implied that both the redress and the effort to prevent such acts must be effective. 
Quite predictably, the Greek government did not defend the actions of the coastguard, while it 
contested that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of torture, also suggesting that the 
domestic judicial system had provided adequate satisfaction to Mr. Zontul, and stating that they 
had not impeded the applicant from being actively involved in the proceedings. The ECtHR, 
however, reviewed both the leniency of the penalty imposed on the rapist and the procedural 
aspects of trials in stark violation of Article 3. 
Moreover, the ECtHR argued that, even if not reiterated, the rape denounced by Mr. Zontul 
amounted to an act of torture, worsened by the fact that an official of the State had perpetrated 
it. The wording of the judgment is clear and extremely harsh on Greek authorities. 
In respect to lgbt human rights in the contexts of deprivation of personal freedom, the ECtHR 
endorses a unbiased perspective, framing homosexuality as an essential individual feature, 
which can’t be suppressed, and managing to critically review majoritarian assumptions. 
Also the definition of torture is rather enlarged, and to this scope the ECtHR recalls the UN 
Convention against torture and other inhuman and degrading treatments135, and the decisions of 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia Criminal International Courts136. Both the nature of the acts which can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Under Article 1 of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment “the term torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed 
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. This article 
is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain 
provisions of wider application”. 
136 Most notably, in Zontul the ECtHR quotes paragraph 150 of Kunarac, IT-96-23, which states “The 
Appeals Chamber holds that the assumption of the Appellants that suffering must be visible, even long 
after the commission of the crimes in question, is erroneous. Generally speaking, some acts establish per 
se the suffering of those upon whom they were inflicted. Rape is obviously such an act. The Trial 
Chamber could only conclude that such suffering occurred even without a medical certificate. Sexual vi-
olence necessarily gives rise to severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, and in this way justi-
fies its characterization as an act of torture”, and paragraph 597 of Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, which reads 
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give rise to a breach of Article 3, and the concrete duties of public authorities are drawn from 
other legal texts, thus stating a clear path of duties and obligations. 
If considering the context when these three judgments were delivered, the qualification of rape 
as torture is not really surprising, since by 2011 the most important sources of international law 
and human rights law justified a theoretical and legal frame targeted at condemning and actively 
preventing torture and degrading treatment or punishments. The infamous mass rapes and kill-
ings during the civil wars of Rwanda and Yugoslavia had made the international community 
aware of the importance of enlarging the conventional definition of torture, so to accord more 
relevance to the power imbalance which may subsist between the victim and her executioner.  
Also the statement according to which the Court is entitled to find a State in violation of Article 
3, even though such a violation has been perpetrated by a public official by his own initiative, 
fits to the established international judicial pattern. If, indeed, national authorities do not ade-
quately redress the victim, they behave as if they endorsed the ill-treatment, or underestimated 
it. 
On the contrary, if compared to the EComHR decisions of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the 
approach of the Court in X v Turkey is quite innovative for the first time in history, for it up-
holds a complaint related to sexual orientation under Article 3 of the ECHR.  
The ECtHR jurisprudence appears more problematic and begrudging in respect to lgbt immi-
grants claiming refugee status. It has to be acknowledged that it’s difficult to ascertain whether 
infringements of human rights occurred or whether there is a concrete risk for their breach in 
politically turmoiled countries, ravaged by war, or in socio-legal systems where hostility against 
lgbt subjects is mostly conveyed by informal practices. Moreover, the ECtHR does not guaran-
tee the specific right to obtain the status of refugee, and domestic immigration policies are tradi-
tionally regarded as one of the main bastions of national sovereignty. As the ECtHR recalls,  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“the Chamber considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of 
rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts. The Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment does not catalogue specif-
ic acts in its definition of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual framework of state sanctioned vio-
lence. This approach is more useful in international law. Like torture, rape is a used for such purposes 
as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control, destruction of a person. 
Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in 
official capacity”. Kunarac and Akayesu judgments can accessed at this  ad-
dresshttp://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide 
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The expulsion by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence 
engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have 
been shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being 
subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. In such a case, Article 3 of the Convention im-
plies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country (M.E. v Sweden, § 
71). 
 
Given the core significance of individual integrity, and considering that the Court has included 
sexual orientation as a characteristic worthy of protecting under the ECHR, one may think that, 
when the applicants’ submissions are likely to be plausible, the Court will adopt the principle of 
precaution in favour of potential victims. As extensively shown hereinafter, the ECtHR has, in-
stead, consistently applied the principle of precaution to protect the autonomy of Contracting 
Parties in controlling their borders. 
Nine complaints were filed between 2003 and 2015; four have been struck out whereas the oth-
er five have been deemed either inadmissible or the Court has not found any violation. As for 
the formers, in three cases the Court acknowledged that the applicants had been guaranteed a 
residence permit while the trial was still pending (Sobhani v Sweden; A.E. v Finland; A.S.B v 
Netherlands), while in the last one, the applicant interrupted communications with her lawyers 
and with the Court (D.B.N. v UK). However, if in A.S.B v Netherlands, n. 4854/12, and Sob-
hani v Sweden, (dec) 32999/96, the respondent authorities recognized a permanent residence 
permit, the ECtHR approach in A.E. v Finland, n. 30953/11, is more problematic, for the Finn-
ish government granted a permit for a period of one year, with the possibility of renewal; de-
spite the risk of future deportation, the ECtHR held that the absence of an imminent risk 
caused the decadence of the case. In light of the similarity between the arguments put forward 
by Mr. A.E. and those put forward in cases where the ECtHR delivered the final judgment, I 
thus consider A.E. joint with F. v UK, I.I.N v Netherlands, M.K.N. v Sweden, M.E. v Sweden.  
All lgbt migrants had illegally entered European borders, they had submitted their homosexuali-
ty as a relevant reason for fleeing their homeland, but they had been refused either the status of 
refugee or a permanent residence permit. 
Under the theoretical frame I outlined in chapter II, the judicial approach appears flawed, in 
respect to the international human rights law, controversial, most notably on the private/public 
distinction, and problematic, as concerns the normative image of homosexuality.  
Firstly, the Court confronts with the complicate, sometimes contradictory, facts alleged by the 
applicants according to a homonormative and simplified perception of reality. By this, I refer to 
both the tendency of the judges to implicitly refer to a sexual and personal model to which the 
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applicant has to conform, and to their indifference, if not misjudgement, to complexities and 
nuanced conditions which mark concrete life. Indeed, the Court seems not to interpret the 
Convention so as to shape the meaning of theoretical rules on practical reality, but rather to re-
quire the applicants to demonstrate a linear path of life, fitting with clear-cut legal distinctions. 
Consider for instance, the story of Mr. M.K.N.: he was an Iraqi, married to a woman and with 
two children. He arrived in Sweden in 2008, and applied for asylum two days later, submitting 
that he had been persecuted due to his Christian beliefs and due to the fact that he was well-off 
as he was the part-owner of a workshop. After the Swedish Migration Board rejected his re-
quest, Mr. M.K.N. appealed, adding that, “after his departure from Iraq, the Mujahedin had 
found out that he had had a homosexual relationship and that, as a consequence, his partner 
had been stoned to death” (M.K.N., § 7). The Mujahedin had also been looking for the appli-
cant in 2009 due to this relationship; nevertheless, “he had not revealed this information earlier 
as he had not been aware that homosexual relationships were accepted in Sweden. Despite this 
relationship, his intention was to continue living with his wife” (Ivi, § 7). The Court, on one 
hand, admitted to being aware of the very difficult situation for real or perceived homosexuals 
in Iraq, but, on the other, it counterbalanced this evidence by commenting that he “has ex-
pressed the intention of living with his wife and children” (Ibidem). Also the silence of Mr. 
M.KN. regarding his homosexual relationship until his second hearing with Swedish authorities, 
was negatively considered by the Court, which agreed “with the Migration Court that the appli-
cant did not give a reasonable explanation for the delay in making this claim in the domestic 
proceedings” (Ibidem).  
In conclusion, the Court considered that the applicant’s claim concerning his homosexual rela-
tionship was not credible. I do not dispute flawed aspects in M.K.N. submissions, but I suggest 
that the Court filtered the applicant’s case through a normative image of how a homosexual 
person should behave in order to obtain ECtHR credibility. The Court recalls the intention of 
Mr. M.K.N. to live with his wife and his delay in reporting his condition in a diminishing way; 
hence even if the applicant grew in a legal and social hostile environment against homosexuals, 
the ECtHR didn’t even reckon that he might effectively be ashamed of declaring his relation-
ship. Moreover, the intention of M.K.N. not to divorce his wife was evaluated as a weighty 
grounds to uphold the decision of the Swedish authorities, as if he could erase his past experi-
ence without facing possible prosecutions; the applicant, however, did not allege risking ill-
treatment and death because he wanted to live openly as a homosexual, but he denounced he 
had been already prosecuted because of his homosexual relationship and contended that, if de-
ported, the Mujahedin would still search for him. Hence, to be credible Mr. M.K.N. should 
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have conformed to the Western model of homosexuality, displaying a linear homosexual ten-
dency and waiving it as essential to his personal identity. 
The idea of coherent and seamless homosexuality also emerges in M.E. v Sweden, both in 
Chamber and Great Chamber judgments. The applicant was a Libyan citizen and he had en-
tered Sweden in 2010, applying for asylum after three days. At first, he submitted that he had 
worked as a soldier and had smuggled illegal weapons for local clans; after national authorities 
arrested and tortured him, he revealed the names of clans involved and, finally, managed to es-
cape from prison. If deported to Libya, he alleged risking at least ten years’ imprisonment for 
his involvement in weapons trafficking. He would further risk being killed by the clans since he 
had revealed their names under torture. As the ECtHR recalls, “the Migration Board’s officer 
asked whether the applicant had other grounds for requesting asylum, to which the applicant 
replied no”, after a few months, however, he wished to add to his grounds for asylum that he 
was homosexual and had a relationship with N., a Libyan transsexual who lived in Sweden and 
had a permanent residence permit. Mr. M.E. justified his initial position affirming that “he had 
been ‘normal’ before and that it was N. he had become interested in” (Ivi, § 16). They had also 
married in late 2010 but, nevertheless, the Swedish authorities refused to give him the status of 
refugee and stated that he could apply for family reunion only once having returned to Libya. 
Consequently, he feared that if returned to Libya, it would become known that he was married 
to a man and he would risk persecution and ill-treatment.  
Effectively, Mr. M.E. shifted from alleging to Swedish authorities that he had never had homo-
sexual contacts in Libya, to reporting to the ECtHR that he had been living as a homosexual in 
Libya and that he had suffered two arrests by the moral police; although this change could well 
undermine his credibility, the ECtHR upheld the initial statement of Mr. M.E., whereby he was 
normal and had heterosexual desires, to suggest that he completely lacked credibility.  
To my analysis, the outcome itself is not necessary to be striking, but the reasoning behind it: 
the ECtHR did not even consider the influence of cultural environment. In non-Western cul-
tures homosexual behaviour may be spread, but those who engage in it do not necessarily de-
fine themselves as being homosexual. Therefore, even if aware of his tendencies, Mr. M.E. 
could have decided not to reveal them immediately to the Swedish authorities either because he 
did not consider them as being relevant or because he still did not think of himself as a gay 
man. In the ECtHR reasoning there are not hints suggesting that a similar perspective has been 
considered; this reluctance could be framed as recalling the notion of homonormativity. The 
ECtHR does not endorse separation between heterosexuality and homosexuality, but it requires 
a linear path, thus imposing and disciplining the normative shaping of the homosexual image.  
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Moreover, whilst the ECtHR problematically adheres to an innatist conception of homosexuali-
ty, reinforcing the clear distinction between heterosexuals and gay people and implying that the 
two categories do not present blurred borders, it also legitimizes a controversial and quite con-
tradictory position on the private/public sphere. 
The previously mentioned M.E. case offers a reasoning shaped precisely by the model of the 
closet, denying that the applicant could face prosecution once deported to Libya, while waiting 
for family reunification; even though Mr. M.E. should hide his sexuality while waiting for the 
approval of his request, during an estimated period of four months, “this must be considered a 
reasonably short period of time and, even if the applicant would have to be discreet about his 
private life during this time, it would not require him to conceal or suppress an important part 
of his identity permanently or for any longer period of time” (Ivi, § 88).  
Furthermore, the Court did not judge it credible that the family of Mr. M.E. could know of his 
homosexuality, since the applicant had introduced N. to his family when they had spoken over 
the internet using a camera and N. presented himself as a woman. “The applicant’s family […] 
believes N. to be a woman since the applicant has chosen to present the relationship in this 
manner. In the Court’s opinion, this indicates that the applicant has made an active choice to 
live discreetly and not reveal his sexual orientation to his family in Libya – not because of fear 
of persecution but rather due to private considerations” (Ivi, § 86). Hence, even though Mr. 
M.E. had denounced that another Libyan citizen had become aware of his marriage to a man 
and had informed his family, the ECtHR denied that such an event threatened the applicant’s 
safety, also assuming that the choice to present N. as a woman was not dictated by the Libyan 
social attitude towards homosexuality. 
A comparable situation was also raised in I.N.N. v the Netherlands, concerning an Iranian citi-
zen. 
Most notably, Libya and Iran share a similar degree of legal confusion, of discrepancy between 
the law in books and the law in action, and the political turmoil surely did not facilitate the pro-
vision of certain and sure information.  
Formally, in Iran homosexuality was punished harshly, even with death, while in Libya Article 
407 and 408 of the Penal Code provided imprisonment for male same-sex acts; the evidence 
gathered by international NGOs and diplomatic institutions highlighted, however, a confused 
enforcement of these provisions. As far as Iran is concerned, the UK, Canadian, Swedish and 
Danish reports on the condition of homosexuals highlighted a climate of informal and judicial 
tolerance. Not only would the police not be allowed to “go in search of possible sinners […] be-
hind the veil of decency of their closed doors” (I.I.N), but “is expert opinion that in practice 
homosexuality is presently, and has been in the past, most part tolerantly treated and frequently 
 263	  
occurring. In practice it is the only public transgression of Islamic morals that is condemned” (F 
v UK) and “that there are some parks in Teheran where many homosexuals meet up in the 
evening. Generally speaking it can be said that people seeking homosexual relations in Iran are 
known to find their way. It must be noted that openness about it is avoided.” (I.I.N. v Nether-
lands).  
As long as homosexuals publicly conform to the dominant model, by marrying a woman and 
having children, they may avoid prosecution.  
Also the burden of proof seems heavy, for “it must be proven by either four righteous men who 
witnessed the act, or through the knowledge of a Shari’a judge derived through customary 
methods, If the accused repents before the witnesses testify, the penalty will be quashed” 
(Ibidem).  
Despite apparent tolerance, homosexuals are however forced to live discreetly, to conceal their 
identity and they may result more exposed to the risk of blackmailing. Furthermore, as UN-
CHR Branch Office in Germany points out “although the most repeated execution by stoning 
for repeated homosexual acts and adultery took place in 1995, local newspapers continue to re-
port about executions of homosexuals”. In the absence of systematic observations of the en-
forcement of human rights in Iran, the Court decided that it could not be confirmed whether 
the people concerned had been convicted and executed solely for homosexual acts or also for 
additional charges; against this background they stated “it cannot be asserted with certainty that 
the criminal law provisions on homosexuality only have a theoretical significance” (Ibidem).  
Even in Libya “it appears unclear to what extent homosexual acts are prosecuted and punished, 
as they are difficult to prove” (M.E., § 43), but relevant sources report a hostile situation. 
In 2012, a Libyan activist stated that he had never heard of publicly documented cases of men 
being charged under the Penal Code (Ibidem). On the other hand, however, the UNHCR em-
phasized that “homosexuality is a taboo subject not only in public spaces but also within the pri-
vate sphere, seen as an immoral activity against Islam”, and the UK Border and Immigration 
Agency noted that “during 2012 the Nawasi brigade, Tripoli’s largest and most powerful militia 
brigade, allegedly arrested, assaulted and beat homosexuals simply for being homosexuals.” (Ivi, 
§ 44).  
As the actual enforcement of criminal provisions may be not strict, homosexuality surely 
emerges as an aggravating factor, and the ECtHR admits that the political climate does not fos-
ter the protection of human rights and that homosexuals may be vulnerable to abuse (I.I.N). 
In fact, the ECtHR quotes the UNCHR, which clearly sets out a general strategy to protect lgbt 
refugees:  
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The UNCHR states that it is well established that laws which criminalize consensual same-
sex relations are discriminatory, and violate international human rights norms. Even if irreg-
ularly, rarely, or never enforced, criminal laws prohibiting same-sex relations could lead to 
an intolerable predicament for an LGBTI person, rising to the level of persecution. […] 
These laws can also hinder LGBTI persons from seeking and obtaining State protection; 
[…] where the Country of origin information does not establish whether or not, or to what 
extent, the laws are actually enforced, a pervading and generalized climate of homophobia 
in the country of origin could be evidence that LGBTI persons are nevertheless being pros-
ecuted (M.E. § 47).  
 
Even if “an applicant may be able to avoid persecution by concealing or by being discreet about 
his or her sexual orientation or gender identity, or has done so previously, is not a valid reason 
to deny refugee status” (Ivi, § 44). 
Hence, the ECtHR approach in M.E., and the consequent finding that the necessity to suppress 
his homosexuality for a certain amount of time did not raise any serious doubts, is quite flawed 
and contradicts UN guidelines.  
Moreover, as to the procedure required to file the request for family reunification, the Court 
dismissed the fact that all Swedish embassies in Libya had closed down as an irrelevant issue, 
acknowledging that he would have to travel to a Swedish embassy in a neighbouring country for 
the actual interview, but it also found “no reason to believe that the applicant’s sexual orienta-
tion would be exposed so as to put him at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Conven-
tion in Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt” (Ivi, § 89).  
On this issue Amnesty International stressed the demand as being unreasonable that a homo-
sexual applicant would have travel to, and remain for months, in a country where same-sex sex-
ual conduct was illegal, since this “would mean that the applicant would have to hide a core as-
pect of his or her identity, and run a significant risk if the same-sex marriage became generally 
known.” (Ivi, § 68).  
The Court, however, rejected all claims, and I would provocatively suggest that if it’s extremely 
difficult to prove same-sex activities under Shari’a, it’s far more difficult to gain the credibility of 
the ECtHR. 
Mr. F. had reported that he and his partner had been prosecuted, detained, and beaten by Ira-
nian authorities; Mr. I.I.N. claimed he had been arrested while kissing a male friend in an alley, 
subsequently being beaten and raped. He was also forced to sign a statement in which he de-
clared that he was homosexual and that he had been caught in flagrante delicto. After being re-
leased, he attended a protest meeting and after a few days his friend’s body was found in a 
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ditch. I have already discussed the claims made by Mr. M.K.N. and Mr. M.E., which claimed 
equally serious violation of human rights. In F. v UK the ECtHR stated that since homosexuali-
ty was informally tolerated in Iran, it was not likely that the applicant could have been arrested; 
in respect to Mr. I.I.N the ECtHR bluntly noted that “while he claimed that he had been ar-
rested after having caught kissing a male friend […], there is no indication that his has in fact re-
sulted in any criminal procession’s being brought against him” (I.I.N). As to M.E., even if he 
showed bruises and scars, the ECtHR considered that there could not be sure whether these 
signs were the result of alleged tortures. 
In conclusion, when there’s room for even minimum doubt, the ECtHR prefers to leave na-
tional authorities a wide margin of appreciation, somehow diminishing the sufferance alleged by 
the applicants; in F and I.I.N the Court euphemistically describes the legal sanctions against 
homosexuality as “draconian “and assumes that homosexuality is as a light, which can either be 
switched on or off according to the broad social environment.  
Even in its last judgment, the ECtHR has not altered its standpoint: the Grand Chamber struck 
out M.E.’s case, avoiding upholding the applicant’s claim that his case “raised serious issues of 
fundamental importance relating to homosexuals’ rights and how to assess those rights in asy-
lum cases all over Europe” (Ivi, §, 30). 
The applicant aimed for a general interpretation of the ECHR that could lead to a sort of pilot 
judgment, but the ECtHR preferred not to jeopardize national sovereignty in immigration is-
sues, and considered the permanent residence permit that the Swedish authorities granted him 
after the Chamber judgment as sufficient to declare the striking out of the complaint.  
The only dissenting opinion M.E. v Sweden is that expressed by judge Power-Forde both in the 
Chamber and the Grand Chamber judgment, and it sheds light on unstated premises of the 
Court, displaying an interpretation of the Convention less heteronormative and homonorma-
tive, more devoted to securing individual human rights, and definitely critical in respect to the 
binary public/private. 
The ECtHR emphasized certain international sources only, while not considering the recent 
developments of European jurisprudence; as Power-Forde recalls, “in 2010 [the UK Supreme] 
Court held, unanimously, that the reasonably tolerable test of being discreet was objectionable 
because no heterosexual person would find such constraints on being open about their sexual 
orientation to be reasonably tolerable”. Moreover, it is mentioned that the Court of Justice of 
the European Union judgment Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v. X, Y and Z, which en-
dorsed a similar principle: “it is important to state that requiring members of a social group 
sharing the same sexual orientation to conceal that orientation is incompatible with the recogni-
tion of a characteristic so fundamental to a person’s identity that the persons concerned cannot 
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be required to renounce it” (C- 0199/12 and C0201/12, §70). Therefore, despite the absence of 
a clear and ascertained legal situation in Libya and Iran, the frequent remainder of the Court of 
the importance of being discreet contradicts these recent findings, and it justifies a loose protec-
tion of lgbt immigrants under the ECHR; given the peculiar aim of the Convention to foster 
human rights, such an outcome is extremely problematic, since it upholds a strong majoritarian 
conception of reality, where the minoritarian part is expected to behave as the majority dictates. 
As Power Forde notes,  
 
had it been applied to Anne Frank, it would have meant, hypothetically, that she could have 
been returned to Nazi-occupied Holland, as long as denying her religion and hiding in an at-
tic were reasonably tolerable means of avoiding detection. The absurdity of that argument is 
not diminished by the fact that the requirement to hide in an attic to avoid detection might 
involve only few months rather than years. (M.E., dis. op., judge Powder-Forde) 
 
The ECtHR ignored that the disclosure of one’s own sexual orientation might not be entirely 
determined by his own conduct; with respect to M.E., Powder-Forde stresses that the applicant 
would be obliged to travel to a Swedish Embassy in Egypt to Algeria, where homosexual acts 
are criminalized, and she contended that it was inconceivable to conduct the interview process 
for family without disclosure of his sexual orientation. Therefore, there would be the real “risk 
that his sexual orientation […] would be disclosed to the authorities at that point and his careful-
ly woven cover blown” (Ibidem). 
From an ideal and theoretical perspective, the ECtHR approach results as being even more 
startling. The ECtHR upheld the nonlinear account of M.E.’s sexuality as a sign that he lacked 
credibility, therefore understanding sexual orientation in terms of identity, but, after a few lines, 
the Court acknowledged that “sexual identity is, primarily a matter of sexual orientation” 
(Ibidem), and perhaps also not even essential. As Power Forde notes, this perspective contra-
dicts previous ECtHR jurisprudence, whereby sexual orientation involves a most intimate aspect 
of private life, and it twists reality, up to presume that the hidden part of one’s own identity 
would not bear serious consequences. 
Since the ECtHR had previously held the opinion that depriving a person of his reading glasses 
for a few months reaches the minimum threshold required by Article 3, something in the EC-
tHR approach doesn’t fit, to quote judge Power Forde words. Either the ECtHR judges homo-
sexuality through heteronormative lens or there are other reasons which push the majority to 
such a restrained reading of the ECHR.  
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In support of the first hypothesis, it may be suggested that the ECtHR found that discretion re-
quirement is insufficient to reaching the threshold of Article 3. To my analysis, the final out-
come can be regarded as heteronormative, but the core reasons behind the ECtHR reasoning 
are probably shaped by policy concerns. Surely, the Court justifies some requirements it’s not 
necessarily that would not be considered the same if applied to heterosexual persons, and while 
heterosexuality is fully dignified as a feature worthy of staying in the public arena, homosexuality 
is enclosed under the veil of decency. Nevertheless, if jointly considering cases on refugee status 
and those addressed in the first part of the paragraph, a more complex puzzle emerges; namely 
one where the actual cornerstone is the national autonomy in immigration policies. In all com-
plaints, the ECtHR begins its review by remembering that “the Contracting States have the right 
as a matter of international law and subject to their treaty obligations including the Convention, 
to control the entry, residence, and expulsion of aliens” (M.K.N. § 25; M.E. § 71; F § 1; I.I.N § 
12). Then, it can’t be said the Court refrained from interpreting Article 3 in order to provide 
protection against ill-treatment and torture perpetrated on the grounds of the victim’s sexual 
orientation. Rather, positive obligations are more demanding when citizens of Contracting Par-
ties or regular immigrants are concerned, while in respect to illegal immigrants the interpreta-
tion of the ECHR takes another path. To obtain redress, the applicants should be able to detail 
any alleged violence: even if informally perpetrated or even if they come from a Country where 
homophobia is wide spread, they should demonstrate that, despite their discreet lifestyle, they 
were prosecuted only due to their homosexuality. 
Quite absurdly given that they are presumed to conceal homosexuality, they should also pro-
duce evidence supporting that they effectively lived as homosexuals in their homeland. 
The ECtHR, up to now, has chosen a deferent approach to national authorities, possibly be-
cause immigration and safety lie at the core of domestic sovereignty, and an activist judgment 
might trigger criticism from the States, hence threatening the legitimacy of the ECtHR interpre-
tation. As judge Gaetano implied in M.E. chamber judgment, a quite consistent portion of pub-
lic opinion suspects that if the ECtHR required member States to grant asylum to lgbt migrants 
from countries in which homosexuality is formally or informally prosecuted, then a great por-
tion of heterosexual people would enter into marriages of convenience and declare themselves 
as being homosexual, even if not true.  
Despite the involvement of third parties, such as Ilga-Europe and the International Federation 
of Human Rights, arguing that “homosexual applicants for asylum had the right to be open in 
their country of origin about their sexual orientation and marital status and could not be ex-
pected to remain silent or discreet about these important aspect of their lives” (M.E., § 70), the 
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ECtHR avoided providing general statements, not only considering domestic decisions as legit-
imate, but also evaluating the alleged violence as not being particularly severe. 
In cases concerning both the treatment of lgbt detainees and those of illegal immigrants claim-
ing refugee status, the ECtHR performed a law-making function, most notably since it clarified 
the meaning of Article 3. 
In respect to lgbt prisoners the Court made several statements of general value, favourable to 
the applicants: the ECtHR qualified rape, confinement, and the exclusion from prison life in a 
wide frame, establishing an interpretive milestone which binds future judgments and forecasts 
strict obligations for respondent governments (X v Turkey, § 38, 40; Zontul v Greece, § 84, 88, 
89, 91).  
On the contrary, in respect to lgbt asylum seekers, the Court gave a far-reaching interpretation 
which restricted applicant’s claims, by reinforcing the model of the closet. 
A.E. v Finland, F v UK, I.I.N. v UK, M.K.N. V Netherlands, M.E. v Sweden judgments share a 
common semantic macrostructure, which provides information on how the discourse weighs 
different ideals and concept-based structures (Van Dijk in Wodak and Meyer 2002, 102). 
The first macrostructure is comprised of the already quoted reiteration of national sovereignty 
in immigration policies (I.I.N., § 12; M.K.N., § 25; M.E., § 71); the second, counterbalances 
the former by remembering that the Court can, in exceptional cases, review domestic decisions 
as infringing Convention (Ibidem). The relationship between the first and second concept 
seems enclosed in the word ‘however’, which remainders of a balance between these two con-
trasting statements, a balance which implies a compromise between ideal human rights en-
forcement and complete national discretion.  
The balance between contrasting ideals also marks the remainder of the judgment. In the turn 
of two paragraphs, the ECtHR admits that the applicants are entitled to allege violations of hu-
man rights in their homeland and it also suggests that when assessing the credibility of their 
statement, “the benefit of doubt” should be considered; such cue is however restricted, for “the 
individual must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged discrepancies” (M.E., § 73). In 
principle, “the applicant has to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial 
grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he would be 
exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.” 
(M.E., § 71). Under these circumstances, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts; hence, 
if the benefit of doubt is seen as the most suitable solution in an ideal world, the practical ap-
proach to follow is stated in the last part. In particular, the wording establishes a high threshold 
for applicants: they must produce evidence, to prove the existence of substantial and real risks 
against his direct person.  
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From this analysis, the balance reached by the ECtHR clearly favours national autonomy, estab-
lishing a general frame whereby the eventual and possible findings of a breach of the ECHR will 
remain reasonably confined to a restricted number of cases and it won’t create space to inter-
pret the Convention as imposing positive obligations in respect to this dramatic issue. 
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4.4 Non Discrimination, Sexual Orientation, and the ECHR 
 
This paragraph gathers a wide and heterogeneous cluster of cases, which address different is-
sues and raise interpretative questions on multiple aspects of private and public life; they, how-
ever, present a twofold common feature, in that all claims are based on anti-discriminatory ar-
guments and the demand surrounding individual rights. 
The applicants contended a violation of the ECHR alleging illegitimate pejorative treatments. 
The Court was, then, forced to deepen its reasoning of the comparability between homosexual 
and heterosexual subjects, and to review its early, restrained, approach towards the application 
of Article 14. 
The main theoretical claim underpinned to these cases is the equal value of lgbt persons to oth-
er citizens; as extensively explored these cases attain to the recognition of basic rights which en-
able the individual to openly identify himself/herself as being homosexual, without fearing ille-
gitimate treatment or being forced to conceal it. 
If in the previous phase homosexuality was framed as a private element, affecting intimate and 
individual life, but not necessarily the relational, working, and social experience, the anti-
discriminatory perspective insists that lgbt must be protected not only as individuals, but pre-
cisely as homosexuals. Moreover, the recognition of the right to engage in same-sex acts does 
not require a positive evaluation of the acts involved, as long as they do not harm third parties; 
on the contrary, as Zanetti points out, protection against discrimination is granted only when 
judges and policy-makers evaluate a certain feature as valuable and worthy of protection (Zanetti 
2015, 48 and fol.). Claiming rights on anti-discriminatory grounds requires going beyond ma-
joritarian indifference, to simultaneously apply the principle of equality to homosexuals, and to 
legally and symbolically recognize them as equals. 
Given the heterogeneous variety of claims advanced, I will discuss the conclusive remarks in re-
spect to each section, without providing a final section as for other paragraphs. 
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4.4.1 The Right to Serve in the Army 
 
The right to serve in the army of one’s Country has been traditionally linked to the notion of 
citizenship, to such an extent that, as Zanetti argues, the possibility to enter into the army is in-
tertwined with being recognized as being “valuable” (Zanetti 2015, 49). A person is valuable if 
he is judged able to defend his homeland, and, conversely, only those who are considered phys-
ically, mentally, and morally valuable are deemed able to serve the army.  
Hence, the traditional exclusion of gays and lesbians from this conglomerations of virtues is not 
surprising, but it reveals the multiple prejudices against them. Firstly, they were regarded as in-
adequate, since presumed to be mentally fragile, hysterical, and not capable to be effective in 
distressing conditions; secondly, they were judged as immoral, and it was commonly thought 
that they dishonoured the value of the army itself. Thirdly, more recently some argued that 
even though gay men and lesbian women were capable of being good soldiers and excellent pa-
triots, they would disrupt troops’ moral, since heterosexual colleagues might feel uncomfortable 
sharing showers, restrooms, and bedrooms with them (Ivi, 50-51).  
While the first two categories openly express negative moral and a normative evaluation of ho-
mosexuality, the third pretends to be objectively based, just looking at reality and coping with it. 
However, it assumes the status quo as being fixed, as if either this environment couldn’t change 
or as if it was not necessary to alter it; consequently, eventual entrenched prejudices and bias are 
not challenged, discussed, criticized, or tackled but solely read as the starting point, as the evi-
dence that shapes norms and policies.  
To sum up - this argument goes- minorities would only be allowed to claim the rights which do 
not threaten or even disturb common assumptions; insofar that lgbt remain closeted, they can 
claim rights as people, as citizens perhaps, but not as gays, lesbians, or as a sexual minority. 
Hence, the right to enter into the army mainly challenges the heteronormative depiction of so-
ciety and the rigid division between private and public; lgbt individuals demand more than the 
tolerance of private same-sex activities and they also interpret their homosexuality as an essen-
tial part of their identity. As US history testifies, formal tolerance coped with the indifference of 
the law in so that private spaces can coexist with a ban on homosexual soldiers, while the en-
forcement of positive measures aimed at tackling homophobia spread in the army and at secur-
ing the right of lgbt people to openly serve their Country requires dismantling the prejudice of 
homosexuality as a vice, and rejecting the image of gays and lesbians as not being suited to mili-
tary life. 
The ECtHR delivered its most important judgments on this theme in the late 1990s and in the 
early 2000s, showing interesting timing compared to the USA. While in the USA the final 
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compromise was the introduction of Dadt, which forced gay and lesbian soldiers into the closet 
and imposed on them the obligation to dissimulate their identity, the ECtHR denied that sol-
diers could be legitimately discharged solely on the grounds of their sexual orientation.  
Surely the reasoning of the Court displays also dark areas, but it highlights the ability of the 
judges to review, contrast, and even reject biased arguments which supported the exclusion of 
homosexuals from the army.  
Judgments hereinafter analyzed are theoretically relevant, and they mark a turning point in the 
approach of the ECtHR to sexual orientation. The Court, indeed, does not refer to the proce-
dural margin of appreciation, rather examining the possible ratio of differentiated treatment, 
engaging in a rich debate over the foundations of the right to serve in the army, and finally in-
terpreting the discharge based on sexual orientation as lacking objective justifications and of be-
ing in breach of the ECHR. It may be true that at that time the majority of the Coe members 
did not openly prevent homosexuals from joining the army, and that a clear consensus emerged 
in favour of the applicants. Nevertheless, the Court could have approached the complaints by 
relying on the crucial role of the army in ensuring national safety and, accordingly, by judging 
domestic authorities as best placed to define which standards should respective armies conform 
to. 
Between 1996 and 2002, British gay and lesbian soldiers alleged that the UK army had 
breached their human rights by discharging them on the exclusive grounds of their homosexual-
ity. In one case there was the involvement of Liberty, a civil rights group based in London 
(Smith and Grady, § 1), while in the others no official connection with lgbt movement emerges. 
The applicants, employed in various departments, had gained positive judgments from their su-
periors, being recommended for promotion (Smith and Grady, § 11), obtaining “8 of a maxi-
mum of 9 marks for trade proficiency, supervisor ability and personal qualities” (Ivi, § 17), and 
proving to be able to adequately perform their functions (Beck, Copp and Bazeley, § 12). 
Hence, it was not disputed that their discharge was entirely due to their homosexuality. Moreo-
ver, when their sexual orientation had become noted, all the applicants had been subjected to 
detailed and intrusive interviews by the service police, while their personal lockers had been 
searched for items connected to their sexual activities.  
The procedure was moulded on those used in criminal investigations, and that they had been 
treated as criminals. For instance, Ms. Smith was asked “whether she and her partner had a 
sexual relationship with their foster daughter 16 years old” (Smith and Grady, § 14), and Mr. 
Beckett was interrogated about his previous relationship with a woman and whether “she was 
not enough” and whether “he had been touched up or abused as a child and whether he had 
bought pornographic magazines” (Lustig-Prean and Beckett, § 19). The wording as well as the 
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nature of questions effectively showed a biased, and morose attitude towards gays and lesbians, 
who were depicted as deviants; the service police questioned them in detail about their sexual 
practices, whether they had had sex in public, if they considered themselves ‘queens’ or ‘bend-
ers’, if their parents knew about their homosexuality, whether they were monogamous and if 
they were sure that they could not be “normal” (Ibidem).  
Moreover, the applicants highlighted that such that a ‘blanket policy’ was only adopted in refer-
ence to sexual orientation, while there were not similar measures against those whose actions 
could or did affect service efficiency, such as those involved in theft or adultery, or those who 
carried out dangerous acts under the influence of drugs or alcohol (Smith and Grady, § 81). 
Under these circumstances, the individuals could be dismissed only after a careful considera-
tion of all the circumstances of the case (Ibidem), whilst, on the contrary, homosexuality was 
considered in itself as a weighty ground to justify discharge without further evidences.  
All the applicants wished to discretely live their sexuality, yet they alleged a violation not only of 
their right of respect for their private life, but also of their right to “give expression to their sexu-
al orientation” (Smith and Grady, § 124); with the exception of Lustig-Prean and Beckett, no 
31417/96, and no. 32377/96, in other cases the complaints were framed as to disrupt the tradi-
tional private nature of homosexuality, and to challenge the silence imposed on lgbt soldiers. At 
the time of the introduction of the Dadt in the Usa, Smith and Grady, n.33985/96, 33986/96, 
argued that freedom of expression secured the freedom to express one’s sexuality, which in turn 
“encapsulated opinions, ideas and information essential to an individual and his or her identity” 
(Ivi, §126). Given that the UK policy forced them to “live secret lives, denying them the simple 
opportunity to communicate openly and freely their own sexual identity” (Ibidem) they had suf-
fered from a severe inhibiting factor of their right to express themselves. 
Before analyzing the interpretation endorsed by the ECtHR, it’s appropriate to recall the argu-
ments displayed by the UK government, for it effectively produced a wide and varied set of pa-
pers, reports, and opinions in support of its policy.  
Firstly, it claimed that the ECtHR should allow wide discretion on the matter and that, since the 
issue was politically debated and a number of reform proposals had been issued to Parliament, 
it was not up to the judges to substitute British politicians. The core of Government submis-
sions, however, addressed substantial reasons, and attempted to provide objective and reasona-
ble grounds for the exclusion of homosexuals from the army.  
From a theoretical perspective, the Government did not dispute the ability or personal qualities 
of gays and lesbians, nor did it openly depict them as not being valuable, rather recognizing that 
homosexual men and women are in themselves “no less physically capable, brave, dependable 
and skilled than heterosexuals” (Lustig Prean and Beckett, § 44). However, it also argued that 
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since the majority of staff was heterosexual, it could not disregard the common attitude towards 
gays and lesbians, hence upholding a majoritarian understanding of morals and human rights. 
After Smith and Grady and Lustig Prean and Beckett lodged complaints with the ECtHR, the 
British government conducted an intensive report to “undertake the internal assessment of the 
armed forces” (Ivi, § 44). The report of the Homosexuality Policy Assessment Team (hereinaf-
ter HPAT) was based on approximately 639 letters from UK soldiers all over the world, and 
the conclusion was that there was an “overwhelming view that homosexuality was not normal” 
and that the “vast majority of participants believed that the present ban on homosexuals should 
remain” (Ivi, § 45). The Government disputed that the applicants’ claim that British policy was 
not established by a pressing necessity was ill-founded, and concluded that even though a 
change in mentality was desirable, policy-makers had to deal with the present attitudes and they 
could not undermine troops’ cohesion by allowing gays and lesbians to serve (Smith and Grady, 
§ 74, 78). 
Even if acknowledging that other counties experienced a wide variety of official positions and 
legal arrangements (Lustig Prean, § 51), the report highlighted that the crucial point was to pro-
tect the effectiveness of the army, even if this implied a restriction of individual liberty and pri-
vacy (Ivi, § 69). 
In conclusion, UK authorities apparently suggested that the ban on homosexuals should be 
maintained in force despite the opinion of the Minister of Defence or that of the Government:  
 
if service people believed that they could work and live alongside homosexuals without loss 
of cohesion, far fewer of the anticipated problems would emerge. But the Ministry has to 
deal with the world as it is. […] in the UK homosexuality remains in practice incompatible 
with service life if the armed forces are to be maintained at their full potential fighting power 
(Ivi, § 55).  
 
Despite the pretence of neutrality, if not empathy, there are two issues reiterated by the UK 
Government which conveyed a situated standpoint on sexual orientation: firstly, authorities con-
sidered “well established that the presence of homosexuals into the armed forces would pro-
duce certain behavioural and emotional responses and problems, which […] negatively affect 
the fighting power of the armed forces” (Ivi, § 47) and, thus, they did not conduct a survey de-
parting from a neutral perspective, but tried to practically ground a policy that they already con-
sidered ideally justified and desirable.  
Likewise, the official Policy and Guidelines on Homosexuality, distributed from 1994 onwards, 
did not problematize homophobia, nor did it encourage a tolerant climate among soldiers; on 
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the contrary, it considered “homosexuality, whether male or female, […] incompatible with ser-
vice in the armed forces”, not only because of the close physical conditions in which personnel 
had to live and work, but also because homosexual behaviour allegedly caused offense, polar-
ized relationships, included ill-discipline, and damaged morale and unit effectiveness.  
The ECtHR refused to apply the procedural margin of appreciation, and it critically reviewed 
the submissions of the respondent Government, engaging in a vivid debate as to whether the 
objectivity and the appropriateness of HTAP and Policy Guidelines.  
The Judicial approach, hence, was definitely activist, and the overwhelming majority found that 
the Court was entitled to review domestic policies on a strategic sector as the army.  
Amongst these cases, the ECtHR significantly disrupted the normative understanding of homo-
sexuality, upholding the applicant’s perspective as far as private life was concerned. Indeed, it 
affirmed that national authorities could not frustrate the exercise by individual members of the 
armed forces of their right to respect for private lives (Ivi, § 82), and it qualified the policy at 
stake as “striking” (Ivi, § 86), since it established the immediate discharge irrespectively from 
the individual’s conduct or service record (Ibidem). Moreover, the Court challenged the value 
of the HPAT report, it criticized the methods adopted to collect data, and it denied the legal 
relevance of prejudice; since the report did not automatically grant anonymity, and since the 
Ministry of Defence had made its standpoint clear, “many of the questions in the attitude survey 
suggested that answers in support of the policy” (Ivi, § 87). The most interesting issue, however, 
entails the criticism of the merits of the report: the Court argued that even accepting that the re-
sults of the survey were representative, a violation of the Convention still existed. Judges en-
dorsed an anti-discriminatory perspective, dismissing the threats highlighted by the HPAT as 
“founded solely upon the negative attitudes of heterosexual personnel towards those of homo-
sexual orientation” (Ivi, § 89); secondly, instead of labelling homosexuals through majoritarian 
lens, the Court embraced minorities’ perspective. Both the arguments and the language chosen 
by the ECtHR pay no deference to national discretion, clarifying that neither common sense 
nor the quest for effectiveness amount to legitimate grounds to discretionally restrict human 
rights. The de-legitimization of heteronormativity is, hence, coupled with a positive evaluation 
of differences, and with the refusal to justify the status quo as un-coerced and natural. 
The ECtHR stated that to the extent that negative attitudes against gay and lesbian soldiers “rep-
resent a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority” (Ivi, § 90), they could not, of 
themselves, be considered to suffice to the interferences with the applicants’ rights, “any more 
than similar negative attitudes towards those of a different race, origin, or colour” (Ibidem). 
The comparison with ethnicity is extremely powerful, for ECtHR jurisprudence and the inter-
national law case against racial discrimination was more developed than that in respect to sexual 
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orientation, and it symbolically meant that the discrimination of gays and lesbians had to be 
evaluated as odious as racism.  
Had the Court considered homosexuality abnormal, it would not have established such a theo-
retical link, nor would it have explicitly argued that “even if […] the integration of homosexuals 
would give rise to problems not encountered with the integration of women or racial minorities, 
the Court is not satisfied that the codes and rules which have been found to be effective in the 
latter case would not equally prove effective in the former” (Ivi, § 95). 
Hence, the ECtHR somehow overturned the approach developed in Dudgeon, whereby some 
control over homosexuals was necessary, and it posed a milestone in interpreting the ECHR so 
as to include homosexuality among the issues to be protected. 
These being the premises, the Court finally held that UK policy violated the right to respect for 
private life, and that it could not be defined either necessary or proportionate. 
The interpretation upheld by the Court had a primary symbolical meaning, for it reduced the 
discretion granted to Contracting Parties in disciplining their armed forces, it reversed the bal-
ance between individual rights and public interest in favour of the former, and it denied any le-
gitimacy to the ban on homosexual conscripts.  
In Lustig-Prean and Beckett the Court dismissed all three reasons traditionally claimed to ex-
cluding homosexuals from the army: the fact that they were both capable and morally adequate 
to serve in the army was not even discussed, while their alleged disruptive effect was considered 
as not being prominent. It was up to national authorities to adopt all necessary measures so as 
to positively integrate homosexual soldiers within the army environment, and “in so far as nega-
tive attitudes to homosexuality are insufficient, of themselves, to justify the policy […], they are 
equally insufficient to justify the rejection of a proposed alternative.” (Ibidem).  
The reasoning of the Court displayed, however, some dark areas on the separation between 
public and private, and on the interpretation of Article 10, almost loosening the approach here-
to analyzed. If previously the ECtHR apparently implied that not only the discharge, but also 
the ban on the recruitment of homosexuals was illegitimate, the interpretation under Article 10 
traces quite a dissimilar path.  
The silence imposed on the applicants as regards to their sexual orientation, together with the 
constant need for vigilance, discretion, and secrecy in that respect with colleagues, friends and 
acquaintances “could” constitute as an interference with their freedom of expression (Smith and 
Grady, § 127), but the Court noted that “the subject matter of the policy and, consequently, the 
sole ground for the investigation and discharge of the applicants, was their sexual orientation 
which is an essentially private manifestation of human personality” (Ibidem). Consequently, the 
Court considered the freedom of expression claimed by the applicants as subsidiary to the right 
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of respect for private life, and it concluded that it was not necessary to further examine the 
complaints under Article 10.  
Hence, while the right of expression applies to the public sphere, sexual orientation appears 
circumscribed to the private realm. If heterosexuality and homosexuality were considered as be-
ing perfectly equal, and just as two sides of the same coin, then this judicial approach would be 
flawed. Hypothesizing a reversed frame where homosexuality is the norm, heterosexuality 
would be read as essentially a private manifestation of personality, and policies targeted at disci-
plining heterosexual orientation would not apparently amount to an interference with one’s 
right to expression, rather pursuing the safety of the army. Quite obviously a similar condition 
has never occurred in judicial history, and the hypothetical environment where vigilance, secre-
cy, and discretion are required of heterosexuals would result against their freedom of expres-
sion.  
Reappraising Kavey’s fresh and insightful critique of Smith and Lustig-Prean, such a narrow def-
inition of the private realm would mostly convey an unrealistic definition of what homosexual 
orientation actually consists of. 
The ECtHR’s perspective, as previously mentioned, is encapsulated in the expression whereby 
sexual orientation is “a most intimate aspect of an individual’s private life” (Smith and Grady, § 
89); though there can be no doubt that private life entails both intimacy, confidentiality, and se-
crecy, this definition fails to grasp the complex and multifaceted relational dimension of private 
life. Such a narrow definition creates both a “crude, one-dimensional and hyper-sexualized” 
homosexual subject (Kavey 2013, 768) and it restricts all claims advanced on the sole legal 
ground of Article 8, dismissing for instance the claims related to the freedom to express one’s 
identity and sexuality under Article 10. If linking the wording of the ECtHR to the frequent re-
mainders to Dudgeon, it’s indeed clear that private life refers to the private sexual life, while it’s 
not clear the extent to which it also includes a relational dimension. In everyday life there are 
countless occasions in which we witness a public manifestation of someone’s heterosexual ori-
entation137, but almost no one would react by thinking that the people involved have publicly ex-
posed a feature that they have revealed an “essentially private manifestation of human personali-
ty”. To sum up, from the ECtHR’s reasoning homosexual people appear as being mainly de-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Daily discourses and behaviors are soaked with references to heterosexuality, and generally no one 
thinks they shouldn’t; from the pronoun used to talk about one’s partner to discourses about plans of 
life, from holding hands to kissing, these are all actions part of heterosexuals’ daily routine; on the con-
trary, lgbt people are forced to be cautious or to tone down their behavior and discourses depending on 
their audience, and, above all, they are expected not to suffer from such a limitation. See Kavey (2013). 
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fined by their confidential and private sexual urges, but, if adopting the lens used to understand 
heterosexual behaviour, homosexuality should be recognized as a “pervasively public manifesta-
tion of human personality” related to parts of life that are “publicly visible and often celebrated 
by other people” (Ivi, 768).  
In the overall context of the wording adopted by the Court, this choice is not easily interpreta-
ble, for the ECtHR adopted a universalist layering, to suggest an equal approach to every sexual 
orientation. However, more than a neutral choice, such wording recalls Gordon’s image of ex-
pressive categories with the purpose of justifying and subtly rationalizing existing bias (Gordon 
1988). 
The applicants themselves had alleged a violation of their freedom of expression, but the EC-
tHR did not understand same-sex sexual orientation to affect the public realm.  
One could resist that, practically, since the Court denied a ban on homosexual policies, it also 
implicitly legitimized those discourses and behaviour that, in the daily working routine, might 
disclose one’s sexual orientation.  
Effectively this unbalance remains on a mostly symbolic level: as already shown, according to 
the ECtHR’s frame it’s extremely difficult to prove the legitimacy of eventual restrictions based 
on sexual orientation; hence the implicit assumption is that homosexuality should not lead to 
detrimental effects on one’s working track. 
However, this result remains only timidly implied; given the highly symbolic poignancy en-
trenched in human rights, a careful evaluation of these aspects would have suited the ECHR’s 
aims at best. 
In conclusion, the Court did not endorse a strict model of the closet, but its reasoning fails to 
fully recognize homosexuality as being entitled to enter the public arena just as heterosexuality 
does. 
Hence, the Court did shape and process the applicants’ inputs, picking up certain claims and 
dismissing others. Besides the already mentioned complaints, Smith and Grady and Lustig-
Prean and Beckett alleged a violation of Article 3, denouncing that the way service police had 
conducted interviews amounted to ill-treatment. The Court, however, ruled that the minimum 
level of severity required had not been reached, even though “investigation and discharge […] 
were undoubtedly distressing and humiliating for the applicants” (Ivi, § 127).  
The reasoning had also prominent significance of law-making, and, to a socio-legal reading, it 
sheds light on the extra-legal evaluation of homosexuality; in fact, judicial perspective on homo-
sexuality is crucial to understanding the ECtHR and this element effectively works as a chemical 
component (Pound 1923c, 941) which allows to pass from an aggregate of substances to their 
synthesis. Judicial interpretation is grounded on the assessment made by the judges on the risks 
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entrenched in the presence of gay and lesbian soldiers, not on the meaning of some legal provi-
sions or on the coherency of a given case-law. There are three perspectives clarified in this track 
of cases: firstly, homosexuality is a human, innate, feature such as race and gender; then, sexual 
orientation does not amount to such problematic issues in order to justify the ‘blanket ban’ on 
lgbt soldiers and, hence, gays and lesbians themselves do not threaten national security. Thirdly, 
although the distinction between private and public is problematically addressed, the ECtHR 
widens the space of the private realm, stretching it to also cover the work place. The restrained 
frame, where the private collapsed over the four bedroom walls, is now outweighed, and the 
Court rejected the image of homosexuality as morally ambiguous, or pathologically unbalanced.  
The interpretation of Article 8 is extremely creative, for it gives substance and clarifies the 
meaning of private life, also assessing that this realm can’t be restricted without objective, urgent, 
and reasonable justifications. Moreover, the link established between sexual orientation, ethnici-
ty, and gender foreshadows a connection between the realm of privacy and that of non-
discrimination, hence requiring stronger safeguards for lgbt subjects and symbolically upholding 
their claims as being highly valuable.  
As for the internal judicial culture displayed, no harsh divisions recur and the Court shows a 
homogenous approach, reiterating the established interpretative structure without altering it. In 
Lustig- Prean and Beckett and Smith and Grady, the first two cases where the ECtHR has dealt 
with this issue, one judge only filed a dissenting opinion, suggesting a restrained interpretation 
of the ECHR. Most notably, he endorsed the disruptive argument, denouncing the fact that 
“the applicants would have to share single-sex accommodation and associated facilities (show-
ers, toilets, etc.) with their heterosexual colleagues” as problematic and concluding “conduct 
codes and disciplinary rules cannot change the sexual orientation of people and the relevant 
problems which – for the purposes of the issue under consideration – in the analogous case of 
women makes it incumbent to accommodate them separately from male soldiers” (Smith and 
Grady, dis. op., judge Loucaides). He also relied on the margin of appreciation, stating that “the 
Court should not interfere simply because there is a disagreement with the necessity of the 
measures taken by a State” (Ibidem) and that judges should not substitute their view to that of 
the national authorities, further adding that “the wider the margin of appreciation allowed to the 
State, the narrower should be the scope for interference by the Court” (Ibidem). 
Therefore, the reason for such a limited internal dissent rests on a different interpretation of the 
principle of precaution, and on a divergent image of how to balance majority and minority. As 
far as relevant, these contrasting perspective neither gathered significant consensus within the 
ECtHR nor proposed peculiar and innovative standpoints to interpret the ECHR. 
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4.4.2 The Freedom of Expression 
 
Although freedom of expression has been subsidiarily claimed throughout cases challenging the 
criminalization of same-sex acts and the exclusion of lgbt people from the army, there are a 
number of complaints which primarily deal with Article 9 and Article 10.  
The right to freely express one’s own sexuality and ideas gathers heterogeneous cases, which 
differ in both the facts at stake and in the judicial timing: they, indeed, cover a temporal arch 
from 1979 to 2013, and, therefore, are intertwined with ongoing ECtHR jurisprudence on sex-
ual orientation. 
After a closer look, I distinguish among a) complaints framing blasphemy and public disclosure 
of obscene materials as part of freedom of expression; b) complaints demanding the right to 
manifest homophobic expressions and to practice conscious objection against same-sex couples; 
c) complaints concerning the alleged freedom of press in outing public or semi-public persons.  
The first cluster is not particularly relevant, since neither the applicants’ claims nor the ECtHR 
reasoning disclose innovative findings, according to my theoretical frame; the only relevant fea-
ture comes from the diversity between the majority’s and separate opinions’ perspective about 
how to effectively secure public decency. In X ldt. v UK, no. 8710/79, the publishing company 
X had approved a poem describing homosexual acts between the author and Christ’s dead 
body, and, hence, it had been condemned to pay a fine of 1000 pounds; in the second case, 
Wingrove v UK, no. 17419/90, Mr. Wingrove had shot a movie on the ecstasy of Saint 
Therese, depicting it as a sexual experience and filming some scenes where the Saint and an 
unknown woman performed sexual acts with the crucified Christ. The national British Board of 
Film Classification, hence, classified the movie as unsuitable to be sold, and prohibited the ap-
plicant from distributing or to broadcasting it. Both the applicants were prosecuted on the 
grounds of national criminal law against blasphemy, and in both cases national decisions were 
considered legitimate, and the judges recalled that under the Convention itself the freedom of 
expression could be regulated by  
 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a demo-
cratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of 
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary (Art. 10).  
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Only two of the seven judges voted against Wingrove’s final decision, and even though their 
reasoning is not shaped by a biased evaluation of homosexuality, it still gives some valuable 
hints on the internal disagreement over the enforcement of morals, and on the possibility to ap-
ply the margin of appreciation when not agreeing with national decisions. 
Judge Bernhardt began by stating that “personally” he would not have banned the vision of the 
movie, and he ascribed this conviction to “his impressions while watching the film”; however, 
he concurred with the majority, asserting that the classification of video films might result sensi-
tive “in view of the dangers involved, especially for young persons and the rights of others”. 
Hence, in order to control possible damages, proper procedures are required, and to judge 
Bernhardt, “national authorities have a considerable margin of appreciation”. On the contrary, 
judge De Meyer reviewed the case as “a pure case of prior restraint, a form of interference 
which is […] unacceptable in the field of freedom of expression” (Wingrove, § 1), displaying a 
perspective endorsed also by judge Lohmus. Even admitting that “it is difficult to ascertain what 
principles determine the scope of […] margin of appreciation”, he offered a structured opinion, 
where the degree of protection given by the Court to Christian beliefs is read as problematic. 
British laws, indeed, only protected “the Christian religion and, more specifically, the estab-
lished Church of England”, and consequently “this in itself raises the question whether the in-
terference was necessary in a democratic society” (Ivi, § 4). Furthermore, even admitting the le-
gitimacy of similar provisions, Lohums suggested that “the Court makes distinctions within Arti-
cle 10 when applying its doctrine on the States’ margin of appreciation. Whereas, in some cas-
es, the margin of appreciation applied is wide, in other cases it is more limited” (Ivi, § 6), thus 
depicting the ECtHR jurisprudence on the matter as flawed and obscure.  
The protection of traditional feelings, especially when religious beliefs are concerned, has been 
regarded as sensitive; consequently, it opened a wider margin of appreciation, and it was likely 
to justify domestic decisions. It has to be highlighted, however, that while this trend emerged 
clear when religious traditions resulted offended by blasphemous behaviour, in cases when reli-
gion was waived to justify conscientious objection or homophobic acts against the lgbt commu-
nity, the Court adopts a far more demanding scheme to review national outcomes. 
As for homophobic behaviour and speeches, when direct and manifest incitements to hate are 
not present, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate acts is blurred and hard to ascer-
tain. Even within the lgbt community there’s an ongoing debate, opposing those who support 
the restriction of homophobic speeches, even if not directly inciting violence, and those who 
contend that similar restrictions might prove ineffective and damage the lgbt community, by 
portraying it as intolerant, and not able to accept any critical or negative opinion on its account. 
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Given the slippery theoretical ground, it’s complicated to legally distinguish between the two 
categories, but, at the same time, it’s also a t bench mark to evaluating the breadth of the protec-
tion ensured by the ECtHR against homophobic expressions or actions.  
In two cases the Court has been called to strike a balance between the freedom of expression 
and the prevention of discrimination or hatred incitements and, by looking at the reasoning 
adopted in this trial, it’s possible to comprehend the parameters adopted. 
These judgments allow the researcher to evaluate the rigidity of the Court and to assess the 
threshold beyond which facts or speeches are not qualifiable as freedom of expression, but they 
do on the rights of others. As shown hereinafter, the ECtHR has interpreted the Convention in 
favour of restricting the freedom of expression to protect homosexuals, and, quite surprisingly, 
it has reached this outcome by a large majority. 
Vedjedland v Sweden, handed down in 2012, precisely remainders of this hard balance, and it 
questions the practical boundaries the freedom of expression; another element of interest, in 
this case, concerns the involvement of third parties, for it testifies the effort to encourage judicial 
law-making, and to establish a specific and comprehensive frame against hate speech. Although 
the ECtHR framed the complaint according to the already set jurisprudence, not deriving from 
the ECHR a new legal institution, the perspective adduced by third parties seems to have influ-
enced the overall judicial approach. 
The complaint was lodged by four Swedish men, who had distributed a hundred leaflets in an 
upper secondary school, leaving the sheets in or on the pupils’ lockers. The author was Nation-
al Youth and, inter alia, leaflets denounced that “in the course of a few decades society has 
swung from rejection of homosexuality and other sexual deviances to embracing this deviant 
sexual proclivity. Your anti-Swedish teachers know very well that homosexuality has a morally 
destructive effect on the substance of society and will willingly try to put it forward as something 
normal and good.” (Ivi, § 8). 
The pupils were also directly addressed with further advice, such as to remember their teachers 
that “HIV and AIDS appeared early with the homosexuals and that their promiscuous lifestyle 
was one of the main reasons for this modern-day plague gaining a foothold”, and that “homo-
sexual lobby organizations are also trying to play down paedophilia” (Ibidem). The director of 
the school stopped the applicants, who were charged with agitation against a national or ethnic 
group. Despite further appeals, they were given suspended sentences combined with fines rang-
ing from 200 to 2,000 euros and the fourth applicant was sentenced to probation (Vedjdeland, 
§ 17).  
Under the ECHR the applicants alleged a breach of their right to expression, stating that “the 
wording in the leaflets was not hateful and did not encourage anyone to commit hateful acts, […] 
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rather encouraging the pupils to discuss certain matters with their teachers and providing them 
with arguments to use in these discussions” (Ivi, § 26). Moreover, they denied that the Swedish 
secondary school could be regarded as being sheltered from the political actions of outsiders, 
since the Swedish education system would allegedly have a tradition of letting political youth 
parties spread their messages to pupils in secondary schools. 
Third parties, namely INTERIGHTS and ICJ, filed a powerful and dense intervener, even 
though the focus was not entirely on the facts committed by the applicants. The core of their ar-
gument, indeed, stood in the demand to “adopt particularized standards to address the problem 
[of homophobic hate speech], at both the European and the international political level” (Ivi, § 
42). The present case provided third parties with the opportunity to prod the ECtHR to inter-
pret the Convention as prohibiting hate speeches against a person or a class of people because 
of their sexual orientation, hence enlarging the protection already granted to lgbt citizens.  
Judicial law-making was strongly backed and encouraged on the grounds of three legal princi-
ples: firstly, the ECtHR should consolidate a clear approach to hate speech, in analogy with its 
case-law on xenophobia and racism. Secondly, by establishing such a comparison, it would be 
desirable for the ECtHR to finally recognize sexual orientation both as equal to race, ethnicity, 
and religion, and as a marker of group identity (Ivi, § 45). Lastly, third parties justified a broad 
restriction of freedom of expression, arguing that “restrictions on freedom of expression must 
therefore be permissible in instances where the aim of the speech is to degrade, insult, or incite 
hatred against persons or a class of person on account of their sexual orientation, so long as 
such restrictions are in accordance with the Court’s well-established principles” (Ivi, § 46). 
The optimum was intended as a legal frame which limited not only speeches directly causing or 
inciting hatred actions, but also those degrading or insulting others; predictably, the borders of 
what could amount to degrading or insulting speech is quite blurred, and it opens up to judicial 
law-making and judicial discretion. 
In response, the Court handed down a fascinating judgment without, however, recognizing ho-
mophobic hate speech as distinct from other verbal expressions amounting to a violation of the 
ECHR. 
Judicial wording mirrors the difficult balancing of competing interests, and it also shows the will 
to appear equidistant from both parties, thus not adopting the wording of third parties. Never-
theless, the majority progressively identifies multiple criteria which allows us to interpret the 
ECHR as tackling homophobic hate speech. 
After reiterating that the freedom of expression is applicable to information or ideas that shock, 
offend, or disturb (Ivi, § 54), the Court also noted that restrictions to Article 10 must be strictly 
and convincingly established. As for the language and the concepts expressed in the leaflets, 
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even though not directly calling for hatred actions, the ECtHR qualified them as serious and 
prejudicial (Ibidem).  
The controversial issue was to determine whether such arguments and expressions fell within 
the cluster of disturbing ideas secured by Article 10, and to draw the line beyond which hate 
speech could be sanctioned.  
Though never mentioning homophobic hate speech, the Court affirmed that  
 
inciting to hatred does not necessarily entail a call for an act of violence, or other criminal 
acts. Attacks on specific persons committed by insulting, holding up to ridicule, or slander-
ing specific groups of the population can be sufficient for the authorities to favour combat-
ing racist speech in the face of freedom of expression (Ivi, § 55). 
 
The applicants had been limited with their right to expression, and the ECtHR paid attention to 
assess the proportionality of the interference they had suffered, by evaluating the nature and the 
severity of the penalty imposed in respect to the aim sought by national authorities. 
Lastly, given that the distribution of leaflets had taken place at a school which none of the appli-
cants attended and had involved young people without the possibility of declining to accept 
them, the Court regarded the fines as not being excessive, it also considered the suspended 
conviction of the applicants as “not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” (Ivi, § 59).  
Therefore, the ECtHR unanimously held the view that there had been no violation of Article 
10. In Vejdeland there are three concurring opinions, each displaying a peculiar interpretation, 
and showing how the same result can be shaped by different aims and theoretical perspectives. 
The presence of such a varied cluster of separate opinions testifies the complexity of the debate 
on the freedom of expression, and it questions the separation between offensive, but legitimate, 
forms of expression and prosecutable ones.  
In particular, the majority and the minority opinions conveys diverse attitudes towards judicial 
activism. 
Judge Bostjan and judge Zupanic admit they voted for no violation of Article 10, though up-
holding the conviction of the applicants, with “great hesitation” (Vejdeland, con. op., judges 
Bostjan and Zupanic, § 1). On one hand, they considered the message of the leaflets “relatively 
inoffensive” (Ivi, § 5), further criticizing the majority’s approach as going “too far […] on the 
grounds of proportionality and considerations of hate speech - in limiting freedom of speech by 
overestimating the importance of what is being said.” (Ivi, § 12).  
On the other, however, these two judges recalled that, given the peculiar nature of secondary 
schools, Swedish authorities had not exceeded their margin of appreciation. This conclusion 
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comes at the end of an extensive analysis of US jurisprudence on the freedom of speech, and 
their opinion expresses a position begrudgingly favourable to the majority’s decision. Judges 
Bostjan and Zupanic, indeed, do not rely on ECtHR law case, while they do compare Europe-
an framework with the USA; as it may be known, in the US Supreme Court they apply two 
strict parameters, both to be met in order to justify an interference with the right to free expres-
sion: “it must avoid content discrimination (the State cannot forbid or prosecute inflammatory 
speech only on some disfavoured subjects) and, second, it must avoid viewpoint discrimination 
forbidding or prosecuting inflammatory speech that expresses one particular view on the sub-
ject” (Ivi, § 4). As it is noted in this opinion, had the ECtHR applied this test to the case at 
stake, the applicants would have probably breached in their rights secured under Article 10, es-
pecially as the latter criterion is concerned.  
I evaluate this concurring opinion as relevant also for the implicit statement it holds, which, to 
my reading, has a gaze on the future jurisprudence, and aims at tracing an interpretive track for 
other similar cases. Most notably, the merits of the applicants and the content of the leaflets are 
evaluated thorough the theoretical lens developed by US jurisprudence. 
Both Swedish and ECtHR’s decisions are considered as “culturally predetermined” (Ivi, § 7), 
and concurring judges also suggest that national authorities voted for the punishment of the ap-
plicants only because it was targeted against homosexuals, for “had the applicants defended 
homosexuality and railed against wicked homophobes in their leaflets, they would probably not 
have been convicted” (Ivi, § 4).  
Apart from schools and other venues where the audience can’t but listen to certain messages, or 
where the audience is particularly impressionable, judge Zupanic and judge Bostjan evaluate the 
message of the leaflets secured by Article 10. 
Also Judge Spielmann and Judge Nussberger adduced the peculiar scholastic environment as 
decisive in deciding against the applicants, though following a different reasoning and endorsing 
a more activist approach and a perspective sensitive to tackling homophobia. 
They recalled that “hate speech, in the proper meaning of the term, is not protected by Article 
10” (Ivi, § 4), but they disputed whether national Courts exhaustively examined if “behind the 
apparent aim there was any hidden agenda to degrade, insult or incite hated against persons or a 
class of persons on account of their sexual orientation” (Ibidem).  
The last part of the separate opinion, however, provided a powerful theoretical ground which 
anchored the final decision to the Coe and UE policies against homophobia and transphobia. 
In particular, besides recalling that “the factual circumstances of the distribution have an impact 
regarding the scope of the margin of appreciation” (con. op. judge Spielmann and judge Nuss-
berger, § 6), they noted that  
 286	  
 
members of the lgbt community face deeply rooted prejudice, hostility and widespread dis-
crimination all over Europe” (Ibidem), concluding that “it should also not been forgotten 
that a real problem of homophobic and transphobic bullying and discrimination in educa-
tional settings may justify a restriction of freedom of expression […]. It is against this back-
ground that I am satisfied, on balance, that the conviction […] did not violate Article 10 of 
the Convention (Ivi, § 8). 
 
As for the commune policy environment, judge Spielmann and judge Nussberger further men-
tioned the Resolution that had been adopted by the European Committee of Ministers, in 
2009, which recognizes that “statements of a homophobic nature contribute to an atmosphere 
of hostility and violence against sexual minorities” (Ibidem). 
This judicial outcome was influenced by considerations which do not strictly attain with the facts 
at hand, and the judges were highly aware of the symbolic and the social meaning of their inter-
pretation. Therefore, even though admitting they voted with the majority with “the greatest hesi-
tation” (Ivi, § 1), they preferred to endorse an interpretive approach which is more concerned 
with preventing hate crimes, rather than supporting an almost unlimited freedom of expression, 
like in the USA.  
The last separate opinion, filed by judge Yudkivska and judge Villiger, fully embraced an activist 
perspective, considering the case at hand as the starting point to create a specific discipline on 
homophobic hate speech under the ECHR. 
Unlike the previous opinions and in contrast with the majority itself, that aforementioned judges 
said that they had “no difficulty in finding that Article 10 was violated” (con. op., judge 
Yudkivska and judge Villiger, § 1), thus denying Vejedland any highly problematic and sensitive 
profile. 
Whereas other concurring judges aimed at emphasizing the caution that the ECtHR should 
adopt in similar cases, the last concurring judges criticized the ECtHR reasoning as being too 
mild, and as missing the opportunity to “consolidate an approach to hate speech against homo-
sexuals” (Ivi, § 2).  
In this opinion the submissions of third parties are openly recalled, and not simply implied as 
in ECtHR judgment; the opinion starts out precisely from quoting third parties intervener and 
from complaining of the lack of a specific category to sanction homophobic hate speech.  
Moreover, judge Yudkivska and judge Villiger suggested that the Court should take into account 
the most recent developments in the international human rights law, amongst which they re-
called the Recommendation R (97)20 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
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reading: “the term hate speech is to be understood as covering all forms of expression which 
spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of ha-
tred based on intolerance” (Ivi, § 3). This statement amounts to the interpretive lens through 
which facts at stake are evaluated; the accusations of “spread HIV” and of “morally destruct so-
ciety” are hence evaluated as fitting the above definition. 
In respect to the first separate opinion, it’s interesting to note the internal disagreement over 
which theoretical and the legal path to follow when dealing with speeches expressing prejudice 
and bias. The American solution, proposed by judge Zupanic and Bostjan, imposes “a high 
threshold”, protecting hate speech until it “threatens to give rise to imminent violence” (Ivi, § 6); 
yet, according to this standpoint, “for many well-known political and historical reasons today’s 
Europe cannot afford the luxury of such a vision of the paramount value of free speech.” 
(Ibidem).  
From judge Yudkivska and judge Villager’s perspective, this judgment has to be considered too 
restrained, for it refrained from considering hate speech as a distinct offense, which would be 
destructive “for democratic society as a whole” (Ivi, § 9). Quoting the Canadian Supreme 
Court, concurring judged emphasized that hate speech  
 
should not be viewed merely as a balancing exercise between the applicant’s freedom of 
speech and the targeted group’s right to protect their reputation, […] since prejudicial mes-
sages will gain some credence, with the attendant result of discrimination, and perhaps even 
violence, against minority groups, and therefore it should not be protected. (Ibidem) 
 
Activism and judicial law-making are strongly encouraged, to the extent that this opinion waives 
the threat of hate speech as a prelude to a climate in which “conduct and actions that were not 
possible before, become possible” (Ivi, § 12).  
Against the background of a relatively plain judgment, separate opinions capture the complexity 
of theoretical issues implied, and also testify the sociological role of the judges. 
Not only do all judges perform a creative role, but they do not even pretend to attain either to 
the wording or to the original intensions of drafters. They are aware that they are called to an-
swer to pressing social needs that the ECHR functions as the essential frame to which they are 
bound, and that they have to draw concrete criteria from the present legal situation. The source 
of disagreement regards how to philosophically and politically frame the competing interests, 
and how to balance them.  
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Also the collection of legal sources varies; while judge Bostjan and judge Zupanic look at the 
US context, other concurring judge’s focus on the European framework, suggesting that the 
Court should mould its own peculiar solution.  
In Vejedland the Court strengthened and widened the anti-discriminatory safeguards provided 
for homosexual subjects, connecting homophobic speeches to the already existent case-law 
against racist and xenophobic speeches; in conclusion, Article 10 does not protect those 
speeches that, despite not openly calling for violence against minoritarian groups, convey par-
ticular heinous biased and hatred images of a person or of a group of people, especially when 
these expressions are targeted at easily influenced and vulnerable audiences.  
Even though the Court did not adopt particularized standards to address the problem, carefully 
avoiding even to name “hate speech”, the effective interpretation of the ECHR set a first safe-
guard against these kind of expressions; had the ECtHR found a breach of Article 10, the im-
pact on European legislation would have been severe: a consistent number of COE Countries 
already punished hate speech on the grounds of legislations similar to the Swedish one, and, 
hence, under this hypothesis, several groups hostile to LGTB community would have seized 
the ECtHR and demanded the repeal of similar provisions138.  
The Court further specified its approach as to which behaviour and actions conveying hostility 
against homosexuals are secured by the ECHR in Eweida and others v UK, n.48420/10, 
59842/10, 51671/10, 36516/10. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138A original critical reading of Vedjeland is offered by Heinze; as a legal scholar active in human rights, 
he is extremely concerned about the words and the expressions loaded with hatred meanings, and he 
acknowledges that “queer bashing without words is like a dirge without music” (Heinze 2009, 193). Yet, 
he strongly argues that in “stable, long-standing democracies” (Ivi, 204) sexual minorities should avoid 
activating or reinterpreting the restriction of the freedom of speech, while instead fostering tolerant lan-
guage and broadmindedness through informal socio-cultural strategies. On a closer look, judgments like 
Vedjeland would breach twice the profound theoretical premises of non-discrimination. Firstly, they 
would call for a limitation of free speech regardless of the evidence of a demonstrated correlation be-
tween the amount of potentially offensive insults and the degree of violence perpetrated. Secondly, and 
most importantly, they would endorse a legal asset that, if applied to every human category which is ver-
bally mocked and offended - Heinze mentions the disabled and mentally impaired people, the obese, 
and the aged ones, would result in an unfeasible restriction to almost every form of expression and in an 
inherently wrong interpretation of human rights. Heinze resorts indeed not only to pragmatic arguments, 
but also to arguments of justice: given the practical impossibility to extend the ban on hate speech to any 
actual or potential group victim of discrimination, “even if a hate speech ban could be both drafted and 
applied so to protect some groups […] we would still be contradicting the founding assumptions of lead-
ing human rights norms - certainly, of all those that have been central to rights of sexual minorities- if we 
were to maintain that a norm is legitimate even if it cannot be enjoyed equally by all similarly situated 
persons” (Heinze 2009, 202-203). As a consequence, sexual minorities should pretend to fully enjoy of 
their human rights but, at the same time, they should avoid the illusion that the judiciary is entitled to ad-
just and uphold any possible claim. In other words, democracies are legally equipped with all the in-
struments to enforce existing human rights without restricting or infringing those of others. 
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This case was filed by four applicants alleging to be discriminated against because of their reli-
gious beliefs. Most notably Ms Ladele, the third applicant, held that marriage was exclusively 
the union of a man and one woman for life, and believed that same-sex civil partnerships were 
contrary to God’s law (Eweida, § 23). Being employed as a registrar of births, deaths, and mar-
riages, when the UK Civil Partnership Act entered into force, in 2004, she was required to legal-
ly register also civil partnerships; initially the applicant was permitted to make informal ar-
rangements with colleagues to exchange work, but then she was reported for not respecting the 
equality policies supported by the local authorities. The refusal to carry out civil partnerships 
cost Ms Ladele her dismissal. The Civil Partnership Act, effectively, provided the eventuality to 
opt out of designation as civil partnership registrars in the event of sincere religious beliefs, but 
it left the discretion to local authorities, not to individuals. Therefore, since Islington authorities 
did not approve of such an option, Ms Ladele was not entitled to refrain from celebrating same-
sex civil unions. She claimed the right to object to a law in contrast with her religion and con-
science, on the grounds that a) UK law did not impose this duty without exceptions, as it is in 
France for instance, and b) she had been hired before the Civil Partnership Act was approved 
and, hence, she could not have reasonably foreseen that her mansions might contrast with her 
faith.  
The ECtHR delivered a quite concise judgment, dismissing Ms Ladele's claims; scratching be-
neath the surface, however, a number of important elements arose. Most notably, it’s necessary 
to pay attention to both what the ECtHR actually said and to what judges avoided stating. 
The structure of ECtHR reasoning does not attach particular relevance to Ms Ladele’s choice, 
almost displaying a begrudging attitude to her case; on one hand, the Court acknowledged that 
the consequences for the applicant were serious, and it also admitted that, given the strength of 
her faith, she had no choice but to face disciplinary action. 
The Court recalled that she was not able to waive her right to manifest her religious belief by 
objecting to participate in the creation of civil marriages when hired, since this requirement was 
introduced later. However, the Court bluntly held the view that wide discretion should be 
granted when it comes to “striking a balance between competing Convention rights” (Ibidem), 
and concluded that “national authorities [had not] exceeded the margin of appreciation availa-
ble to them” (Ibidem).  
Apparently, the Court applied a structural margin of appreciation, but a closer look reveals a 
substantial evaluation. Firstly, the ECtHR did not review objections on genuine religious 
grounds as valuable, or as sensitive, showing a decisive secularized interpretation of the Conven-
tion, nor did it display any affection for Christian morals. This evidence could be considered as 
obvious, but if compared with the EComHR and also with dissenting opinions in Dudgeon, 
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where commissioners and judges justified the criminalization by recalling religious feelings, 
Eweida marks a completely different approach. Secondly, the Court did not even consider the 
possibility that the conscientious objection, optional according to the Civil Partnership Act, had 
to be granted to all those individuals who genuinely opposed same-sex unions. Thirdly, I con-
sider the absence of even a slight empathy towards the applicant extremely relevant, or at least 
of a symbolic positive evaluation of the contrast between individual conscience and legal obliga-
tions.  
Lastly, even though the applicant was discreet about her beliefs in public, she did not try to per-
suade anyone, and she did not compromise the effective possibility for same-sex couples of that 
district to register their civil partnership, the majority found sanctions imposed proportioned 
and necessary. However, the Court resulted divided on the issue, and the final decision of non-
violation gathered five votes out of a total of seven; the two dissenting judges filed a sharp opin-
ion, going far beyond the mere legal evaluation of the facts at hand, rather crying out for a more 
deferent interpretation to individual and, I would add, to traditional beliefs. 
Judge Vucinic and judge Gaetano backed the supremacy of individual conscience, arguing that 
“once a genuine and serious case of conscientious objection is established, the State is obliged 
to respect the individual’s freedom of conscience both positively (by taking reasonable and ap-
propriate measures to protect the rights of the objector) and negatively (by refraining from ac-
tions which punish the objector or discriminate against him or her)” (Ivi, § 3).  
The applicant’s choice was also dignified in relation to the symbolic meaning it conveyed, since 
judges established an implicit link between the upholding of Ms Ladele’s claims and the “acts of 
heroism, whether at the hands of the Spanish Inquisition or of a Nazi firing squad” (Ivi, § 4). 
While the majority reviewed Ms Ladele’s behaviour as infringing on the promotion of equal 
opportunities ensured by local authorities, the dissenting opinion evaluated the facts from an 
different perspective, arguing that the reasoning and arguments of the majority are “at best irrel-
evant and at worst a case of inverted logic: the issue in Ms Ladele’s case is not one of discrimi-
nation by an employer, a public authority or a public official vis-à-vis a service user of the Bor-
ough of Islington because of the said service user’s sexual orientation” (Ivi, § 6). 
Lastly, I wish to emphasize that the judges shared the specific set of values recalled by the appli-
cant, since their opinion went beyond a merely objective evaluation of the facts, conveying a re-
sentful opinion against the policies activated by local authorities. Ms Ladele’s dismissal was thus 
defined as “the combination of back-stabbing by her colleagues and the blinkered political cor-
rectness of the Borough of Islington (which clearly favoured gay rights over fundamental human 
rights) eventually led to her dismissal” (Ivi, § 5). Apart from the wording, the message implied is 
extremely hostile in respect to lgbt rights, since it implies that there would be a conflict between 
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human rights and gay rights, as if the latter were not a part of the former; at the same time, this 
argument opposed the two categories, as to label the conduct of domestic authorities as unrea-
sonable. Such an evaluation is stated even clearer a few passages below, where dissenting judges 
polemically contended that Islington authorities “instead of practicing the tolerance and the 
dignity for all it preached, pursued the doctrinaire line, the road of obsessive political correct-
ness.” (Ivi, § 7). 
Both Vejdjeland and Eweida tested the possibility to waive the ECHR to legitimize positions 
and ideas restricting lgbt rights, and they have to be interpreted within the wider legal and politi-
cal European context. Back then, legal safeguards against discriminations grounded on sexual 
orientation were expanding, and new regulatory schemes against homophobic speeches and 
behaviour were arising in national and international laws. Moreover, up to that point, the 
ECHR had proven useful to enlarge lgbt rights, to legitimize their pretences as human rights; in 
Vejdjeland and Eweida the situation is reversed, and traditional social sectors resorted to the 
ECHR precisely to stem the tide of lgbt achievements.  
The Court, however, denied this possibility and it strongly endorsed a secularized interpretation 
of the ECHR, detaching from the confused notion of morals outlined in previous judgments; 
therefore bias arising from genuine personal or religious beliefs deserves no more consideration 
than that accorded to bias stemming from racist and xenophobic perspectives.  
Turning to the last section, related to the freedom of the press, the ECtHR caselaw addressed 
the issue by focusing on the practice of outing. The term ‘outing’ defines the practice of publicly 
disclosing that someone who is assumed to be heterosexual is instead gay, lesbian, or bisexual; 
newspapers and journalists have generally been quite interested in the sexual behaviour of poli-
ticians or other well-known people, to the extent that, in the late 1890s, newspapers all across 
Europe ensured coverage of the trial of Oscar Wilde, and British newspapers, up to the mid-
1960s, devoted several pages to trials conducted on the grounds of gross indecency.  
The clash with human rights possibly arises when the outed person alleges a violation of her 
privacy or frames her outing as contrary to her good reputation; applications raised to the EC-
tHR on this practice precisely address this hypothesis.  
These cases do not convey any creative claim, rather expecting individual satisfaction, nor do 
they challenge the ECtHR to innovate the interpretation of the Convention. Their demands 
could be understood as asking for a clarification of the boundaries of the freedom of expres-
sion, and as encouraging a reflection over the balance between the freedom of the press and the 
right to private life.  
In Porubova v Russia, n.8237/03, the applicant was a journalist, condemned by respective na-
tional judicial authorities for the publication of several items concerning the large-scale misap-
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propriation of budgetary funds allegedly committed by Mr V., the head of the Sverdlovsk Re-
gional Government, for the benefit of Mr K., an employee of the Moscow representative office 
of the Sverdlovsk Region. Ms Porubova indulged in great detail depicting a homosexual rela-
tionship between Mr. V. and Mr. K.; the main article was entitled “Gay Scandal at the White 
House”, and the piece, inter alia, read  
 
Once upon a time there lived the head of the Sverdlovsk Regional Government Mr V. He 
had everything: his position, high esteem and respect. And also the governor's love. […] But 
V. fell in love […] not with the governor or with his work, but with a twenty-five-year-old 
employee of the region's representative office in Moscow, Mr K. […] how does one become 
a homosexual? Where does this “love” come from? We are simple unsophisticated people 
[…] And we cannot imagine the scene that took place between them in the sumptuous build-
ing of the region's representative office in Moscow. […] Rumour has it that the governor, on 
having learnt certain details, was furious and even fired K. from his position. But love, as we 
know, can overcome any obstacle. It finds not only a time, but also a place. (Porubova, § 8) 
 
The article further asserted that Mr V. had used public funds to purchase a three-room flat in 
Moscow (Ivi, § 10).  
Her conduct was judged as being outrageous, and the Moscow Court of Appeal held that she 
had disseminated information based on insinuations which she knew to be untrue and defama-
tory. Consequently, she was found guilty under Article 129 § 2 of the Criminal Code, i.e. dis-
semination via the mass media of information known to be untrue and damaging to other per-
sons' honour, dignity and reputation” (Ivi, § 22).  
 In Kuchl v Austria, n.51151/06, and Rothe v Austria, n.6490/07, the case was brought forward 
by two priests who had been outed during a journalistic enquiry on presumed homosexual activ-
ities spreading in St. Poulten Seminary. The article they complained of suggested that Mr. 
Rothe and the principal of the seminary had had sexual relations with seminarians, also report-
ing that some seminarians had downloaded pornography and child pornography onto their 
computers. Two photographs of the applicant were shown, one in which he was about to em-
brace a seminarian, Mr Kuchl, and another one where he and Mr Kuchl were about to kiss 
each other. Mr. Kuchl and Mr. Rothe reported the newspaper, but both the Regional Court 
and the Vienna Court of Appeal held, firstly, that “a large percentage of readers […] would read 
the news magazine in only a cursory manner and would also consult other media before form-
ing their opinion” (Ivi, §12); secondly, Vienna Court of Appeal found established that “the ap-
plicant had had a homosexual relationship with a seminarian, in which he had openly engaged 
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at the priests’ seminary. One witness had stated that the two men were wearing rings with each 
other’s names engraved on them together with the date of the beginning of their relationship” 
(Ivi, § 15). Moreover, owing to the importance of the Roman Catholic Church as a role model, 
the public had a great interest in knowing what was going on in that seminary, also in light of the 
heated debate on civil partnerships. Therefore, both the claims were dismissed. Under the 
ECHR they alleged a violation of their right of respect for private life, contending that national 
journalists could not hide behind the freedom of expression secured by Article 10.  
The ECtHR balanced these two competing interests by giving prominence to the freedom of 
expression at the hands of the press. In particular, when professional politicians or public fig-
ures are involved, a closer scrutiny of their every word is inevitably both by journalists and the 
public at large; hence “the right of the public to be informed, which is an essential right in a 
democratic society, can even extend to aspects of the private life of public figures, particularly 
where politicians are concerned” (Porubova, § 45). 
Furthermore, by reporting the facts, even if controversial, the press enhanced the public debate 
related to politicians in the exercise of their functions, and it exercised the vital role of watchdog 
(Ibidem). 
Such freedom could not be restricted even in a context particularly hostile to homosexuality: in 
Porubova, indeed, the Court found that even though, as reported by cultural and linguistic ex-
perts, “tolerance was uncharacteristic of the Russian mentality” (Ivi, § 48), a journalist could not 
be reported if not explicitly adopting an offensive language, and if reporting information of pub-
lic interest or useful to corroborate other statements. In this case, the ECtHR read the passage 
on the alleged homosexuality of Mr. V. and Mr. K. as “to explain why the scheme had been 
mounted in such a way that Mr K. would be its ultimate beneficiary” (Ivi, § 44). 
Also the negative judgment conveyed by ecclesiastic authorities on homosexuality was not eval-
uated as being sufficient to uphold Mr. Kuchl and Mr. Rothe’s right not to be outed; on the 
contrary, precisely because of the Catholic Church’s model role and its active participation in 
the debate on the recognition of same-sex couples, the Court recognized that the public had an 
interest in what had happened in the seminary (Ivi, § 54). 
Quite obviously, the press does not enjoy unlimited freedom of expression, but the ECtHR ap-
plied a set of criteria already established in cases not specifically involving sexual orientation139, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 In detail, when ascertaining whether articles or photographs infringing on one’s right to private life, the 
ECtHR had to answer, or to take into account, the following questions “(i) which is the contribution to a 
debate of general interest? (ii) how well known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the 
report? (iii) prior conduct of the person concerned; (iv) method of obtaining the information and its ve-
	  
 294	  
hence not considering this feature as more problematic or requiring specific standards of evalu-
ation.  
I do not consider the ECtHR caselaw on freedom of press and outing as particularly theoretical-
ly crucial, since it does not innovate the Court’s perspective on difference nor does it disrupt or 
reinforce a heteronormative understanding of sexuality. 
It could be argued that the ECtHR reasoning on the matter proves relevant as to the distinction 
between private/public, since it apparently fosters public debate on sexual orientation and does 
not close it behind the veil of privacy and silence. 
Insofar as journalists respect the parameters set out by the Court, they are, indeed, allowed to 
disclose one’s sexual orientation to public audience, but I wish to stress that this perspective 
does not necessarily imply a positive evaluation of homosexuality itself, since the press is al-
lowed, if not encouraged, to unveil crimes and the darks sides of politicians and public figures.  
As far as judicial wording does not disclose any hostile evaluation of homosexuality, the context 
in which the outing took place is intertwined with other elements, such as corruption or monas-
tic life. Therefore, the same approach would have occurred if, for instance, Ms. Porubova had 
denounced a heterosexual affair as the reason of Mr. V actions, or if Mr. Kuchl and Rothe had 
engaged in heterosexual intercourse, equally problematic under Catholic morals. 
In conclusion, the ECtHR has delivered relevant theoretical and general interpretive assump-
tions only in relation to homophobic expressions and conscientious objection, which I have al-
ready analyzed above.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
racity/ circumstances in which the photographs were taken; (v) content, form and consequences of the 
publication” (Von Hannover v Germany, § 109-113) 
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4.4.3 The Freedom of Assembly and Association 
 
The ECtHR has recently dealt with complaints alleging a violation of Article 11, securing the 
freedom of association, on the grounds of sexual orientation, and it had the opportunity to ex-
pand and review the safeguards given to the lgbt community when entering the public arena. 
If compared to the complaints related to the ban on joining the army, this collection marks a 
relevant shift and it fully addresses the public dimension of sexual orientation. 
If backwards lgbt people had been secured thanks to the qualification of sexual orientation as a 
strictly private issue, nowadays a growing number of complaints demands the full enjoyment of 
the freedom to gather in associations and to publicly manifest in order to claim rights and to de-
fend interests precisely shaped from any perspective.  
Hence, the right to public visibility as gay and lesbian citizens is claimed, the right to enter pub-
lic spaces as homosexual people, the possibility to influence public opinion and to actively par-
ticipate in political and social debates. 
As for the complaints, the first element which stands out is the exclusive involvement of Eastern 
European Countries, and this situation can be ascribed to multiple political, social, and legal de-
terminants.  
As for the social environment, Eastern Countries are permeated with entrenched homophobic 
attitudes and behaviour: lgbt manifestations are likely to be interrupted by hostile counter-
manifestations, gays and lesbians are exposed to a higher degree of violence and hate crimes, 
and what may be considered as hate speech in Western Countries, here it is regarded as being 
perfectly legitimate and normal. 
Informal sanctions are also mirrored in the political realm, to the extent that a recent ILGA 
Survey pointed out that Eastern authorities do not talk openly about the devastating effects of 
homophobic bullying among young people, nor do they encourage the reporting of attacks and 
hate crimes (Ilga-Europe 2006). The lack of legal instruments, policies, and political intention 
to tackle these phenomena, quite obviously constricts many homosexual people from living dis-
creetly; moreover, in recent years a legal backlash leading to formal discrimination has spread 
throughout Eastern Europe. 
Since 2006, an increasing number of Russian regions has enacted multiple laws restricting the 
public distribution of lgbt materials, formally to protect minors; in 2013 a federal law has crimi-
nalized the distribution of “propaganda” in support of what it has been defined as ‘non-
traditional’ sexual relationships, in contexts where minors could be exposed to such infor-
mation. As various NGOs and lgbt activists report this laws de facto criminalize homosexuality 
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if publicly disclosed, and they provide a justification to hate crimes (Kon 2009; Wilkinson 
2013). 
Secondly, in all cases analyzed national associations were supported by international groups and 
lawyers, so as to elaborate sound theoretical justifications to their claims.  
The involvement of lgbt international dimension, particularly clear in Aleksejev v Russia, 
n.4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, attests that these cases go beyond the demand of satisfac-
tion or restitution, trying to hold the ECHR as a safeguard against the hatred winds coming 
from the East. Most notably, I emphasize that the ECtHR reasoning did not revolve round the 
tolerability of private homosexual acts, but it focused on the legitimacy of public claims put for-
ward in support of the lgbt agenda.  
In Baczkowski and Others v Poland, n.1543/06, the ECtHR firstly set out an interpretative 
guideline, establishing quite a friendly path to the lgbt movement, further widened, deepened, 
and detailed in over the following years.  
The applicants wished to hold a march in Warsaw, with a view to alerting public opinion to the 
issue of discrimination against minorities – sexual, national, ethnic, and religious – and also 
against women and disabled people. Despite the initial agreement on the itinerary of the 
planned march, Municipal authorities subsequently denied them the possibility of holding the 
march, since they had not submitted a “traffic organisation plan” (Baczkowski, § 11). The 
Mayor held the opinion that such a march had to be organised away from roads used for traffic. 
If they were to use roads, more stringent requirements were to be applied. The organizers 
wished to use cars carrying loudspeakers, but they had not indicated where and how these cars 
would park during the assembly as not to disturb the traffic, and how the movement of people 
and cars between the assembly sites would have been organized. As both the applicants and the 
ECtHR recalled, a number of requests had been submitted to organise other assemblies on the 
same day the tenor of which ran counter to the ideas and intentions of the applicants, permis-
sion was also refused in order to avoid any possible violent clashes between participants in the 
various demonstrations. The Major, however, adopted different standards and he permitted six 
demonstrations with slogans as “For more stringent measures against persons convicted of pae-
dophilia”, “Against any legislative work on the law on partnerships”, “Against propaganda for 
partnerships”, “Education in Christian values, a guarantee of a moral society”, “Christians re-
specting God's and nature's laws are citizens of the first rank”, “Against adoption of children by 
homosexual couples” (Ivi, § 16). 
Hence, the applicants decided to hold the manifestation, even if not authorized, and luckily no 
disorder occurred, but they denounced their treatment as discriminatory. In 2006 the Polish 
Constitutional Court upheld the applicant’s claim, and condemned municipal authorities; the 
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applicants, however, denounced a violation of their right to manifestation under the ECHR, 
since despite their efforts, local authorities had not revised their decision in good time to hold 
the march, nor had the latter recognized any satisfaction or compensation to the applicants after 
the judgment of Polish Constitutional Court. 
The ECtHR started out by recalling that the Convention was designed to promote and maintain 
the ideals and values of a democratic society; therefore, the limitations admitted to Articles 9, 
10, and 11 had not to compromise the democratic structure of society. Then, it extensively con-
sidered the value of pluralism and respect for diversity, hence endorsing the applicants’ per-
spective, and it finally found that Polish authorities had breached Article 11. 
Besides the outcome, the structure of judicial reasoning criticizes the heteronormative concep-
tion of sexuality and it disrupts the image of homosexuality as a purely private personal feature. 
Not only is the essence of democracy linked to pluralism and tolerance, but the Court reviews 
public manifestations in support of sexual orientation as performing a crucial role in fulfilling 
democratic ideals, as a “harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is 
essential for achieving social cohesion.” (Ivi, § 62). A few lines after, the Court also indirectly 
cautioned Municipal authorities, by reiterating that “although individual interests must on occa-
sion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of the 
majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper 
treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.” (Ivi, § 63). 
Public actors are first mentioned as being the bearer of duties, and unlike in other judgments, 
the ECtHR does not proceed by recognizing a margin of discretion to Contracting Parties which 
is progressively reduced, taking instead the opposite standpoint and assessing that  
 
genuine and effective respect for freedom of association and assembly cannot be reduced to 
a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere; a purely negative conception would not 
be compatible with the purpose of Article 11 nor with that of the Convention in general. 
There may thus be positive obligations to secure the effective enjoyment of these freedoms. 
(Ivi, § 64) 
 
This passage already discloses that the final judgment would probably find a violation and, more 
interestingly, it grounds this interpretation not merely on the Constitutional Court judgment, but 
on substantial reasons concerning the legitimacy of the facts at stake. 
The Court, indeed, affirmed that the obligation upon public authorities was of “particular im-
portance for persons […] belonging to minorities, because they are more vulnerable to victimi-
zation” (Ivi, § 65).  
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Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument of the respondent Government, which contend-
ed that since the applicants had however taken their march, without incidents, no violation of 
the ECHR could be reasonably claimed. The ECtHR indeed found that “the applicants took a 
risk in holding them given the official ban in force at that time” (Ivi, § 67), and the absence of a 
presumption of legality, which constituted as “a vital aspect of effective and unhindered exercise 
of freedom of assembly and freedom of expression” (Ibidem), could have had a “chilling effect 
on the applicants and others participants, […] discourag[ing] other persons from participating in 
the assemblies on the ground that […] non official protection against possible hostile counter-
demonstrators would be ensured by the authorities.” (Ibidem). 
The lgbt community was fully entitled to publicly displaying their demands, and the ECtHR 
positively encouraged such manifestations as being able to gather the widest number of people 
interested in such issues. Had the Court opted for a more heteronormative perspective, also re-
stricting the enforcement of the ‘closet’, this reasoning would not have occurred, and the effec-
tive carrying out of the specific march would have been deemed as being sufficient in order to 
quash any pretence of violation under the ECHR. 
Besides alleging a violation of Article 11, the applicants claimed to be a victim of discrimination 
on the grounds of their sexual orientation, relying on Article 14. In previous sections I have al-
ready highlighted the fluctuating approach of the Court to this issue, and the general caution to 
directly bind lgbt claims to the principle of non-discrimination, rather connecting them to other 
provisions of the Convention.  
In Baczkowski administrative decisions had refused the request, relying on the absence of a 
proper ‘traffic plan’, without judging the message of the march; the applicants, however, assert-
ed that these decisions were shaped by the will to prevent lgbt from publicly holding a parade 
and, to corroborate this statement, they recalled an interview released by the Mayor of Warsaw, 
only a month before the date of the planned march. On that occasion, he had admitted that he 
would have banned the manifestation “regardless of what they had written”; in fact, he stated to 
be “not for discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation” but he aimed at preventing any 
form of public propaganda of homosexuality, commenting “I do not forbid them to demon-
strate, if they want to demonstrate as citizens, but not as homosexuals” (Ivi, § 27). 
Although apparently not contesting the good faith of administrative actors, and conceding that 
no speculation could be carried on the existence of motives, other than those expressly articu-
lated, to refuse the authorization, the Court stated it “could not overlook” (Ivi, § 97) the inter-
view with the Mayor. He was both an elected politician and holder of public office, with particu-
lar responsibilities. The fact that administrative authorities acted “on the Mayor’s behalf” could 
not be regarded as a merely formal element, but, on the contrary, it affected the ECtHR reason-
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ing, which indeed held: “his opinions could have affected the decision-making process […], and, 
as a result, impinged on the applicants’ right to freedom of assembly in a discriminatory man-
ner” (Ivi, § 100). 
Therefore, the Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11, and it re-
fused the distinction between “homosexual propaganda” and freedom of manifestation, display-
ing an interpretive standpoint definitely in contrast with a biased evaluation of homosexuality.  
This frame was subsequently implemented and specified in Aleksejev v Russia; Johnson, for in-
stance, interprets this case as the trailblazer for a more general approach, which conveyed a cre-
ative interpretation of the ECHR less tied to the concrete circumstances of facts (Johnson 
2011).  
Briefly outlining the background of the case, Mr. Aleksejev made three applications to the 
Court, between 2007 and 2009, related to the attempts to organize a ‘Pride March’ in Moscow. 
In 2006 after he had announced his intention, the Mayor of Moscow delivered a statement 
showing hostility towards any gay march held in Moscow. Consequently, the Mayor also in-
structed his officials and all prefects of the city “to take effective measures for the prevention 
and deterrence of any gay-oriented public or mass actions in the capital city” (Aleksejev, § 20). 
Hence, the Department of Liaison with Security Authorities of Moscow Government and the 
Mayor refused the applicant’s request on the grounds to secure public order, to prevent riots, to 
protect health, morals, the rights and the freedom of others. Regardless of the applicant’s ap-
peals, Moscow Central Administrative Court confirmed this decision, and it also reiterated it for 
the following two years. 
Government’s submissions display a range set of justifications to their conduct whose signifi-
cance goes beyond the facts at hand, pointing out the relation between national sovereignty and 
the ECtHR, also showing a certain hostility towards moral standards imposed by the outside to 
Russian political environment.  
From an institutional perspective, the Government openly claimed that “if the Court were to 
give an assessment different from that of the domestic authorities, it would put itself in the posi-
tion of a Court of fourth instance” (Alekseyev, § 58), and, hence, it disputed the legitimacy of 
the Court to review the assessment made by the Russian Courts, implying that, in the event a 
breach was found, the Russian authorities would have not complied with the judgment of the 
ECtHR. 
From a substantial point of view, the decision of the Mayor was considered as the only measure 
that could adequately address the security risk; according to the Russian Government, after Mr. 
Alekseyev announced the ‘Pride March’, numerous public petitions had been sent to the 
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Mayor’s office, from political, religious, governmental and non-governmental organizations call-
ing for the ban of this manifestation, some of which also included threats of violence (Ivi, § 57).  
Differently from Baczkowski, however, the Russian Government did not mantle his intentions 
under technical issues, nor did it pretend that the ban was entirely due to protecting the appli-
cant and those who might attend this march. On the contrary, the Government alleged the ne-
cessity to protect morals, and it upheld a strong majoritarian understanding of which behaviour 
and values were worthy of legal protection. It emphasized that “any promotion of homosexuali-
ty was incompatible with the religious doctrines for the majority of the population […] and that 
allowing the gay parades would be perceived by believers as an intentional insult to their reli-
gious feelings and a terrible subbasement of their human dignity” (Ivi, §59).  
If in Grady and Smith, Sutherland, and other cases, the respondent Government had recalled 
the predominant traditional moral feelings, but it had also highlighted its efforts in promoting a 
change in dominant mentality, Russian authorities presented their decisions as fully in accord-
ance with international human rights law and with the ECtHR jurisprudence. Relying on the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and on the ECtHR Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria judgment, 
they noted that individuals should be respected in their religious and moral beliefs, in their right 
to bring their children up in accordance with them, and they concluded that “the State must 
take into account the requirements of the major religious associations and […] the democratic 
State must protect society from destructive influence on its moral fundamentals, and protect the 
human dignity of all citizens, including believers” (Ivi, § 60).  
Believers’ perspective was, hence, fully legitimized, and it was not critically scrutinized to deter-
mine whether it illegitimately restricted the rights of others. Moreover, the quoted statement at-
tests that Russian authorities were not neutral, but they considered homosexuals as morally de-
structive, and as not being entitled to human rights. 
Gay parades may be viewed by involuntary spectators, the Russian argument goes, especially 
children and, because of this, any form of celebration of homosexual behaviour should only 
take place “in private or in designed meeting places with restricted access” (Ivi, § 61).  
Lastly, the Russian Government tried to demonstrate the lack of consensus among COE Coun-
tries on the issue, so as to claim a wide margin of consensus. As the Court noted, however, they 
took into account a loose and flawed parameter, namely the extent to which homosexuality was 
accepted in each country, also referring to obsolescent cases, like Dudgeon or Muller.  
The ECtHR disowned Government’s submissions by each and every point, taking the oppor-
tunity to reaffirm the competences of the Court in reviewing domestic decisions. 
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The Court distanced itself from the heteronormative and majoritarian reading of homosexuali-
ty, neither interpreting it as a potential disruptive feature, nor defining rights granted to minori-
ties on the grounds of majoritarian attitudes. The ECtHR unanimously held the view that there 
had been a violation of Article 11 and of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11, according to 
a straightforward reasoning, which directly challenged the Government’s position.  
While the Russian Government implied that the ban was required precisely to maintain the 
democratic asset, the Court noted “irrespective of the aim and the domestic lawfulness of the 
ban, it fell short of being necessary in a democratic society” (Ivi, § 69).  
The anti-majoritarian judicial attitude can be understood also in relation to two other issues: the 
evaluation of the actual risk posed by threats received by local authorities - and the consequent 
obligation imposed on public actors- and the ascertainment of whether public morals justified 
the ban. 
As for the former, the Court admitted that “where a serious threat of a violent counter-
demonstration exists, domestic authorities [enjoy] a wide discretion in the choice of means to 
enable assemblies to take place without disturbance” (Ivi, § 75); however, the mere existence of 
a risk was insufficient to justifying the ban, and further investigation was required. 
The Court noted that some groups, such as the Orthodox Church, had simply written to local 
authorities to express their opposition to the pride March, and others, such as the Supreme 
Mufti, had declared they would hold a counter manifestation, but they did not threaten the ap-
plicant in anyway whatsoever. Only the Muslim authority in Nizhniy Novgorod threatened vio-
lence; consequently, Russian authorities should have assessed the degree of risk posed solely by 
this association and the possible means to contrast it. 
Then, even admitting the serious threat posed by petitions and opponents, the Government 
had failed to carry out an adequate assessment of the risks for the participants and to take all the 
necessary measures to offer minorities the effective opportunity to enter into the public arena. 
The absence of deference to national sovereignty emerges even in another passage, where the 
Court found that “if security risks played any role in the authorities’ decision to impose the ban, 
they were in any event secondary to considerations of public morals” (Ibidem). The Court 
scaled down security issues in the overall assessment, almost implying that the attention to this 
theme was functional to cover the core reasons behind the Russian decisions.  
As for the protection of morals, the Court denied that the march posed relevant trouble or that 
it could result as being offensive for large portions of society, since the purpose of the march 
was to promote respect for human rights and freedom, and to call for tolerance towards sexual 
minorities; at no stage was it suggested that the event would involve any graphic demonstration 
of obscenity (Ivi, § 82). Also the assumption that democracy imposed the obligation to strictly 
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respect majoritarian beliefs, by restricting individual rights, was rejected, and the Court clarified 
that such a perspective was in direct opposition with the ideals of the ECHR itself, for “it would 
be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Convention 
rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted by the majority” (Ivi, § 
81). Were this so, a minority group's rights would become merely theoretical rather than practi-
cal and effective as required by the Convention. 
Interestingly, the Court restated the secularized approach developed in Baczkowski, and it did 
not even consider whether the majority of the Russian population actually despised homosexu-
als, further detaching itself from the interpretive path of Dudgeon, where the majority had held 
that if “there are disparate cultural communities residing within the same State, it may well be 
that different requirement, both moral and social, will face the governing authorities” (Dudgeon, 
§ 56). 
The strict separation between the private and public realm was deemed unacceptable as well; 
the Russian Government had quoted ECtHR Dudgeon, Norris, and Muller to allege that the 
only right that homosexuals could claim was not to be criminally prosecuted, if living their ori-
entation discreetly. The Mayor had, indeed, clearly considered it necessary “to confine every 
mention of homosexuality to the private sphere and to force gay men and lesbians out of the 
public eye, implying that homosexuality was a result of a conscious, and antisocial, choice” (Ivi, 
§ 86).  
Judicial standpoints show an emphatic evaluation of the applicant, and, to my reading, the judg-
es sent Russian authorities the message that the increasing institutional homophobia would no 
longer be tolerated under the ECHR. The tenure of the arguments, the choice of language, and 
the sharpness of wording are quite surprising, especially when considering that in 1993 the 
EComHR had dismissed the case of two Austrian citizens, wishing to hold at official national 
celebrations banners remembering gays and lesbians who had been deported to Nazi camps, by 
justifying the argument provided by domestic authorities that the tenor of their claim clashed 
with the solemnity of the ceremony. 
Eventually, the Court also denied the necessity to rely on European consensus, since, on these 
questions, it was “of no relevance […] because conferring substantive rights on homosexual per-
sons is fundamentally different from recognizing their right to campaign for such rights” (Ivi, § 
84). In any case, the ECtHR highlighted that no ambiguity could be admitted by national legisla-
tion on the recognition of the individual right to openly identify themselves as gay, lesbian or 
any other sexual minority, and to promote their rights and freedoms, in particular by exercising 
their freedom of peaceful assembly. 
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The contrast between the ECtHR definition and that endorsed by the Russian Government led 
to the substantial dismissal of the ECtHR judgment, since the Russian Parliament enacted the 
same year anti-gay propaganda laws, and politicians openly defended the legitimacy to ban gay 
parades.  
Formally, Russian authorities argue that they are complying with European standards on human 
rights, since, according to their submission in response to harsh critics from the European Par-
liament, these laws would only prevent the proposal of homosexuality as being normal and as 
desirable as heterosexuality, but they would neither criminalize homosexuals, nor would they 
preventively deny freedom to expression and manifestation to sexual minorities.  
As several NGOs highlight, however, the actual enforcement of similar provisions consistently 
restricts lgbt rights, and it contributes to creating a social and informal environment which was 
extremely hostile to gays, lesbians and transsexuals, who often fell victims to hate crimes (Wil-
kinson 2013; Fish 2014). 
The interpretation of Article 11 was applied again in Genderdoc v Moldova, n.9106/06, which 
is extremely similar to Alekseyev, while the ECtHR significantly innovated its interpretation in 
Identoba and others v Georgia, n.73235/12, a case which has been defined as a “jurisprudential 
milestone for lgbt citizens” (Johnson 2015). 
The main fact of that case may be summarized as follows: Identoba, a Georgian non-
governmental organization promoting lgbt rights, planned to organize aq march on 17th May 
2012, in the centre of Tiblisi to mark the International Day Against Homophobia. Identoba 
gave notice to the Tiblisi City Hall and to the Ministry of the Interior prior to the event, inform-
ing them of the planned route of the march and of the estimated number of participants, and 
also requesting specific protection from possible violence, stemming from the general back-
ground of hostility towards sexual minorities. Neither the City Hall nor the Ministry of the Inte-
rior objected, and the march took place. However, while proceeding through the city centre and 
holding banners, staff members of Identoba and other activists were stopped by members of the 
Orthodox Parents ‘Union and the Saint King Vakhtang Gorgasali’s Brotherhood, who claimed 
that “nobody was entitled to hold a Gay Pride Parade or to promote ‘perversion’, as it was 
against moral values and Georgian traditions” (Ivi, § 12). In reply, the marchers continued to 
walk. They were even subjected to threats of physical assault and to insults, accused of being 
“sick” and “immoral” people and “perverts”. Further pejorative name-calling such as “fagots” 
and “sinners” was also repeated. The police patrol cars, which were escorting the marchers, dis-
tanced themselves from the scene, intervening only after counter-demonstrators grabbed the 
banners from the hands of several activists, kicked, insulted and knocked them down. Moreo-
ver, the police did not arrest counter-demonstrators, but forced three lgbt activists to stay in the 
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Police department for some twenty minutes, while waiting for counter-demonstrators to go 
away; as a consequence of this attack, three applicants had to receive medical treatment for inju-
ries on the knees, grazes on palm and fingers, haemorrhagic forearm, hematoma on eyebrows, 
contusions on the chest and wrists. Therefore, Identoba filed a formal proceeding, complaining 
both of the attacks and of the behaviour of the police, who had not promptly protected them; as 
stated to the ECtHR, several TV channels had broadcasted the scenes of the fight and the po-
lice was well able to identify the aggressors, since their faces were clearly recognizable. 
Subsequent investigations, however, concluded that, as there were no signs of illegality in the ac-
tions of the police during the demonstration, there was no need to launch an investigation for 
abuse of power. As for the counter-demonstrators’ actions, two of them were arrested for trans-
gression of minor breaches of public order and fined 100 Georgian laris - 45 euros- each. The 
applicants specifically requested that criminal investigations be launched on account of the ver-
bal and physical attacks perpetrated against them, and on account of the acts and/or omissions 
of the police officers, who had failed to protect them from the assaults. The applicants empha-
sized that criminal inquiries should be conducted with due regard to Article 53 of the Criminal 
Code, which provided that the existence of homophobic intent was an aggravating circumstance 
in the commission of a criminal offence. Nevertheless, domestic authorities did not review their 
decisions, and at the time of the ECtHR judgment, as the Court notes, “the criminal investiga-
tions opened […] by the sixth and fourteenth applicants are still pending, and the two applicants 
have never been granted victim status” (Identoba, § 28). 
Hence, Identoba and the activists affected by aforementioned events alleged a violation of Arti-
cle 3 in conjunction with Article 14, and of Article 11 in conjunction with Article 14; they also 
alleged a violation of Article 10, but the Court stated that there was no need to examine the case 
under that provision.  
In light of Backowski and Alekseyev, the finding of a violation of Article 11 in conjunction with 
Article 14, namely an illegitimate interference with the applicants’ right to manifestation on the 
grounds of their sexual orientation, appears relevant but not innovative.  
Rather, this outcome reiterates and strengthens the interpretive path already set out in the pre-
vious two cases. The most important outcome, which justifies the relevance attached to this 
judgment, lies in the fact that the Court held that the Georgian authorities had breached Article 
3 in conjunction with Article 14, thus framing the conduct of the police as amounting to ill-
treatment: they had failed to provide due protection during the parade, and they had also car-
ried out ineffective investigations, twisted by the entrenched bias against homosexuals.  
A violation of Article 3 in respect to sexual orientation has rarely occurred in ECtHR jurispru-
dence, and, moreover, here it is linked with Article 14; this implies that discrimination and ill-
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treatment against homosexuals are brought into the scope of Article 3, which is one of the most 
important and absolute rights within the entire ECHR. Furthermore, the Court did not inter-
pret ill-treatment as requiring extreme physical harm, rape or other forms of bodily torture, ra-
ther referring either to treatments which are discriminatory or addressing the lack of adequate 
measures against hate crimes, and framing them as exceeding the minimum threshold required 
by Article 3. 
Public authorities are not only bound not to allow public officials to directly inflict ill-treatment 
on lgbt people, but also to effectively protect individuals from attacks related to their sexual ori-
entation, perpetrated by private actors. 
Whilst in Vejdedland the concept of hate speech/crimes was not set out by the Court, in Iden-
toba the Court takes a further step in interpreting the Convention as imposing broad obligations 
in respect to homophobia. The majority of the judges considers that “all of the thirteen individ-
ual applicants became the target of hate speech and aggressive behaviour” (Ivi, § 70), and as-
sessed the existence of inhuman treatment by starting from subjective feelings and sufferance 
experienced by the applicants themselves: “the treatment of the applicants must necessarily 
have aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity, which were not compatible with 
respect for their human dignity and reached the threshold of severity within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention” (Ibidem). Thus, despite violence 
being described as mainly verbal and only sporadically physical, it nevertheless infringed the 
applicants’ human rights.  
This judgment conveyed a notable positive evaluation of difference, and it further legitimizes 
lgbt movements as essential actors in democratic public debate. 
The Court began its review by recalling that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severi-
ty if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (Ivi, § 65), and by interpreting discriminatory re-
marks and insults as “an aggravating factor when considering a given instance of ill-treatment” 
(Ibidem).  
Discrimination carries the prejudice against a minority, and it is utterly incompatible with the 
essential aims of the Convention; since a biased interpretation of differences leads to behaviour 
infringing on human dignity, the prevention of such crimes plays a fundamental role in comply-
ing with obligations arising from the ECHR. 
Quoting ECtHR wording, “the authorities must do whatever is reasonable in the circumstances 
to collect and secure the evidence, explore all practical means of discovering the truth and de-
liver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may 
be indicative of violence induced by […] violence motivated by gender-based discrimination 
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[…].Treating violence and brutality with a discriminatory intent […] would be turning a blind eye 
to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights.” (Ivi, §, 67) 
Not even wide spread hostility against the lgbt community can justify the restriction of the free-
dom of manifestation, while, instead, it obliges competent authorities to elaborate actions which 
effectively contrast the risks faced by lgbt activists and which ensure them the right to freely 
manifest for their goals and claims (Ivi, § 68). 
The Georgian police failed to comply with such positive obligations, also falling “short of their 
procedural obligation to investigate […], with particular emphasis on unmasking the bias motive 
and identifying those responsible for committing the homophobic violence.” (Ivi, § 80). 
The only dissenting opinion did not dispute the violation of Article 11 in conjunction with Arti-
cle 14, but it claimed that those acts of ill-treatments could not be brought into the scope of Ar-
ticle 3. According to judge Wojtyczek the Court should have been more cautious in evaluating 
the applicants’ submissions, while remaining as suspicious as in its previous jurisprudence and 
interpreting Article 3 as requiring either physical harm or prolonged psychological damage. 
From this opinion, however, the main element of dissent does not rely on a specific under-
standing of homosexuality, but on how to assess the existence of torture or of inhuman treat-
ment, and, to my reading, it can’t be interpreted as endorsing discrimination against sexual mi-
norities. 
If considering the interpretive approach of the ECtHR in respect to Article 11, it seems that the 
Court is taking quite a straightforward direction, aimed at securing the right to freely manifest 
for lgbt rights and at interpreting the contribution of the lgbt movement to the public debate as 
an enriching and essential precondition for the protection of democratic regimes, and as a posi-
tive obligation imposed by the ECHR. 
Even if anchoring the present judgment to past caselaw and presenting it as coherent and linear 
prosecution, the Court innovates its interpretation and performs law-making. Firstly, it enlarged 
the set of events that has given rise to treatments forbidden by Article 3; secondly, it framed dis-
crimination as an aggravating factor when assessing the breach of other provisions. Then, the 
Court specified that public authorities are obliged both to positive and negative obligations, re-
quiring not to illegitimately restrict the citizens’ right of manifestation, and also requiring to ef-
fectively secure that everyone is enable to exercise their rights.  
The remainder to hate speech and hate crimes stems from a marked awareness of the Europe-
an social and political debate, since these terms refer precisely to issues highly debated in na-
tional political arenas; hence, the Court is not concerned with interpreting the ECHR so as to 
maintain an originalist reading of the Convention, but if fully undertakes a creative and innova-
tive path, aimed at answering the social needs expressed by an oppressed minority.  
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The reference of the Court is the ECtHR jurisprudence itself, even as to the definition of ill-
treatment and degrading treatment, and it definitely disrupts the model of the closet. 
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4.5 The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples 
 
Following the scheme set out in paragraph 4.1, I now address the cases claiming for the legal 
recognition of same-sex couples, whether through wedlock or civil partnerships. I focus on 
those claims of rights, whose raison d’être lying in the existence of a relationship between the 
applicant and another person of the same sex; these rights attain to social benefits granted to 
married or cohabiting heterosexual couples, to the application of specific schemes of taxation 
and, above all, to the legal recognition of same-sex couples.  
The strategic aim pursued by these complaints is to obtain the recognition of a progressively 
wider frame of rights, moulded on those granted to married couples. Before the ECtHR, the 
applicants contended that the recognition and protection of homosexual relationships fell into 
the ambit of human rights, and claimed that Countries not recognizing same-sex marriage, or 
not providing adequate civil partnerships, would be in breach of the Convention. 
The ECtHR case-law on same-sex couples is marked by three phases: firstly, the applicants long 
challenge of the ECtHR and the EComHR interpretation, thus framing same-sex relationships 
as falling within the ambit of family life, secured by Article 8 (par. 4.5.1); secondly, in the land-
mark Schalk and Kopf v Austria case, n.30141/04, it was extensively discussed whether the 
ECHR obliged contracting States to recognize same-sex marriage (par. 4.5.2); thirdly, in recent 
years, the Court has dealt with relevant cases concerning the legal recognition of same sex cou-
ples by means of frameworks alternative to that of marriage (par. 4.5.3). 
The relational and affective dimension plays a fundamental role, and it leads to a significant 
shift of the paradigm: in previous case-law, the entrenched question raised by the applicants ad-
dressed those rights which enabled the person to live his homosexuality openly, to gather with 
other homosexuals, to create networks, to serve in the army, or to manifest on the grounds of 
his/her sexual orientation. 
The claim of legal recognition of same-sex couples, instead, assumes the existence of a commit-
ted, relational bond as the foundational element of the rights claimed: the legislator is required 
to discipline, to recognize as publicly valuable, and to make the relationship between two same-
sex partners official. Public authorities are not just the guarantors of the effective possibility for 
homosexual individuals to fully enjoy of all their citizen’s and human rights, but they are the au-
thority who is deemed to legally recognize same-sex couples.  
Hence, the demand of specific rights and duties bears the symbolic image whereby the recogni-
tion from the State brings a qualitative melioration in the relationship between two people, in 
that it becomes official and with public relevance.  
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lgbt strategic litigation on this issue falls within the wider ongoing litigation on same-sex mar-
riage, spread throughout European Countries, the USA, and also non Western Countries. 
Though this claim has only been directly raised twice, in Schalk and Kopf v Austria and partial-
ly in Oliari and others v Italy, n. 18766/11 and 36030/11, also complaints demanding alternative 
forms of recognition try to reduce the distance with the legal status of married couples. It might 
be suggested that the other applicants chose to frame their claim without recalling the right to 
marry, precisely because of the ECtHR approach to Schalk and Kopf, with the intent to pursue 
a pragmatic strategy and incremental achievements. 
The first phase attains to the right of lgbt couples to be recognized even through different legal 
schemes; from this point, activists can push forward the ECtHR reasoning by challenging the 
legitimacy of differentiated treatment between heterosexual and homosexual cohabiting part-
ners and, then, between unmarried homosexual and married heterosexual ones, on the grounds 
that the former were not allowed to enter wedlock. 
At this point the margin of discretion granted to national countries would result as being re-
duced, and despite marriage still being restricted to heterosexuals only, homosexual couples 
should be granted legal schemes ensuring the same and equal rights. From a pragmatic point of 
view, the unicity and supremacy of marriage would be disrupted, but from a symbolical perspec-
tive, this solution would lead to a problematic ‘separate but equal’ regime. 
Marriage indeed confers rights, and social dignity to those relationships which are considered 
valuable, which allegedly convey positive values and ideals, and fulfil social utility. Nowadays all 
Western legislations do not consider the presence of children as essential to enter into wedlock, 
to the extent that couples which are not able to generate biologically or which do not plan on 
having children are allowed to marry. Reappraising a famous article by Nussbaum, the meaning 
of marriage is neither univocal nor fixed; leaving aside the religious meaning, two main aspects 
are related to marriage: a civil right, and an expressive aspect (Nussbaum 2009, 669). As for the 
first aspect, “married people get a lot of government benefits […]: favourable treatment in tax, 
inheritance, and insurance status; immigration rights; rights in adoption and custody; decisional 
and visitation rights in health care and burial; the spousal privilege exemption when giving tes-
timony in Court; and yet others” (Ibidem).  
Moreover, though marriage people express a public commitment to mutual care, that is often 
expressed in the front of the community where the partners live; as such “being able to make it, 
and to make it freely […] is considered a definitive aspect of adult human freedom” (Ibidem), 
and as Nussbaum argues, marriage presumes a symbolical answer on the part of the society, for 
the spouses declare their love and commitment, and the society, in response, recognizes and 
dignifies that commitment.  
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Civil partnerships risk becoming citizens of second class, even on a purely symbolical level; the 
dimension of symbols and social meanings, however, is essential to individual and collective life, 
as Zanetti points out in a powerful and catchy passage “un sogno d’amore non viene coronato 
offrendo un anello in un ristorante fancy, col ginocchio piegato, chiedendo al partner se accetta 
la proposta di formare una domestic partnership; e indubbiamente c’è una certa differenza se si 
presenta la persona amata come il proprio consorte o come il proprio domestic partner” (Za-
netti, 2015, 88). 
At the moment, however, the ECtHR does not seem to be the appropriate arena where to ad-
vance claims based on symbolical arguments; even though the Court has recently recognized 
the equal value of same-sex relations, it appears quite difficult that this institution will interpret 
Article 12 as requiring Contracting Parties to recognize same-sex marriage, at least in the nearest 
future. 
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4.5.1 Same-sex Couples and Family Life 
 
One of the most controversial and sensitive issues that the ECtHR had to confront with regards 
to the question whether same-sex relationships fall into the ambit of ‘family life’, secured by Ar-
ticle 8 of the ECHR. The relevance of this issue is twofold: the claim to frame same-sex rela-
tionships as a form of family life challenges the heteronormative assumption according to which 
gays and lesbians are not capable of establishing an affective bond comparable to heterosexual 
ones; furthermore, the recognition of homosexual family life stands as the legal and theoretical 
starting point that justifies the reading of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 in respect to 
same-sex couples and, consequently, the comparison between the legal treatment granted to 
heterosexual couples and homosexual ones.  
Approaching the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and of EComHR, the first complaint based on 
the existence of homosexual relationship between the applicants is X. and Y. v UK, (dec) n. 
9369/81, whereas the first deemed admissible, and partially upheld, has been P.B. and J.S. v 
Austria, n. 18984/02140.  
As previously recalled, Dudgeon enlarged the notion of private life, up to include homosexual 
private life, but the ECtHR didn’t consider homosexual acts as falling within the ambit of family 
life. Establishing a strict separation between the private and public sphere, the ECtHR also drew 
a line between private, consensual homosexual activities and homosexual relationships. 
In a sense, it could be argued that what appeared as most troublesome was not the idea of two 
men having sex but, instead, the possibility that their relationship was based upon the same 
commitments and desires as heterosexual couples. The imaginary of gay men indulging in fre-
quent and promiscuous activities challenged the heteronormative perception of affectivity less 
than the idea of a homosexual mutual commitment. 
X and Y v UK, S. v UK, (dec) n.11716/85, W.J and D.P. v UK, (dec) n.12513/86, Z.B. v UK, 
(dec) 16106/90, C. and L.M. v UK, Röösli v Germany, (dec) n.28318/95, Mata Estevez v Spain, 
(dec) n. 56501/00, Manec v France, (dec) n. 56501/00, Courten v UK, (dec) n. 4479/06, Karner 
v Austria, n.40016/98, Kozak v Poland, n.13102/02, and P.B. and J.S. v Austria, n.18984/02, 
questioned precisely this idea and argued for the recognizing a legal value to the affective, as 
well as to the sexual, bond between two same-sex persons. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 The Court deemed the case admissible on the 20th March 2008, two years before Schalk and Kopf v 
Austria, Nevertheless, the Grand Chamber upheld Schalk and Kopf a month before the First Section 
judged the case P.B. and J.S. v Austria. 
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Until Mata Estevez, the decision of what fell within ‘family life’ was entirely at the hands of the 
EComHR, which deemed all complaints inadmissible. By performing this role of gatekeeper, 
the EComHR both prevented the ECtHR to judge on the issue and, at the same time, it en-
gaged in the interpretation of Article 8, and performed a consequent creative interpretation. 
On a closer look, the EComHR laid the foundations of its restrained notion of family life in X 
and Y v UK, W.J. and D.P. v UK, B v. UK, C. and L.M. v UK, (dec) n. 4753/89, which chal-
lenged, unsuccessfully, British provisions in immigration law. Even though insisting on the same 
national context, these cases still prove relevant, since the EComHR enriched the final deci-
sions considering general importance.  
To briefly sketch the main common features, the British Statement of Changes in Immigration 
Rules HC 169, allowed certain foreign heterosexual spouses and fiancés to join the partner in 
the United Kingdom but, as the EComHR noted, the law did not make any provision for the 
reunification of homosexual couples (W.J. and D.P. v UK, § 22). 
This provision also applied to heterosexuals with an unsettled immigrant situation, under the 
condition that the British partner was able to economically maintain the second without public 
expenditure, and that, at the time as the request, the partner seeking admission held a current 
entry clearance granted to him for that purpose. 
Leaving aside the specificities of different cases, the reiterated and basilar departing assumption 
of the Commission was that, despite the evolution of attitudes towards homosexuality, the 
Commission could not ascribe same-sex relations to family life for purposes of Article 8. 
Moreover, when evaluating the alleged discriminatory treatment imposed by British Rules on 
Immigration, the EComHR acknowledged that the applicants had been treated less favourably 
because of their sexual orientation, but, nonetheless, the Commission fully justified the choice 
of British authorities, accepting that  
 
the treatment accorder to the applicant was different from the treatment [he] would have re-
ceived if the partners had been of different sexes. […] the Commission therefore accepts 
that the difference in treatment between the applicant and somebody in the same position 
whose partner had been of the opposite sex can be objectively and reasonably justified. 
(Ibidem) 
 
This decision reveals the practical consequences of the privilege attached to a heteronormative 
conception of sexuality. Had the applicants been a heterosexual couple, the EComHR would 
have considered their relationship as falling within the meaning of ‘family life’, thus restricting 
the discretion granted to the respondent Government. Instead, the EComHR found that the 
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deportation order was proportionate to the “aim [of] economic well-being of the country” (Arti-
cle 8) and dismissed all claims. 
Moreover, the reasoning adopted by judges implies that a homosexual person, with an unsettled 
immigration status, has to abstain from establishing affective and loving relations, unlike hetero-
sexual people; this assumption could be related to different but connected arguments: it firstly 
recalls the stereotypical idea that, since gay couples can’t give birth to children and are pre-
sumed not to have deep social roots, they could easily settle in any country; secondly, it assumes 
either that the enforcement of a deportation order doesn’t affect the same intensity same-sex 
and heterosexual relations or that a same-sex relationship does not realise a valuable commit-
ment. 
The EComHR did not review, or change, its perspective, not even when the risk of criminal 
prosecution was implied, or when minors were involved. In Z.B. v UK the applicant was a Cyp-
riot national who lived in a stable relationship with a British citizen; subsequently to the expira-
tion of his residence permit and to the denial of stable residence permission, the applicant 
claimed for asylum, “on the basis of a well-founded fear of prosecution […] in view of the fact 
that male homosexual behaviour is a criminal offence in Cyprus” (Z.B v UK, § 1). 
The EComHR, however, legitimized the UK decision and its indifference to the fact that Mr. R 
couldn’t follow the applicant in Cyprus suggests a prejudiced approach; evaluating the concrete 
risk of prosecution, the EComHR didn’t attach relevance to the probable prosecution against 
Mr. R, almost suggesting that if he followed his partner to Cyprus it would be his responsibility 
not to behave too openly. 
The case of C and L.M. v UK raised the issue from a different standpoint, namely that of 
child’s best interest. C. was an Australian citizen who had been living with a female partner in 
the UK since 1984 and who in 1989 had given birth to a child, namely the second applicant. Af-
ter her request of a permanent residence permit was denied, she lodged a complaint with the 
ECtHR, contending that since the birth of the child she was economically dependent on her 
partner and that “in the event of her deportation to Australia with the child, she would be 
homeless, destitute, and have to rely on social security payments for the maintenance of herself 
and her child”. Given the stable relationship between the two women and the necessity to guar-
antee a fair balance between the best interest of the child and the public laws on immigration, 
one could expect a careful approach, engaging in a critical reading of UK immigration rules, 
even leaving the final outcome unchanged. Instead, no weighty reasoning occurred and the 
Commission simply relied on its previous case-law, without even mentioning the well-being of 
the child, but solely upholding the legitimacy in treating differently same-sex and heterosexual 
relationships. 
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Both the traced interpretive standpoints and the plain words of the Commission display a het-
eronormative definition of family life: the EComHR acknowledged that the final outcome was 
due to the homosexuality of the applicants, but it also emphasized the different entrenched val-
ue of heterosexual ones, attaching greater value to the latter:  
 
The Commission considers that the family merits special protection in society and it is no 
reason why a High Contracting Party should not afford particular assistance to families. The 
Commission therefore accepts that the difference in treatment between the applicant and 
somebody in the same position whose partner had been of the opposite sex can be objec-
tively and reasonably justified. (W.J. and D.P. v UK, C and L.M. v UK) 
 
Not only did the EComHR refuse any possible relationship between the notion of ‘family life’ 
and a same-sex relationship but it expressed a conception of family completely grounded on 
marriage. Even though in the quoted passage judges do not plainly express this concept, they 
convey it as underpinning the ideal of family, as if the only thing that has to be secured under 
the Convention, is the one sanctioned by wedlock. Following the reasoning of the EComHR 
any other relationship should be allowed to claim rights under the Convention only insofar as it 
can be assimilated to the ideal model of family.  
The character of the heteronormative perspective endorsed by the EComHR is so pervasive 
that judges do not justify further their position and completely reject the claims of the applicant. 
Majoritarian morals are both undisputed and upheld by the EComHR; its reasoning, however, 
conveys an inherent biased interpretation of family life, since the Commission mentioned the 
recent developing trends towards a growing tolerance, but it accorded them less relevance than 
that granted to the protection and the enforcement of traditional values, as if the latter aims 
were more desirable and dignified. 
The differences were negatively evaluated and commissioners did not deny the difference be-
tween cases put forward, but they fully justified the UK decisions, framing homosexual and het-
erosexual relations as two separate and unequal conditions.  
Looking at the structure of the EComHR decisions, national laws constitute to the parameters 
and the reference point of any evaluation. The extent to which the status quo is considered as 
good and uncoerced is given by the absence of a reasoning taking into account, even partially, 
the perspective put forward by the applicants. 
At the core of the EComHR decision to quash the applicants’ complaints a rigid distinction be-
tween private and public sphere can be understood, between sexual and family life. From the 
reasoning of the Commission, the private sphere looks like a closet, wherein lgbt people have to 
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stay, and which is completely closed off from any other realm. In other words, the EComHR 
does not attach legal relevance to social relations built on the grounds of a specific sexual orien-
tation, as if it were possible to separate sexual intercourses from affective bonds established on 
the grounds of a given sexual orientation. 
Over the same time period, a number of applicants asked for the recognition of specific rights 
descending from long-term cohabitation, generally guaranteed to heterosexual couples under 
the notion of ‘family life’ secured by Article 8 of the Convention. 
Until the already mentioned Mata Estevez, judges reiterated a completely heteronormative con-
ception of ‘family life,’ without further explaining or justifying their perspective. In S v UK and 
Roosli v Germany, the applicants claimed the right to succeed in the tenancy of the house 
where they had been living with their deceased same-sex partner, who was the tenant. Both Brit-
ish and German laws provided this opportunity for unmarried, cohabiting heterosexual couples, 
but a similar opportunity was precluded to lgbt couples. The EComHR simply considered that 
“the family (to which the relationship of heterosexual unmarried couples living together as hus-
band and wife can be assimilated) merits special protection in society and it see no reason why a 
High Contracting Party should not grant particular assistance to families” (S. v UK, §7), also ac-
cepting “that the difference in treatment between the applicant and somebody in the same posi-
tion whose partner had been of the opposite sex can be objectively and reasonably justified.” 
(Ivi, § 7). 
The realm of private life, for the purposes of present cases, was furthermore narrowly defined 
as the relationship between the applicant and his/her deceased partner; given that the applicants 
had not been interfered with in the course of their same-sex relationship, no breach of their re-
spect for private life could be claimed. Hence, according to this perspective, private life neces-
sarily included an ongoing relation with a same-sex person, and it did not cover the situation of 
the surviving partner. Furthermore, in S v UK the Commission entirely dismissed the perspec-
tive of the minority, adopting a loose reasoning. The Court stated that “The fact remains, how-
ever, that on the death of the partner, under the ordinary law, the applicant was no longer enti-
tled to remain in the house, and the local authority was entitled to possess the house so there-
fore it could no longer be regarded as "home" for the applicant within the meaning of Article 8” 
(Ivi, § 4). 
It could be critically noted that the Commission took as its starting point the same arguments 
and evidence that the applicant had brought before them, in order to critically review them; the 
exact reason which had led the applicant to file a complaint, became the starting and undisput-
ed premise of the EComHR. Therefore, the structure of this passage recalls the structural mar-
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gin of appreciation, and it encourages a formalist review of national provisions, further strength-
ened by the heteronormative and majoritarian standpoints already addressed. 
Mata Estevez can be considered, however, as the initial turning point that pushed judges to criti-
cally consider their positions. It was indeed the first complaint in which the ECtHR provided 
justification for its decision not to comprehend the homosexual relationship of the applicant in 
the notion of ‘family life’, by recalling the doctrine of consensus. 
After the death of his long-term partner, Mr. Mata Estevez appealed to national authorities 
claiming the social-security allowances for the surviving spouse; however, the National Institute 
of Social Security refused to grant him a survivor’s pension on the grounds that since he had not 
been married to Mr G.C., he could not legally be considered as his surviving spouse. 
The Court accepted that marriage constituted as an essential precondition for eligibility for sur-
vivor’s pension, but it clarified that a difference in treatment is discriminatory under Article 14 if 
it has no objective and reasonable justification, in other words if it does not pursue a “legitimate 
aim” or if there is no “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought to be realised” (Article 14). 
The judicial reasoning is still extremely problematic, for it combines a substantial question, 
namely whether a homosexual relationship falls within the scope of family life, with a procedur-
al method, the consensus analysis.  
Judges do not express any substantial argumentation against the claim of the applicant, also rec-
ognizing that, in principle, he might have a fair demand. Apparently, the main grounds which 
leads to the exclusion of long-term same-sex relationships from the notion of ‘family life’ lies en-
tirely on the absence of a European consensus on that specific issue. 
It could however be contended that the practical definition of consensus departs from a biased 
interpretation of legal and social changes that were taking place within the Council of Europe. 
While same-sex marriage were already legal in the Netherlands, by then seven Contracting 
States had recognized same-sex civil partnerships141 and in other three, at least, the legal recogni-
tion of same-sex couples was an issue of public relevance142. Even though there wasn’t a homo-
geneous common policy, the ECtHR could have attached some relevance to the developing 
trends, hence more accurately reflecting the evolution of European legal systems and conduct-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 At that time Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Netherlands, France and Belgium already recog-
nized same-sex civil partnerships. 
142 In Germany, Finland and United Kingdom the legal recognition of homosexual couples was debated 
in Parliament. In Germany a Civil Partnership Act was approved the 1st August 2001, in Finland in 2002 
whereas the British Parliament adopted the Civil Partnership Act in 2004. 
 317	  
ing an in-depth analysis of public debate around gay and lesbian issues, even if not leading to a 
different decision. 
The absence of hostile considerations in respect to the applicant suggest that, unlike in the pre-
vious cases, this decision is imbued more by the image of marriage as a fixed institution, shaped 
by national culture, rather than by a prejudiced evaluation of same-sex relations; the wording of 
the ECtHR suggests indeed that if Spanish legislation had provided the same rights to unmar-
ried heterosexual partners, its reasoning might have been different: hence, the Court implies a 
comparison between heterosexual and homosexual couples, even though restricting it to un-
married ones. 
In fact, this approach was at the core of Karner v Austria, where the Court upheld the com-
plaints of the applicant, but left the question open as to whether a same-sex relationship still fell 
outside the notion of family life. 
This case revolved around the alleged right of the survival partner to continue the tenancy of 
the house where he had been living with his partner; the applicant died in 200l while the com-
plaint was still pending, but his mother asked for the case not to be struck out. 
Karner marks the initial point of a process of change within the ECtHR’s approach to family 
life, and here the Court opened the interpretation of the ECHR as to include same-sex affectivi-
ty within the notion of family life, displaying however very cautious reasoning. 
The first innovative element is the reason not to strike out the case: the Court interprets the 
case as the opportunity to extensively clarify the rules instituted by the ECHR, and it further 
notes that “although the primary purpose of the Convention system is to provide individual re-
lief, its mission is also to determine issues on public-policy grounds in common interest, thereby 
raising the general standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights juris-
prudence throughout the community of Convention States.” (Karner, § 26). 
Hence, Mr. Karner’s claim is framed not as primarily entailing individual satisfaction or com-
pensation, but as involving “an important question of general interest not only for Austria but 
also for other States Parties to the Convention” (Ibidem), namely that of the difference in 
treatment of homosexuals as regards to succession tenancies.  
Karner is also the first case in which the Court has positively evaluated and mentioned third 
parties’ opinion; Ilga-Europe, Liberty, and Stonewall granted legal and argumentative support to 
the applicant, and through his case tried to promote civil partnerships as a matter of human 
rights. They submitted the idea that strong justification was required when the grounds for a dis-
tinction was sex or sexual orientation, also alluding to the growing number of national Courts in 
European and other democratic societies requiring equal treatment of unmarried different-sex 
partners and unmarried same-sex partners (Ivi, § 36).  
 318	  
Quite interestingly, the ECtHR started out from third parties’ statements and it did not stray 
from them, rather considering that their intervention had highlighted the general importance of 
the issue, and therefore the majority decided not to reject the case . 
The Court undertakes an activist and creative perspective, which gathered the overwhelming 
majority of the judges; judge Grabenwarter, however, filed a significant dissenting opinion, 
where the main terrain of disagreement concerned the role of the Court and its proper degree 
of activism.  
Most notably, this opinion raises doubts as to whether the Court is entitled to deliver judgments 
of general importance, and as to whether it is appropriate to establish a frame which could easi-
ly lead to a massive caseload of parallel applications. Judge Grabenwarter, indeed, suggests that 
“it is not in line with the character of the Convention system […] to continue proceedings with-
out an applicant on the ground that this contributes to elucidating, safeguarding and developing 
the standards of protection under the Convention. […] General importance needs to be read in 
a narrower sense” (Ivi, dis.op., judge Grabenwarter). 
Not only did the Court take the opposite view, but it also opened up to consider same-sex rela-
tionship as falling within ‘family life’; even if suggesting that the present case did not raise the 
necessity to examine the meaning of family life, the Court reduced the margin of appreciation 
conceded to domestic authorities, affirming that the aim of protecting the family “in the tradi-
tional sense is rather abstract and a broad variety of concrete measures may be used to imple-
ment it” (Ivi, 41). Under the ECHR differences in treatment based on sexual orientation could 
be accepted only if national authorities convincingly show that in order to achieve a legitimate 
aim, as it may be the protection of traditional marriage, “it was necessary to exclude certain cat-
egories of people – in this instance persons living in a homosexual relationship. […]” (Ibidem). 
In Karner the Court concluded that the Austrian Government had failed to uphold this re-
quirement and, therefore, held that there had been a breach of Mr. Karner’s rights under the 
ECHR. 
This passage is extremely relevant, both for what the Court says and for what it does not do. To 
clarify my position, I focus on the argumentative structure of the Court’s evaluation: if in previ-
ous cases the departing macrostructure had been the recognition that the protection of tradi-
tional family was weighty and required great discretion, here the Court begins by questioning 
the set of policies usually labelled as necessary in order to protect a situated model of family.  
While in S. v UK the Commission had considered such aim as “itself clearly legitimate”, in 
Karner it does not recall the great importance of traditional values, but emphasized its abstract 
nature: the breadth of national discretion was reduced and even though implicitly, the Court 
clarified that homosexual couples could be compared to heterosexual unmarried ones. 
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This reading enlarged the role of the Court in substantially reviewing national legislations, and it 
explicated the pre-eminence of non-discrimination over the enforcement of traditional values; 
the Court further discussed the notion of family life, roughing out the approach that will mark 
its interpretive perspective in the majority of cases concerning the claim of rights grounded on 
same-sex long-term relationships. 
In Kozak the Court compares the applicant’s situation to family in a traditional sense, detaching 
from the notion of family based on heterosexual marriage. 
Mr. Kozak alleged a discrimination against him, on the grounds of his homosexuality, since 
Polish authorities had denied him the possibility of taking over the rent of his deceased partner, 
hence infringing his private and family life, while this opportunity was granted to unmarried co-
habiting heterosexual couples. 
Before the Court, the respondent government contended that the relationship between Mr. 
Kozak and Mr. T.B. could not be considered as genuine, since “at some unspecified time the 
applicant and T.B. had come into conflict. T.B. asked the authorities to strike the applicant's 
name out of the residents' register and intended to start eviction proceedings against him” 
(Kozak, §11) while the applicant had not assumed responsibility for T.B.'s funeral. 
Moreover, the applicant’s credibility was further questioned since Polish authorities referred 
that in the years 1994-1995, the applicant had unsuccessfully attempted to succeed to have ten-
ancy of a council flat, after the death of a certain E.B., hence implying that Mr. Kozak’s claim 
should be dismissed as ill-founded. 
The applicant contended that despite the fact that he and Mr. T.B. had been arguing for a peri-
od, nine months before T.B.'s death they had reconciled and they had resumed their relation-
ship. He also submitted that he had looked after T.B. during his illness up until his death, and 
explained that he had helped T.B.’ former wife to organize his funeral but that officially she fig-
ured as the sole organizer, in order to receive a partial refund of expenses from the Social Secu-
rity. 
Quite interestingly, the Court preferred not to judge the quality of the relationship between the 
two men. Judges noted that for heterosexual cohabiting partners the Polish 1994 Act did not 
require them to be fully and sincerely committed one another, but it solely required the objec-
tive cohabitation in the tenant’s household, in a “de facto marital cohabitation” (Ivi, § 40).  
Had the Court filtered the facts through a heteronormative perspective, or even through the 
principle of precaution, it would have extensively disputed the nature of their commitment, for 
instance by considering the decision of Polish authorities as not deriving from a discriminatory 
intent. 
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The ECtHR standpoint is innovative on two occasions: firstly, the Court does not directly link 
the aforementioned provisions with the legitimate aim of protecting traditional family and, sec-
ondly, it dismantles the biased idea, conveyed throughout previous judgments, whereby in order 
to claim rights, lgbt people were required to demonstrate a linear and coherent path of behav-
iour. By undertaking such a view, the Court interprets the EHCHR as detaching from both het-
eronormativity and majoritarian premises. 
As in cases before Karner, the ECtHR initially conceded that the protection of the family in the 
traditional sense was “in principle a weighty and legitimate reason which might justify a differ-
ence in treatment”, but in the proceeding judges shelled out a rich reasoning, which restricted 
the set of legitimate means to adopt in the protection of traditional family.  
Most notably, respect for family life had to necessarily take into account developments in socie-
ty and changes in the perception of social, civil-status and relational issues, “including the fact 
that there is not just one way or one choice in the sphere of leading and living one's family or 
private life” (Ivi, § 97). The intangibility of traditional family was, then, dismantled, and the 
Court suggests that even same-sex couples may fall within this notion. A few lines later, the ma-
jority also focuses on striking a balance between traditional family and the rights of sexual mi-
norities, stating that it “is, by the nature of things, a difficult and delicate exercise […]. Neverthe-
less, […] a blanket exclusion of persons living in a homosexual relationship from succession to a 
tenancy cannot be accepted by the Court as necessary for the protection of the family viewed in 
its traditional sense” (Ivi, § 97). 
The innovations encapsulated in these passages are various, relevant from a sociological and le-
gal perspective, for they convey an interpretation of the ECHR anchored to the present social 
environment. 
Firstly, the Court acknowledges that the term family comprises of a heterogeneous multiplicity 
of relationships, among which the traditional model is just a specific one, and it upholds that the 
discrimination of other forms of family life could amount to discrimination under the ECHR. 
The Convention does not mention sexual orientation among forbidden causes of discrimina-
tion, nor could it be deduced by drafters’ original intentions, but it is derives from the reading 
of present-day conditions. Moreover, the Court considers the balance between traditional fami-
ly and same-sex relationships, without mentioning the existence of overwhelming majorities 
supporting alternative models of family; this suggests that the assessment of rights which could 
be afforded to lgbt couples neither requires support from the widest national public opinion nor 
presumes scientific evidence on the comparability between these two models. 
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Domestic authorities are enabled to decide how to legally structure rights arising from wedlock 
and the Court does not deny that traditional family would stand in a preeminent position in 
confront of all others models. 
This standpoint appears as being mostly shaped by a substantial evaluation of the deep rooted 
social meaning of marriage and by the principle of precaution, but not by majoritarian con-
cerns; otherwise, the Court would have probably relied on public opinion, as it did in Dudgeon, 
or on medical evidence, as it did in Sutherland. 
Though not explicitly stated, Kozak is framed as falling within family life, and even the doctrine 
of the Convention as a living instrument is influenced by such a frame. The Court, indeed, 
states that “the State, in its choice of means designed to protect the family and secure, as re-
quired by Article 8, respect for family life must necessarily take into account developments in 
society and changes in the perception of social, civil-status and relational issues, including the 
fact that there is not just one way or one choice in the sphere of leading and living one's family 
or private life.” (Ivi, § 99). 
Even though not recognizing same-sex couple relationship as family life, the ECtHR seems 
aware that the traditional family is not the only existing model, and that also the others deserve 
legal protection under the ECHR. 
The ECtHR made its most direct statement about the relation between family-life and same-sex 
relationships in two almost simultaneous judgments, Schalk and Kopf v Austria and P.B. and 
J.S. v Austria. While the first one has been extensively criticized and will be thoroughly ana-
lyzed in the next paragraph, less has been written about the latter, which still represents an in-
teresting case. 
The complaint was about the alleged right to obtain an extension of the health insurance to the 
partner of a stable same-sex relationship. Mr .J.S, an Austrian citizen, was, indeed, ensured with 
the Civil Servant Insurance Corporation, which refused to recognize Mr. P.B. as being entitled 
to benefits, in 1997.  
Austrian legislation was then amended, but it reiterated discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion. Before J.S. and P.B. filed their complaint to national Courts, the law specifically provided 
a difference based on the sex of the partner of the insured. After the definitive amendment, 
however, health insurance was granted to a person who even though not a relative of the in-
sured, had been living with him/her in the same household for at least ten months and since 
then, inter alia, he or she is bringing up one or more children living in the same household. 
The majority, five to two, departed from what previously implied in Kozak, finally stating that  
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The Court considers it artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a different-sex cou-
ple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy ‘family life’ for the purposes of Article 8. Consequently, 
the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto 
partnership, falls within the notion of ‘family life’, just as the relationship of a different-sex 
couple in the same situation would. (Ivi, § 30) 
 
The right to respect of family life, to which applicants were now entitled, allowed the Court to 
reduce the margin of discretion for national authorities; in respect of the original legislative pro-
vision the Court found a violation, whilst it considered the amended versions legitimate, since it 
set out criteria according to a neutral wording, and since “the applicants did not argue that un-
der Austrian law homosexuals are excluded from caring for children” (Ivi, § 47). 
I consider this argument, however, as extremely problematic, since it doesn’t address the prob-
lem of indirect discrimination; even though the applicants did not dispute the exclusion of ho-
mosexuals from raising children, at that time, Austrian legislation excluded same-sex couples 
from second parent-adoption and joint adoption. It was not rare that homosexual couples 
raised a child, whether she was the biological or the adopted child of one partner, but the fre-
quency of these families could not be compared to the extension of unmarried couples with 
children. 
The alleged neutrality of the wording adopted by Austrian legislator, therefore, could be inter-
preted not as a way of eliminating discrimination against same-sex couples but just to shape the 
discriminatory provisions in a more suitable and apparently equal way.  
The deliberate choice of the majority not to consider this issue, consequently, could be consid-
ered as a restraint approach that endorsed the discretion of national authorities to pursue dis-
criminatory policies, as long as covered by a neutral language. 
The final outcome appears jeopardized, torn between the enlargement of the notion of the 
meaning of Article 8 and the consequences that would logically follow from an activist interpre-
tation of the ECHR. If the interpretive instruments developed by the ECtHR are adequate and 
sharp in contrasting the multiple forms of direct discrimination, their potential in addressing in-
direct and pervasive forms of discrimination remains undeveloped.  
If the prejudice according to which same-sex couples weren’t considered as families has been 
formally overturned, still, the perspective that orients the ECtHR to same-sex issues does not 
take a full departure from the heteronormative understanding of marriage, as explored in the 
next paragraph. 
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4.5.2 Is There a Right to Same-Sex Marriage Under the ECHR? 
 
Given the theoretical, legal, and symbolical relevance of marriage, it’s surprising that the Court 
has only directly dealt with this issue once, in Schalk and Kopf v Austria. As already suggested, 
the claim of same-sex marriage is implied in a variety of other complaints, yet the demand that 
Article 12 requires same-sex marriage has been presented as the main grounds of a complaint. 
This fact could be explained by the interpretation laid down by the ECtHR, which, on one 
hand, clarified that there was no room to support an interpretation of the ECHR requiring 
same-sex marriage, at least in the short run, and, on the other, which also pointed out that the 
only way through which lgbt could claim couple rights, was that of widening the sphere of com-
parison between unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples. 
Effectively, Schalk and Kopf v Austria offered the testing ground for hopes flourished after 
Karner and Kozak, and judges were faced with the choice as to whether or not to lay the foun-
dations for a completely renewed definition of marriage. 
This case was originated by two male Austrian cohabiting citizens who, between 2002 and 2004, 
were denied the possibility to marry or to have their relationship otherwise recognized by law 
(Schalk and Kopf, § 3). Until 2010 the decision of domestic authorities not to amend the Civil 
Code, which directly mentioned the heterosexual nature of marriage, led to the total absence of 
legal recognition for gay and lesbian couples. 
In 2010, the Austrian government introduced the Civil Partnership Act for homosexual cou-
ples, which granted limited rights and denied gays and lesbians the right to adopt; nevertheless, 
the applicants contended that even after the introduction of civil partnership, gays and lesbians 
were granted fewer rights and, hence, they argued that a discriminatory distinction between lgbt 
and heterosexual married couples was still held.  
The applicants pursued an activist and strategic perspective: their main aim was to push the EC-
tHR to consider same-sex couples as being legally equal to married couples and, to this end, 
they relied on two distinct but intertwined standpoints. Firstly, they alleged that even though Ar-
ticle 12 did not mention same-sex marriage, the Court should interpret that provision as prohib-
iting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in civil status legislation. Then, they 
claimed that, since lgbt affectivity fell within family life, any differential treatment between het-
erosexual and homosexual couples would amount to discrimination; as a consequence, under 
the conjoint reading of Article 14 and Article 8, COE Parties were allowed to recognize same-
sex couples by alternative means to marriage, only insofar such institutions conferred the same 
rights and duties arising from wedlock. 
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Before considering the ECtHR response, it’s worth emphasizing the role played by the third 
parties, which made a valuable effort to produce legal, social, and theoretical compelling argu-
ments. Among third parties, the UK Government intervened against the applicants, highlighting 
that relevant political pressure was upon the Court. NGOs, represented by Robert Wintemute, 
clearly encouraged the Court to create law, “to use the opportunity to extend access to civil 
marriage to same-sex couples”, since “the fact that different-sex couples were able to marry, 
while same-sex couples were not, constituted a difference in treatment based on sexual orienta-
tion” (Ivi, 37).  
In his submission Wintemute contrasted various arguments usually against same-sex marriage, 
offering multifaceted cues to judges. 
From a legal standpoint, Wintemute argued that differential treatment could only be justified 
for “particularly serious reasons” and that, in their contention, “no such reasons existed: the ex-
clusion of same-sex couples from entering into marriage did not serve to protect marriage or the 
family in the traditional sense” (Ibidem). He also recalled judgments from the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, from Canadian and the US Courts, so as to demonstrate that, despite the 
lack of a European consensus on same-sex marriage, legal recognition of same-sex couples was 
marking a worldwide trend. 
From a symbolical perspective, NGOs emphasized that same-sex marriage would not devaluate 
marriage in the traditional sense, since those who believe in the latter institution would be free 
to behave as they pleased. 
Finally, Wintemute relied on social evidence, recalling that the institution of marriage had un-
dergone considerable changes and that, as the Court had already held, the inability to procreate 
could not be regarded as per se removing the right to marry. It was conceded that in Goodwin, 
relating to the right of trans genders to marry a person of the opposite sex, there was European 
consensus, but Wintemute argued that in the absence of any objective and rational justification, 
considerably less weight should be attached to consensus doctrine. 
The Court took the opportunity to reason on the meaning of ‘family’ and ‘marriage’, but the 
majority did not acknowledge either the applicants or the NGOs’ arguments, and its judicial 
reasoning has given rise to multiple controversial issues. 
As for the claim that Article 12 required same-sex marriage, the ECtHR strongly anchored its 
understanding of marriage to the alleged intentional ratio of the drafters and to a restrained lit-
eral interpretation of Article 12, which read: “men and women of marriageable age have the 
right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of 
this right”. 
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The ECtHR, at unanimity, held that there had been no violation of Article 12 (Ivi, § 64). I 
would read this decision as the outcome of political and institutional concerns; by 2010 the na-
tional and international lgbt movement was strongly claiming the right to marry throughout 
Western countries, often clashing with counter-demonstrators, with religious opposition, and 
with political conservative parties. The fact itself that the UK Government filed an opinion 
against the applicants marks that this case went beyond the situation of the applicants, and it 
signifies a contrasted vision of ECtHR aims. The lgbt movement, on one hand, resorted to the 
Court with the intent of pursuing socio-legal change aiming at overstepping national coalitions 
that impeded such a reform, hoping that the Court would lay down a uniform legal frame for all 
COE Countries; on the other hand, the UK Government reiterated the primary role of national 
sovereignty and European consensus, and recalled that the issue of same-sex marriage con-
cerned a sensitive area of social, political and religious controversy, where national States should 
enjoy a particularly wide margin of appreciation. 
The effective lack of consensus of same-sex marriage might suggest that the ECtHR actually 
shaped its decision purely on formal and doctrinal reasons, without discussing the merits of the 
parties. Even if it were so, the ECtHR reasoning could be critically evaluated as being strongly 
majoritarian, since it would however subordinate the legitimacy of claims advanced by the effec-
tive existence of a broad and uniform interpretive environment, favourable to the recognition of 
the aforementioned rights.  
Throughout the judgment there are several passages suggesting a reasoning moulded on struc-
tural margin of appreciation; the comparison between Article 12 and Article 9 of the European 
Charter of Human Rights, which does not mention specifically ‘men and women’, the statement 
that the Court “would no longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in 
all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex”, as well as the 
final affirmation that “the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regula-
tion by the national law of the Contracting State” (Ivi, § 60). 
As far as being majoritarian and targeted at strengthening its own legitimacy, the ECtHR reason-
ing might be still regarded as not openly heteronormative; other passages depict quite a differ-
ent frame.  
Assessing the principles that guide its review, the ECtHR hints at considerations of general im-
portance, laying the reference points also for following case-law; firstly, the Court recalls that 
even though the right of marriage is subjected to national laws, “the limitations thereby intro-
duced must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such extent that the very essence 
of the right is impaired” (Ivi, § 49). Then, the Court observes that at the outset, it had not yet 
had “the opportunity to examine whether two persons who are of the same-sex can claim to 
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have a right to marry” (Ivi, § 50). Hence, even though the focus is the case at stake, the horizon 
of the Court is definitely wider, since judges do not deal with the question of whether, given the 
factual circumstances, the applicants can claim the right to marry, but rather they reason on 
whether same-sex marriage falls within human rights secured by the ECHR.  
Recalling its jurisprudence on the marriage of transsexuals, the Court also noted that since the 
enactment of the Convention there had been “major social changes in the institution of mar-
riage” (Ivi, § 52), and that Article 12 could be interpreted in order to meet such changes. 
Nevertheless, the Court relied on a strong heteronormative perspective: transsexuals had been 
allowed to marry both because in Europe the legal frame was quite homogenous, and because 
judges had considered that in those cases the post-operative transsexuals could be assimilated to 
a born female/male (Hodson 2011, 170). Hence, the final outcome relied not on the reform of 
the institution of marriage, but on the normalization of transsexuals, whose features were con-
sidered fitting the binary heteronormative conception of sexuality143. Had the Court upheld the 
claim of transsexuals on the grounds that the legal notion of marriage was presumed to mirror 
wide spread social changes, the claim of same-sex couples to enter into wedlock would have ap-
peared less problematic.  
Instead, the ECtHR departed from the original wording of the Article, stating that even though 
“looking at in isolation, the wording of Article 12 might be interpreted so as not to exclude the 
marriage between two men or two women, […] the choice of wording in Article 12 must be re-
garded as deliberate” (Ivi, 55).  
It is true that Article 12 is the only provision where the ECHR grants rights not to “everyone” 
but to “men and women”, and it is also quite obvious that in the 1950s marriage was under-
stood in the traditional sense of being a union between partners of different sex.  
Yet, it seems disputable to draw a line between some aspects of marriage, considered as funda-
mental to secure its traditional asset, and others which, instead, are depicted as accessories: in 
the 1950s not only same-sex marriage, but also legal equality between the spouses, the right to 
divorce, and the dismantling of the presumption of paternity were unconceivable, but the Court 
has interpreted the ECHR as securing such features. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 On this point I recall Gonzales, who conducted an in-depth analysis of the ECtHR’s caselaw on gen-
der identity; in respect of transsexual marriage he offers a critical reading of the arguments displayed by 
the ECtHR’s judges, arguing that “the victory of Goodwin […] showed that the Court decided to re- de-
fine its understanding of legal sex in a manner that incorporates the transsexual who has moved across 
the binary, as a member of the sex group on the other side of the boundary.” (Gonzales 2014a, 812) 
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Even the statement that the choice was deliberate is loose, since drafters mentioned both men 
and women not to crystallize the heterosexuality of marriage, but to emphasize that both men 
and women enjoyed the same freedom to choose when and who marry. (Johnson 2015, 207). 
Besides being historically inaccurate, such a statement offers a theoretical ground to deny that 
same-sex marriage could even fall under Article 12, since even imagining a clear consensus on 
the issue, the deliberate intention would remain unchanged. 
In this frame, the ECtHR recurs to the principle of precaution, endorsing the status quo as neu-
tral and natural, but not completely casting off the possibility to develop a different approach in 
the future. Firstly, the Court observes that “marriage had deep-rooted social and cultural conno-
tations, which may differ from one society to another” and that “the Court must not rush to 
substitute its own judgment in place of that of national authorities” (Ivi, 62). Precaution and 
subsidiarity are strongly intertwined, and the Court enigmatically finds that “it cannot be said 
that Article 12 is inapplicable to the applicants’ complaint” (Ivi, § 61). 
This ‘double negative’ form does not lead to an affirmative outcome, rather suggesting that the 
applicability of Article 12 to same-sex couples is inconclusive, and, as the Register of the EC-
tHR held, it could neither be ascertained that Article 12 applies to same-sex couples, nor that is 
does not, leaving the issue opened. 
As Hodson remarks, “if marriage is not inevitably an institution for opposite-sex couples, as the 
Court has acknowledged, then the exclusion of a peculiar group from it requires explanation.” 
(Hodson 2011,173). Article 12 does not provide exemption clauses144 and, accordingly, a differ-
entiated treatment in the enjoyment of the aforementioned right may be justified only on the as-
sumption that homosexual and heterosexual couples wishing to marry are not in a relevant 
comparable situation. Before Schalk and Kopf, the ECtHR had endorsed such reading; after 
Schalk and Kopf, however, the position of the Court is less than clear: same-sex couples are 
comparable to different-sex couples, but nevertheless Article 12 only applies to them if with the 
say-so of national States (Hodson 2011, 173). 
Undoubtedly, a different reading of Article 12 would have fuelled the objection that by engaging 
in activist judicial review, the ECtHR would usurp the democratic functioning of Contracting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Most notably, unlikely Article 8, Article 12 does not allow the Contracting Parties to restrict the en-
joyment of the right to marry insofar they pursue a legitimate aim, they respond to a pressing social 
need, and there is proportionality between the means and the aims sought. On the interpretation of Ar-
ticle 12 with reference to same-sex marriage see Schuster (2012); Hodson (2011); Johnson (2011); 
Scherpe (2013). 
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Parties, especially if considering that in 2010 only seven of 47 Countries allowed same-sex cou-
ples to marry (Lau 2013, 643). 
In fact, it’s relevant to note that several leading scholars and jurists, though starting out from a 
secularized perspective, considered the ECtHR reading of Article 12 as appropriate or, more 
precisely, as the only feasible under the COE’s political and legal framework. 
Commenting that judgment, Wintemute, for instance, reflected whether the tie of consensus 
had a utility, and he considered it a strength in the overall scenario of lgbt litigation. Single 
judgments surely disappoint the applicants and the activists, but a judicial review completely de-
tached from consensus analysis would prove much more perilous;145 “the Court looks for con-
sensus because its judgments are binding” Wintemute argued, further adding “if the Court ap-
peared to force the views of a small minority of Countries […], it would risk a political backlash, 
which could cause some governments to threaten to leave the Convention system” (Wintemute 
2010, 1).  
This incremental approach is also endorsed by Eskridge, who considers the small but incre-
mental achievements as the safest solution to foster an inclusive culture, to root respect and 
dismantle prejudices, and to prevent the risk of backlashes (Eskridge 2002, 58). 
Against this background, the restraint of the ECtHR on the alleged violation of Article 14 con-
jointly read with Article 8 is definitely more questionable. 
Dissenting judges Spielmann, judge Rozakis, and judge Jebens, in particular, highlight the non-
exhaustive and contradictory Court reasoning. The majority recognized the comparability be-
tween heterosexual and homosexual couples, stating that it would be “artificial to maintain the 
view that, in contrast to a different same-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy family life 
for purposes of Article 8” (Schalk, § 94), also clarifying that “the Court would start from the 
premise that same-sex couples are just as capable as different-sex couples of entering into stable, 
committed relationships. Consequently, they are in a relevantly similar situation to a different-
sex couple as regards their need for legal recognition and protection of their relationship” (Ivi, § 
99). Yet, the majority denied that the absence of recognition for same-sex couples amounted to 
an unjustified discrimination (Ivi, § 103). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 In that occasion Wintemute also compared the ECtHR and the UN system, pragmatically weighting 
the gradual but concrete achievements of the former with the plangent proclaims of the latter: “United 
Nations human rights law often loses all contact with Earth, and floats off into the stratosphere. Laudable 
pronouncements about human rights are made, but they are not binding on governments, and there are 
no sanctions for non-compliance, especially not expulsion from the UN. The closest we have to a world 
court of human rights is the UN human rights committee in New York and Geneva. But it is a commit-
tee, not a court, and issues non-binding "views", rather than binding judgments” (Wintemute 2010, 1).  
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To make the situation even more complex, in 2010 the Austrian government approved the Civ-
il Partnership Act, specifically to provide a legal frame for homosexual couples. Not only did 
this Act mark the difference with marriage, but it also denied lgbt couples the right to access the 
technique of artificial insemination, unlike that provided for heterosexual unmarried couples. 
The majority of the ECtHR, however, argued that the Court was not called to review the na-
tional legal framework, stating that judgment of PA “would go beyond the scope of the present 
application” (Ivi, §109). 
Neither dissenting judges expressed an evaluation on Partnership Act, but they still considered 
Austrian family laws in breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, up to the introduction 
of the aforementioned Act, nor did they also contend that this outcome was coherent with the 
majority’s reasoning.  
According to dissenting judges “having decided that the relationship of the applicants […] falls 
within the notion of family life, the Court should have drawn inferences from this finding” (Ivi, 
dis.op., judge Spielmann, judge Rozakis, judge Jebens, § 3). By deciding that there has been no 
violation, the Court at the same time “endorses the legal vacuum at stake, without imposing on 
the respondent State any positive obligation to provide a satisfactory framework, offering the 
applicants, at least to a certain extent, the protection any family should enjoy.” (Ivi, § 4). 
Had the majority followed this reasoning, the Court would have eluded obstacles posed by Ar-
ticle 12, by recognizing the illegitimate nature of the absence of legal recognition for homosexu-
al couples. Such an interpretation would have significantly challenged the heteronormative in-
terpretation of the Convention, innovating the notion of marriage and, at the same time, inter-
preting the ECHR as a living instrument. 
The Court argued that in order to assess eventual discrimination, the legal treatment of gay and 
lesbian couples had to be compared to that of unmarried heterosexual couples, but it also con-
sidered that States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation as regards to the exact status conferred 
by alternative means of recognition (Ivi, § 108), hence rejecting the idea that “if a State chooses 
to provide same-sex couples with an alternative means to recognition it is obliged to confer a 
status on them which […] corresponds to marriage in each and every aspect” (Ibidem). 
Schalk and Kopf marked an impasse in the ECtHR jurisprudence, but, at the same time, it reit-
erated that same-sex relationships fell within family life, that a blanket distinction between the 
former and heterosexuals was artificial, and that, gay and lesbian couples had a similar need for 
legal protection. 
The majority of comments has focused on the shortcomings of the ECtHR’s review. However, 
some authors have also addressed the innovative features of Schalk and Kopf, effectively antici-
pating the ECtHR’s approach of Vallianatos and Oliari. Most notably, Scherpe considered this 
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judgment as “an ‘historic’ one, as truly marking the beginning of the end of discrimination 
against same-sex couples and as the first step on the final meters on the road towards equality” 
(Scherpe, 2013, 92); also Hodson (2011) emphasized the opening up of the Court towards 
same-sex couples, and she stressed the importance of a judgment where, despite the outcome, 
judges had not endorsed an inherent heteronormative definition of marriage. 
Despite the final outcome, the approach to Article 14 conjoint with Article 8 left some room for 
lgbt activists, who indeed challenged the ECtHR reasoning within short space of time.  
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4.5.3 The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples  
 
The inclusion of same-sex relationships in the notion of family life made a breakthrough in the 
exclusive heteronormative conception endorsed by the Court up until then; hence, despite the 
dissatisfaction due to the ECtHR interpretation of Article 12, Ilga-Europe, national movements, 
and same-sex couples put all their efforts in loosening the reading of Article 14 conjointly with 
Article 8. 
In Schalk and Kopf, the Court considered same-sex affectivity theoretically worthy of some legal 
protection, while in Vallianatos and Others v Greece, n. 29381/09 and 32684/09, and Oliari 
and Others v Italy it specified the nature of such protection, further weakening the ECtHR het-
eronormative understanding of sexuality, without however completely disrupting it. 
It has to be underscored that both these cases concerned two specific national realities, which 
do not recur in other parts of Europe: in Greece the law operated a double discrimination 
against gays and lesbians, since they were not allowed to marry and they could not enter civil un-
ions; in Italy, however, even though the Italian Constitutional Court had stated the necessity to 
provide a legal frame for same-sex couples, national Parliament refused to introduce civil un-
ions.  
In Vallianatos judges were called to review the legitimacy of the Greek Act 3719/2008, which 
had introduced only civil unions for heterosexuals; the applicants lodged with the ECtHR alleg-
ing that the aforementioned Act amounted to a discriminatory provision, since it infringed on 
their right of respect for private and family life. 
The applicants offered a ‘sociological’ perspective, since they highlighted both material and 
symbolical consequences of being excluded from legal recognition. To them, “the present case 
affects their civil status and their position in Greek society” (Vallianatos § 43), and they also 
contended that Greek law “cast a negative moral judgment on homosexuality as it reflected an 
unjustifiable reserve, not to say hostility, towards same-sex couples.” (Ivi, § 60). 
On the contrary, the Greek government displayed a wide range of arguments to justify its deci-
sions, ranging from legal to social, from political to institutional, hints. Firstly, the authorities al-
leged that the main aim of the enacted legislation was to arrange a “set of provisions allowing 
parents to raise their biological children […] without the couple being obliged to marry” (Ivi, § 
62). Far from dismantling the traditional institution of marriage, civil unions “sought to 
strengthen […] family in the traditional sense, since the decision to marry would hence for be 
taken irrespective of the prospect of having a child and purely on the basis of a mutual com-
mitment” (Ibidem). 
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The aim of the Act was to amend obsolete laws on traditional marriage and family, so as to dis-
cipline parental relations that, otherwise, encouraged fathers to avoid their responsibilities: most 
notably, “Law 3719/2008 enabled the father of a child born outside marriage to establish pater-
nity and be involved in the child’s upbringing without having to be married to the child’s moth-
er” (Ivi, § 67). 
However, the presence of children was not an essential requirement to enter into civil union, 
which could be concluded by “two different-sex adults governing their life as a couple” (Ivi, § 
16). 
Despite this incongruence, the Greek government heavily relied upon the relationship between 
civil unions and parenthood; I would frame this as the attempt to justify its policies by advancing 
an argument on which the Court, at least until then, had been quite restrained and had avoided 
general considerations, namely that of homo-parentality. 
Domestic authorities did not call for a wide margin of appreciation on sensitive issues, rather 
reiterating that “the biological difference between different-sex and same-sex couples in so far as 
the latter could not have biological children together, justified limiting civil unions to different-
sex couples” (Ivi, § 67). 
Then, according to Greek submissions, civil unions simply ratified existing phenomenon, they 
just provided a legal frame to unmarried different-sex couples with children, already rooted in 
Greek culture. 
The Greek legislature had expressly stated in a report that it was not seeking to regulate all 
forms of de facto partnership and, as a consequence, “the introduction of civil unions for same-
sex couples would require a separate set of rules governing a situation which was […] not the 
same as the situation of different-sex couples.” (Ibidem).  
It was also denied that same-sex couples were not granted the possibility to regulate their patri-
monial assets, since for social security matters they were in an identical position as different 
same-sex couples who had decided to enter into a union, while as far as maintenance and inher-
itance issues were concerned, “these could be regulated within a same-sex couple without a civil 
union, by means of a contractual agreement” (Ibidem). 
In addition, Greek authorities also proposed strict separation between the private and public 
realm, pointing out that among the applicants some did not live together on a regular basis as 
they worked in different cities, and that they could not claim any right under the notion of fami-
ly life. 
The ECtHR began its reasoning by narrowing the scope of the present case, framing the appli-
cants’ complaint as not relating “to a general obligation on the Greek State to provide for a form 
of legal recognition in domestic law for same-sex relationships” (Ivi, § 75). I consider this pas-
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sage as a device of derivative legitimacy, which serves a twofold aim: firstly, the Court removes 
the expectations of general judicial law-making and it clearly avoids delivering a judgment which 
would bind all COE Parties to the introduction of civil unions for homosexual couples; second-
ly, by referring to the casuistic nature of judicial review, the Court also pays deference to the 
wording and to essential doctrines of the ECHR system. 
Greek submissions are then carefully analysed, and by starting from the notion of family life, 
the majority depicted them as being flawed, incoherent, and biased. 
Not only did the applicants form stable same-sex couples, but their relationship fell within fami-
ly life, “just as would the relationships of different-sex couples in the same situation” (Ivi, § 73). 
The Court, moreover, “can see no basis” for drawing a distinction between those who live to-
gether and those who for professional or social reasons, do not, since “the fact of not cohabiting 
does not deprive the couples concerned of the stability which brings them within the scope of 
family life within the meaning of Article 8” (Ibidem).  
The majority, hence, chooses a blunt but decisive expression, and it does not concede the min-
imum credibility to Greek perspective, simply evaluating it as lacking any rational or objective 
grounds.  
Since Act 3719/2008 did not require the existence of children born outside wedlock, nor did it 
consider them essential to enjoy of special rights of inheritance, social and health assistance, the 
ECtHR dismissed the Government’s standpoint, and stated that the legislation in question was 
designed “first and foremost to afford legal recognition to a form of partnership other than mar-
riage […]” (Ivi, § 86).  
Departing from such a premise, the ECtHR further developed a reasoning disruptive of heter-
onormative assumptions and prejudices.  
The majority, indeed, widened what had already been found in Schalk and Kopf v Austria, reit-
erating that same-sex couples are just as capable as different same-sex couples of establishing 
stable committed relationships. Therefore, the alleged impossibility of same-sex couples to bio-
logically have children was dismissed, while the applicants were considered in “a comparable 
situation to different-sex couples as regards their need for legal recognition and protection of 
their relationship” (Ibidem). 
I wish to stress the relevance that the ECtHR attached to the symbolic meaning of civil unions, 
and to the role of the enforcement of traditional familiar and models. 
Most notably, judges appear fully aware of the immaterial meaning attached to the instrument 
of law, and they highlight that, besides concrete benefits and rights, the legal recognition of af-
fective relations conveys value, dignity, and social acceptance; public and legal positive sanctions 
are particularly relevant when marginalized minorities are involved; hence, the central issue of 
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the case is not whether same-sex couples are allowed to regulate their affairs through private 
agreements, but the fact that civil unions have an intrinsic value and they would grant gays and 
lesbians the “only opportunity […] of formalizing their relationship by conferring on it a legal 
status recognized by the State” (Ivi, § 81).  
The relevance of legal recognition is thus separated from the rights and benefits it implies, and 
the Court evaluates that in the absence of same-sex marriage, same-sex couples have a crucial 
interest in entering into civil union, which would legally and publicly recognize their union.  
In conclusion, the Grand Chamber, sixteen to one, evaluated that the Greek government 
couldn’t show convincing, objective, and grounded reasons to justify the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from civil unions introduced with the enactment of the law 3719/2008, finally finding a 
violation of Article 14 conjoint with Article 8. 
Also consensus doctrine is approached from an innovative perspective: though not reviewing 
the case in abstract, the Court recalls the resolution 278(2010) of the COE European Assembly, 
the EU Charter of Human Rights, the recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5, the directives 
2003/86 EC and 2004/38 EC, in order to stress that EU and COE institutions were significantly 
reducing the margin of discretion granted to national States on such issues, with the aim of tack-
ling differentiated treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation. 
As hinted at the beginning of this section, alongside innovative and creative elements, the Court 
also displayed problematic statements, which can be considered as showing the pervasive nature 
of heteronormativity. 
Throughout its reasoning, the Court reiterates that the criterion of comparison applies only be-
tween unmarried heterosexual and same-sex couples, reinforcing marriage as a legal and social 
unicum, endorsing the same perspective laid down in Schalk and Kopf.  
In addition to this, judges considered the protection of traditional family a legitimate and 
weighty aim, which could also justify a difference in treatment (Ivi, § 83). 
Hence, the Court actually promoted the legal recognition of same-sex couples, but following the 
“separate but equal” model, thus weakening the effects of heteronormative culture without, 
however, managing to completely overturn it. 
The concurring opinion filed by judge Casadevall, judge Ziemele, judge Jociene, and judge Si-
cilianos suggests that the Court upheld the applicants’ claims because Greek civil unions did not 
provide adoption for unmarried couples, and because it did not raise any question on second 
parent or joint adoption by same-sex couples. 
The fact that neither the applicants nor the Greek law involved to any extent homo-parentality 
significantly could have favoured the final outcome of the Court, which was not called to evalu-
ate whether being raised by same-sex parents could fit the child’s best interest.  
 335	  
Despite the casuistic premise, many statements bear a general significance and they appear as 
marking the frame also for future cases. 
It is precisely against the alleged too activist trend of the Court that judge Pinto De Albuquer-
que filed a dissenting opinion. In particular, De Albuquerque accused the Grand Chamber of 
“performing an abstract review of the conventionality of Greek law, while acting as a Court of 
first instance” (Ivi), also harshly depicting the ECtHR as a “positive legislator”, and emphasizing 
that “not even Hans Kelsen, the architect of concentrated constitutional review system, would 
have dreamed that one day such step would be taken in Europe” (Ibidem). 
In conclusion, in Vallianatos judges take a further step in enhancing the rights of same-sex cou-
ples and in dismantling the privilege of heterosexuality, also reducing the margin of discretion 
given to national authorities. The perspective flashed out in the concurring opinion raised, 
however, the doubt that on same-sex parenthood the Court might prefer a more restrained ap-
proach; had Greek law provided civil partners with the right to adopt, perhaps the Court could 
have considered the exclusion from this right on the ground of sexual orientation as being legit-
imate.  
Such a concern is further reappraised in Oliari and others v Italy, where the ECtHR highlights 
the existing tension between the legal recognition of same-sex couples and the right to adopt 
which could descend from entering civil unions; as extensively argued hereinafter, the Court re-
stricted its own review in order not to draw a general obligation from the ECHR to grant differ-
ent-sex couples all rights provided to different-sex couples. 
Oliari and others v Italy is the last case where the ECtHR has dealt with the legal recognition of 
same-sex couples, and in this judgment all parties involved displayed relevant arguments con-
cerning both same-sex marriage and civil unions. 
The applicants held multifaceted arguments, complaining that Italian legislation did not allow 
gays and lesbians to get married or even to enter into any type of civil union, and that a stark 
conflict marked the relationship between judicial and legislative powers; already in 2010 the 
Constitutional Court had considered that “the State had an obligation to introduce in its legal 
system some form of civil union for same-sex couples” (Oliari, § 105). 
Moreover, civil jurisprudence and local municipalities had supported a legislative reform, with-
out obtaining response from the government; in particular, in 2012, the Tribunal of Reggio 
Emilia, in light of the EU directives and of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, considered a 
same-sex marriage contracted abroad as valid for the purposes of obtaining a residence permit 
in Italy. In 2014, the Tribunal of first instance of Grosseto had held the opinion that the refusal 
to register a foreign same-sex marriage was unlawful, and had ordered the competent public au-
thority to register the marriage. The State appealed and a few months later the Court of Appeal 
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of Florence quashed the first-instance judgment, remitting the case to the tribunal of Grosseto. 
The Court of Cassation, to which the case was finally delivered, remarked in its judgment 
4284/12 that “to the effect that a same-sex marriage contracted abroad was no longer contrary to 
the Italian pubic order”, there could be room to recognize same-sex marriages contracted 
abroad, but only by means of a legislation approved by the Italian Parliament. 
Consequently, the applicants described the government policy on the matter as flawed, and 
highlighted that the so called cohabitation agreements provided a limited set of rights, that they 
could be signed also by cohabiting people not in a relationship, and that these agreements had 
not an erga omnes effect, nor could they be considered as equally binding as rights secured by 
legislative means. 
Both the applicants and NGOs, intervened as third parties, emphasizing the symbolic and so-
cial meaning entrenched in civil unions, contending that the recognition in the law of one’s fam-
ily life and status was “crucial for the existence and well-being of an individual and for his or her 
dignity”, and that no private cohabitation agreement could adequately substitute a “recognized 
union […] by means of a solemn juridical institution, based on a public commitment and capa-
ble of offering legal certainty” (Ibidem).  
Besides alleging same-sex unions as a necessary step in enhancing minorities’ rights and in fos-
tering democratic spirit (Ivi, § 113), the applicants and Wintemute, on behalf of the interna-
tional lgbt NGOs, engaged in a critical reasoning on the Court’s decision in Schalk and Kopf. 
Firstly, it was emphasized that, in the turn of four years, a clear consensus had been achieved, 
for until June 2014 22 of 47 COE founding States recognized same-sex unions, and Greece was 
under obligation to introduce such reforms after the Vallianatos judgment.  
Wintemute, in particular, extensively relied on international jurisprudence, hence asserting that 
even if the primary source of the ECtHR was the ECHR, it could really protect and enhance 
human rights only by giving relevance to judicial, legislative, and political trends spreading all 
over the world. He also framed the Italian situation though the lens of indirect discrimination - 
introduced in the EU anti-discriminatory law by the directive 78/2000- and recalled that in light 
of the recent Vallianatos case, the burden of proof was entirely on the government. The Italian 
Associazione Radicale Certi Diritti even shown the result of a survey carried out by the Italian 
institute for statistics, which gave evidence that a considerable majority of the Italian population 
did not consider civil unions as threatening traditional family or traditional values (Ivi, § 144). 
The clear intent was to contrast the objection that in Italy a pressing social need justified the ab-
sence of a legal frame for gay and lesbian couples, but from a socio-legal perspective this argu-
ment enriches the debate and brings into the judicial arena social data, hence attesting the EC-
tHR attention for social system. 
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To these statements the Italian government replied by alleging Italian peculiar culture on sexual 
matters and argued that even if “at the end of a gradual evolution a State was in an isolated posi-
tion with regard to an aspect of its legislation, this did not necessarily mean that that aspect was 
in conflict with the Convention” (Ivi, § 124).  
Drawing a similar approach to Sutherland, respondent authorities also relied on the argument 
of political pre-eminence; the ongoing debate on civil unions would not testify the inability of 
political authorities to comply with judicial outcomes and social needs, rather showing the real 
intention of Italian authorities to find a solution which would meet public approval, as well as 
with the needs of protection by a part of the community. From this premise, it would follow that 
neither could the Italian State be held responsible for the tortuous course towards legal recogni-
tion of same-sex couples nor should the ECtHR substitute its own review to the legitimated de-
cisions approved by national Parliament.  
Among third parties, the European Centre for Law and Justice, ECJL, strongly argued against 
the applicants, relying on the alleged slippery slope that an eventual judgment favourable to civil 
union would trigger. In particular, the ECJL feared that if the Court established that same-sex 
couples had a right to recognition in the form of a civil union, the next issue would be what 
rights to attach to such a union, “in particular in connection with procreation.” (Ivi, § 149). Not 
only should same-sex couples not be legally recognized, but the ECLJ contended that the entire 
ECtHR jurisprudence which had ascribed same-sex relations to family life was ideologically ori-
ented and legally flawed.  
To them, only the presence of a biological child justified the notion of family life, and they con-
sidered that any recognition given to a couple by society had to depend on the couple’s contri-
bution to the ‘common good’ through founding a family, and definitely “not on the basis that 
the couple had feelings for each other, that being a matter concerning private life only.” (Ivi, § 
150).  
Moreover, the intervener resorted to the (in)famous PIB argument (Corvino 2005, 501), name-
ly that an interpretation of the ECHR favourable to lgbt couples would open up to the recogni-
tion of “certain families, such as polygamous or incestuous ones.” (Oliari, § 153).  
To sum up, the ECJL invited the Court to qualify only those couples with biological children as 
family life and denied that the stability of a relationship could amount to a relevant criterion to 
frame a same-sex couple as a family. The recent jurisprudence of the Court in favour of lgbt 
claims was regarded as ideologically twisted and as threatening the very existence of democracy. 
On one hand, “if children stopped being at the heart of the family, then it would only be the 
concept of interpersonal relations which would subsist – an entirely individualistic notion” (Ivi, 
§ 156); on the other hand, a State wanting to define “family” in contrast with ‘natural law’, and 
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aiming at accepting medically assisted procreation for female couples and surrogacy for male 
couples, would be a “totalitarian state” (Ivi, § 158). 
In contrast with ECJL, judges reaffirmed the equal capacity of same-sex couples to enter into 
stable and committed relationships, and they referred to positive obligations connected to this 
issue, reiterating that “while the essential object of Article 8 is to protect individuals against arbi-
trary interference by public authorities, it may also impose on a State certain positive obligations 
to ensure effective respect for the rights protected by Article 8” (Ivi, § 159). This standpoint 
implies that the ECtHR reasoning might have a general effect and might set out positive binding 
obligations for all COE Parties. 
The intertwining of statements on positive obligations and the general wording adopted to refer 
to the applicants’ claims, suggests that the ECtHR also focused on future cases, and that it did 
not disregard the possibility of offering a general interpretation of the Convention requiring the 
legal recognition of same-sex couples, under Article 8 ECHR. 
Such an innovative cue was not unanimously shared, and concurring judge Mahoney, judge 
Tsotsoria, and judge Vehabovic opted for a “narrower reasoning” (Ivi, § 1), also stating there 
was “no need to assert that today Article 8 imposes on Italy […] a positive obligation to provide 
same sex couples [..] within a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and protec-
tion of their unions” (ibidem). Most notably, concurring judges grounded their decision to the 
specific and peculiar Italian framework, namely to the fact that the “Italian State has chosen, 
through its highest Courts, notably the Constitutional Court, to declare that two people of the 
same sex living in stable cohabitation are invested […] with a fundamental right to obtain juridi-
cal recognition […]” (Ibidem). It was this “voluntary, active intervention” (Ibidem) by the Italian 
State into the sphere of Article 8 that attracted the application of the Convention’s guarantee of 
the right to respect for private and family life, “without there being any call to invoke the pre- 
existence of a positive Convention obligation” (Ibidem). 
The majority of the Court, did not consider the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court as 
prominent, while it extensively debated the damage caused to lgbt couples by actual legislative 
vacuum. Also the aforementioned contract of cohabitation was deemed insufficient to “provide 
for some basic needs which are fundamental to the regulation of a relationship between a cou-
ple in a stable and committed relationship” (Ivi, § 169).  
The Court also stressed the particular social, meaning of civil unions, accepting that an eventual 
recognition would “further bring a sense of legitimacy to same-sex couples.” (Ivi, § 174). 
So, not only did the section on general principles, but also that concerning the application of 
theoretical principles to the fact at stake clearly set out substantial and comprehensive argu-
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ments that deeply question the negative effects on lgbt private and family life due to the lack of 
adequate national legislation or to the State’s failure to comply with its positive obligations. 
The reference to the Constitutional Court, hence, seems quite accessory, suitable to further ac-
centuate the inability of the Italian government to comply with an already existing positive obli-
gation.  
The different role assigned to the Italian judicial outcomes can be understood by focusing on 
the argumentative structure displayed by concurring judges and by the majority. In the former, 
the first paragraph defines Italian legislative and judicial peculiar frame as the “decisive” ele-
ment of the forthcoming evaluation (Oliari, con.op. § 1); this premise is further reiterated in 
each and every paragraph, and it functions as the logical macrostructure which justifies and in-
troduces the conclusions of concurring judges. On the contrary, though attaching relevance to 
the Constitutional Court judgment as well as to the decisions of lower domestic Courts, the ma-
jority directly recalls that judgment in the end of its review, and not in a preeminent position. In 
fact, the macrostructure which orients the ECtHR review does not refer to the duties imposed 
by the Italian judicial system on the Italian government, rather entailing the general evaluation 
of differential treatment between unmarried different-sex and same-sex couples. Hence, refer-
ence to the Italian Courts is functional to justifying the restriction of national margin of appreci-
ation and to further legitimize the ECtHR perspective, but they do not shape the tenure of the 
final decision, taken at unanimity, that found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 
8. 
The ECtHR clearly disrupts the heteronormative notion of family life in its heaviest form, it de-
parts from the arguments developed in Vallianatos but embraces more creative and activist 
ones. Yet, Oliari can’t be considered as dismantling the privileges attached to heterosexuality. 
Amongst other claims, the applicants had also alleged a violation of Article 12, hence proposing 
again the same claim of Schalk and Kopf. While in respect to civil unions the ECtHR de facto 
overturned its previous decisions, in respect to marriage it stuck to the principle of caution, 
finding that “despite the gradual evolution of States on the matter the findings reached […] re-
main pertinent. In consequence […] Article 12 of the Convention does not impose an obliga-
tion on the respondent Government to grant a same-sex couple access to marriage” and it also 
considered the complaint under Article 14 as ill-founded in conjunction with Article 12 as well. 
The Court hence reinforced the qualitative uniqueness: of marriage: given the traditional values, 
beliefs, and meanings attached to this institution, the Court preferred not to modify it, as if its 
solemnity would be diminished if adapted to present conditions. 
On this aspect the ECtHR adhered to a majoritarian perspective, while in respect to civil unions 
majoritarian tones are quite superficial. The Court recognized that a “thin majority” had 
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emerged on civil unions (Ivi, § 195); it further linked the final decision to the fact that “the Ital-
ian Government ha[d] failed to explicitly highlight what, in their view, corresponded to the in-
terests of the community as a whole” (Ivi, § 196). This statement might be interpreted as being 
soaked with majoritarian tones: if, instead, the Government had proved that the Italian com-
munity as a whole was against the recognition of same-sex civil unions, the Court could have as-
sessed the interest of the community in a different light. Hence, the direction of the outcome 
appears to be shaped by the already spread tolerant attitude towards gays and lesbians, and the 
ECtHR seems to ratify an already existing social environment. Whilst this reading may be 
grounded to some extent, it has to be pointed out that even if the Government had satisfied the 
burden of proof, still the Court would have probably found a violation, in light of the substantial 
and general principles outlined at the beginning of its own review. Therefore, I suggest that the 
structure of the arguments echoes majoritarian tones in order to justify the ECtHR reasoning, to 
emphasize its adherence to traditional doctrines of interpretation, and to prevent harsh criticism 
of policy-making. 
Lastly, the private/public distinction is not really discussed neither in Vallianatos nor in Oliari, 
but, if ‘private’ is understood as synonym of ‘closet’, then the ECtHR does not endorse or sup-
port such framework arguing, on the contrary, in favour of the public visibility of lgbt couples, 
to the extent that positive obligations are imposed on national authorities. Same-sex couples are 
fully entitled to enter into the public arena, to claim rights on the ground of their relationship, 
and to demand their legal and public recognition. Still, they are not entitled to claim the right to 
marry under the ECHR. Hence, they deserve public relevance, but, at the same time, the re-
gime of ‘separate but equal’ holds. 
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4.5.4 Conclusive Remarks 
 
The various demands advanced through the cases addressed in this paragraph can be gathered 
under the claim of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. 
The demand of legal recognition also conveyed a symbolical claim, according to the already an-
alyzed mutual influence between the social and legal realm: law bears legitimacy, meaning both 
that it grants certain people to legitimately claim a right, and that it defines certain pretences as 
legitimate to public opinion, thus favouring a change in attitude on the issue which has been 
amended. 
The road that led to the most straightforward argumentative line, in Schalk and Kopf, in 2010, 
has been long and multifaceted, and from M.W onwards it displays certain features typical of 
strategic litigation. If the first complaints against UK immigration laws were mainly aimed at ob-
taining individual satisfaction and a permanent residence permit, then, the effort to consciously 
promote legal and policy change through judicial claims becomes increasingly relevant.  
The involvement of third parties - most notably of Ilga-Europe- has gradually increased, and if 
in M.W. the arguments displayed were relevant but quite casuistic, in Oliari Wintemute deliv-
ered a wide-ranging submission, which engaged in the ECtHR on the legal meaning of the Con-
vention, on the relevant international legal and political trend, on the balance between majority 
and minority’s claims, and on the theoretical value of same-sex couples. 
In general terms, two main phases emerge: the first involves all complaints which argued that 
same-sex relations fell within family-life; the second departs from the essential finding that “a 
cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of fami-
ly life” (Schalk and Kopf, § 94), and questions the concrete effects and implications arising from 
such a statement. Both these lines consists of further phases: the first mainly comprises a bot-
tom up approach, where the applicants, alone or assisted by national lgbt movements, tried to 
establish a comparison between heterosexual and homosexual couples on a limited collection 
of rights, whether concerning the succeeding in a tenancy or immigration laws. Hence, the claim 
does not directly call for legal recognition of gay and lesbian couples, but it demands the en-
joyment of rights guaranteed to married or cohabiting heterosexual couples. 
Therefore, judicial findings in Karner, Kozak, P.B. and J.S could be read as a creative disrup-
tion (Friedman 1975, 277), which prelude Schalk and Kopf, Vallianatos, Oliari, and to the cases 
concerning homo-parentality (par. 4.6). 
The judicial opening the homosexual understanding of family life effectively brought major 
changes, since, on one hand, lgbt movements across Europe relevantly resorted to the ECtHR 
in order to stretch this notion to hold the right to same-sex marriage, and, on the other, the 
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Court found a theoretical base in human rights to dismantle all provisions which deliberately 
admitted a differentiated treatment on the ground of sexual orientation. 
The ECtHR is aware of its creative potential, and it clearly masters the direction of the desegre-
gation, most notably by restricting it to unmarried couples and by apparently upholding the 
‘separate but equal’ solution. 
As a consequence, in the second phase - which is still ongoing and whose outcomes are not eas-
ily foreseeable- the applicants and the third parties variously adjusted their strategy; even though 
the aim remained unchanged, the rhetoric and legal arguments were carefully planned within 
the frame established by the ECtHR case law, seeking to focus on the most progressive out-
comes of the ECtHR, and to expand them. After Schalk and Kopf and Vallianatos the Court 
had reaffirmed national discretion in recognizing rights enshrined to the institution of marriage; 
therefore judges were keen on comparing same-sex and different-sex couples only where na-
tional laws already recognized civil unions, but provided different rights for homosexuals and 
heterosexuals, or where domestic provisions conferred this right to heterosexual unmarried 
couples only.  
This approach could be criticized as flawed, since it preluded to a two-track Europe, in which 
judgments of the Court would have a real impact for homosexual citizens only in those Coun-
tries which already have overturned the dogma of intangibility of marriage, whereas the same 
judgments would just represent a pragmatic statement for Countries where parental and family 
rights are entirely anchored to wedlock.  
However, Oliari marks a turning point, which gives effect to hints already implied in Schalk and 
Kopf and it adjust previous interpretive approaches on a more coherent track. 
The ECtHR reasoning in Oliari to some extent reaffirms this suggestion, while, at the same 
time, it endorses a lgbt friendly interpretation of the ECHR. The perspective of marriage re-
mains unchanged, and, hence, in a context where familiar and parental rights are entirely bound 
to wedlock, it’s possible that the ECtHR would not interpret the ECHR as imposing positive 
obligation to provide civil unions. However, Oliari casts a different light on the Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 8: certainly, the reiterated judgments of the Constitutional Court and of 
other domestic tribunals had legal relevance, but it’s worth stressing that the Court upheld the 
applicant’s claim even though Italy did not provide civil unions for heterosexual couples, as did 
Greece. 
The majority also made a number of general statements, whereby it’s possible to conclude that 
same-sex couples are entrusted with the right to be legally recognized by means of domestic 
partnership, which represent “the most appropriate way in which they could have their relation-
ship legally recognized and which would guarantee them the relevant protection – in the form 
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of core rights relevant to a couple in a stable and committed relationship – without unnecessary 
hindrance” (Oliari, § 147).  
Hence, the only criticism that still stands concerns the enforcement of heterosexual marriage: 
it’s possible that the ECtHR will change its approach in the future, but, at the moment, judges 
prefer to gradually require the same rights granted to married couples from civil unions.  
Moreover, if the Court follows the track of Oliari, its interpretation will probably evolve only to 
ratify an existing trend. Indeed, Oliari innovates the ECtHR jurisprudence in a context where 
the overwhelming majority of COE States already recognize civil unions or same-sex marriage, 
and its judgments appear innovative in respect to its own previous judgments, but not in respect 
to the European social and political context. 
Considering the legal culture emerging from the cases addressed in this paragraph, quite a dy-
namic, still linear, trend emerges. By this, I refer to the fact that especially from 2002 onwards, 
the Court has been able to continuously innovate the interpretation of the same provisions, 
without displaying significant internal dissent. 
Until Karner both the EComHR and the ECtHR had decided at unanimity; then, just as the 
ECtHR engaged in law-creation and activist role, a minoritarian dissent emerged. In Karner, 
P.B. and J.S., Vallianatos and Oliari only one judge dissented, while Kozak the decision was at 
unanimity; Schalk and Kopf was the only case where the Court effectively displayed a high de-
gree of internal conflict in respect of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, since the final de-
cision was reached with a majority of four votes to three. 
On a closer look, it can be noted that dissenting opinion recur when the Court embraces a cer-
tain interpretation for the first time: while in Karner, the dissenting judge labelled the case as 
not relevant, in Kozak, even though the personal situation of the applicant was far less linear, no 
doubts were cast on the fact that same-sex couples cohabiting in a de facto marital relationship 
had legal relevance under the ECHR. Therefore, the disagreement was not anchored on a clash 
of values, but rather on the priorities of the Court, on its timing, and on the most appropriate 
interpretive perspective. In fact, judge Grabenwarter did not negatively depict Mr. Karner, nor 
did he suggest that his claim undermined any fundamental tradition; on the contrary, he sug-
gested that the case should be struck out, because the applicant was deceased, and he stressed 
that the ECtHR was not “a constitutional Court which decides on a case-by-case basis which 
cases it deems expedient to examine on the basis of a general criterion such as the one provided 
by the majority.” (Karner, dis op, § 3). Hence, the bifurcation of the Court was mainly on the 
admissibility of the case. 
In Schalk and Kopf the disagreement revolved around a value-oriented bifurcation. Most nota-
bly, the opinion filed by judge Rozakis, judge Spielmann, and judge Jebens dissented both 
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against the consistency of the ECtHR reasoning and against the evaluation of substantial rights at 
hand. Minoritarian judges claimed that the final decision of the ECtHR did not logically derive 
from stated premises, since, on one hand, the Court had recognized same-sex cohabitation as a 
form of family life and, on the other, it denied that such findings had legal relevance. Moreover, 
whilst the majority precisely referred to the social and political frame to assess that the timing to 
claim same-sex marriage was wrong, dissenting judges held the view that “any absence of a legal 
framework offering them, at least to a certain extent, the same rights and the same benefits at-
tached to marriage would need robust justification”, since at that time it was widely recognized 
and also accepted that same-sex couples enter into stable relationships. Another partially dis-
senting opinion was signed by judge Malinverni and judge Kovler, and it held that Article 12 
necessarily excluded the marriage between two men or two women. In particular, the minoritar-
ian perspective addressed an alleged inconsistency of the ECtHR, with the scope of the ECHR 
system, and with the appropriate doctrine to interpret it. In particular, the Vienna Convention 
was mentioned as the main reference point, and literal interpretation was deemed as the general 
and preeminent rule which would preclude to Article 12 from being construed as conferring the 
right to marry on people of the same sex. From such a standpoint, even the cautions opening to 
a positive future different reading of Article 12 would be inadmissible, since it would derive a 
right not included therein at the outset. 
Disagreement over procedural aspects lie at the core of the powerful dissenting opinion filed in 
Vallianatos, where judge Pinto De Albuquerque contested the admissibility itself of the com-
plaint. While the majority considered that Greek government neither intended nor was able to 
provide effective redress to the applicants, and hence admitted their case even though they had 
not exhausted domestic remedies, judge De Albuquerque took the opposing view. For the pur-
poses of the present research, I consider it appropriate to focus on two points, namely the disa-
greement over the new procedures adopted by the ECtHR and over the possibility of identify-
ing homosexual unmarried couples as a suspect category. As for the former issue, the clash be-
tween the majority and the dissenting judge mirrors the theoretical tension between the re-
strained and the activist vision of the ECHR, already described in chapter III. Judge De Albu-
querque stressed the international role of the Court that is of a supra-national tribunal bound to 
respect national sovereignty and to apply the principle of subsidiarity whenever possible; by de-
parting from the case at stake, he then sharply argued against the ECtHR recent trends, stating 
that  
 
After pilot judgment procedures, and […] so called quasi pilot judgments, the Grand Cham-
ber has inaugurated a novel remedy […] which posits a specific legislative solution to a social 
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problem that has allegedly not been solved by the national legislator […]. The Court is no 
longer a mere negative legislator: it assumes the role of a supranational positive legislator 
which intervene directly in the face of a supposed legislative omission by a State Party. (Val-
lianatos, dis. op., judge Pinto de Albuquerque) 
 
The term ‘legislative’ recurs throughout the text, and it clearly aims at denouncing that the EC-
tHR is developing a jurisprudence contrary to the natural constraints of judiciary; whereas the 
majority opts for an activist solution in order to grant an effective response to the applicants, this 
opinion looks back at the ECHR as securing minimum standards.  
As for the latter issue, the dissenting opinion gives rise to a bifurcation which points against the 
consistency of the present judgment with the ECtHR case-law. According to Article 34 appli-
cants must fall into one of the categories of petitioners mentioned in the provision and must be 
able to make out a case that he/she is the victim of a violation of the Convention. According to 
the Court’s established jurisprudence, the concept of “victim” has to be autonomously inter-
preted, and it protects not only the direct victim of the alleged violation, but also “any indirect 
victims to whom the violation would cause harm or who would have a valid and personal inter-
est in seeing it brought to an end” (Vallianatos, § 47). 
Against this background, judge De Albuquerque contended that only those under pain of crim-
inal prosecution and those who are members of a class of suspect people, who risk being direct-
ly affected by the legislation, such as illegitimate children, Roma and Jewish people, would be 
able to file a complaint without being directly harmed. Even though the applicants argued to be 
belonging to a group based on an identifiable characteristic, historically discriminated against, 
and directly affected by the enacted Greek legislation, the dissenting judge considered their 
claim as lacking any justification. 
Such a standpoint might be justified by two arguments: the first relies on a restrained interpreta-
tion of the ECHR, whereby the Court should refrain from creating law or expanding its power 
of judicial review; the second might speculate over a personal evaluation of the claims advanced. 
Since in the wording the judge does not express any sort of empathy or understanding towards 
the applicants, I would suggest that both perspectives concur to shape his final opinion. 
As confirmed in Oliari, however, this minoritarian view did not gather much consensus and the 
ECtHR does not consider the legal recognition of same-sex civil unions as a problematic issue 
anymore. 
In conclusion, the ECtHR restricted the realm addressed by the applicants and reiterated the 
power of the law to legitimatise and discipline kinships, crystallizing some differences and as-
suming them as relevant to justify differential treatment.  
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If the institution of marriage and the reformist agenda of strategic litigation is questioned from a 
radical perspective, the ECtHR reasoning raises even more doubt, in that it emphasizes the 
power of the law in deciding what should be recognized as valuable, and in continuous quanda-
ries about kinship which condition and limit judicial approach (Butler 2002, 16). 
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4.6. Homosexuality and Parenthood 
 
Is homosexuality compatible with parenthood? Is it legitimate to restrict the rights of one parent 
because he or she is homosexual? Are homosexuals and heterosexuals in a similar condition 
for the purposes of adoption procedures? Does the concept of ‘family life’ recognized to same-
sex couples also include the right to be parents? Which rights should be granted to the so-called 
care-giver or social parents within the frame of a same-sex relationship?  
These questions have been raised before the ECtHR several times and they fully address one of 
the most debated themes related to family. 
Surely, if these claims had been raised in the 1950s, the answer would have been completely 
negative, from both judicial Courts and legislative assemblies.  
Not only were homosexuals assumed to be harmful for minors, but also the dominant model of 
family was still anchored to traditional grounds and values. I do not dwell further on the trans-
formations of the idea of family in Western society, since it would require in itself an entire the-
sis, but I wish to emphasize that heteronormativity cast off the acceptability of gay and lesbian 
parents, just in the same manner whereby it disqualified unmarried and single mothers/fathers 
or step-families. 
In the second half of the XX century European society gradually evolved, and so did the law, 
laying the foundations for the actual fragmented, multifaceted, and definitely not univocal socio-
legal notion of family. In particular, divorce spreading in all European Countries broke the 
bound of monogamous, life-lasting, heterosexual relationship as the only socially legitimate and 
legally recognized tie between men and women. Divorced parents began to form new families, 
where children established a social and affective relationship with their new parent’s partner, 
and with their eventual half-siblings. Therefore, the severing of the indissolubility of marriage 
led to the severing of the indissolubility of the filiation (Pocar and Ronfani,2008: 224); a gradual 
change occurred in social and legal culture, and the minor’s best interest became decisive to de-
termine with whom a child should grow up, thus giving less importance to the ‘stability’ of the 
traditional model of family. 
Most notably, as Ronfani notes, the notion of child’s best interest and the growth of new famil-
iar structures, oblige to “dissociare in tre questioni ciò che prima ne costituiva una sola […]: la 
questione della coppia, quella della famiglia e quella della filiazione” (Ibidem). 
Moreover, thanks to the decriminalization of homosexuality, to the strengthening of the lgbt 
movement, to the increased social tolerance, and to policies aimed at tackling homophobia, the 
number of parents who decided to live their sexuality openly increased; if during the 1970s and 
1980s parenthood was mainly issued in the lesbian movement only, later it gained primary rele-
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vance also within the gay reformist movement. Unlike the claim of same-sex marriage, 
parenthood is somehow declined even according to queer perspective, in that radical trends 
suggest that the rethinking of parental roles in light of a fluid sexuality might dismantle the exist-
ing social structures. I refer here to the constructivist queer approach, which endorses an im-
manent critical effort devoted to realizing sexual liberation from normative structures that shape 
legal, political, cultural, and cognitive relations in our societies. While anti-social queers general-
ly focus on nihilist stances, on internal dynamics within the lgbt community, casting off demands 
to public authorities, constructivist queers produce a compelling theoretical reflection which can 
effectively ground legal and judicial strategies as well. Butler, for instance, reappraises the dis-
tinction between concepts of family and kinship and she emphasizes the latter’s subversive po-
tential, for both theoretical and legal purposes (Butler 2002, 14). I suggest that by departing 
from her reflection it is possible to identify both a specific meaning of heteronormativity, which 
is specifically applied when minors are involved, and a critical perspective whereby evaluating 
the applicants and the ECtHR’s reasoning.  
While the existence of marriage unavoidably depends on the recognition and regulation of the 
State, that kinships stems from social and interpersonal practices, and it accounts for the com-
plexity, the fluidity, and the heterogeneity of sexual and affective forms established by non-
heterosexual people. As Butler notes, “a number of kinship relations exist and […] do not con-
form to the nuclear family model and […] draw on non-biological relations, exceeding the reach 
of current juridical conceptions, functioning according to non formalizable rules” (Ivi, 15); these 
kinship frames pervade every aspect of human life, negotiating “the reproduction of life, the 
demands of death”, addressing the fundamental forms of “human dependency, which may in-
clude birth, child-rearing, emotional dependency and support, generational ties, illness, dying 
and death” (Ibidem).  
Even though the intervention of the law always conveys the risk of disciplinary and normalizing 
practices, when kinships are concerned a critical political movement can promote the legal pro-
tection of new emerging social assets. 
The theoretical premise of such perspective addresses the significance attributed to the State; 
from a queer perspective, the State “can be worked, exploited” (Ivi, 27), while policy agenda 
and judicial arena can challenge law, and push Courts to adjudicate and recognize new kinships 
as legitimate. 
To the extent that the law is considered the function to providing individuals with the oppor-
tunity and rights to settle their kinships as they please, judicial litigation may also pursue radical 
goals. To the extent that legal and judicial institutions cope with social complexity, foster the 
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flourishing of new kinships, do not subordinate the enjoyment of rights to normative and nor-
malizing constraints, law can grasp and secure life’s complexities.  
In more detail, most controversial questions linked to non-heterosexual, or rather not heter-
onormative, kinships entail, for instance, the politics of international adoption and donor in-
semination, families in which relations of filiation are not based on biology. Among the “salu-
tary consequences” which judicial decisions might reach, Butler recalls the breakdown of tradi-
tional symbolic order, since “kinship ties that bind persons to one another may well or may not 
be based on enduring or exclusive sexual relations, and may well consist of ex-lovers, non-
lovers, friends, community members” (Ibidem).  
Hence, the law should recognize the multiple and unconventionally affective trajectories which 
mark the affective map of a growing number of minors. 
The ECHR system, as far as being malleable and open to judicial creativity, it is however bound 
to doctrines of interpretation which do not encourage a radical role; however, I suggest that, on 
one hand, the applicants could frame their case by positively evaluating their difference and, 
hence, by claiming that judges should secure existing kinships and not only those kinships that 
do conform to heterosexual models already legally recognized. On the other hand, judicial rea-
soning can be scrutinized to determine whether the ECtHR’s interpretive standpoint seems 
open to the acceptance of the aforementioned not predetermined notion of family.  
This perspective is relevant because it allows for the study of the intertwining between heter-
onormativity and the dilemma of difference, showing that the disruption of the former does not 
necessarily lead to a positive evaluation of the latter.  
Traditional heteronormative model’s of family presumes the cohabitation of two parents with 
their biological or adopted children. As previously recalled, this paradigm has been disrupted 
by many changes in family patterns; the notion of social parenthood, the techniques of assisted 
heterologous reproduction, and the practice of surrogacy - just to mention the most relevant- 
have impacted on the image of parenthood, and have led to the possibility of having a child 
without necessarily abiding to the nuclear and monogamous image of couple. 
According to the radical perspective, the legal reforms introduced to keep up with these chang-
es may have altered all the premises of the traditional family, but one: even in the actual same-
sex families by choice146 it is generally assumed that there can be only two parents which, regard-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 I recall here the famous slogan firstly adopted by US gay and lesbian couples who from the mid-1980s 
were “recasting close friends as kin” (Weston 1997, xiv). The first pioneering essay which extensively ac-
counted for this phenomenon is Weston’s Families We Choose, published in 1990 and soon become a 
reference point in the academic literature on LGBT families. Most notably, the ways gays and lesbians 
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less of their biological bond with the child, are supposed to live in a nuclear, monogamous, and 
committed relationship. As such, outside the couple, those who are involved in the surrogacy 
and may play a relevant role in the child’s upbringing, or those who are daily involved in paren-
tal tasks, remain without voice and without rights. Under these premises, the heterosexual 
meaning of traditional family is disrupted, but the differences introduced by these new relation-
al patterns are not legally evaluated; according to this critique, same-sex partners would be enti-
tled to parental rights only insofar their conduct can be assimilated to that of traditional hetero-
sexual parents.  
It follows that the law evaluates any distance from the unstated normality as negative, even if it 
were proved that such an environment was very positive and healthy for the child. If the core 
aim of family law is to assess the child’s best interest, it may be argued that, insofar as they play a 
relevant and continuous role in the child’s life, the recognition of kinships different from nucle-
ar families might really answer the idea of a child-oriented law. 
It might be critically observed that the ECtHR is seized by same-sex couples and homosexual 
individuals and since judicial review is limited by the text of the ECHR, the ECtHR is not the 
appropriate arena where to discuss the normative features still embedded in the model of fami-
ly.  
While it is undoubtedly true that the Court mainly addresses pretences of assimilation, there is 
one case, thoroughly investigated in the next paragraphs, where judges were provided with the 
opportunity to detach from the aforementioned image of family (see paragraph 4.6.3).  
While national debates are mostly focused on joint adoption and on the acceptance of medical-
ly assisted procreation for same-sex couples, the Court has not yet had the opportunity to re-
view similar issues, delivering however landmark judgment which granted lgbt parents a variable 
degree of protection under the human rights law. 
On this respect, three groups have emerged: the first takes into account the claims raised by 
homosexual biological parents; the second is concerned with the alleged discrimination against 
homosexual individuals who wished to adopt, in a context where singles were allowed to adopt; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
structured their families, the new kinships and relations they were establishing, the social and economic 
constraints that were burdening them, and she tried to explain the shift of paradigm which led gay and 
lesbian movement to publicly uphold the necessity to include family issues in their agenda. Over the 
years, this expression has become common in public discourses on lgbt families and it generally aims at 
emphasizing that, independently from State’s recognition, gay and lesbians have families, that they exper-
iment and explore new kinship and that, both by resisting and by enduring homophobe dynamics social-
ly spread, they are already active subjects of their lives and not passive objects of others ’prejudice.. 
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the third addresses the multifaceted issues related to social parenthood and second-parent 
adoption. 
The caseload is quite limited, but relevant from a qualitative point of view. The covered tem-
poral arch goes from 1989 to 2013, even though in certain periods there is a significant gap: af-
ter Kerkhoven and Heinke v the Netherlands, (dec) 15666/89, the ECtHR had to decide on 
parental rights only after eleven years, in Salguiero de Silva Mouta v Portugal, n. 33290/96, and 
Craig v the UK, n. 45396/99. Subsequently, Fretté v France, n. 36515/97, and E.B. v France, n. 
43546/02, were decided in 2002 and 2008, respectively, while the Gas and Dubois v France, n. 
25951/07, and X and others v Austria, n.19010/07, date to 2012 and 2013. 
It is however extremely probable that in the near future the Court will be called to debate the 
issue again, with much more frequency; whereas in the past years the main goals of the lgbt 
movements were focused on individual rights, first, and on couple rights, then, one crucial bor-
der which marks the privilege attached to heterosexuality concerns the restrictions of the right 
to adopt or to access assisted medical procreation, and parental rights are considered essential 
by the international and domestic lgbt movement. 
The undisputed theoretical and legal reference point is the child’s best interest, and this notion 
recurs throughout all decisions and judgments; in this respect, a similarity can be drawn with the 
jurisprudence on the age of consent. In both cases, it is claimed that homosexuality does not 
harm minors, whether they wish to engage in homosexual activities or they live with same-sex 
parents. When dealing with minors, international and domestic jurisprudence generally resort 
to the well-known principle of precaution, and it is, thus, presumable that the judges will be 
more restrained in opening up to new and unseen scenarios. On the age of consent the Court, 
effectively, admitted that a differentiated threshold for gays and heterosexuals was discriminato-
ry only when the majority of COE Countries already provided an equal age and when the over-
whelming majority of scientific evidence demonstrated that minors would not have been 
harmed. 
It is generally deemed that the child’s best interest is to live in a safe environment, where her 
concrete needs are satisfied and where she is able to learn a valuable way of life.  
Hence, personal qualities and economic possibilities are certainly extremely important but, let 
alone, they could not suffice to deem a person adequate to adopt; in fact, one argument against 
same-sex parenthood suggests that even though gays and lesbians are able to provide a safe, 
comfortable, loving environment to the child, still their homosexuality would have detrimental 
effects on her psychological development, for instance by impairing her sexuality. 
Therefore, the issues related to homosexual parenthood not only contend that it is possible to 
be good parents regardless of sexual orientation, but also that both homosexual single parents 
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and same-sex couples are able to foster a valuable way of life, to convey the essential values of 
our society.  
Same-sex adoption and the protection of homosexual parents’ rights not only dismantled the 
heteronormative and binary model of different-sex parents but also support the equal value of 
lgbt people and couples, enhancing the full enforcement of the principle of equality. 
As extensively explored in forthcoming sections, this argument has been variously raised before 
the ECtHR, with fluctuating outcomes. 
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4.6.1 Homosexual Parents and the ECtHR 
 
In this section I analyze the ECtHR reasoning on the human rights secured by the ECHR to 
lgbt parents; with reference to the above mentioned repartition, here the separation between the 
couple realm and the family realm is addressed, but not the distinction between the family and 
the filiation realm, since all the applicants are biologically tied to the child. 
Both in Salguieiro De Silva Mouta v Portugal and J.M. v UK, the applicants had been previous-
ly married and in that context they had had a child; after divorcing and openly living their sexual 
orientation, however, they alleged that their parental rights had been impaired and denounced a 
discriminatory treatment. 
Salgueiro is the first case on the matter that passed the gatekeeping decision of the EComHR, 
and that was also upheld by the ECtHR.  
This judgment dates to 1999, the same period when the ECtHR tuned its anti-discriminatory 
approach on issues related to homosexual soldiers, also affecting the Court’s perspective on this 
case. In order to contextualize and critically analyze the ECtHR review it’s necessary to briefly 
detail the facts and to recall the arguments displayed by both parties.  
After divorcing his daughter’s mother to move in with a same-sex partner, Salgueiro signed an 
agreement with C.D.S., his ex-wife, where the parental responsibility was awarded to the latter 
while he maintained the right to have contact. However, Salgueiro was not able to exercise this 
right, because C.D.S. did not comply with the agreement. Consequently, the applicant sought 
an order giving him parent’s responsibility, while C.D.S. accused Salguiero’s partner of sexually 
abusing the child.  
The Lisbon Family Affairs Court upheld the applicant’s compliant and, relying on the opinion 
of psychologists and psychiatrists, dismissed the mother’s accusation as ill-founded and prompt-
ed by others to the child, which at that time was aged 6.  
After a few months, however, the mother abducted M. and appealed against the Family Affairs 
Court’s judgment to the Lisbon Court of Appeal, which finally reversed the lower Court’s 
judgment. In particular, judges maintained that a child needs the care which “only the mother’s 
love can provide” (Ivi, 14), and that even though “there is ample evidence […] that the appellant 
habitually breathes the agreements entered into by her regard to the father’s right to contact […] 
her conduct is due not only to the applicant’s lifestyle, but also to the fact that she believed the 
indecent episode related by the child, implicating the father’s partner” (Ibidem). Furthermore, 
the Lisbon Court resorted to the principle of precaution and produced a wording which did not 
hide or conceal the Court’s negative opinion of the applicant’s homosexuality. In fact, despite 
the experts’ unanimous opinion, the Lisbon Court evaluated “cannot rule out the possibility 
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that it [the sexual abuse] did occur. It would be going to far […] to assert that the boyfriend of 
M’s father would never be capable of the slightest indecency towards M.” (Ibidem). Finally, 
judges also stated that Salgueiro and his partner did not provide the healthiest environment for 
a child’s psychological, social and mental development further commenting that “the child 
should live in a family environment, a traditional Portuguese family […]. It is not our task here 
to determine whether homosexuality is or is not an illness or whether it is sexual orientation to-
wards persons of the same sex. In both cases it is an abnormality and children should not grow 
up in the shadow of abnormal situations; such are the dictates of human nature.” (Ibidem). 
Before the ECtHR the applicant alleged a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, 
and accused the Portuguese authorities of denying him his parental rights, on the grounds of his 
sexual orientation. 
Neither international national lgbt organizations filed third opinions, nor did they appear in-
volved in shaping the applicant’s reasoning. 
He argued that the paramount interest of her daughter was to live with him, while the Lisbon 
Court of Appeal’s had only reinforced “atavistic misconceptions” (Ivi, § 24). The respondent 
Government, instead, proposed a restrained and quite striking reading of Article 8, alleging that 
the applicant’s right to respect for his private life prevented public authorities only from interfer-
ing with his right to freely express and develop his personality. The decision of the Lisbon 
Court, moreover, had to be read in light of the child’s best interest and of all the circumstance 
of the case. 
The Court reached an innovative outcome, reviewing substantially the decisions of both domes-
tic Courts; the wording and the scheme of the reasoning line suggest a begrudged attitude 
against the applicant, but I argue that certain rhetoric devices are mainly useful to justify the 
Court’s reasoning and to balance its review with the respect for national sovereignty. 
As for the arguments displayed, the Court observed that whilst Lisbon Family Affairs Court had 
not mentioned the applicant’s homosexuality in deciding M’s custody, the Court of Appeal had 
introduced a new factor, namely that he was homosexual and lived with another man. There-
fore, the ECtHR described itself as “forced to conclude” (Ivi, § 28) that a different treatment 
based on sexual orientation had occurred, and it considered that the final judgment depended 
on the legitimacy of the aim pursued and on the proportionality of the means applied by the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment.  
The ECtHR did not dispute the intentions of the Court of Appeal, but it found the decision ex-
ceeding the necessary proportionality and endorsing discrimination in contrast with the ECHR. 
Most notably, the wording of the Court of the Appeal clearly expressed prejudice against the 
applicant, and homosexuality played a central role in the final decision: not only was the father 
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depicted as abnormal and his partner as a potential paedophile, but the Court of Appeal also 
made it clear that, when in contact with the child, “it should be impressed upon the father that 
he would be ill-advised to act in any way that would make his daughter realize that her father is 
living with another man in conditions resembling those of man and wife” (Ivi, § 14).  
Consequently, the ECtHR reiterated that it was “forced to find” (Ivi, § 36) that the Court of 
Appeal had made a distinction which was not acceptable under the ECHR. 
I deliberately quoted the expressions “forced to conclude” and “forced to find” because in no 
other analyzed judgment did the Court adopt such expressions, almost as if it were reproaching 
Portuguese authorities not really for the substantial decision, but for the openly discriminatory 
and biased language adopted, somehow suggesting that had national Courts adopted a neutral 
wording, the final review could have been different.  
However, at least two elements shed different light on the ECtHR reasoning: firstly, the Court 
disagreed with the Court of Appeal, dismissing the image of homosexuality as a potential illness 
as biased. Therefore, the ECtHR challenged the idea of lgbt people as abnormal also in con-
nection with parental rights: if in previous cases the Court had recognized rights connected with 
their personal life to lgbt subjects, here the core issue involved a third, vulnerable, party. Hence, 
if the Court had really endorsed a begrudging perspective, it would have recalled the principle 
of precaution, which instead is not even mentioned. Another realm which provided some space 
of manoeuvre related to the alleged sexual violence by Salgueiro’s partner.  
Despite the opinion of psychologists, the ECtHR could have made a similar reasoning to that 
endorsed in X v UK on the age of consent, where regardless of recent scientific findings, the 
EComHR granted national authorities with wide discretion. Given the controversial nature of 
the alleged violence, the Court could have reviewed the final decision of the Court of Appeal as 
legitimate. The fact that the ECtHR, at unanimity, did not attach any relevance to the alleged 
violence, fully endorsing the lower Court and of experts, is extremely valuable, for it reinforces 
the image of a Court not biased against gay men, which reveals an innovative perspective behind 
the veil of cautious expressions. 
In 2010, the ECtHR decided another case dealing with a claim raise by a biological homosexual 
parent who alleged to be suffering from discriminatory treatment. Ms. J.M. was a lesbian moth-
er of two children, who lived with her female partner. Parental custody had been awarded to the 
father and she was declared ‘non resident parent’. Under UK Child Support Act 1991 the par-
ent who does not have the primary care of the children is required to pay for child mainte-
nance, but, the amount of this support is reduced when the absent parent enters into a new rela-
tionship, whether she also decides to marry or not. 
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At first reading this rule seems counterintuitive, but, on a closer look, it bears a stereotyped im-
age of family; as it has been pointed out (Timmer, 2010), the implicit rationale is twofold. First-
ly, after divorce, children are generally presumed to stay with their mother, while their father 
pays for support, and effectively in most cases the agreement went this way. Secondly, it is as-
sumed that when the father enters a new relationship, he has to financially support his new 
partner, and their eventual new children. Despite the neutral wording, this Act effectively recalls 
the classic male-breadwinner family, with a clear division of roles, and echoes the primary role 
of the mother in the upbringing of the children.  
In this case the roles were reversed, and national Courts dismissed the applicant’s request to re-
duce her financial support, since she was living in a stable relationship with a same-sex partner, 
stating the aforementioned Act did not apply to same-sex relationship. 
The ECtHR quite predictably found a violation, but it did not frame the compliant under Arti-
cle 8, rather raising Article 1 of Protocol 1, concerning private property.  
This case dates to 2010, when the Court was gradually affirming that same-sex relationships fell 
within family life; hence, this standpoint could be justified by the aim not to lay the foundations 
for attracting parental rights within the ambit of a same-sex relationship. 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission, intervened as a third party, extensively exploring 
the different perspectives whereby UK authorities would have violated Article 8; most notably, 
the Commission framed the claim as a strategic step in the strengthening and widening of the 
ECtHR jurisprudence on same-sex ‘family life’. In fact, it “urged” the Court […] to accept in 
principle that a same-sex relationship is no less capable of constituting family life than a hetero-
sexual relationship” (Ivi, § 44).  
Despite these demanding urges, the Court refused to assess whether the claim fell within the 
ambit of Article 8, and in that case, if it entailed private or family life, laconically stating that the 
“natural” frame of J.M.’s complaint was Article 1 of Protocol 1, since the object at stake inhered 
to the State’s interference with a possession of hers.  
The startling effect of this standpoint is confirmed by eminent sources: three judges filed a con-
curring opinion where, though agreeing with the majority on the final outcome, they highlighted 
that J.M. offered a “good opportunity to contribute to the emerging change in our case law [af-
ter Schalk and Kopf]. Regrettably, the majority chose to avoid taking a clear position” (Ivi, con. 
op.), further cautioning the risks implied by a too restrained approach: “judicial self-restraint is 
often a virtue, but not in cases in which Courts should admit their own mistakes. […] In any 
case, we should not have refrained from unequivocal confirmation that today, in 2010, the no-
tion of family life can no longer be restricted to heterosexual couples alone” (Ibidem). 
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While in Salgueiro the Court significantly detached from a heteronormative notion of family 
and parenthood, endorsing the claim of a gay man who was cohabiting with a same-sex partner, 
in J.M. the reasoning appears far more entangled, as if the majority wished to restrict and delim-
it the innovative effects of Schalk and Kopf and P.B. and J.S. judgments. 
Although parental rights are part of family life, which inheres to the private realm, in Salgueiro 
the Court takes a further step in detaching from the stereotype of the closet: the Court of Lis-
bon had indeed cautioned the applicant to conceal his same-sex relationship while being with 
his daughter, hence suggesting him to hide his sexual orientation. The ECtHR made no refer-
ence to the desirability of such conduct, neither directly nor indirectly suggesting a discreet life-
style.  
Therefore, the ECtHR clarified that it does not take being heterosexual or in the closet, to be a 
good parent. 
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4.6.2 Homosexuality and the Right to Adopt 
 
The ECtHR case-law on the right of lgbt people to adopt is restricted to two complaints, which 
insist on the same legislation and which provide the opportunity to compare the reasoning dis-
played. In Fretté v France, n. 36515/97, and E.B. v France, n. 43546/02, the applicants had 
been refused the authorization to adopt, and they alleged a discriminatory treatment on the 
grounds of their homosexuality. 
The pronouncements date back respectively to 2002 and 2008, and since at that time the Court 
had not yet framed homosexual relationships as family life, the applicants relied on the concept 
of private life, hence contending that a negative evaluation of one’s ability to adopt infringed on 
her essential ambit of private life. Before delving further into the applicants’ claims and in the 
ECtHR’s reasoning, I briefly recall French legislation; under Article 343 of the Civil Code, sec-
tion 1 read “adoption may be also applied for by any person over twenty-eight years of age” 
(Fretté, § 17); single persons were thus allowed to adopt and, as such, the binary model of 
parenthood had been formally overturned. In practical terms, however, social services were en-
titled to take into account multiple factors, among which the general lifestyle of the applicant 
and her ability to provide other reference figures; under such labels it was possible to concretely 
dismiss those who were deemed as not fitting to an alleged normal and desirable model as be-
ing inaccurate. 
Both Mr. Fretté and Ms. E.B. had been positively evaluated, and social services had empha-
sized their subjective qualities; in the former case social services concluded “Mr Fretté has un-
doubted personal qualities and an aptitude for bringing up children. A child would probably be 
happy with him” (Ibidem). Many qualities were also recognized to Ms. E.B. and she was de-
picted as “enthusiastic and warm-hearted and come across as very protective of others.” (E.B., § 
12).  
The first difference between the applicants concerned their kinships: while Mr. Fretté was sin-
gle, living alone, even though surrounded by friends and he also had a female friend who ex-
pressed the wish to play a role in the eventual child’s rearing, Ms. E.B.’s condition was more 
blurred, in that she cohabited with a female partner but they did not consider themselves as a 
couple nor did her partner express the will to have a continuous and primary role in the child’s 
life.  
Ms. E.B. also referred to her social broad environment, contending the positive value of social 
parenthood and upholding an enlarged notion of family; she indeed proposed to “provide a fu-
ture adopted child with a father figure in the person of her own father and her brother-in-law” 
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also emphasizing that “the child will be able to choose a surrogate father in his or her environ-
ment (a friend’s relatives, a teacher, or a male friend…)” (E.B., § 10). 
However, the final decision was against both their applications, and they were judged as not be-
ing adequate to adopt. Mr. Fretté was dismissed on the grounds that he offered no stable ma-
ternal models and that he might experience difficulties in envisaging the practical consequences 
caused by the arrival of a child; Ms. E.B. was instead considered as inadequate because she did 
not offer a stable paternal model and because the relationship with her partner was unclear, a 
situation that could harm a future child.  
The ECtHR was then called to ascertain whether the applicants had been discriminated against 
on the grounds of their sexual orientation, and it delivered two different judgments. 
In Fretté the Court held that even though national authorities had decided exclusively on the 
grounds of the applicant’s homosexuality (Fretté, § 39), the decision had to be considered pro-
portionate and objectively aimed at securing the legitimate interest of a possible child.  
It was not disputed, then, the existence of a difference in treatment, nor the applicant’s situation 
was framed as not comparable to that of a single heterosexual; on the contrary, the majority re-
viewed the facts in light of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, but it concluded that national 
authorities had not exceeded their margin of appreciation. 
To my frame, this judgment presumed both a heteronormative understanding of family and a 
negative evaluation of differences. 
The Court recalled the international scientific opinion in order to assess the suitability of homo-
sexuals to adopt; as extensively explored, the appeal to scientific argument is quite recurrent 
when minors are at stake and it helps to clarify the Court’s perspective laid down in Salguiero. 
In that judgment the Court had not restricted the applicant’s rights by mentioning the potential 
detrimental effect of his homosexuality; hence, one could presume that the Court would not re-
call the principle of precaution neither in Fretté. However, in the former case the ECtHR had 
decided so because the child had already established a relationship with the applicant, and a dif-
ferent outcome would have harmed her; in Fretté instead no child was effectively implied and 
the Court assessed that only those who could offer the child the most suitable home in every re-
spect should be chosen to adopt.  
At this regard, the ECtHR’s legal culture on homosexual parenthood is shaped by two, distinct, 
unstated evaluations, which do intersect. The first is related to sexual orientation, and it ques-
tions whether homosexual individuals or couples are capable of nurturing a child, to ensure her 
an environment as adequate and loving as possible, and to properly address her cognitive, psy-
chological, and relational needs; the second, instead, depends on the model of parenthood to 
which judges, even implicitly, refer, and it is shaped by how they understand the notion of nor-
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mal development. In fact, as Hodson highlights (2011, 5), it is possible to define the normal and 
healthy development of a child not only in regards to her subjective and specific needs, but also 
in consideration of what it is commonly assumed to be the proper and average model of life. 
To sum up, paraphrasing the words of French authorities in Fretté, it is perfectly possible to 
recognize a homosexual person the personal qualities and the aptitude for bringing up children, 
it is even feasible to admit that a child would be probably happy and fulfilled with this person 
while, at the same time, arguing that it’s better to deny him the possibility of adopting on the 
grounds that his lifestyle would result as being too unconventional for a child. 
Therefore, the knot to solve revolves around whether a single homosexual person could be a 
good parent and whether it is appropriate to permit him to establish a relationship with a child; 
“the scientific community is divided over the possible consequence of a child being adopted by 
one or more homosexual parents”, the Court observed, also adding that no conclusion could be 
assessed given “the limited number of scientific studies conducted on the subject” (Ivi, § 42).  
The Court resorted to the principle of precaution and, implicitly, it assumed that until proven 
otherwise homosexuals should be regarded as not being adequate to adopt.  
Once more homosexuality was considered under a majoritarian and prejudiced frame, as an 
abnormal and problematic feature, which deviated from the normal status quo and, hence, 
could harm children.  
The pejorative depiction of homosexuality emerges from another passage, where the Court 
bluntly considered that “there are not enough children to adopt to satisfy the demand” 
(Ibidem), in order to justify French concrete preference for heterosexual couples. Unless a fam-
ily based on the traditional monogamous relationship is considered as the best option for a 
child, such a statement would make no sense, for it would be unclear why homosexual singles 
should be accounted as being the second choice.  
A different perspective was developed by judge Bratza, judge Furthmann, and judge Tulkens; 
they indeed dissented with the majority and emphasized how the Court’s departing assumption 
endorsed discriminatory treatment and how the reference to the child’s best interest was actual-
ly used to cover a biased attitude against same-sex persons. 
Given that French law authorized single persons to apply for adoption, if all those who could 
not provide a parental model of different-sex were excluded, the effective enjoyment of that 
right would have been completely disregarded. 
Dissenting judges remarked that the majority had shared such a premise but that after a few 
paragraphs it had nevertheless voted against finding a violation; besides criticizing the majority’s 
judgment as loose and flawed, dissenting judges also expressed concern related to the wider Eu-
ropean socio-legal context, by noting that “in a time when all countries of the Council of Europe 
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are engaged in a determined attempt to counter all forms of prejudice and discrimination, we 
regret that we cannot agree with the majority” (Ibidem).  
In the minoritarian opinion no principle of precaution applied, and, as such, dissenting judges 
did not consider homosexuals as posing more problems than heterosexuals. 
The ECtHR overturned Fretté in E.B. and, although it contended that the latter case was signif-
icantly different from the former, the final reasoning contradicted several hints underpinned in 
Fretté. Firstly, scientific consensus was not even mentioned, and the entire reasoning revolved 
around the principle of discrimination; secondly, even though national authorities had de-
scribed the applicant as problematic even in relation to issues not necessarily linked to her ho-
mosexuality, the Court considered that French social services had been biased against Ms. E.B.; 
thirdly, it’s also interesting to note that the minoritarian opinion filed in Fretté strongly shaped 
E.B. judgment, hence demonstrating the dynamic internal relation among different conceptions 
of the ECHR.  
The psychologist who had examined the applicant had indeed recommended the refusal of the 
authorization, alleging that Ms. E.B. was “seeking to avoid the violence of giving birth and genet-
ic anxiety regarding biological child”, that she idealized and underestimated the difficulties con-
nected to providing one with a home, and that she “fantasised about being able to fully amend a 
child’s past” (E.B, § 11).  
Besides the lack of a paternal model, the psychologist negatively considered the relationship be-
tween E.B. and her partner, since the latter did not appear to be a party to the plan. 
However, the Court read such a statement in the context of a broad hostile evaluation of Ms 
E.B.’s homosexuality, arguing that the manner in which certain opinions were expressed was 
“revealing in that the applicant’s homosexuality was a determining factor” (Ivi, § 85).  
The ECtHR acknowledged that it was perfectly normal that French authorities scrutinized the 
relationship between Ms. E.B. and R., but it also did not consider their relationship as a rele-
vant negative element, to the extent that the Court did not address this point at any length in the 
review. On the contrary, the interpretation of the ECHR was entirely devoted to ensuring an ef-
fective enforcement of the principle of non-discrimination, which reappraised Fretté minoritari-
an perspective; national authorities were free to choose whether singles could apply for the au-
thorization to adopt but, in that event, they were bound by the ECHR to enforce such policies 
by abiding to the principle of equality and non-discrimination.  
The ECtHR’s approach was hence quite straightforward and it was extremely different from the 
confused and contradicting judgment laid down in Fretté; to my reading, this case conveyed an 
interpretation of parental relations moulded on the idea of kinship described by Butler, and on 
the assumption that even non heterosexual persons, who do not fit into the traditional catego-
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ries, are able to be good parents. Had the Court wished to apply the principle of precaution, it 
would have probably evaluated the role of R. from another perspective; even though French law 
enabled singles to adopt, the Court could have considered Ms E.B. relational environment as 
significant and it could have concluded that national authorities had not decided on the solely 
grounds of her homosexuality. Seven judges effectively upheld such a perspective and they con-
tended that French social services had just acted to secure the child’s best interest. 
Therefore, not only did the ECtHR reaffirm that if the law admitted singles to adopt, these 
could not be excluded on the grounds that either they did not provide another parental figure, 
of different sex, or that they were homosexual, but it also implied that even though a kinship 
did not fall within traditional and conventional categories, it could nevertheless provide a safe 
environment for a child. 
Before evaluating the ECtHR’s reasoning as for the binary public/private, I wish to compare the 
ECtHR’s approach to these two cases in light of the applicants’ biological gender.  
A closer analysis of these judgments raises the doubt that the ECtHR did not uphold Mr. Fret-
té’s claim because, as a homosexual male, he was filtered through the stereotype whereby men 
would be unable to be single fathers. To support this statement, it’s necessary to recall how the 
ECtHR dealt with the submissions of French authorities; social services had negatively noted 
that Mr. Fretté had realized how unsuitable his flat was for a child only when they had visited 
his house, but they admitted that he had stated to be considering the possibility of moving (Fret-
té, § 10). As the ECtHR acknowledged, the main reason for denying him the authorization was 
his homosexuality coupled with the fact that he was single. In light of these submissions, one 
could reasonably presume that the ECtHR might want to substantially discuss such statements 
while, instead, the majority approached the issue by both endorsing his alleged practical inca-
pacity - as if he had not expressed the intention to move in to another flat- and by questioning 
whether homosexual single men should be entrusted to adopt.  
As far as criticisable, this reasoning-line set a clear path: the ECtHR, in light of the current sci-
entific studies available and considering the lack of political consensus on the matter, consid-
ered it legitimate to deny a person the authorization to adopt precisely on the grounds of his 
sexual orientation. 
Against this background, it would have been reasonable to find the same approach in E.B., giv-
en that, as the Court noted, the case concerned “the question of how an application for authori-
sation to adopt submitted by a homosexual single person is dealt with” (E.B., § 71), and given 
that also some elements of Ms. E.B.’s personal life were judged as inappropriate. Instead, the 
ECtHR did not even refer to the divided scientific community, nor did it take into account the 
lack of a consensus among COE Countries.  
 363	  
As such, despite appearing comparable on several aspects, there has to be some peculiarities 
which divide these two cases, so as to justify such a significantly diverse review.  
To my reading, the answer might lie in the unstated and undiscussed prejudice whereby a single 
man, especially if homosexual, is deemed as not being able to properly comply with the task of 
caregiving, whereas a woman, even though living in a unclear lesbian relationship, would how-
ever be equipped with the necessary resources to be a mother. As such, the comparison be-
tween Fretté and E.B. would provide a relevant example of the dynamics described with refer-
ence to Minow’s theory: the perspective adduced by Mr. Fretté remained ignored and, despite 
his efforts to comply with social services’ requests, the ECtHR understood his case by filtering 
him through the interpretive and cognitive stereotype of the gay man, whose request to adopt 
deserved to be regarded with suspect and caution, at the very least. 
Both Fretté and E.B., however, are problematical as far as the division between private and 
public is concerned, since the Court framed the complaint through the lens of private life, deny-
ing that their case fell under that of family life: whereas in Fretté judges did not even discuss the 
reason for such an approach, in E.B. they denied that the claim to apply for the authorization to 
adopt amounted to the attempt to create a familiar relationship with a child. According to the 
majority the notion of family life presupposes the existence of family, it does not secure the 
right to create a family or to adopt; at least it requires the “potential relationship between […] a 
child born out of wedlock and his or her natural father, or the relationship that arises from a 
genuine marriage, if family life has not yet been fully established, or the relationship that arises 
from a lawful and genuine adoption” (E.B., § 41). As such, the situation of Ms. E.B. had to be 
considered under private life, insofar as it encompassed “the right to establish and develop rela-
tionships with other human beings, the right to personal development, or the right to self-
determination as such, […] gender identification, sexual orientation and sexual life” (Ivi, § 43). 
Although such framing did not prevent the Court from finding a violation, it still could be criti-
cized as displacing, since the case at stake did not entail a general claim to establish interperson-
al relations, but to create a bond based on a parental one, which is commonly presumed to be 
the very core of family life itself.  
It might be argued that if the Court had aimed at enforcing the model of the closet, it would 
have probably delivered a diverse outcome, or at least a more hostile wording; likewise, it could 
have also judged that the relationship claimed by Ms. E.B. did not fall within those secured by 
Article 8. I quite agree on this point and I suggest that the approach of the Court has to be con-
textualized within the general strategic litigation for the recognition of same-sex family life; E.B. 
was delivered four years before the Court finally innovated its jurisprudence on the matter and, 
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as such, I would ascribe this restrained and clear-cut division between private and public to the 
will not to open interpretive spaces for framing same-sex couples under this realm. 
 In fact, as explored in the forthcoming section, once that the ECtHR framed same-sex relation-
ships under the notion of family life, it extended such frame also to claims addressing parental 
rights.  
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4.6.3 Second-Parent Adoption 
 
From 1989 onwards several same-sex couples, lesbians, filed complaints to the ECtHR, claim-
ing either the right to enjoy the so-called second parent adoption that is the adoption by the 
mother’s partner, or the application of rules on legal paternal presumption in the context of a 
same-sex kinship.  
If in previous clusters the parties discussed the effective parental ability and value of lgbt per-
sons, with reference to second-parent adoption the theoretical core changes; the debate does 
not revolve around whether homosexual individuals are able to take care and to properly raise 
children - the Court had already held that they were, both if biological or adoptive parents- but 
it focuses on the meaning of family and on its structural asset. By this, I frame the applicants’ 
claim as proposing a different structure of family, more suitable to ratifying the existing kinships, 
and a rights configuration moulded on the changing social reality.  
The main problem, the reason why national authorities had dismissed the applicants’ claims, 
was that those lesbian couples aimed at being recognized both as parents; therefore, French, 
Austrian, German and Netherlands governments denied that families not adhering to the het-
erosexual model could claim any right.  
Under this light, the State performed a legitimizing function, for it did not merely ratify situa-
tions which de facto existed and which did not harm any of parties involved, but it understood 
the law as a main vehicle of legitimation, and endorsed a quite traditional reading of what family 
is. As a consequence, reality had to conform to legal categories, whilst the latter were not read as 
particularly flexible or suited to answer social trends and demands. 
The factual condition before the ECtHR was, indeed, clear, and it addressed the legal status of 
same-sex social parents, who had already established a strong tie with their partner’s child.  
Besides specificities of different cases, which will be analyzed hereinafter, the perspective laid 
down by same-sex couples is complex and remainders, at the same time, of a traditional and a 
queer approach to law and family.  
As for the first, the dimension of a couple was read jointly with that of family, implying that the 
essential core of a family was fixed and necessarily implied the committed relationship between 
two persons; therefore, these cases did problematize the foundational role of monogamous kin-
ship, to the imitation of the biological tie between generations, but the fact that same-sex cou-
ples resulted excluded from it. 
Moreover, the request advanced in Boeckel and Gessner to extend the presumption of paterni-
ty to the same-sex partner who lived with the biological parent at the time of the child’s birth 
conveys a symbolical and ambivalent meaning. 
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With reference to the aforementioned case, German laws provided second parent adoption in 
the context of a same-sex registered partnership, and local authorities had not denied this op-
tion to the applicant. However, they submitted that “there was no reasonable justification for en-
tering the biological mother’s husband into the birth certificate as the child’s father, while refus-
ing to enter the biological mother’s same-sex partner” (Boeckel and Gessner, § 21), hence fram-
ing legal presumption of paternity as applicable irrespectively of the mother’s partner sex. 
This case did not challenge existing laws in that they did not provide a direct and immediate 
recognition of the second parent, or in that they mirrored an outdated concept of family, rather 
alleging the indifference between the situation disciplined by German legislator in 1952 and that 
of the applicants.  
As a consequence, Boeckel and Gessner somehow claimed a normalization of their condition 
within the traditional narrative of family; they did not refer to a presumption of more general 
parental care nor did they discuss the required statement of paternity on the birth-certificate, 
but they precisely defined the second parent as the father.  
On the other hand, all claims described also convey innovative and potentially radical conse-
quences. In general terms, the fictio of biological parents is disrupted, since in the case of same-
sex couples the biological bond obviously can’t be presumed by the law; as such, the reason to 
legally recognize same-sex second parents can’t be concealed under the legal indifference for 
the effective genetic tie, nor can it be viewed as a way of enforcing the institution of marriage in 
contexts where gays and lesbians are only allowed to enter civil unions. If anything, the grounds 
of similar innovations recalls the positive evaluation of social caregivers, the valorisation of those 
people who effectively play a relevant role in the child’s life, regardless of genetic ascendance. 
Such flexibility would therefore ratify existing situations and would pose the first step to shaping 
family law according to multifaceted, complex and not linear family bonds which mark Western 
society. 
The progressive widening of homosexual parental rights potentially blurs the normative effects 
of traditional laws on parenthood, thus enhancing the ratification of not heterosexual and not 
conventional kinships.  
As discussed below, both parties and the ECtHR have mostly relied on the principle of equality 
and on the comparability of lgbt families to the traditional one, but in the future such a perspec-
tive could change and emphasize most disruptive consequences. 
Turning to the specific cases, Kerkhoven and Hinke v Netherlands is interesting from a histori-
cal perspective, since it was raised in 1989 and it gave the opportunity to the EComHR to inter-
pret this issue before it became a widely politically debated public issue. As such, the diachronic 
approach allows the understanding of the change occurred both on the interpretation of the 
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same provisions, and on the wider theoretical approach, in the turn of two decades. Ms. Hinke 
was the biological mother of a child she had by means of medical assisted reproduction, and 
she cohabited with Ms. Kerkhoven, who actively took part in taking care of the child, to the ex-
tent that the Commission noted that they “shared parental tasks”. The couple had asked with-
out success the national Courts to vest the second parent with parental authority, without suc-
cess: under Dutch laws, the adoption presumed the absence of the parent of the same-sex of 
the adopter and also legal recognition was admitted only for men, since it relied on the legal 
presumption of paternity. 
Before the ECtHR they contended a discriminatory treatment in the enjoyment of their right to 
respect for private and family life. The EComHR dismissed the possibility of framing that situa-
tion as family life, but it also displayed contradicting reasoning, whereby the reason why it 
reached such a decision was not that the applicants and their child could not be considered as a 
family, but that they did not fit the model of family allegedly required by the ECHR. Indeed, 
firstly commissioners held that a relationship between two women does not fall in family life, 
but after a few lines, it “further note[d]” that even if the frame of family life had applied, no vio-
lation could have been claimed, in that “the relevant legislation in itself does not prevent the 
three applicants form living together as a family. The only problem […] is the impossibility to 
the first applicant to establish legal ties with the third applicant, which may become of practical 
importance should the natural mother die or the relationship between the two adults end oth-
erwise”. 
If the EComHR had really considered the applicants as not being able to claim family life, the 
second part of the quote would sound odd, because it would offer non required justification; 
not only the Court admits that the applicants live as a family, but it also concedes that the legal 
recognition of the second parent may have substantial grounds, under particular and exception-
al circumstances.  
The issue at hand, hence, inhered to the possibility deriving from the ECHR the obligation to 
recognize second parents, also in the context of same-sex cohabitations, consequently question-
ing the tolerable distance from the traditional cluster of values and models of life attached to the 
Convention, so to raise a legitimated pretence. 
On the issue, the Commission judged the situation of the applicants as not comprising neither 
in private life nor in family life secured by Article 8. Commissioners did not indulge in exten-
sive explanations of their normative perspective, just legitimizing the status quo secured by 
Dutch legislation as neutral. 
I would ascribe the lack of sensitivity towards differences to a stark heteronormative endorse-
ment: the Commission implicitly compared Kerkhoven and Hinke to a family, but it assessed 
 368	  
that such comparisons should not give rise to legal consequences, in that the difference to the 
normal and desirable model of family was too great. 
When the same claim was reiterated to the Court, in Gas and Dubois v France, the ECtHR 
conducted a deeper analysis, even though it finally found no violation; since the Court was 
called to review a similar complaint two years later, in X and others v Austria, and it reached the 
opposite outcome, I consider the interpretation laid down jointly, so as to evaluate the reasons 
for such dissimilar interpretive result. 
In Gas and Dubois the applicants creatively interpreted the existing legislation, proposing to 
apply the legal institute of ‘simple adoption’ also to circumstances other than those for which it 
had been created. According to the original provision simple adoption does not sever the ties 
between the child and her original family, but creates an additional legal parent-child relation-
ship, in order to compensate for the failings of biological parents. Only in the event of a mar-
ried couple, was the spouse allowed to resort to simple adoption to create a tie with her part-
ner’s child.  
The lesbian couple, however, supported a creative disruption of that legal institute, by stretching 
its effects also to unmarried same-sex couples, where the biological parent gave her/his consent 
even though he/she was able to raise the child; by loosening the prerequisite of biological par-
ent’s incompetence, simple adoption would affirm social parenthood, providing thus a legal in-
strument to introduce second-parent adoption even in legal contexts where this issue was not 
regulated by specific provisions. 
However, the overwhelming majority of the Court did not uphold their reasoning, for both sub-
stantial and institutional reasons. 
As for the former, Schalk and Kopf was reiterated and, consequently, the situation of the appli-
cants was compared to a heterosexual unmarried couple; according to the ECtHR marriage 
“confers a special status on those who enter it” (Gas and Dubois, § 68), also implying its speci-
ficity and unicity in the overall legal frame. 
The Court conceded that the indirect discrimination alleged by the applicants effectively ap-
plied, since it was possible for them to marry, whereas heterosexual couples could circumvent 
French legislation on simple adoption by that means. Nevertheless, it held that on this issue no 
activist outcome could be reached, and that the Court had to abide to its restrained previous 
case-law. 
As for the latter, namely for structural reasons, the ECtHR started out from the premise that 
French law refused simple-adoption within the frame of civil partnerships, and in the event of 
one partner adopting his/her partner’s child, parental responsibility would have been trans-
ferred to the adoptive parent, to the detriment of the latter. The Court did not dispute such 
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framing, and took it as the orienting framework for its review, which read “in essence, […] any 
couple in a comparable situation by virtue of having entered into a civil partnership would like-
wise have their application for a simple-adoption order refused […]” (Ivi, § 69) and which ob-
served that no difference in treatment based on sexual orientation could be claimed. 
At first sight, the ECtHR seems to only review the internal coherence of national laws, hence 
addressing only if unmarried heterosexual couples were treated the same as same-sex couples, 
without taking into account the reason why the latter could not be compared to married ones. 
Hence, it might be argued that judges applied the structural margin of appreciation, in defer-
ence to national authorities, but, on a closer look, they reached this conclusion after a careful 
substantial reasoning. Indeed, they firstly discussed, and rejected, the applicants’ claims, debat-
ed the emerging COE trends, recalling that Article 12 did not secure same-sex marriage, depict-
ing French legislation on simple adoption as not problematic, and only in the end did they con-
cede national authorities a wide margin of appreciation. 
ECtHR wording somehow expects that this was the only objective and logic interpretation of the 
ECHR; concurring and dissenting opinions, however, proposing a different perspective which, 
even though leading to the same final outcome, sheds light on a less majoritarian interpretation. 
Whilst the majority held that “it can only refer to its previous findings” (Ivi, § 71) as concerned 
the claim of indirect discrimination, concurring judge Spielmann and judge Berro-Lefevre con-
tended that the applicants’ legal situation was comparable to that of a married couple, precisely 
because they were prevented from entering wedlock. Moreover, on one hand, the Court did 
not critically address the role of child’s best interest within French laws, hence assuming it had 
been properly taken into account; on the other hand, both concurring and dissenting judges 
emphasized the relevance of this issue pointing out that even though they had voted against 
finding a violation French legislation still remained extremely problematic. Judge Costa labelled 
the structure of Article 365 of the Civil Code as “less than convincing”, hoping that “French leg-
islature will […] review the issue”, and judge Spielmann, and judge Berro-Levefre, considered 
that simple adoption remained “a source of problems […]. The child’s legal status remains pre-
carious, a situation which cannot be in his or her best interests” (Ivi).  
Despite these remarks, all mentioned judges found no violation, by relying on structural margin 
of appreciation, by considering domestic authorities as best placed to address the issue, and by 
noting that although a European trend in favour of lgbt second parent adoption was emerging, 
still no definite majorities existed.  
Judge Villiger, the only dissenting, offered an interesting reasoning, since he approached the 
facts and the claims from a different angle, namely that of child’s best interest. Against the ma-
jority he argued that “the judgment focuses on the adults but not on the children who are never-
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theless an integral part of the applicants’ complaints”. Effectively, this issue was barely un-
touched in the majority’s review, and judge Villiger assumed that the essential question the 
Court should have answered was “whether the difference of treatment complained of is justified 
from the vantage point of the child’s best interests”. From this angle the final decision could not 
be justified, as the Court legitimatised a jeopardized position of the children of the various rela-
tionships. Children of heterosexual couples benefit from joint parental responsibility if the cou-
ple is married, those of a same-sex couple don’t as their parents are prevented from marrying, 
but not because their best interest is not to be legally tied to those who are raising them. If all 
children should be given the same treatment on the grounds that they share the same needs, 
judge Villiger argued that there was no reason “why some children, but not others, should be 
deprived of their best interests, namely of joint parental custody”.  
Thanks to concurring and separate opinions, it’s possible to scratch beneath the surface of Gas 
and Dubois judgment, and to comprehend the implied and situated premises endorsed by the 
majority.  
Firstly, creative desegregation is rejected, and the Court dismisses any attempt to apply simple 
adoption for unintended purposes; secondly, the necessity to establish a comparison is ground-
ed on majoritarian and heteronormative premises. Judge Villiger demonstrated how the com-
parison between married and unmarried couples was not the only possibility, and proposed de-
parting from the child’s perspective; the majority, however, reiterated the intangible nature of 
marriage, and did not give particular relevance to the minoritarian perspective brought forward 
by the applicants. The child’s voice is practically erased, and the Court evaluates only the inter-
est of the biological parent not to be deprived or diminished in her rights and duties, not the in-
terest of the minor involved in being secured in his/her affective kinships. 
By focusing on what the Court implicitly states, a premise which preluded to a possible lgbt 
friendly interpretation of the ECHR emerges. Such peculiarity can be grasped if confronting the 
majority with concurring judge Spielmann and judge Ferro-Lefevre; whilst the latter contended 
that even if the law discriminated against same-sex couples as far as simple adoption or second 
adoption were concerned, this differential treatment would not be unjustified or problematic, 
the majority anchored the final decision to the fact that French law made no difference between 
heterosexual and homosexual unmarried couples. 
Hence, one could presume that in the event of a differentiated legal frame, the Court would 
have reached a different outcome, still reinforcing the intangibility of wedlock, but requiring 
equal treatment of other forms of family life.  
As such, the Court would not convey a biased attitude against homosexuals as parents, but it 
would not manage to dismantle the privilege of heterosexuality, in that only national authorities 
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are legitimatised to allow same-sex marriage while, in the absence of a clear trend, the ECHR 
would secure only different-sex marriage. 
Effectively, this premise was reappraised in X and others v Austria, where the ECtHR reached a 
landmark decision.  
In X and Others v Austria, n. 1910/07, two cohabiting lesbian women alleged Article 182 of 
Austrian Civil Code as discriminatory, since it implicitly denied the second-parent adoption in 
case of same-sex couples, while allowing heterosexual unmarried couples147. The applicants were 
bringing up a child, which one applicant had had from a previous heterosexual marriage, and 
the social mother claimed the right to access adoption without severing parental rights and du-
ties of his biological mother. Whereas the minor consented to the adoption, his biological fa-
ther remained hostile to the lesbian couple and did not consent to the adoption, since he risked 
being severed in his paternal role.  
Insofar as fluctuating in undertaking his duties and begrudging in respect of the lesbian couple, 
the father was attached to the child, and before national Courts he stated that if his paternal role 
were severed, he would have not the opportunity to establish a positive relationship with his 
son. 
Unlike in Gas and Dubois, the ECtHR departed from assessing the child’s best interest and 
even though it acknowledged that, in theory, difference in treatment based on sexual orientation 
violated the ECHR, the Court also held the opinion that the final outcome had to protect the 
rights and needs of the child involved.  
It’s true that the Court recalled that, in cases of simple adoption, the French law allowed only 
married couples to share parental rights, stating that “having regard to the special status con-
ferred by marriage” (X and others, § 104) the applicants’ legal situation was not comparable to 
that of a married couple. The final decisions might be ascribed, hence, to the different legal 
frame, namely to the fact that Austrian legislation discriminated between heterosexual and ho-
mosexual unmarried couples, while the French did not. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Article 182 (2) of Austrian Legal Code provides “If the child is adopted by a married couple, the legal 
relationship under family law- above and beyond the legal kinship itself- between the biological parents 
and their relatives on one hand, and the adopted child and his or her offspring who are minors at the 
time of the adoption takes effect on the other hand, shall cease at that time, apart from the exceptions 
referred to in Article 182. If the child is adopted just by an adoptive father (an adoptive mother), the re-
lationship shall cease only in respect of the biological father (the biological mother) and his (her) rela-
tives; in so far as the legal relationship with the other parent remains intact after the adoption, the court 
shall declare it to have been severed, subject to the consent of the parent concerned. The relationship 
ceases to exist as of the date on which the statement of consent is given, but no earlier than the date on 
which the adoption takes effect” (X and others, § 27). 
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To some extent I agree, and I suggest that if under Austrian provisions second-parent adoption 
had been provided to married couples only, the Court’s reasoning would have followed another 
path.  
However, I wish to emphasize the reiterated statements directly tackling the prejudice against 
homosexual parents, and confronting with opponents on second-parent adoption on the terrain 
of whether a child should grow up with two same-sex parents. 
Two conservative thinking, the Alliance Defending Freedom and the already mentioned Euro-
pean Centre for Law and Justice, urged the Court not to uphold the applicants’ claims, contend-
ing that there had been “no interference with the applicant’s de facto family life” (Ivi, § 81), and 
that domestic Courts had only tried to preserve the “natural family and providing legal certainty 
for the child” (Ivi, §); moreover it was argued that recent studies conducted in the USA, among 
which the infamous Regnerus study148 had falsified the so-called “indifference thesis, […] the 
claim made by various studies that children raised by same-sex couples were not disadvantaged 
in any significant respect compared to children raised by heterosexual parents” (Ivi, § 91 ). 
The ongoing medical and scientific debate was also paired with the alleged lack of COE con-
sensus, so to claim wide national discretion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 In 2012 Mark Regnerus, professor of sociology at Austin University, published a study which allegedly 
demonstrated that children raised by same-sex parents experienced serious side-effects during their 
adulthood. Such a study was published by the prestigious academic journal “Social Science Research”, 
and it was waived by Republican, conservative Parties, and religious groups all over the world, both in 
legislative assemblies and before judicial Courts. According to Regnerus children with same-sex parents 
were more likely to remain unemployed, to have an unsatisfactory affective life, to commit suicide, to 
feel unsatisfied with themselves, and not to become completely autonomous adults. This research of-
fered a crucial weapon to opponents of same-sex marriage and homosexual parenthood, in that it 
claimed to objectively prove beyond any doubts that it was in the child’s best interest to grow up with 
heterosexual parents. Quite predictably, the impact of Regnerus’ study -backed by religious and political 
parties- was, and still is, immense, and it directly affected the enhancement of lgbt rights: in the USA ar-
guments against same-sex marriage and lgbt adoptions still recall this study, and all over Europe tradi-
tionalist parties resort to this research in order to influence public opinion, framing the ban on lgbt 
parenthood as necessary for minors’ correct development. However, the scientific nature of this re-
search was heavily disputed, and, finally, three serious flaws were found in Regnerus’ study. Firstly, Reg-
nerus had adopted biased criteria and parameters to gather data, including in the sample only persons 
raised by homosexual parents in context of social disadvantage, and framing as homosexuals biological 
parents which had had even just only one sporadic homosexual encounter. The departing point of the 
research was, then, definitely unreliable. Secondly, as a consequence, the statistical relevance of his find-
ings have also been challenged; thirdly, the peer review process had been shortened thanks to the lobby-
ing of foundations which, on one hand, has sponsored Regnerus and, on the other, had managed to 
convince the editors of “Social Science Research” to accept his manuscript without revising it. In conclu-
sion, Regnerus’ study was judges as completely unfounded and lacking of any scientific evidence. How-
ever, its influence still spreads effect: not only it is raised as a scientific argument against lgbt rights in the 
political arena, but, as X and others demonstrate, it is also echoed by judges who interpret human rights 
law. 
For a detailed account of Regnerus affair, see Zanetti 2015. 
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The Court agreed that the only relevant criterion was the protection of the child’s best interest, 
but at the same time, it pointed against the lack of evidence “adduced by the Government in 
order to show that it would be detrimental to the child to be brought up by a same-sex couple 
or to have two mothers and two fathers for legal purposes” (Ivi, § 146), and to the absence of 
“any specific argument, any scientific studies or any other item of evidence to show that a family 
with two parents of the same sex could in no circumstances adequately provide for a child’s 
needs” (Ivi, § 142).  
As such, the Court did not adopt the principle of precaution, and it firmly held that same-sex 
couples had to be considered as equal to different-same sex couples even in the realm of adop-
tion. The reasoning which led to the final decision, namely the finding of a violation of Article 
14 jointly considered with Article 8, relied on the child’s interest and merely on the enforce-
ment of the principle of equality and non-discrimination.  
Before further analyzing the ECtHR , it’s worth emphasizing that the ECtHR highlighted that 
the present case did not concern the question “whether the applicants’ adoption request should 
have been granted in the circumstances of the case” but “whether the applicants were discrimi-
nated against on account of the fact that the Courts had no opportunity to examine in any 
meaningful manner whether the requested adoption was in the second applicant’s interests, giv-
en that it was in any case legally impossible” (Ivi, § 152). 
In fact, the Court adopted a standpoint critical to several heteronormative assumptions.  
Firstly, the judgment endorsed a parental frame not inherently heterosexual; secondly, the 
Court recalled previous jurisprudence referred to sexual orientation, narrowing the national 
margin of appreciation, implying that national authorities were entitled to exclude unmarried 
couples from adoption procedures but, they could not draw a distinction between unmarried 
different-sex and same-sex couples without violating the Convention. Thirdly, the missed re-
course to the principle of caution can be read as a further step in legitimatising a reading of hu-
man rights detached from biased and majoritarian gaze against homosexuals.  
Quite predictably, the ECtHR reasoning was harshly challenged by dissenting and concurring 
opinions. Judge Spielmann reiterated the argument laid in Gas and Dubois, whereby same-sex 
couples should be compared to married heterosexual ones, being the former not allowed to 
marry even though living in a de-facto marriage; the strongest criticism was however raised by 
seven dissenting judges. They indeed labelled the ECtHR reasoning as saying “too much and 
yet not enough on the subject of second-parent adoption in same sex couples” (Ivi, dissenting 
opinion, § 11). On one hand, the Court ascribed the restriction of second parent adoption to 
heterosexual couples as merely “reflecting the position of those sectors of the society which are 
opposed to the idea of opening up second parent adoption to same-sex couples” (Ivi, § 143), 
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but dissenting judges contended that such opinion was legitimate and could mirror a reality “val-
id for Austria but also for other State Parties to the Convention” (Ivi, dissenting opinion, § 9). 
On the other, the Court imposed responding to the Government the burden to scientifically 
prove that homosexual couples were not able to provide a child’s needs but, according to dis-
senting opinion, it failed to clarify why “the Government [should] have adduced such evidence” 
(Ivi, dis. op., judge Spielmann § 10), since in the frame of the actual case it allegedly proved “ir-
relevant”. Given the lack of European consensus on the matter, the ECtHR should have been 
careful not to impose change, and not to engage in an activist interpretation of the ECHR. 
Surely X and others v Austria marked a consistent precedent but I would argue that its efficacy 
is quite limited, especially if considering those States in which only married couples can adopt; 
from this standpoint, the Court reaffirmed national discretion in defining rights enshrined to the 
institution of marriage. Therefore, I would evaluate judicial interpretation as challenging and 
overcoming specific and limited heteronormative assumptions, without breaking their most per-
vasive effects. 
Another criticism concerns the evaluation made by the ECtHR in respect to the father’s role 
and in respect to the family reinforced by Austrian legislation. The aim of Austrian provisions 
was “to create a relationship akin to that which exists between biological parents and their chil-
dren” (Ivi, §18) and it assumed the model of nuclear heterosexual family as the normative, 
fixed, horizon, to where any other kinships should conform in order to be legally protected. In 
this case, for instance, the child consented to be adopted by his mother’s partner but, at the 
same time, he didn’t deny the existence of a relatively positive tie with his father, demonstrating 
that both his stepmother and his father played a diverse but relevant role in his life. The Court, 
however, didn’t give any room to the eventual father’s right not to be deprived of his parental 
role, endorsing a model of homosexual adoption shaped upon the nuclear model, according to 
which even if homosexual, there can be only two parents, in imitation of biological ones.  
Most notably, dissenting opinion recalls the conflict between the claims of applicants and the 
possible interest of the biological father, highlighting open questions embedded in the legal sys-
tem affecting not only homosexual couples, but all families in which, on one side, the parent 
who will lose parental rights has not committed sever breaches and, on the other, the child’s 
best interest would require both to maintain the tie with her biological parent and to recognize 
the existing relationship with her social parent. It is a complex framework and I am aware that 
the Court has to narrow its reasoning only to claims made by the applicants, but, perhaps, the 
ECtHR could have detailed a few notable and detailed remarks on the problems posed by the 
traditional family.  
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In conclusion, however, spaces hinted in Gas and Dubois were considerably expanded, and the 
Court secured the human right of homosexual couples to enjoy of the same rights provided by 
national legislations to heterosexual unmarried, or civil united, couples in quite general terms. 
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4.6.4 Conclusive Remarks 
 
From a general perspective the ECtHR jurisprudence on sexual orientation and parenthood 
displays relevant features especially as far as internal divisions are concerned. The Court’s legal 
culture on this specific issue, indeed, unveils theoretical tensions related to the evaluation of the 
applicants, but also profound disagreement as to the roles and of the Court and to the functions 
of the Convention.  
These contrasts entail a wide range of issues; on closer analysis in some cases behind doctrinal 
or institutional arguments a substantial evaluation of the claim advanced is implied, while in 
others the dissenting judges contrast the majority outcome even though probably agreeing with 
the content of the final judgment. 
Consider, for instance, E.B. v France and Gas and Dubois v France. Both cases reached a final 
result with a majority of ten against seven votes, and while in the first the Court upheld the ap-
plicant’s claim, in the latter it dismissed the request of second parent adoption.  
Focusing on dissenting opinions in E.B., judge Costa, judge Turmen, judge Ugrekhelidze, and 
judge Jocene disagreed on the tasks that the ECtHR should perform; most notably, they shared 
the message sent by the ECtHR to State Parties that “a person seeking to adopt cannot be pre-
vented from doing so merely on the ground of his homosexuality. […] Our Court […] considers 
that a person can no more be refused authorization to adopt on the grounds of their homosex-
uality than have their parental responsibility withdrawn on those ground” (E.B., diss. op., judge 
Costa, judge Turmen, judge Ugrekhelidze, judge Jocene, § 3).  
However, to them the applicant’s homosexuality had not been the decisive element in denying 
her the possibility to adopt, and they argued against the so-called contamination argument, 
namely the idea that homophobic feelings could percolate into decisions and policies even 
though not explicitly stated. 
Surely, their perspective could be criticized as formalistic, as devoted mainly to tackling formal 
discrimination but not informal, effective, or indirect discrimination. Effectively, as they empha-
sized, French law did not prohibit homosexuals from adopting, but the procedure carried out 
by social services posed on them such a heavy burden that practically impaired their rights. 
On the other hand, their arguments can’t be considered as strictly erasing the minoritarian per-
spective, as instead does the dissenting opinion of judge Zupanic. He framed adoption as a 
“privilege”, also discussing the difference between rights, which involve “discrimination in terms 
of unequal treatment”, and privileges, namely “situations in which the granting vel non of the 
privilege make it legitimate for the decision-making body […] to exercise discretion without fear 
the right of the aggrieved person will be violated” (E.B., dis. op., judge Zupanic). 
 377	  
Just as it would be “bizarre” for anybody to claim a particular award, decoration, or privilege, 
likewise judge Zupanic considered the applicant’s claim odd; further contending that the Court 
was called to secure the child’s best interests, which to him had not been considered enough.  
Hence, the other remarks on the margin of appreciation and on the alleged objectivity of the 
French authorities, could be read as being soaked in the aforementioned value-oriented per-
spective.  
Turning to Gas and Dubois, instead, as already explored, the concurring opinions call French 
authorities to review rights provided to civil unions, showing sympathy for the applicants, but, at 
the same time, they denied that national decisions had breached the ECHR, by relying on doc-
trinal elements and, most notably, on the necessity not to draw from the ECHR either the right 
to adopt, nor the right to second adoption.  
In fact, most critic passages do not entail the possible situated perspective conveyed by the 
Court, rather contesting its role of law creation and suggesting that the restrained path followed 
on same-sex marriage should be reiterated also as far as parenthood and adoption are con-
cerned.  
Another relevant element attains to the different sensitivity to direct and indirect discrimination. 
Neither French, nor Austrian legislations openly prevented gays and lesbians from adoption 
but, in fact, either administrative procedures or the general meaning of single provisions, re-
stricted their rights. Hence, the applicants mostly relied on a substantial meaning of discrimina-
tion, contending that the essential grounds for their reaction had been their homosexuality, or 
pointing out that given the wording of certain provisions, same-sex couples resulted excluded 
from second parent adoption. 
If on direct discrimination, like that denounced by Mr. Salgueiro, the Court undertook a clear 
and unanimous decision, upholding his claims, in respect of indirect discrimination the situa-
tion is far more blurred. In Gas and Dubois concurring judges alleged that had the applicants 
been a man and a woman who were not married, they would not have been eligible for this type 
of adoption either, hence stating that “it is difficult to argue that this was a case of discrimination 
on sex, still less it was homophobic”. In this reasoning it completely misses any reference to the 
fact that a heterosexual couple was allowed to marry and, hence, to meet the requirements pro-
vided for second parent adoption; only the formal wording of the law is examined, while the 
broad legal context or its practical effects are not equally evaluated. 
The ECtHR internal legal culture on the issue is hence passed though by multiple and varied 
bifurcations; as concerns the interpretation of the ECHR and the substantial rights secured, the 
Court appear to be extremely divided. 
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As for the former, the terms of comparison and the applicability are strongly debated. 
Throughout all case-law on second parent adoption, the Court does not agree whether same-sex 
cohabiting partners could be compared to unmarried heterosexual ones, whether they could be 
compared to married couples, or whether same-sex couples could not be compared to hetero-
sexual ones at all.  
In Gas and Dubois v France e X and others v Austria the majority endorsed the second per-
spective, establishing an analogy between same-sex and unmarried couples; however, judge 
Spielmann, in the former, and him jointly with judge Berro-Lefevre, in the latter, strongly ar-
gued that the applicants should have been compared to married couples, since same-sex cou-
ples were not provided with the right to enter into wedlock. In both cases, however, this per-
spective did not gain much success and, at the moment, it remains restricted to a tiny minority.  
As for rights secured, disagreement entails a triple dimension: firstly, majorities and minorities 
do not agree if and whether a right to adopt exists; secondly, the balance between the child’s 
best interest and the parents’ rights is difficulty assessed. Lastly, the very definition of which is 
the child’s best interest is extremely debatable. 
In Fretté concurring judges emphasized that since no right to adopt was included in the ECHR, 
the Court should refrain from introducing rights not originally enclosed and also previously de-
nied by the Court itself. In a precedent case the ECtHR had clearly denied that a right of adop-
tion existed, and, in fact, both in Fretté and E.B. the majority referred to the right of being con-
sidered for adoption purposes. However, also in E.B. seven judges claimed that neither the 
ECHR secured the right to adoption, nor did it include the right to be considered eligible to 
apply for adoption. 
The second and third element are deeply explored in Gas and Dubois and X and others, where 
the applicants already had a relationship with the child and, hence, where both parties could 
claim interests on these grounds.  
While Gas and Dubois depart from the positions of the applicants, X and others relies mainly 
on the child’s best interest, as if to suggest a change of perspective. In the former, indeed, dis-
senting judge Villiger precisely contested the majority on the grounds that it had focused on 
adults, without fully evaluating the child’s point of view, which, in his opinion, required the sim-
ple adoption by his mother’s partner. In the latter, however, dissenting judges disputed both the 
assessment of the child’s best interest and the evaluation of adults’ interests involved. As already 
recalled, dissenting judges argued that biological father’s rights had not been considered and, 
they suggested that it was up to the Court to balance the applicants’ interest with the father’s 
rights, even if the latter had not lodged with the ECtHR. Moreover, while the majority endorsed 
the assumption whereby the child’s best interest was to be legally secured in the affective and 
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social environment in which he was growing up, dissenting ones strongly supporting the model 
of traditional family as best suited.  
The latter argument could also be framed as imbued by a disagreement of values to secure, 
and, therefore, it can be read in conjunction with E.B. dissenting opinion delivered by judge 
Mularoni, and with X and others joint dissenting opinion. 
Internal disagreement strongly holds in all judgment, and it shows that adoption by same-sex 
couples or homosexual persons is still a deeply debated theme, on which the Court had not 
reached a uniform perspective; in fact, even though the majority has progressively interpreted 
the ECHR favourable to the applicants, the width of dissent has not significantly decreased, still 
holding 40% of total judges. 
Even the departing assumption shared by all judgments, namely that the applicants had a case 
under the ECHR is not shared, and a minoritarian but fierce portion of judges opposing law-
creation at the hands of the ECtHR. 
In conclusion, focusing on how the Court shaped the applicants’ claims, I would highlight three 
remarks. Firstly, the ECtHR narrowed the terms of comparison between heterosexual and ho-
mosexual couples, since in Gas and Dubois it denied that unmarried same-sex couples were 
comparable to married ones. As such, the intangibility of wedlock was safeguarded and the 
Court perpetuated the assumption that heterosexual couples would be in such a valuable posi-
tion that national authorities are allowed to provide them with specific rights. In the reasoning of 
the Court, marriage is worthy of legal protection since it’s entrenched in European culture and 
it’s greatly evaluated in every society; as long as true, such a perspective reiterates a perspective 
which does not merely ratifies an effective long-standing tradition, but it mantles tradition with 
normativeness. Although not stating that same-sex couples are less capable or valuable than het-
erosexuals, the Court reinforces a legal and symbolic order whereby rights and duties connected 
to marriage can’t be extended beyond the borders of wedlock.  
Secondly, on the other hand, the Court has variously confirmed that besides marriage, same-sex 
couples deserve the same legal treatment granted to different-sex couples, even in respect to 
adoption and parenthood. The minoritarian assumption whereby homosexual couples would 
not be a healthy environment, or whereby “homosexuals, like […] any other persons with some 
peculiarity, accept that they may not qualify for certain activities which, by their nature and un-
der certain circumstances, are incompatible with their lifestyle” (E.B. dis. op. judge Loucaides).  
On the contrary, neither in E.B. nor in X and others the Court referred to the principle of pre-
caution, but it expanded the original findings of Salgueiro.  
Reappraising the questions mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, according to the EC-
tHR homosexuality is definitely compatible with parenthood, but the exact willingness of the 
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Court to recognize the rights claimed by lgbt people will depend on the legislation concerning 
unmarried heterosexual couples. 
Such perspective could be criticized as endorsing a majoritarian meaning of human rights con-
nected to parenthood. In fact, if comparing the subjective condition of Ms Gas, Ms Dubois and 
the applicants in X and others, the element that pushed the Court to find a breach only in the 
latter was due to the different legal frame provided for unmarried couples, not to an alleged in-
ability of the former women to take care of a child. Hence, it could be suggested that if Austrian 
legislation had not allowed second parent adoption for cohabiting heterosexual couples, the 
ECtHR judgment would have been analogous to Gas and Dubois. 
If one considers that in COE Countries the trend is to recognize and secure increasing rights 
also to cohabiting partners and to single individuals, it’s likely that the ECtHR outcome could 
apply to several Countries; nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective the final interpretation 
of the ECHR remains problematic, for it does not focus on how lgbt deserve to be treated as 
parenthood is concerned, but it assumes the condition of a group of heterosexuals as the yard-
stick to determine rights of homosexuals.  
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIVE OBSERVATIONS 
 
 
 “Most people think of the legal recognition of homosexuality  
as one single development. That is a mistake.  
Homosexuality is a complicated phenomenon,  
with different aspects of feeling and of behaviour. 
In the words of the song-writer: a many splendored thing.” 
K. Waaldijk, 1994 
 
 
5.0 Foreword 
 
In the context of the European lgbt mobilization for rights, the innovative potential of the EC-
tHR is often recalled by the applicants and by lgbt reformists as one of the most relevant vehi-
cles in which to pursue their agenda. Effectively, the ECtHR is equipped with enough autono-
my and legal resources to deliver extremely activist and innovative judgments; however, this 
possibility does not imply that the majority of the Court is willing to do so, nor that other con-
straints wouldn't bind the judges. 
Before discussing the findings of this research, I will briefly outline the evolution of the EC-
tHR’s jurisprudence in respect to sexual orientation. Reappraising Friedman’s seminal socio-
legal theories, the ECtHR’s review amounts to the answer of the legal system to the claim of 
change put forward by various social forces (Friedman 1975, 2), and, as such, it has to be com-
prehended that in the wider frame of the permeable dynamic that relates to the social aspect of 
the legal realm. 
The timing of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has been shaped, partially by social inputs and par-
tially by the ECHR system itself, most notably through the gatekeeping role of the EComHR.  
Generally speaking, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence can be defined in three phases, which I shall go 
on to treat separately but which are strongly related. The first, the Court has dealt with com-
plaints invoking individual rights; secondly, the Court has been sized by couples seeking legal 
recognition or the enjoyment of social rights guaranteed to heterosexual partners; and thirdly 
the Court has interpreted the ECHR when same-sex parenthood is concerned. 
As to individual rights, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence entails both criminal and civil law, and it im-
poses both positive and negative obligations on Contracting Parties. Initially, homosexuals chal-
lenged the legitimacy of criminal legislations sanctioning male same-sex acts, invoking the right 
of respect for their private lives, secured by Article 8; in Dudgeon v the UK the Court set the 
first landmark judgment: homosexuality was judged as falling into the ambit of private life and 
the Court held that although some members of the public might be shocked or disturbed by the 
 382	  
commission by others of private homosexual acts, “this cannot on its own warrant the applica-
tion of penal sanctions” (Dudgeon, § 60). Subsequently, this approach was strengthened and re-
iterated in Norris v Ireland and in Modinos v Cyprus, where the ECtHR clarified that also ap-
parent death-letter laws criminalizing same-sex consensual acts could amount to a breach of the 
ECHR (Modinos, § 23). Despite its initial restraint and the famous endorsement of “some con-
trol” of homosexuality, by the first years of the XXI century the ECtHR had declared that en-
gaging in private, consensual, homosexual sex, independently of the number of partners in-
volved be recognised as a human right (A.D.T. v the UK); in those years it also highlighted the 
discriminatory and illegitimate nature of national legislations in imposing a higher age of con-
sent for same-sex activities. Moreover, the ECtHR challenged the prejudice whereby homosex-
uals could not enter the army, and in the essential Lustig-Prean and Beckett v the UK, the 
Court widened its interpretation of the right to respect private life, when applied to lgbt issues: 
even though homosexuality remained a private feature, a soldiers career could not be damaged 
if they were discovered to be gay or lesbian; not even the delicate nature of the army or the al-
leged necessity to maintain the troops’ cohesion could justify a breach of the principle of equali-
ty. As such, in light of these judgments, Article 8 was interpreted as also securing the human 
right not to be discharged from the army purely based on the grounds of an issue pertaining to 
the private sphere. Hence, respondent governments were burdened with negative obligations 
and with the duty to refrain from interfering with the applicants’ privacy and intimacy. More re-
cently, however, the Court has also drawn from the ECHR positive obligations, most notewor-
thy Article 3, Article 10, and Article 11. Domestic authorities are indeed required to adequately 
redress homosexual persons in case of torture and ill-treatment perpetrated by public actors, 
and also to take all the positive measures necessary to prevent public officials from infringing 
homosexuals’ dignity and physical integrity (X v Turkey § 44; Zontul v Greece §§ 110-111). Al-
so, under Article 10 and Article 11, the freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly and 
the freedom of association must be effectively ensured; national and local authorities are not 
only required to formally allow lgbt associations to organize marches and assemblies (Bączkow-
ski v Poland § 62, § 67; Alekseyev v Russia, §§ 77-82), but, if the safety of lgbt protesters is un-
der threat in advance of public events, competent authorities are called to evaluate the risk and 
to prosecute those responsible before the march takes place, so as to comply with Article 11 
(Genderdoc-M v Moldovia, §§ 51-53; Identoba v Georgia, §§ 99-100). In particular, the ECtHR 
reiterated that the States are the “ultimate guarantor of the principles of pluralism, tolerance 
and broadmindedness” (Identoba v Georgia, § 47), implying that national authorities are re-
quired to adopt all necessary measures in order to truly ensure a genuine debate. 
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The ECtHR has also considered whether it be possible to claim the status of refugee or to ob-
tain a permanent residence permit on the grounds of sexual orientation, and it has rejected such 
an option. The Court has not excluded that, in the event of specific, verified, demonstrated and 
reiterated threats to someone because of her homosexuality, the ECHR would not secure the 
right to a permit nor would the individual be deported (M.K.N. v Sweden, § 25; M.E. v Swe-
den, § 71); however, the threshold to gain the ECtHR’s trust has been placed so high that actu-
ally no applicant has showed sufficient evidence to convince the Court. 
In respect to the freedom of expression, secured by Article 10, I would like to emphasize that 
the ECtHR’s case law even addressed the demand to publicly convey homophobic opinions 
and to refuse to perform working duties because of them being incompatible with religious be-
liefs. In both cases the ECtHR denied that personal freedom may legitimately support hatred 
attitudes, or that it may justify homophobic conscientious objection; however, such decisions 
caused harsh internal divisions: several judges voted in favour of this outcome with “greatest 
hesitation (Vejdeland v Sweden, con.op., § 1) and critical voices have denounced how the so-
called “gay rights” would outweigh the essential freedom to obey one’s conscience (Eweida v the 
UK, dis. op., § 5). 
As to the claim of legal recognition of same-sex couples, the law case is quite complex and it has 
interested the ECtHR’s jurisprudence for almost thirty-five years. After denying for years that 
both same-sex cohabitations fell within the ambit of family life, secured by Article 8, (X and Y v 
the UK; W.J. and D.P. v the UK; Z.B. v the YK; Cardoso and Johansen v the UK) and that 
same-sex partners should be entitled to the same social rights and benefits granted to hetero-
sexual partners (S v the UK; Mata Esteves v Spain; Courten v the UK), in 2010 the ECtHR re-
viewed its approach and framed same-sex cohabiting partners as a de facto cohabitation, under 
the notion of family life under Article 8 (Schalk and Kopf, § 94). At the moment the Court has 
not yet imposed the obligation to recognize a legal frame to cohabiting same-sex partners on 
Contracting Parties, but the interpretation it has laid down in Oliari suggests that it could do so 
in the near future. In Schalk and Kopf the Court has admitted that Article 12 might be inter-
preted as not securing the union between a man and woman, but it has also clarified that until 
the majority of Coe Countries will not allow same-sex marriage, a similar interpretation will not 
be endorsed.  
In contrast, however, the ECtHR has conjointly interpreted Article 8 and Article 14 so as to re-
duce the national margin of appreciation on de facto cohabitations, civil unions and domestic 
partnerships. Contacting Parties may decide not to recognize any familiar asset alternative to 
traditional marriage; however, in the event they grant rights or social benefits to unmarried het-
erosexual couples, if similar measures are not also extended to same-sex couples it is very likely 
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that the ECtHR will find a breach of the Convention (Karner v Austria, §§ 40-43; Kozak v Po-
land, §§ 97-99). Likewise, national legislations only recognizing heterosexual partnerships, thus 
discriminating against homosexual ones; in that judgment, since “a difference of treatment is 
discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification” (Vallianatos v Greece, § 76) 
and since “same-sex couples are just as capable as different-sex couples of entering into stable 
committed relationships” (Vallianatos, § 81), the ECtHR judged Greek authorities in breach of 
the Convention (Ivi, § 92). In Oliari v Italy the Court has widened this approach, holding the 
view that the “Italian Government have overstepped their margin of appreciation and failed to 
fulfil their positive obligation to ensure that the applicants have available a specific legal frame-
work providing for the recognition and protection of their same-sex unions” (Oliari, §185). 
Although this outcome may prelude to the positive obligation of recognizing same-sex couples 
by means of civil partnerships, it is worth remembering that the Court’s interpretation hinged 
on a previous judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court; as such, it’s unsure whether the 
same result would have occurred if not even national Courts had interpreted national legisla-
tions as requiring a form of juridical recognition for homosexual couples. Since a consistent 
number of Contracting Parties allow same-sex marriage or provide civil partnerships (Ivi, § 
178), and in light of the ECtHR’s established law case on de facto homosexual family-life, it’s 
highly probable that also under that hypothesis the Court would have restricted the national 
margin of appreciation, but only future complaints might verify or falsify this hypothesis.  
As to family rights, the ECtHR’s law case is still limited and it has not had the opportunity to 
debate the delicate theme of surrogacy that is being widely discussed by political institutions and 
Courts in all Europe. The ECtHR has dealt with three issues related to homosexual 
parenthood: firstly, it has assessed whether sexual orientation might legitimatize the restriction 
of biological parents’ rights and duties. Secondly, it has evaluated whether homosexual persons 
might be refused authorization to adopt purely on the grounds of their sexual orientation. 
Thirdly, it has interpreted the ECHR as clarifying whether the protection of private and family 
life may require the obligation to permit a homosexual cohabiting person the possibility of 
adopting her partner’s child.  
Even though the ECHR does not secure the right to adopt, the ECtHR has framed aforemen-
tioned complaints under the concepts of private, family life, and non-discrimination. 
According to the established case-law of the Court, gay and lesbian parents must be entitled to 
the same rights and responsibilities looming over heterosexual parents (Salgueiro de Silva Mou-
ta v Portugal, §§ 34-36), and when assessing the child’s best interests national authorities can’t 
rely on sexual orientation without infringing the principle of non-discrimination secured by Ar-
ticle 14. 
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If in the case of homosexual persons with an already established parental tie, it appears quite 
obvious what is in the child’s best interest in complaints lodged by homosexual applicants who 
had been refused the authorization to adopt, the ECtHR found it more complex to ascertain 
the appropriate interpretation of the ECHR.  
In Fretté v France the Court granted national authorities wide discretion and it upheld that, “the 
decisions to reject the applicant's application for authorisation pursued a legitimate aim, namely 
to protect the health and rights of children who could be involved in an adoption procedure” 
and that they resulted not discriminatory. The ECtHR considered that the case of Mr. Fretté 
was one of those social issues “on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably 
differ widely” (Fretté, § 41) and it also recalled the division within the scientific community over 
the possible consequences on a child who had been adopted by one or more homosexual par-
ents in order to justify its final decision (Ivi, § 42). 
However, just six years later, the ECtHR went against its own interpretation, and in E.B. it con-
cluded that if national legislations envisaged adoption by singles, then no differential treatment 
should be deemed legitimate purely based on sexual orientation under the ECHR (E.B., § 96). 
A similar trend also marked the ECtHR’s approach on the theme of second parent adoption. 
Indeed, in Gas and Dubois the Court interpreted the ECHR as leaving the final decision up to 
national authorities as to whether to provide or not this kind of adoption; most notably the EC-
tHR endorsed a quite striking reasoning, based more on the enforcement of traditional mar-
riage than on the child’s best interests. Unlike Fretté and E.B., in this case there was already a 
child who was living with the applicants, namely Ms Dubois’s daughter, conceived through do-
nor insemination; therefore, one could reasonably expect that the ECtHR greatly evaluated 
such an element when striking a balance between the arguments at stake. On the contrary, the 
premises which shaped the ECtHR’s reasoning were quite different. Under French law, Ms 
Dubois was the sole parent of the child and the applicants wished to obtain a simple adoption 
order, to create a parent-child relationship between the child and her mother’s partner with the 
possibility of sharing parental responsibility. The Court, however, noted that, in cases of simple 
adoption, the French law only allowed married couples to share parental rights. As a conse-
quence the ECtHR rejected their claim and held that the applicants could not state to be suffer-
ing from discriminatory treatment on the grounds of their sexual orientation. Same-sex couples 
could not be compared to married couples and, accordingly, the ECtHR found no term of 
comparison for the case. In this respect the ECtHR highlighted that if Ms Gas and Ms Dubois’s 
complaint had been upheld, the implications of law-creation would have gone too far, for in-
stance in outweighing the fact that the legislation in question did not allow the creation of the le-
gal adoptive relationship sought by the applicants (Gas and Dubois, § 63). 
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Six years later, the Court reached an opposite outcome and, even though the relevant legislation 
was different, it conveyed a different theoretical approach to the issue. In X and others v Austria 
the ECtHR did not consider that excluding second-parent adoption for a same-sex couple was 
necessary for the protection of the interests of the child (X and others, § 151). 
The Court attached great importance to the fact that, under Austrian legislation, heterosexual 
unmarried couples were allowed to stipulate a second parent adoption, which therefore severed 
the parental tie between the child and her biological parent of her parent’s partner same-sex. 
Against this legal background, Austrian legislation was found in breach of the Convention, in 
that it provided a differential treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation in the enjoyment of 
rights covered by the ECHR. Even though this outcome apparently appears justified by con-
cerns entailing domestic regulation, a closer analysis suggests that judges also evaluated whether 
same-sex couples could be harmful to a minor, reaching a negative conclusion. Indeed, as ex-
tensively argued in chapter IV, if the ECtHR had had doubts on the parental qualities of the 
applicants, it could have recalled the child’s best interest and dismiss their claim.  
Precisely for the decisive and unambiguous wording chosen by the ECtHR, X and others has 
been widely addressed both in academic literature and in newspapers as a turning point in the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence on sexual orientation. 
At the outset, same-sex couples and families are protected under Article 8 and Article 14, and, 
differently from past decades, the ECtHR has progressively identified a growing amount of de-
manding evidence that the respondent Governments have to show in order to comply with its 
duties and obligations (X and others, § 135, §142, § 151). 
This excursus might be puzzling, at first, for the heterogeneity of the issues recalled, for the va-
riety of the arguments displayed, and for the multiple legal and social standpoint implied. No 
doubt, this complexity makes any analysis hard, but it also describes a rich and fruitful institu-
tion where social interests, creative claims, and national legal sensibilities constantly encourage 
the ECtHR to further elaborate its interpretation of the ECHR and of the rights therein de-
clared. 
Moreover, the fact that issues heatedly debated in national Courts and Parliaments are almost 
simultaneously raised in the ECHR system confirms that from the applicants’ perspective the 
quest to Strasbourg is crucial, in that it offers the chance to foster a legal lgbt friendly frame de-
spite an eventual political and legislative reluctances149. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Such a statement also predictably well describes how the ECtHR is perceived by other categories of 
disadvantages citizens; as Anagnostou recalls the ECtHR is a venue where “individual and collective ac-
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Hence, the Court is invested with great expectations, and it is thought to hold the power to set 
the policy path for Coe Countries. Reappraising Wintemute’s terminology (Wintemute 1995, 
2), strategic litigation is triggered by the same determinants that stand beneath political fight: as 
such, the ultimate aim is not only the applicants’ satisfaction, but, rather, the overruling of 
norms and policies considered as oppressive and discriminatory. 
My analysis, however, partly falsifies the assumption of a completely innovative Court, and 
paints quite a different picture; by resorting to crucial socio-legal concepts I propose the expla-
nation of some of the ECtHR’s features and dynamics that at first glance might convey the im-
age of an inconsistent and loose judicial review. 
I recall, for instance, Dudgeon, Norris, Modinos, and Smith and Grady; they are generally 
deemed being landmark cases, and they have effectively marked a turning point in ECtHR’s ju-
risprudence; however, when considering the impact of that litigation on the Coe policy agenda, 
the innovative meaning of such judgments has to be reduced. 
By 1980, out of the Coe Countries only the UK, Ireland, and Cyprus still criminalized adult 
and consensual homosexual acts, and by 1997 only Austria and the UK still set an unequal age 
of consent and only the UK openly discharged gay and lesbian soldiers. Consequently, the EC-
tHR did not act as a beacon of novelty, rather ratifying what in the overwhelming majority of 
Coe Countries was already the norm.  
As for ‘family life’, still in the early 2000s the Court preferred not to review the issue, stating that 
it was not essential to determine whether the applicant’s request fell under the notion of private 
or family life (Karner, § 33). Only in 2010 did the Court overturn its approach and even though 
such an outcome innovated the reading of the ECHR, it did not introduce outstanding legal 
doctrines. In fact, by that year, in the Council of Europe a growing number of Countries already 
recognized or were about to recognize same-sex unions, and in seven States same-sex marriage 
was already legal. Five years later, in Oliari the Court vaguely referred to the necessity to recog-
nize same-sex couples; nevertheless, the judges did not openly introduce positive obligations on 
Coe Parties, and even though 27 out of 47 members granted some form of legal protection to 
gay and lesbian couples, the Court did not completely cast off the legitimacy of not recognizing 
affective frames others than marriage. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
tors seek redress, contest policies, and pursue social reform, […] where some of the most sharply con-
tested societal issues today, concerning sexuality, migration, ethnic diversity and social integration, are 
debated and fought”(Anagnostou 2014, 8). 
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A similar dynamic can be traced also with reference to claims entailing immigration policies, 
which are widely debated throughout Europe and on which the Court prefers not to directly 
impact, even though it has been provided with the opportunity to play a guide role. 
Before altering its jurisprudence, the Court requires an absolute majority shared between mem-
ber States, sometimes even more qualified; otherwise it is likely to adopt a restrained perspec-
tive, and to endorse both the traditional status quo and national discretion.  
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5.1 ECtHR Internal Perspectives: Interpretation and Disagreement 
 
When dealing with such a multifaceted law case, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence displays an obvi-
ous degree of heterogeneity, which might be interpreted as both a richness and a threat to the 
effective enforcement of the ECHR.  
For instance, a criticism raised against the ECtHR is that relating to lgbt rights it would adopt a 
“piecemeal” jurisprudence (Johnson 2010, 579), namely an approach marked by a high degree 
of variability and by an “inconsistent” (Ibidem) use of consensus analysis and margin of appre-
ciation doctrine.  
According to this critique, the recent judgments of the ECtHR potentially damage the “integrity 
of [its] judicial methodology and, ultimately, its interpretation of the Convention” (Ibidem); the 
ECtHR is indeed criticized for not applying universal and fixed standards to all the complaints 
but rather to develop specific, sometimes contradictory, approaches in respect to each claim 
advanced. 
Socio-legal theories provide the tools to possibly account for such confusion; judicial reasoning 
and its style are social facts which might reveal some clues to interpret what judges think 
(Friedman 1975, 235). 
Hence, the conceptual frame of internal legal culture (Ivi, see par. 2.2) proves particularly useful 
in filtering the ECtHR’s arguments, and it enables us to look at the significant patterns of judi-
cial review that, at first, remain hidden.  
Against this background, the study of internal disagreement allows us to focus on the ECtHR’s 
legal culture from a critical angle, namely from a perspective devoted to emphasizing the re-
pressed alternative interpretations of the law (Gordon 1981, 17). 
Internal divisions are crucial, in that they offer a valuable instrument to study the ECtHR as a 
social, complex, and dynamic actor; they show that the ECtHR can’t be treated as a monolithic 
institution and that the final outcome is the result of an internal, sometimes conflictual, interpre-
tive process. 
Moreover, such an internal perspective enables the researcher to understand which are the 
most controversial issues for the Court, also stressing how the dynamics between minority and 
majority shape the judicial attitude towards the Convention. 
I will identify three main typologies of disagreement; structural disagreement is related to the 
role of the ECHR within the institutional architecture of the Council of Europe; functional dis-
agreement refers to the role of judicial interpretation and to the appropriate degree of judicial 
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creativity; substantial disagreement concerns the interpretation of programmatic and vague 
rights declared by the Convention. 
As for the first, in Vallianatos and Oliari disagreement opposed two contrasting interpretations 
of the ECHR: on one hand, the majority turned an eye to a maximalist perspective, whereby 
the Convention should foster human rights by expanding its breadth; on the other, the minority 
supported a minimalist approach, moulded on the idea of the alarm bell150 and on the complete 
subsidiarity of the ECHR to national authorities. It’s worth emphasizing that in both cases the 
bone of contention entailed the role of the ECHR, and not the substantial claim advanced, to 
such an extent that in Oliari the minority filed a concurring opinion, not a dissenting one. Most 
notably, in Vallianatos the debated issue regarded the criteria of admissibility: even though the 
applicants had previously not exhausted all national remedies, the majority deemed their com-
plaint admissible, while the minority called for a literal reading of the ECHR provisions. Like-
wise, in Oliari even the minority found the Italian government in breach of the ECHR, but it 
found no need to legitimize the new positive obligations to provide same-sex couples with a 
specific legal framework, rather anchoring its outcome on the already quoted Italian Constitu-
tional Court’s judgment. 
As for functional disagreement, in several complaints the reason for internal fractures lies in a 
different evaluation of the boundaries to which judicial interpretation has to conform. Most no-
tably, if in the previous cluster the attention is focused on the goals of the Convention, here it 
concerns the proper role of the Court, and it depends on the image that judges have of their 
own role. 
Despite activism and restraint being generally unclear and appearing to be melted into each 
other, documental analysis allows us to distinguish between those who support creative and 
purposive interpretations and those who rely on mainly literal and originalist reading. This con-
flict strongly influences the final outcome and, more importantly, it affects the definition of hu-
man rights. 
In Dudgeon, for instance, dissenting judges Matscher and Walsh, stated inter alia that since the 
Council of Europe undoubtedly encompassed considerable diversities of culture, the Court was 
not entitled to impose the changes occurring in a restricted number of societies to other Parties, 
by means of a so-called “Euro-norm” (Ivi, sep.op., judge Walsh, § 16). Likewise, in Fretté and 
E.B. internal conflicts insisted on whether the ECtHR would be entitled to expand the ECHR 
so as to cover differential treatment in the explication of adoption procedures. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 see chapter III, par. 3.1. 
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In Fretté partly concurring judges acknowledged that under French legislation “in practice a 
homosexual such as the applicant is denied any possibility of adopting a child” (partly conc. op., 
judge Costa, judge Jungwiert, judge Traja), but they also held that Article 14 did not apply, since 
the facts at issue did not fall within the ambit of any provision; as a consequence, differential 
treatment in the ambit of adoption procedures did not amount for discrimination because it fell 
outside the ECHR’s ratione materiae, not because national authorities enjoyed wide discretion. 
Had these opinions gain the majority in the ECtHR, they would have led to a different defini-
tion of human rights; in that event, the Convention would not have granted any right in proce-
dures related to adoption, and this realm would have been completely cast off from ECtHR’s 
review. Quite interestingly, this outcome would have been justified not from a substantial per-
spective as to the inherent meaning of the right to adopt, but from a functional aspect. 
Therefore, if the realm of human rights seems to be only theoretically defined by substantial 
considerations, from a pragmatic and realist point of view, even the definition of core values 
and rights of our society depends on the evaluations which, at first glance, might appear margin-
al or on a subordinated realm. 
The category of substantial disagreement gathers the widest number of cases and, for the sake 
of clarity, I go on to differentiate it into three further clusters. 
Generally speaking, it grasps the socially soaked nature of judicial reasoning, and it addresses 
the differences of the definition of legal concepts, the divergences on the evaluation of individu-
als’ rights, and the contrasts on the balance between competing values and claims. 
The first sub category is that of disagreement of the interpretation of single concepts and provi-
sions. Most notably, I refer to the ECtHR jurisprudence on private and family life. As previous-
ly mentioned, in respect to both claims an internal clash opposed judges upholding that private 
and family life comprise also same-sex relationships, and those interpreting sexual and affective 
sphere exclusively through the lens of tradition. 
The second sub category addresses the disagreement over the correct balance between compet-
ing interests and rights. How does one determine which right should prevail? The ECHR does 
not offer pre-determined solutions; they have to be decided by the Court case by case, and the 
different answers to this question might lead to extremely heterogeneous readings. 
In Eweida, for instance, the Court had to weigh up individual freedom of conscience with the 
enforcement of the principle of non-discrimination. While the majority gave pre-eminence to 
the latter and reviewed Ms Ladele’s firing as proportionate, judges Vucinic and De Gaetano ar-
gued the other way around, holding that individual freedom of conscience should prevail over 
any other consideration. 
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Another example of a clash of rights is provided in M.E. and it revolves around the balance be-
tween national economic well-being and personal dignity (M.E., § 96). The majority filtered the 
applicant’s requests through the lens of domestic sovereignty, and it finally stated that the deci-
sion to expel the applicant pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the economic well-being 
and of implementing immigration control. As previously mentioned, against this background 
judge Powder Forde put forward a different evaluation of the interests, weighing up individual 
dignity as valuing for more than national discretion in immigration policies. 
Finally, the third sub category of substantial disagreement concerns the importance of extra-
legal experts’ opinion, and of common moral sense. 
Given the ‘living instrument’ doctrine and the fixed wording of the Convention, the ECtHR is 
able to innovate its jurisprudence only by adopting an open canon of legal propositions, namely 
a system where judges can “invoke broad social standards […] and decide on the basis of ethical 
imperatives, utilitarian and other experiential rules and political maxims” (Friedman 1975, 243). 
Hence, even though the ECtHR formally refers to social context as being only subsidiary, and 
despite the apparent deference to precedents, extra juridical elements strongly shape the final 
meaning of the Convention itself. 
Theoretically, the Court has always been quite unanimous on this point, but heated discussions 
recur when such a principle is put into practice; in other words, judges do not discuss whether 
the social, moral, and cultural realm bear legal relevance, but it’s highly disputed which proposi-
tions and perspectives should be chosen.  
Consider, for instance, X and others v Austria, which attests the impact of scientific studies on 
judicial perspective; the majority quoted, the absence of scientific studies showing that same-sex 
families could not provide for a child’s needs, to corroborate their evaluation in favor of the ap-
plicants. Even in this case an internal minority maintained a restrained approach, which filtered 
scientific studies through the lens of subsidiarity and which considered national authorities as 
best placed to strike a balance between divergent interests. 
Another highly debated realm is that of morals; as thoroughly illustrated in chapter IV, the con-
sensus doctrine often blinks an eye to tradition, in that it reinforces extremely cautious and 
gradual change. 
Nevertheless, even when slight innovations are introduced, the liberal approach to human rights 
coexists with one oriented more towards the enforcement of the status quo. Separate opinions 
in Dudgeon offer the clearest example in support of a binding function of morals, but most of 
the filed separate opinions prove useful to this point; hence, depending on the perspective, ei-
ther liberal or majoritarian, that gathers the majority of the Court, human rights enshrined in 
the ECHR acquire a different meaning. 
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5.2 The ECtHR Jurisprudence through a Feminist and Lgbt Lens 
 
Throughout the documental analysis I have consistently applied the ‘lgbt question’151, which has 
been shaped on the famous “woman’s question” proposed by Bartlett (1989, 837). Indeed, I 
have investigated the ECtHR arguments, by extensively i) analyzing bias against lgbt applicants 
implicit in judicial standpoints and practices that appear neutral and objective ii) exposing how 
the law might exclude the experiences and values advanced by homosexual people and iii) argu-
ing for an interpretation of the ECHR that does not perpetuate the subordination of sexual mi-
norities152. 
In the first part of this paragraph I will proceed to highlight the achievements of ECtHR’s juris-
prudence, while in the second I will emphasize a number of inconsistencies which have 
emerged in respect to the feminist and lgbt criteria identified in chapter II, namely the concept 
of heteronormativity, the dilemma of difference, and the distinction between public/private. 
On the whole, it’s indisputable that the ECtHR has progressively innovated its jurisprudence 
towards a more lgbt-friendly interpretation of the Convention, and that it has increasingly rec-
ognized homosexual individuals, couples, and families as holders of human rights. Academic 
literature and lgbt movements do acknowledge this fact, and even most critical queer actors 
concede that the ECtHR performs a valuable role in protecting the rights of homosexual citi-
zens throughout Europe (Gonzales 2014; Grigolo 2003; Johnson 2014; Hodson 2014; Win-
temute 1995).  
As for the individual realm, Article 8 secures the human right to engage in same-sex acts, even if 
involving more than two partners, and it forbids any differential treatment regarding the age of 
consent. Article 3 and Article 8 also impose the positive obligation to prevent, prosecute and to 
adequately redress violent acts perpetrated against homosexual subjects, whether deprived of 
their freedom or under the State’s temporary custody. Even a single rape might amount to tor-
ture, and Prison Administrations are obliged to not disadvantage homosexual prisoners or to 
expose them to other inmates’ hatred behaviour.  
Sexual orientation constitutes as a private feature, which also effects the public sphere, with the 
consequent widening of duties looming over Coe Parties: as the caseload of the army testifies, 
the disclosure of one’s homosexuality is not sufficient to discharge him/her, nor can gay and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 See ch. II, par. 2.3 and par. 2.4 
152 This phrase paraphrases the famous passage by Clougherty (1996, 7), where she described the essen-
tial steps to critically approaching legal science from a feminist perspective. I have addressed her pro-
posal in chapter II, par. 2.3.1 
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lesbian soldiers be obliged to conceal their sexuality. Moreover, the freedom of expression, of 
assembly, of association, and the freedom of the press can’t depend on majoritarian feelings or 
beliefs, and any restriction grounded on the alleged hostility of public opinion would breach Ar-
ticle 11. 
In addition, the Court has greatly evaluated the importance of the principle of non-
discrimination, Article 14, to the extent that in Eweida and Vejdejdland the ECtHR considered 
the practical and symbolic enforcement of the principle of equality as being paramount to the 
individual freedom of conscience and expression.  
Although the ECtHR’s jurisprudence does not apply the concept of suspect category, yet judges 
have stated on various occasions that when they are dealing with lgbt applicants, the review must 
carefully assess whether the difference of treatment is caused due to homophobic beliefs or not. 
Also the public visibility of the lgbt movement has been recently positively evaluated: in Ale-
ksejev and Identoba the Court stated that lgbt movements deserve to be tolerated, and it has 
judged the possibility to manifest, to picket, and to demonstrate for lgbt rights as essential for 
democratic regimes.  
The ECtHR has, hence, integrated the homosexual subject within its reading of the Conven-
tion, and it has opened spaces to challenge the traditional reading in every aspect of individual 
life. 
If looking at the ECtHR’s wording and at the expressions depicting same-sex couples, the EC-
tHR’s jurisprudence apparently recognizes gays and lesbians as being fully valuable, and the 
Court seems to completely detach itself from a heteronormative perspective, from a negative 
evaluation of differences, and from the enforcement of the closet. In fact, sexual orientation is 
framed as a “most intimate aspect of private life”, a particular “weighty” feature in the develop-
ment of one’s self. 
Also, same-sex couples are openly recognized as being as “capable as different-sex couples of 
entering into stable, committed relationships” (Oliari, § 165), and they are deemed as being as 
“suitable or unsuitable as different-sex couples when it comes to adopting children” (X and oth-
ers, § 142).  
On first reading, the only criticism against judicial interpretation would entail past and over-
turned lawcases, with the relevant exception of same-sex marriage. 
For my analysis, however, such conclusions do not grasp the complexity, the dynamism, and 
even the contradictions entrenched in ECtHR’s jurisprudence. 
On a closer look, multiple inconsistencies stand still, and the ECtHR’s interpretive path fluctu-
ates from creative and innovative judgments to restrained and traditional ones. 
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If it’s true that sexual orientation can’t justify either differentiated or pejorative treatments, a 
more detailed analysis unveils a jeopardized frame, where the ECtHR’s approach can be criti-
cally reviewed from different angles. 
The main subject entitled to full and boundless enjoyment of human rights is a heterosexual 
and, regardless of the variety of rights recognized, homosexuals remain a singular category, and 
in early ECtHR’s jurisprudence they were also framed as being ‘distinct’. 
With the term ‘distinct’ I refer to the approach sketched in Dudgeon and implemented until 
A.D.T: the Court did not shape its reasoning on the comparison between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals, but it discussed which rights were reasonably claimable by gays and lesbians. In 
those complaints the Court departed from analyzing whether justifications adduced by respond-
ent Governments bore reasonable grounds. Hence, judicial interpretation framed the homo-
sexual subject as a category whose human rights were not defined in similarity to those granted 
to heterosexuals, and whose claims were acceptable insofar as he/she was able to demonstrate 
the irrational and prejudiced nature of national laws.  
The possibility of framing lgbt rights without constantly comparing the conditions of lgbt people 
to heterosexuals rested on the idea that the two categories were so qualitatively distinct that they 
couldn’t be correlated; it might be contended that this perspective implied a possible anti-
majoritarian potential, in that the Court opened a hint to frame minorities’ claims by completely 
detaching them from the legal treatment of sexual majority, and by focusing on only what sub-
stantially appeared just.  
From a queer perspective it might be argued that, if implemented, these discourses could have 
led to practices of resistance against normalizing stances, and that sexual minorities could have 
framed a legal counter-narrative by endorsing a fluid and not-binary legal understanding of sex-
uality (Stychin 2003, 113). However, a similar suggestion risks remaining purely speculative, in 
that the majority of the complaints deal with the prohibition of discrimination, which is essen-
tially grounded on comparison153. Hence, in the frame of the ECHR, the rights granted to het-
erosexuals amount to the yardstick whereby measuring lgbt claims; in fact the Court rapidly 
abandoned the distinct approach, and from Sutherland onwards it extensively discussed the 
comparison between heterosexuality and homosexuality. The only notable exception regards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 I do not argue that a similar perspective is not feasible in every judicial or legal system; on the contra-
ry, I consider it extremely fascinating and potentially empowering, but in contexts where the Court deals 
with a much more vast body of legislation. In similar systems, it might prove extremely useful to interro-
gate the law in the intersection of multiple dimension of exclusion and to reappraise the imaginary 
stances of libertarian trends.  
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the complaints concerning physical integrity, the freedom of association and expression. In the 
latter the Court couldn’t draw a comparison because effectively no ‘heterosexual march’ had 
ever occurred, nor had heterosexuals ever been restricted in publicly expressing their sexual 
orientation.  
As to the caseload concerning same-sex couples and families, judges tend to uphold lgbt claims 
insofar as the applicants realize an effective commitment commonly valued by Western culture. 
At first glance, this affirmation apparently disrupts the heteronormative understating of sexuali-
ty, and it allegedly fully realizes the principle of equality. However, as explored in chapter II, 
differences can be filtered through different, if not opposite, perspectives; one which positively 
evaluates them and which aims at fostering alternative lifestyles, and the other which, instead, 
pursues a normalization upon majoritarian standards.  
I would ascribe most of the ECtHR’s reasoning to the latter standpoint, because beneath the 
idea that heterosexuals and homosexuals deserve equal rights, the assumption that homosexuals 
have to be respected in as much as their conduct can be assimilated to heterosexuals’ is often 
present. 
Let’s consider, for instance, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the concept of family life. Despite a 
twisted and rough approach, the Court has recognized that same-sex cohabitations are a form of 
family life, but it has also stated that national authorities are obliged to legally recognize them 
even if domestic legislation already grants specific rights to heterosexual cohabiting partners. 
From Karner to Kozak and Vallianatos, from Fretté to E.B., to X and others, the very condition 
which has pushed the Court to uphold the applicants’ claim was the existence of differential 
treatment between unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples.  
Marriage remains an intangible institution, the garrison of heterosexual privilege, and it draws a 
fundamental distinction, which apparently can’t be bridged by the Court: outside wedlock gays 
and lesbians are equal to heterosexuals but, through marriage, the latter acquires a qualitative 
peculiarity which allows no comparison.  
Hence, the boundaries are fixed, and, in this frame, the best possible result looks like a prob-
lematic ‘separate but equal’ regime. The reason for this choice is not clearly defined; judges do 
not necessarily display hostile or prejudiced arguments, describing, on the contrary, gays and 
lesbians as being capable of having a committed, stable, and caring relationship (Schalk and 
Kopf, § 94), of raising children (X and others, § 151), and also acknowledging that they have 
both the necessity to benefit from some kind of public recognition and the symbolic interest of 
being publicly entrusted with positive sanctions (Vallianatos, § 81).  
Rather, I proceed to evaluate the intangibility of marriage as mostly deriving from strong defer-
ence by national authorities and from a restrained image of judicial roles; throughout judgments 
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several passages suggest that the Court wishes for an increasing of Coe Parties recognizing same-
sex marriage, but the Court also considers itself as not legitimate to derive such obligation from 
the ECHR, at least at the present stage. 
However, apart from the soft and non-binding encouragements towards egalitarian marriage, 
the outcome and the effect of the aforementioned judgments are to confer the residual suprem-
acy of heterosexuality. Indeed, the Court has not been able to critically discuss the discriminato-
ry and oppressive features entrenched in traditional marriage, hence describing such an institu-
tion as foundational and inherently valuable. 
If heteronormativity embraces the ability and the power of heterosexual culture to mould the 
legal system and to veil the partiality and contingency of institutions such as that of marriage, 
then the ECtHR does not manage to disrupt this perspective; on the contrary, in Schalk and 
Kopf the Court pretended to offer a completely neutral interpretation, without even considering 
if the traditional rhetoric on wedlock affected its standpoint. 
Therefore, tradition constitutes to being as neutral and it is generally endorsed, at least until the 
majority of Coe Parties does not choose another path. 
The theoretical reasons why marriage deserves special concern are not discussed by the Court, 
in that they are so deeply entrenched that, reappraising Minow (1987, 95), the continuity with 
traditional prescriptions is in itself considered as a positive and legitimated aim; moreover, I 
consider the rigid separation between marriage and civil partnerships as mantled with a pre-
tence of inevitability, which suppresses any other alternative point of view and tries to “make it 
harder for the observer […] to challenge the absence of objectivity” (Ivi, 46).  
As for the balance struck between heterosexual majority’s interests and lgbt minority’s claims, if 
comparing first EComHR decisions to most recent ECtHR judgments, a progression becomes 
visible and it’s clear that the Court has detached itself from a stark majoritarian reading. 
In particular, when discussing homosexuals right to serve in the army, the Court stated that 
those policies or laws amounting to “a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority 
against a homosexual minority”, can’t bear “sufficient justification for the interferences with the 
applicants’ rights” (Smith and Grady, § 97).  
The Court further specified this concept in Alekseyev, extensively discussing the relation be-
tween the Convention and minorities’ rights; in particular, judges rejected the possibility that the 
exercise of rights by a minority group was “conditional on its being accepted by the majority”, 
otherwise the ECHR itself would become “merely theoretical” (Alekseyev, § 81). 
With reference to the aforementioned cases, the other’s perspective is taken into consideration, 
it is legally secured and positively evaluated; however, if comparing this caseload with ECtHR 
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judgments on lgbt migrants, I suggest that the perspective of the Court can be still considered as 
oriented towards a majoritarian definition of homosexuality.  
To evaluate the attitude of the Court in respect to lgbt migrants correctly, it’s indeed essential to 
focus on how the Court characterizes the homosexual personage. 
From my reading the Court appears to be indirectly soaked with a normative understanding of 
homosexuality, which is read through Western lens; while analyzing M.E., M.K.N., Sobahi, 
I.I.N. the recurrent question I posed myself was ‘which and whose homosexuality is the Court 
securing?’. Apart from the peculiarities of each case, two common traits are shared: firstly, the 
political and legal turmoil situation did not allow the applicants to prove beyond any doubt that 
if deported to their homeland, would they have faced harm and criminal sanctions. Secondly, 
all the applicants displayed a subjective experience of homosexuality which did not fit with the 
Western model: they had not come out, they did not live openly, but they often conformed to 
the heterosexual norm. In fact, some of the applicants did not even identify themselves as being 
gay, only submitting that they had had homosexual encounters and that this had exposed them 
to death threats. Their stories were not linear, but rather flawed and controversial, and the ap-
plicants had often failed to properly comply with immigration procedures. 
Unlike in Dudgeon, Norris, Sutherland and other complaints, the applicants indirectly framed 
homosexuality as a fluid element and they did not waive it as an essential element of their per-
sonality. 
Since the Court generally endorsed an innatist definition of sexual orientation, it’s not surprising 
that the judges considered their account in respect to sexual orientation as lacking credibility.  
To sum up, the Court was quite rigid in respect to the non-Western experience of homosexuali-
ty, and it implicitly restricted the cluster of lgbt people entitled to claim human rights to those 
who fitted to a stereotypical label of homosexual. 
The very recent judgment of Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, app. no. 51362/09, reinforces such 
critical reading: the applicants, an Italian and a New Zealander citizen, who have been living in a 
homosexual relationship since 1999 and their personal history fits with the conventional image 
of sexual minorities endorsed by the Court: they are openly living their homosexuality and they 
have repeatedly challenged the Italian laws so as to obtain a residence permit for Mr. McCall; 
moreover, they live in contexts where information is easily collectable and they are easily la-
belled according to conventional Western narrative of homosexuality. On the contrary, despite 
in the former I.N.N v the Netherlands the applicant had stated to have lived with another man, 
to have kissed him in an alley, and to have been subjected to violence because of this, the Court 
concluded that since it was unlikely that in Iran people engaged in public kissing, the applicant 
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lacked credibility, somehow implying that even if his submissions were true, he was the only 
one to blame, in that he had not paid enough attention to widespread prejudices. 
The Judges implicitly compared the condition of lgbt asylum seekers to an “unstated norm” 
(Minow 1987, 49), namely with the model of homosexuals that has emerged in European and 
north American culture: a man who has been aware of his sexual tendencies since infancy and 
who perceives his sexual orientation as an essential trait of his identity, so that the Court and so-
ciety can label him and enclose him in a static and reassuring category. Hence, the other’s histo-
ry and claims result either simplified or understood through the cognitive lens of majoritarian 
assumptions, and the Court might lean towards a quite stereotyped thinking.  
I use the term stereotype in Gilman’s meaning154, in order to stress how the desire for control 
might nullify the peculiarity of each person and might enclose him/her in a fixed category; with 
reference to asylum or residence permit seekers, the Court might be worried both that migrants 
are likely to lie about their sexual orientation and that a progressive slippery slope might occur. 
Most notably, permissive judgments towards lgbt migrants might incentivate all those whose re-
quest has been denied to lodge a complaint with the ECtHR on this ground, regardless of their 
actual sexual orientation. Had judicial outcome been favourable to the applicants, the Court 
would have endorsed as significant degree of activism, and its reasoning would have been harsh-
ly criticized by national authorities - a threat that the ECtHR tries to avoid as much as possible. 
As for the distinction between private and public, the disruption of the closet emerges as the 
ambit where the ECtHR has developed the most innovative interpretation of the Convention. 
In contrast to coeval US policy, the ECtHR both condemned the UK ban on gay and lesbian 
soldiers and it laid down an interpretation to safeguard the freedom of speech, of expression, 
and of association. In early ECtHR’s judgments, from Dudgeon to A.D.T., the separation be-
tween private and public was extremely sharp, to such an extent that the Court endorsed toler-
ance for private homosexual acts and the enforcement of some control over public disclosure of 
homosexuality. Privacy was, then, narrow and it resembled the model of the closet. Such read-
ing, however, has been overturned in each and every realm: at present, the core for disagree-
ment and the realm where the ECtHR could expand its interpretation are no longer centered 
on the separation between private and public, but, rather, on the range of duties, obligations, 
and rights implied by the right of public visibility recognized to lgbt people. 
I would like to highlight another issue, relevant to the frame analyzed and to all the three crite-
ria described in this paragraph. As Minow suggests, differences are frequently erased and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 See chapter II, par. 2.4.2 
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judged as irrelevant, both by the Courts and by the policy-makers (Minow 1987, 10-95); one of 
the concrete methods to make the other invisible is to enclose her demands, expectations, and 
experience in stereotyped labels.  
As such, the problematic outcomes of the ECtHR might be read as “reject[ing] the experience 
of different people” (Ivi, 51). Yet there is another side to this coin that I would like to empha-
size. 
In the first decades, the EComHR effectively refused any possible debate on homosexuality, 
but from Dudgeon onwards the ECtHR has extensively dealt with the issue of difference and, 
though altering the other’s perspective, it has also recognized and greatly evaluated it.  
Even in problematic judgments such as Smith and Grady, Schalk and Kopf, Fretté, Vallianatos, 
M.E - to quote just a few- the Court strives to identify the correct approach to differences, as far 
as judicial perspective might be imbued by situated standpoints (Harding, 1997). Therefore, the 
Court might reject some claims related to counter-conceptions of sexuality and family, but it 
acknowledges the relevance of the difference, to the extent that it debates which human rights 
should be recognized to lgbt people precisely on the grounds of their difference.  
Hence, a critical reading of the ECtHR’s reasonings might be articulated on two levels, in ac-
cordance with Minow’s proposal. Firstly, the Court selects those differences which should be 
legally evaluated and, secondly, the ECtHR reshapes them according to its theoretical premises 
and methodological choices, and, by doing this, it recreates differences which are conveyed 
through judicial review back in the social and political field. 
In this respect, judicial reasoning amounts to a system of knowledge (Smart 1989, 162), which 
plays a role in constructing a hierarchy among the claims advanced in the name of a different 
sexual orientation. Through the careful picking, skimming, and redefining of the applicants’ 
perspective, the Court also manages to impact the social realm, on how lgbt activists might per-
ceive and shape their claims related to the human rights law. 
This is not a striking element, since, as Friedman extensively illustrated, in the course of the in-
teraction between social interests and legal outputs, recent legal history presents various exam-
ples of legal changes which have led to “major social changes” (Friedman 1975, 276).  
It would be pointless to assume that the ECtHR’s reasoning on homosexuality does not also af-
fect the homosexual themselves; the interesting element is to raise awareness of this mutual in-
fluence among lgbt activists and those involved in ECtHR’s litigation. The comprehension of 
these mechanisms allows them to challenge and resist them: no doubt that in each judgment the 
Court leaves room for further elaboration and change, and that in the frame of pragmatic strate-
gy, the best option is to take maximum advantage of these hints. However, from a more theoret-
ical standpoint, it could also be useful to question the assumptions on which the ECtHR’s in-
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terpretation stands and the eventual prejudiced dynamics it conveys, in order to produce further 
legal arguments to resist them. 
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5.3 Final Remarks 
 
In conclusion, documental analysis does not allow any clear-cut or straightforward answer.  
The ECtHR’s interpretive standpoint may fluctuate from a decisive endorsement of minorities’ 
rights to a questionable majoritarian perspective, from a decisive evaluation of homosexuals’ 
public visibility to a more ‘closeted’ standpoint. 
The ECtHR’s internal legal culture is extremely heterogeneous, and depending on the issue 
addressed also the position of the Court, on which human rights can be legitimately claimed, 
varies. 
As far as marriage and family life are concerned, I resort to the metaphor of a glass ceiling: the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR departed from a ‘floor’ where homosexuals were openly excluded 
from any human rights, to progressively reaching a ceiling glass, a phase where equality and 
non-discrimination are achieved, but only under specific circumstances and under a sort of 
‘separate but equal regime’. 
Therefore, the ultimate consequence is that despite the extremely valuable interpretation of the 
ECHR, at the moment, the Court seems neither to be about to dismantle such a ceiling, nor to 
give full enforcement to the principle of equality, or to carry out a positive evaluation of differ-
ences. 
On the other hand, the Court has certainly interpreted the ECHR so as to open it to a lgbt-
friendly meaning; as far as the Court might sometimes appear restrained, on numerous occa-
sions it has dignified lgbt claims under the legal and theoretical frame of human rights. 
Besides individual cases, the Court has rejected the stereotype of homosexuals as morally devi-
ant, and even when endorsing a traditional asset, it no longer upholds openly begrudged preju-
dices against the applicants, while it seems more concerned about possible tensions with Coe 
political parties at the frontline to defend the traditional model of family. 
Had the Court pursued a biased interpretation of the ECHR, it would have probably rejected 
the claims related to civil rights such as the respect for human dignity and the freedom of as-
sembly, and it would have presumably restated the supremacy of national margin of apprecia-
tion.  
For my analysis, the interpretation laid down by the ECtHR is not a trailblazer in enlarging the 
definition of lgbt human rights law, rather, it collects, systematizes, expands, and legitimizes al-
ready existing and ongoing trends. By this, I do not mean diminishing the valuable role of the 
Court in enhancing the flourishing of human rights; the ECtHR, indeed, performs a crucial task 
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of creative ratification, in that it often combines the ratification of existing legal trends with sym-
bolic or theoretical innovations which affect the interpretation of the Convention.  
Creative ratification can be defined by combining together Friedman’s theories on the concept 
of creative disruption and of ratification. 
Whereas the former “refers to the change through destroying or dismantling an established le-
gal order” (Friedman 1975, 277), ratification identifies those legal acts that “put a formal stamp 
of approval on behaviour previously performed” or that “codify a new social state or rules of 
behaviour or attitude that already exist” (Ivi, 272). 
In the context of the ECHR system, the Court can’t be considered as purely adhering to the 
cluster of creative disruption, for its disposal at judicial activism is quite fluctuating and, at the 
same time, it does not have the authority of the national Courts to alter domestic legislations. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of the ECHR involves a relevant degree of law creation and, 
then, it can’t be classified as an act of pure ratification.  
This feature starkly emerges when considering the law case on the UK ban of homosexual sol-
diers. As I already recalled, the UK was a negative exception in the European frame, in that 
other legislations; hence the Court ratified the existing trends in the Council of Europe, applied 
it to the case of the UK, and it did not set an innovative or unpredicted interpretation of the 
ECHR to this regard. 
However, from a slightly different angle, the Court innovated the ECHR by clarifying its mean-
ing. In reality, the formal admissibility of homosexuals in the army did not mean that they were 
effectively allowed to openly serve in Western armies, nor that they weren’t discriminated 
against on this ground. Therefore, the Court not only ratified the ‘formal trend’ existing in Eu-
rope, but it also upheld the applicants’ perspective under the theoretical umbrella of human 
rights, implying that national authorities had to formally and substantially enforce the right of 
lgbt soldiers to serve in the army and not to be discharged because of their sexuality. It has to be 
emphasized that the arguments adduced by the UK government were internationally shared, as 
the US case shows155, and that the prejudice whereby gay and lesbians would have a negative ef-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 The comparison between the US case and the ECtHR’s one allows also to better appreciate the inno-
vative mind of the judges. In Steffan v Cheney the Court of Appeal offered an articulated opinion to 
dismiss the applicant’s claim that he had been discharged from the army on the only ground of his af-
firmative answer when he had been asked whether he was homosexual. In particular, the Court of Ap-
peals held that “constitutional theory” allowed the Board to terminate Steffan from the Academy, and 
also denied that the argument of Steffan, who had argued that he couldn’t refuse to answer to the 
board’s question and not to disclose his sexual orientation, for had he done so, they would either have 
investigated his private life or discharged him anyway (Zanetti 2015, 47 and fol. ). Also British authorities 
tried to uphold a similar strategy, in Smith and Grad and Lustig-Prean and Beckett, by objecting to the 
	  
 404	  
fect on the morale of armed forces, and would be unable to perform duties in stressful military 
contexts, was still spread both in political and in legal minds over Europe. It’s precisely against 
this background that the ECtHR’s interpretation acquires a creative meaning: it denied to such a 
differentiated treatment whatsoever legal value and it also framed similar arguments not as the 
outcome of an illegitimate perspective, which might have been understood though not legally 
upheld, but it trenchantly dismissed it as a merely negative and unjustified attitude (Smith and 
Grady, § 97). 
As to the bound between the ECtHR and lgbt movements, they affect each other through a two-
fold process; lgbt demands emerged in the social realm are transposed in legal terms, they are 
translated into the theoretical, logical, and discursive canons provided by the ECHR. Through 
its interpretative function, the Court answers those claims and, at the same time, it opens new 
spaces for future action and reflection.  
On one hand, lgbt activists and those who wish to file a complaint extensively debate the im-
plied, perhaps unpredicted, consequences of ECtHR’s judgments, in order to define the future 
steps of their strategic litigation; on the other, lgbt movements stress the powerful legitimation 
given by the ECtHR, and they resemble the discursive practices of human rights moulded in the 
arena of the ECHR.  
To sum up, an accurate analysis of arguments displayed by the ECtHR on sexual orientation 
testifies the contingent nature of human rights, and it helps to unveil the underpinned clash of 
interests: the final outcome, indeed, often appears defined as much by functional or structural 
considerations as by the will to ascertain what is theoretically and inherently just, normal, and/or 
appropriate. 
The caseload on same-sex marriage and civil partnerships further attests that the Court does not 
move within a closed system156, nor does it aim to do so; on the contrary, it variously refers to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
applicants that they had been able to “freely chose, in any event, to answer the questions put to them and 
they were both told that they did not have to answer the questions and that they could have legal advice” 
(Smith and Grady, § 80), hence suggesting that their investigations had not relevantly and illegitimately 
breached the applicants’ private life. Nevertheless, the ECtHR looked beneath the surface, and conclud-
ed that “had the applicants not participated in the interview process and had [the applicant] not consent-
ed to the search, the Court is satisfied that the authorities would have proceeded to verify the suspected 
homosexuality of the applicants by other means which were likely to be less discreet” (Lustig-Prean and 
Beckett, § 102). As such, the Court endorsed an interpretation of the Court more shaped on the 
knowledge of the practice of law, rather than on its mere formal appearance. 
156 Friedman describes closed those formal systems of legal reasoning when “decision-makers on the 
whole believe that they must base their decision only on ‘legal’ premises” (Friedman 1975, 237). De-
pending on whether these systems accept or not innovations, Friedman distinguishes between Sacred 
systems and systems based on Legal Science. In the former, decision-makers have a closed set of prem-
ises and deny any hint of innovation; in the latter, “the canon of premises is fixed but the known canon 
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consensus and to respect for common trends, hence suggesting that also the ‘judicial route’ re-
quires compromises, and that in order to succeed, it’s not sufficient to persuade judges that a 
particular instance of sexual orientation may be interpreted as violating existing human rights 
law.  
Hence, the ECtHR’s arguments depict a frame loaded with potentialities, but also a Court ex-
tremely careful not to overrun national sovereignty; against this background, strategic litigation 
bears significant outcomes when claims insist on the jeopardized enforcement of the human 
rights declared in the ECHR, or when national legislations fail to abide to the principle of equal-
ity or to the essential boundaries set by the Court. On the contrary, the ECtHR is not the ap-
propriate arena where creatively stretching the meaning of human rights to vanguard demands, 
especially if these have not yet been addressed by lower political and legal systems. 
Nor is it an institution keen on tracing a defined path of reforms and on imposing a top-down 
redefinition of the human rights declared in the ECHR. The ECtHR may be the only legitimate 
actor to interpret the ECHR, and it also may perform a crucial role of law-making, but always 
within a theoretical and discursive frame which is accepted, at least, by the quasi majority of 
Contracting Parties. 
Rather, the Court is more receptive of demands from the grassroots which have already been 
the object of legal debate, and it may give them a systematic meaning under the frame of the 
ECHR. By this, I do not intend that in the event of a Country where lgbt claims are systemati-
cally rejected by the Courts and ignored by internal political debate, the ECtHR is necessarily 
likely to recognize a wide margin of appreciation. On the contrary, if in the Council of Europe a 
relevant majority or a growing number of States have juridically considered those demands and 
have developed relevant legal arguments, the ECtHR will probably inquire the ‘outlier’ Country 
and depart from the common perspective emerged to develop its own. 
For my reading, the symbolic realm is the one where the Court delivers its most innovative judi-
cial hints and, effectively, from Dudgeon onwards it has provided lgbt citizens with rights and it 
has empowered them with symbolical resources. Despite the casuistic approach and the very 
narrow margin of comparison between the facts submitted in one complaint and the circum-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of premises is not the same as the potential canon. Jurists can ‘discover’ new propositions, improve old 
ones, and show fresh relationships” (Ivi, 241). In common law the dynamics are revered, in that judges 
do not pretend to draw on a closed system of legal propositions only, while also referring to extra-
juridical prepositions. For contrast, they formally deny innovation, and the doctrine of stare decisis 
would ensure a “notable pole of stability” (Ivi, 239). The ECtHR is, of course, an hybrid between these 
categories, but the doctrines of consensus and of the ECHR as a living instrument show that the canon 
of legal premises endorsed by the judges is quite opened. 
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stances in other Countries, the Court has repeatedly included in its judgments far-reaching 
statements. 
Hence, the Court has transposed the particular to the general, by anchoring claims stemming 
from circumscribed facts to the theoretical frame of human rights. 
Judges not only interpret the Convention and adjudicate cases, but they transform the nature of 
justifications and arguments; quite interestingly, in recent times even when dismissing the appli-
cant’s claims the Court has frequently opened limited spaces preluding to interpretive innova-
tions. For instance, in Schalk and Kopf the Court opened the notion of family life to same-sex 
couples (Schalk and Kopf, § 94); likewise, in Gas and Dubois the Court structured its reasoning 
so as to clarify that its final decision was the outcome not of prejudice, but that of a comparison 
with rights guaranteed by the French legislation to unmarried couples. As far as flawed and 
problematic the final decision may be considered, such a statement still implied that in the 
event that national authorities discriminated between heterosexual and lgbt couples, the ECHR 
would be breached.  
Despite its inconsistencies, the ECtHR stands for a symbolic beacon for lgbt human rights. 
Over the years the ECtHR has indeed specified the meaning of the ECHR so as to include gay 
and lesbian citizens as holders of the rights therein declared, and it has enlarged both negative 
and positive obligations burdening Contracting Parties, hence expanding the variety of rights 
and liberties enjoyed by homosexual men and women. 
Above all, it has consistently clarified that gay rights are human rights, and that the respect for 
sexual minorities legitimately belongs to those values and ideals which constitute the best legacy 
of Europe.  
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APPENDIX I: 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS  
Rome,  
04.11.1950 
 
The Governments Signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe, 
Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on 10th December 1948; 
Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and 
observance of the Rights therein declared; 
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity between 
its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance 
and further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of 
justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political 
democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights 
upon which they depend; 
Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are likeminded and have a 
common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first 
steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration, 
Have agreed as follows: 
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ARTICLE 1 
Obligation to respect Human Rights 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention. 
 
 
SECTION I RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
 
ARTICLE 2 
Right to life 
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life inten-
tionally save in the execution of a sentence of a Court following his conviction of a crime for 
which this penalty is provided by law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it 
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
 (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
 (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully de-
tained; 
 (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
 
ARTICLE 3 
Prohibition of torture 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
ARTICLE 4 
Prohibition of slavery and forced labour 
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 
3. For the purpose of this Article the term “forced or compulsory labour” shall not include: 
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according 
to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from such 
 detention; 
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries 
where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service; 
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(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or wellbe-
ing of the community; 
 (d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. 
 
ARTICLE 5 
Right to liberty and security 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liber-
ty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
 (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent Court; 
 (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of 
 a Court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
 (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him  
 before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an 
 offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an     
 offence or fleeing after having done so; 
 (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision 
 or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal      
 authority; 
 (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious    
 diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; 
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised en-
try into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to de-
portation or extradition. 
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of 
the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Ar-
ticle shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise ju-
dicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Re-
lease may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take pro-
ceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a Court and his 
release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of 
this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
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ARTICLE 6 
Right to a fair trial 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and 
public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the 
private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the 
Court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty ac-
cording to law. 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
 (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
 nature  and cause of the accusation against him; 
 (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
 (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he 
 has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests 
 of justice so require; 
 (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
 examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against 
 him; 
 (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
 language used in Court. 
 
ARTICLE 7 
No punishment without law 
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time 
the criminal offence was committed. 
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omis-
sion which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles 
of law recognised by civilised nations. 
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ARTICLE 8 
Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his corre-
spondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of na-
tional security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
 
ARTICLE 9 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and ob-
servance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others. 
 
ARTICLE 10 
Freedom of expression 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public au-
thority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the li-
censing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be sub-
ject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or pub-
lic safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information re-
ceived in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
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ARTICLE 11 
Freedom of assembly and association 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with 
others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the impo-
sition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of 
the police or of the administration of the State. 
 
ARTICLE 12 
Right to marry 
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according 
to the national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
 
ARTICLE 13 
Right to an effective remedy 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an 
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been commit-
ted by persons acting in an official capacity. 
 
ARTICLE 14 
Prohibition of discrimination 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.
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ARTICLE 15 
Derogation in time of emergency 
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Con-
tracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. 
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or 
from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision. 
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the 
reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such 
measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully ex-
ecuted. 
 
ARTICLE 16 
Restrictions on political activity of aliens 
Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties 
from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens. 
 
ARTICLE 17 
Prohibition of abuse of rights 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the 
Convention. 
 
ARTICLE 18 
Limitation on use of restrictions on rights 
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be 
applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.
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SECTION II: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
ARTICLE 19 
Establishment of the Court 
To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in 
the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human 
Rights, hereinafter referred to as “the Court”. It shall function on a permanent basis. 
 
ARTICLE 20 
Number of judges 
The Court shall consist of a number of judges equal to that of the High Contracting Parties. 
 
ARTICLE 21 
Criteria for office 
1. The judges shall be of high moral character and must either possess the qualifications re-
quired for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised competence. 
2. The judges shall sit on the Court in their individual capacity. 
3. During their term of office the judges shall not engage in any activity which is incompatible 
with their independence, impartiality or with the demands of a fulltime office; all questions aris-
ing from the application of this paragraph shall be decided by the Court. 
 
ARTICLE 22 
Election of judges 
The judges shall be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly with respect to each High Contract-
ing Party by a majority of votes cast from a list of three candidates nominated by the High Con-
tracting Party.
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ARTICLE 23 
Terms of office and dismissal 
1. The judges shall be elected for a period of nine years. They may not be re-elected. 
2. The terms of office of judges shall expire when they reach the age of 70. 
3. The judges shall hold office until replaced. They shall, however, continue to deal with such 
cases as they already have under consideration. 
4. No judge may be dismissed from office unless the other judges decide by a majority of two 
thirds that that judge has ceased to fulfil the required conditions. 
 
ARTICLE 24 
Registry and rapporteurs 
1. The Court shall have a Registry, the functions and organisation of which shall be laid down in 
the rules of the Court. 
2. When sitting in a single judge formation, the Court shall be assisted by rapporteurs who shall 
function under the authority of the President of the Court. They shall form part of the Court’s 
Registry. 
 
ARTICLE 25 
Plenary Court 
1. The plenary Court shall 
 (a) elect its President and one or two Vice-Presidents for a period of three years; they 
 may be re-elected; 
 (b) set up Chambers, constituted for a fixed period of time; 
 (c) elect the Presidents of the Chambers of the Court; they may be re-elected; 
 (d) adopt the rules of the Court; 
 (e) elect the Registrar and one or more Deputy Registrars; 
 (f) make any request under Article 26, paragraph 2. 
 416	  
ARTICLE 26 
Single-judge formation, Committees, Chambers and Grand Chamber 
1. To consider cases brought before it, the Court shall sit in a single-judge formation, in com-
mittees of three judges, in Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand Chamber of seventeen 
judges. The Court’s Chambers shall set up committees for a fixed period of time. 
2. At the request of the plenary Court, the Committee of Ministers may, by a unanimous deci-
sion and for a fixed period, reduce to five the number of judges of the Chambers. 
3. When sitting as a single judge, a judge shall not examine any application against the High 
Contracting Party in respect of which that judge has been elected. 
4. There shall sit as an ex officio member of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber the judge 
elected in respect of the High Contracting Party concerned. If there is none or if that judge is 
unable to sit, a person chosen by the President of the Court from a list submitted in advance by 
that Party shall sit in the capacity of judge. 
5. The Grand Chamber shall also include the President of the Court, the Vice-Presidents, the 
Presidents of the Chambers and other judges chosen in accordance with the rules of the Court. 
When a case is referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 43, no judge from the Chamber 
which rendered the judgment shall sit in the Grand Chamber, with the exception of the Presi-
dent of the Chamber and the judge who sat in respect of the High Contracting Party concerned. 
 
ARTICLE 27 
Competence of single judges 
1. A single judge may declare inadmissible or strike out of the Court’s list of cases an applica-
tion submitted under Article 34, where such a decision can be taken without further examina-
tion. 
2. The decision shall be final. 
3. If the single judge does not declare an application inadmissible or strike it out, that judge 
shall forward it to a committee, or to a Chamber for further examination.
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ARTICLE 28 
Competence of Committees 
1. In respect of an application submitted under Article 34, a committee may, by a unanimous 
vote, 
 (a) declare it inadmissible or strike it out of its list of cases, where such decision can be 
 taken without further examination; or 
 (b) declare it admissible and render at the same time a judgment on the merits, if the 
 underlying question in the case, concerning the interpretation or the application of the 
 Convention or the Protocols thereto, is already the subject of well-established caselaw of 
 the Court. 
2. Decisions and judgments under paragraph 1 shall be final. 
3. If the judge elected in respect of the High Contracting Party concerned is not a member of 
the committee, the committee may at any stage of the proceedings invite that judge to take the 
place of one of the members of the committee, having regard to all relevant factors, including 
whether that Party has contested the application of the procedure under paragraph 1.(b). 
 
ARTICLE 29 
Decisions by Chambers on admissibility and merits 
1. If no decision is taken under Article 27 or 28, or no judgment rendered under Article 28, a 
Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits of individual applications submitted un-
der Article 34. The decision on admissibility may be taken separately. 
2. A Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits of inter-State applications submitted 
under Article 33. The decision on admissibility shall be taken separately unless the Court, in 
exceptional cases, decides otherwise. 
 
ARTICLE 30 
Relinquishment of jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber 
Where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of 
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, or where the resolution of a question before the 
Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a judgment previously delivered by the Court, 
the Chamber may, at any time before it has rendered its judgment, relinquish jurisdiction in fa-
vour of the Grand Chamber, unless one of the parties to the case objects.
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ARTICLE 31 
Powers of the Grand Chamber 
The Grand Chamber shall 
 (a) determine applications submitted either under Article 33 or Article 34 when a 
 Chamber has relinquished jurisdiction under Article 30 or when the case has been     
 referred to it under Article 43; 
 (b) decide on issues referred to the Court by the Committee of Ministers in accordance 
 with Article 46, paragraph 4; and 
 (c) consider requests for advisory opinions submitted under Article 47. 
 
ARTICLE 32 
Jurisdiction of the Court 
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in 
Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47. 
2. In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide. 
 
ARTICLE 33 
Inter-State cases 
Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party. 
 
ARTICLE 34 
Individual applications 
The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group 
of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of 
the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties 
undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.
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ARTICLE 35 
Admissibility criteria 
1. The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, 
according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six 
months from the date on which the final decision was taken. 
2. The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under Article 34 that 
 (a) is anonymous; or 
 (b) is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or 
 has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or set
 tlement and contains no relevant new information. 
3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if 
it considers that: 
 (a) the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the Proto
 cols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual application; or 
(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human 
rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination 
of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this 
ground which  has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal. 
4. The Court shall reject any application which it considers inadmissible under this Article. It 
may do so at any stage of the proceedings. 
 
 
ARTICLE 36 
Third party intervention 
1. In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, a High Contracting Party one of 
whose nationals is an applicant shall have the right to submit written comments and to take part 
in hearings  
2. The President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, invite 
any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person concerned 
who is not the applicant to submit written comments or take part in hearings.  
3. In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, the Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights may submit written comments and take part in hearings.
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ARTICLE 37 
Striking out applications 
1. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of 
cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that 
 (a) the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or 
 (b) the matter has been resolved; or 
 (c) for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the 
 examination of the application. 
However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human 
rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires. 
2. The Court may decide to restore an application to its list of cases if it considers that the cir-
cumstances justify such a course. 
 
ARTICLE 38 
Examination of the case 
The Court shall examine the case together with the representatives of the parties and, if need 
be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the High Contracting Parties 
concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities. 
 
ARTICLE 39 
Friendly settlements 
1. At any stage of the proceedings the Court may place itself at the disposal of the parties con-
cerned with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for 
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto. 
2. Proceedings conducted under paragraph 1 shall be confidential. 
3. If a friendly settlement is effected, the Court shall strike the case out of its list by means of a 
decision which shall be confined to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached. 
4. This decision shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise the 
execution of the terms of the friendly settlement as set out in the decision.
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ARTICLE 40 
Public hearings and access to documents 
1. Hearings shall be in public unless the Court in exceptional circumstances decides otherwise. 
2. Documents deposited with the Registrar shall be accessible to the public unless the President 
of the Court decides otherwise. 
 
ARTICLE 41 
Just satisfaction 
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, 
and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to 
be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party. 
 
ARTICLE 42 
Judgments of Chambers 
Judgments of Chambers shall become final in accordance with the provisions of Article 44, par-
agraph 2. 
 
ARTICLE 43 
Referral to the Grand Chamber 
1. Within a period of three months from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any party to 
the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. 
2. A panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber shall accept the request if the case raises a seri-
ous question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto, or a serious issue of general importance. 
3. If the panel accepts the request, the Grand Chamber shall decide the case by means of a 
judgment.
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ARTICLE 44 
Final judgments 
1. The judgment of the Grand Chamber shall be final. 
2. The judgment of a Chamber shall become final 
 (a) when the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the 
 Grand  Chamber; or 
 (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand 
 Chamber has not been requested; or 
 (c) when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer under Article 43. 
3. The final judgment shall be published. 
 
ARTICLE 45 
Reasons for judgments and decisions 
1. Reasons shall be given for judgments as well as for decisions declaring applications admissi-
ble or inadmissible.  
2. If a judgment does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous opinion of the judges, 
any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion. 
 
ARTICLE 46 
Binding force and execution of judgments 
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any 
case to which they are parties. 
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which 
shall supervise its execution. 
3. If the Committee of Ministers considers that the supervision of the execution of a final judg-
ment is hindered by a problem of interpretation of the judgment, it may refer the matter to the 
Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. A referral decision shall require a majority 
vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the committee. 
4. If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a 
final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party 
and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on 
the committee, refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obliga-
tion under paragraph 1. 
5. If the Court finds a violation of paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Minis-
ters for consideration of the measures to be taken. If the Court finds no violation of paragraph 
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1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers, which shall close its examination of the 
case. 
 
ARTICLE 47 
Advisory opinions 
1. The Court may, at the request of the Committee of Ministers, give advisory opinions on legal 
questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto. 
2. Such opinions shall not deal with any question relating to the content or scope of the rights or 
freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, or with any other 
question which the Court or the Committee of Ministers might have to consider in conse-
quence of any such proceedings as could be instituted in accordance with the Convention. 
3. Decisions of the Committee of Ministers to request an advisory opinion of the Court shall 
require a majority vote of the representatives entitled to sit on the committee. 
 
ARTICLE 48 
Advisory jurisdiction of the Court 
The Court shall decide whether a request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Committee 
of Ministers is within its competence as defined in Article 47. 
 
ARTICLE 49 
Reasons for advisory opinions 
1. Reasons shall be given for advisory opinions of the Court. 
2. If the advisory opinion does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous opinion of the 
judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion. 
3. Advisory opinions of the Court shall be communicated to the Committee of Ministers. 
 
ARTICLE 50 
Expenditure on the Court 
The expenditure on the Court shall be borne by the Council of Europe. 
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ARTICLE 51 
Privileges and immunities of judges 
The judges shall be entitled, during the exercise of their functions, to the privileges and immun-
ities provided for in Article 40 of the Statute of the Council of Europe and in the agreements 
made thereunder. 
 
 
SECTION III MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
 
ARTICLE 52 
Inquiries by the Secretary General 
On receipt of a request from the Secretary General of the Council of Europe any High Con-
tracting Party shall furnish an explanation of the manner in which its internal law ensures the ef-
fective implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention. 
 
ARTICLE 53 
Safeguard for existing human rights 
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contract-
ing Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party. 
 
ARTICLE 54 
Powers of the Committee of Ministers 
Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the powers conferred on the Committee of Minis-
ters by the Statute of the Council of Europe. 
 
ARTICLE 55 
Exclusion of other means of dispute settlement 
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, they will not avail them-
selves of treaties, conventions or declarations in force between them for the purpose of submit-
ting, by way of petition, a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Conven-
tion to a means of settlement other than those provided for in this Convention.
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ARTICLE 56 
Territorial application 
1. Any State may at the time of its ratification or at any time thereafter declare by notification 
addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that the present Convention shall, 
subject to paragraph 4 of this Article, extend to all or any of the territories for whose interna-
tional relations it is responsible. 
2. The Convention shall extend to the territory or territories named in the notification as from 
the thirtieth day after the receipt of this notification by the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe. 
3. The provisions of this Convention shall be applied in such territories with due regard, how-
ever, to local requirements. 
4. Any State which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article may at 
any time thereafter declare on behalf of one or more of the territories to which the declaration 
relates that it accepts the competence of the Court to receive applications from individuals, 
nongovernmental organisations or groups of individuals as provided by Article 34 of the Con-
vention. 
 
ARTICLE 57 
Reservations 
1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratifica-
tion, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent 
that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of 
a general character shall not be permitted under this Article. 
2. Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned.
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ARTICLE 58 
Denunciation 
1. A High Contracting Party may denounce the present Convention only after the expiry of five 
years from the date on which it became a party to it and after six months’ notice contained in a 
notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, who shall inform the 
other High Contracting Parties. 
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the High Contracting Party con-
cerned from its obligations under this Convention in respect of any act which, being capable of 
constituting a violation of such obligations, may have been performed by it before the date at 
which the denunciation became effective. 
3. Any High Contracting Party which shall cease to be a member of the Council of Europe shall 
cease to be a Party to this Convention under the same conditions. 
4. The Convention may be denounced in accordance with the provisions of the preceding para-
graphs in respect of any territory to which it has been declared to extend under the terms of Ar-
ticle 56. 
 
ARTICLE 59 
Signature and ratification 
1. This Convention shall be open to the signature of the members of the Council of Europe. It 
shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe. 
2. The European Union may accede to this Convention. 
3. The present Convention shall come into force after the deposit of ten instruments of ratifica-
tion. 
4. As regards any signatory ratifying subsequently, the Convention shall come into force at the 
date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification. 
5. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify all the members of the Council 
of Europe of the entry into force of the Convention, the names of the High Contracting Parties 
who have ratified it, and the deposit of all instruments of ratification which may be effected sub-
sequently. 
 
Done at Rome This 4th day of November 1950, in English and French, both texts being equal-
ly authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Eu-
rope. The Secretary General shall transmit certified copies to each of the signatories.
 427	  
PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 
Paris,  
20.03.1952 
 
The Governments Signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe, 
Being resolved to take steps to ensure the collective enforcement of certain rights and freedoms 
other than those already included in Section I of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (hereinafter referred 
to as “the Convention”), 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
 
ARTICLE 1 
Protection of property 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general in-
terest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
 
ARTICLE 2 
Right to education 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it as-
sumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to en-
sure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical con-
victions. 
 
ARTICLE 3 
Right to free elections 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret 
ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in 
the choice of the legislature. 
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ARTICLE 4 
Territorial application 
Any High Contracting Party may at the time of signature or ratification or at any time thereafter 
communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a declaration stating the extent 
to which it undertakes that the provisions of the present Protocol shall apply to such of the terri-
tories for the international relations of which it is responsible as are named therein. 
Any High Contracting Party which has communicated a declaration in virtue of the preceding 
paragraph may from time to time communicate a further declaration modifying the terms of 
any former declaration or terminating the application of the provisions of this Protocol in re-
spect of any territory. 
A declaration made in accordance with this Article shall be deemed to have been made in ac-
cordance with paragraph 1 of Article 56 of the Convention. 
 
ARTICLE 5 
Relationship to the Convention 
As between the High Contracting Parties the provisions of Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Protocol 
shall be regarded as additional Articles to the Convention and all the provisions of the Conven-
tion shall apply accordingly. 
 
ARTICLE 6 
Signature and ratification 
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the members of the Council of Europe, who are 
the signatories of the Convention; it shall be ratified at the same time as or after the ratification 
of the Convention. It shall enter into force after the deposit of ten instruments of ratification. As 
regards any signatory ratifying subsequently, the Protocol shall enter into force at the date of the 
deposit of its instrument of ratification. 
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe, who will notify all members of the names of those who have ratified. 
 
Done at Paris on the 20th day of March 1952, in English and French, both texts being equally 
authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Eu-
rope. The Secretary General shall transmit certified copies to each of the signatory govern-
ments. 
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APPENDIX II  
SUMMARIES OF LEGAL CASES 
 
 
W.B. v the Federal Republic of Germany 
App. no. 104/55 
17.12.1955 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
The applicant was, at the relevant time, serving a sentence of 15 months for homosexual acts 
prohibited by the German Criminal Code, which criminalized male homosexual acts. Before 
the ECtHR he complained that the criminalization of such acts amounted to an unjustified in-
terference with his right to private life, and that the existence of a differentiated treatment be-
tween homosexuals and heterosexuals/lesbians was discriminatory. Hence, he invoked Article 
2, Article 8, Article 14, Article 17, and Article 18. 
  
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
The Commission reiterated that the ECHR allowed the Contracting Parties to legitimately inter-
fere with citizens’ private life, insofar the interference pursued a legitimated aim, it was in ac-
cordance with the law, and it was necessary in a democratic society. The Commission consid-
ered that homosexuality did not fall within the meaning of private life, and it held that also the 
differentiated treatment between homosexuals and heterosexuals/lesbians under the German 
Criminal Code was legitimated and did not require further examination. The Commission de-
clared the compliant inadmissible. 
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X v the Federal Republic of Germany 
App. no. 5935/72 
30.09.1975 [Commission] 
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was convicted of indecent assault against minors of the same sex, punished by the 
German Criminal Code. The minors were aged under 16 and he was sentenced to two years 
and a half of prison. He maintained that the evidence given by the witnesses was not trustworthy 
or was improperly taken during abnormally long hearings, and that certain experts whom he 
wished to have heard on his defense had not been called by national Courts. Before the ECtHR 
the applicant alleged that the criminal provisions by virtue of which he was convicted were con-
trary to the ECHR, constituted an interference with the right to private life, and amounted to 
discrimination based on sex, in that German law punished the solely homosexuality of a man 
over 18 years with a partner under 21. He invoked Article 8, alone and in conjunction with Ar-
ticle 14, and Article 6. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision:  
Article 6: the Commission did not find any appearance of violation of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by this Article and considered this part as manifestly ill-founded. 
Article 8: The Commission observed that the provisions of the German Criminal Code relating 
to sexual offences had been considerably amended, and since 1969 masculine homosexuality 
was no longer punished as such. The purpose of the German legislature was to prevent homo-
sexual acts with adults having an unfortunate influence on the development of heterosexual 
tendencies in minors; in particular it was feared that on account of the social reprobation with 
which homosexuality was still regarded, a minor involved in homosexual relationships with an 
adult might in fact be cut off from society and seriously affected in his psychological develop-
ment. In so far as the protective measure enacted by the legislature could be considered to af-
fect the applicant's private life, German legislature was aimed at protecting the rights of others 
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the ECHR . 
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14: the Commission considered that German authorities 
distinguished between homosexuals and heterosexuals/lesbians on the ground of the reasonable 
fear that the former entailed more risks, as it was associated to a distinct social-cultural groups 
with a clear tendency to proselytize adolescents. No breach of Article 14 arose.
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X v the UK 
App. no. 7215/75 
12.07.1978 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was charged and found guilty of the offence of buggery in respect of the acts 
committed with a male aged between 18 and 21. In 1974 he was sentenced to two and years 
and a half of imprisonment, in accordance with Sexual Orientation Act which criminalized ho-
mosexual acts with men aged below 21 years. The applicant was released in 1976. Before the 
ECtHR he complained that the law which set the age of consent was unjust and violated his 
right to respect for private life. He also alleged a discriminatory treatment, since the age of con-
sent for private acts between males was 21 while for heterosexuals and lesbians it was 16. He in-
voked Article 8, alone and in conjunction with Article 14, and Article 10, in that during his sen-
tence he had been denied to freely express his love for men. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Striking out. 
 
Commission decision: 
The Commission deemed the case admissible, but the applicant died shortly after and the 
Court struck the case out. The report of the Commission, however, offers insightful considera-
tions, reappraised in subsequent decisions and judgments. 
Article 8: the Commission considered whether the prosecution of the applicant and the provi-
sion that fixed the age of consent at 21 unjustifiably interfered with his right to private life. The 
prosecution of the applicant was deemed as necessary to the protection of the others, and the 
provision of a minimum age of consent pursued the legitimate aim of protecting young men 
aged between 18 and 21. 
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14: the Commission considered whether the difference in 
the age of consent set for homosexuals and heterosexuals/lesbians amounted to a discrimina-
tion in the right to respect for private life. The Commission considered that both heterosexuals 
and lesbians had a different social nature, less harmful, and voted against finding a violation. 
Article 10: the Commission did not further assess the issue, declaring it inadmissible. 
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Dudgeon v the UK 
App. no. 7525/76 
22.10.1981 [ Plenary Court]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant complained against the existence of criminal laws in Northern Ireland against 
male same-sex acts. The applicant complained of having been questioned by the police about 
his homosexual status, attitudes and behavior in January 1976, and he complained that the ho-
mosexual reform organization of which he was a member had been subject to harassment by 
the police since then, and that he personally had experienced fear and psychological upset be-
cause of such harassment. Before the ECtHR the applicant also emphasized that, being homo-
sexual, he suffered unjustifiable discrimination on grounds of sex and residence, in contraven-
tion of Article 14 of the Convention; offences in the criminal law of Northern Ireland were not 
part of the law in other regions of the UK and, therefore, if being homosexual he resided in 
such other regions, he would not suffer fear and distress of prosecution. The applicant invoked 
Article 8, alone and conjunction with Article 14. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Existence of criminal laws prohibiting homosexual practices between consenting adult men: vio-
lation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8: the Court considered that the prosecution of consensual, private, homosexual acts 
could not be justified by the existence of pressing social needs, nor by the necessity to protect 
the rights of others or to enforce morals. The restriction imposed on Mr. Dudgeon under 
Northern Ireland law, by reason of its breadth and absolute character, was disproportionate to 
the aims sought to be achieved, apart from the severity of the possible penalties provided for. 
As to the age of consent, the Court considered legitimate in a democratic society to provide a 
degree of control over homosexuality, in order to protect the youth and, therefore, it judged 
Northern Irish legislation legitimated. Therefore, the ECtHR found a breach of Article 8 as the 
criminalization of male homosexuality was concerned, but not on the age of consent. 
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14: the Court deemed as not necessary to consider the 
complaint under Article 14. 
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X ldt. and Y v the UK 
App. no. 8710/79 
07.03.1982 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant X ldt. was the publisher and applicant Y the editor of a magazine which consisted 
mainly of homosexual content. One of the issues carried a poem describing explicit acts with 
the body of Christ immediately after his death and ascribing to him promiscuous homosexual 
practices with the Apostles and other men. Private prosecution was brought against X ldt. and Y 
by Mrs W, while the Director of Public Prosecutions decided not to prosecute them. As a re-
sult, the applicants were sentenced to pay a fine, and the second also to few months of impris-
onment. The applicants appealed, submitting that they had not blasphemous intents and argu-
ing that the offense of blasphemy, as far as rooted in judicial practice, was not codified by Brit-
ish law. Before the ECtHR they contended that they had been discriminated in the exercise of 
their freedom of conscience, further adding that their conviction was based on legal principles 
which had not existed or had not been defined with clarity at the time of the commission of the 
offence. They invoked Article 7, Article 9, Article 10, and Article 14 in conjunction with Article 
10 and with Article 9. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 7: the Commission conceded that the applicants had been interfered with their freedom 
of expression, and that this interference needed to be justified. The Commission observed that 
also rules of common or other customary law may provide a sufficient legal basis for the re-
striction of fundamental rights subject to exception clauses, if two requirements are met: the law 
had to be adequately accessible and, secondly, a norm could not be regarded as "law" unless it is 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. The Commis-
sion applied the same principles to common law, holding that the complaint under Article 7 
was ill-founded. 
Article 10: the Commission noted that the Government had invoked three grounds of re-
striction to freedom of expression, namely prevention of disorder, protection of morals, and 
protection of the rights of others. The Commission concluded that the restriction was covered 
by a legitimate purpose, namely the protection of the rights of others, and that the restriction 
imposed on the applicants could be considered as necessary within a democratic society. In 
fact, the Commission accepted that the religious feelings of the citizens deserved protection 
against indecent attacks on the matters held sacred. The applicants' complaint was found ill 
founded, and consequently dismissed. 
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X and Y v the UK 
App. no. 9369/81 
03.05.1983 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
X, who was Malaysian citizen, and Y, who was a UK citizen, had established a stable homosex-
ual relationship, at first living together in the UK. Then, X and Y had left for Malaysia but Y 
was only granted limited residence permit by Malaysian authorities and was refused a work 
permit. In 1979, X and Y returned to the United Kingdom, where X was granted a temporary 
residence permit but no work permit. In 1982, X was found guilty of overstaying and a deporta-
tion order was made against him. Before the ECtHR the applicants complained that the refusal 
by UK authorities to allow the first applicant to remain in the UK infringed their right to respect 
for private life. They invoked Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 8: the Commission found that the applicants' relationship did not fall within the scope of 
the right to respect for family life ensured by Article 8, but that it fell within the respect for their 
private life. The Commission found that it had not been shown that the applicants could not 
live together elsewhere than the United Kingdom or Malaysia. The Commission concluded, 
therefore, that the refusal to allow the first applicant to remain in the United Kingdom did not 
constitute an interference with the applicants' right to respect for private life. Accordingly, this 
aspect of the application was declared inadmissible as ill-founded.  
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B v the UK 
App. no. 9237/81 
12.10.1983 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
In 1972 the applicant joined the army for a term of nine years. On 26 August 1980 he appeared 
before a Court-martial in Germany: he had been charged with homosexual conduct which the 
applicant had engaged in with a gunner in his regiment in Germany, and with a civilian at home. 
The gunner concerned was aged below 21; the applicant admitted the charges and was sen-
tenced to a reduction in rank and to nine months' imprisonment with corrective military train-
ing, followed by dishonourable discharge. He had previously had an exemplary military record. 
Before the ECtHR the applicant complained of his conviction on the above-mentioned charges, 
and he alleged the breach of Articles 8, alone and in conjunction with Article 14. 
 
 
II. Law 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 8: the Commission considered the proceedings against the applicant as interfering with 
his private life, yet necessary and legitimated. The Commission accepted that homosexual con-
duct by members of the armed forces might pose a particular risk to order which would not 
arise in civilian life. In these circumstances, the Commission considered that his Court-marital 
and dismissal from the service could be considered "necessary in a democratic society" for the 
"protection of morals" and also "for the prevention of disorder" in the context of military service. 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: in the Commission's opinion the measures in question 
were taken in pursuit of a legitimate aim and were not in the circumstances disproportionate. 
The Commission declared the complaint inadmissible. 
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S. v the Federal Republic of Germany 
App. no. 10686/83 
05.10.1984 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was a German citizen, who lived and worked in Morocco, between 1963 and 
1975. In 1973 he and a colleague were arrested by the Moroccan police on the suspicion of 
having committed homosexual offences and passport forgery. They were convicted by the Dis-
trict Court in Casablanca and sentenced to three years' imprisonment, but shortly before the 
hearing of the second appeal both defendants were expelled from Morocco. After his return to 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the applicant lodged a civil action against Germany, claiming 
damages on the ground that during his arrest and trial in Morocco he had not been adequately 
assisted by the German diplomatic services. The action was dismissed by domestic Courts, in 
that the applicant’s Moroccan lawyer had kept German diplomats informed and, according to 
Moroccan laws, foreign diplomats were not allowed to intervene in proceedings. Before the EC-
tHR the applicant submitted that German diplomatic services had not intervened to protect him 
while he was in prison and had thereby exposed him to the risk of torture. But also the inhu-
man conditions in prison could have been avoided had the diplomatic service intervened on his 
behalf. He invoked Article 3, and Article 6. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 3: The applicant did not produce adequate evidence of any ill-treatment contrary to Ar-
ticle 3. 
Article 6: the Commission first noted that the subject of the applicant's complaint was not his 
treatment in a Moroccan prison or the alleged unfairness of his trial but the alleged failure of 
the German diplomatic authorities to take adequate action. The Commission therefore consid-
ered whether the Convention imposed any obligation on the diplomatic authorities of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany to take action such as those contended by the applicant. The Com-
mission had previously held that a High Contracting Party may, in certain circumstances, be lia-
ble for the acts or omissions of its authorities occurring outside its territory, or having conse-
quences outside its territory. However, the Commission had even clarified that no right to dip-
lomatic intervention vis-à-vis a third State could be inferred from the Convention. The Com-
mission finally noted that the circumstances of the present case were entirely different from 
those of expulsion cases in which the Commission had held that, in exceptional circumstances, 
expulsion or extradition may violate the Convention. The application was accordingly consid-
ered incompatible with Convention ratione materiae and was rejected. 
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S. v the UK 
App. no. 11716/85 
14.05.1986 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had lived in a house belonging to the Borough of Harrogate with Ms. R. s a “se-
cure tenant" within the meaning of the Housing Act 1980 from the Harrogate Borough Council. 
It was generally known and accepted in the neighbourhood that they lived together in a lesbian 
relationship. In 1984 Ms. R. died and the Harrogate Borough Council commenced possession 
proceedings against the applicant. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal requesting 
that the possession order be set aside, that a declaration be made that the tenancy should rest in 
the applicant by virtue of Section 30 of the Housing Act 1980 and asking for costs. However, 
the Court of Appeal rejected her request and also the House of Lords dismissed her case. Be-
fore the ECtHR the applicant complained that respect for her private and family life had been 
denied, and that she had been evicted from her home for no other reason than that she was of 
the wrong sex to be able to claim under domestic law to succeed to the tenancy of her home. 
She invoked Article 8, Article 13, and Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 8: the Commission recalled that, despite the modern evolution of attitudes towards ho-
mosexuality, a stable homosexual relationship between two men/women did not fall within the 
scope of the right to respect for family life ensured by Article 8. Since the applicant had lived 
alone since the death of her partner, the applicant's own private life in respect of that partner 
had not been interfered with. Any interference which there may have been with the applicant's 
private life, it had to be considered in the context of her home. On this point, however, the 
Commission noted that the applicant was occupying the house without any legal title whatsoever 
and that she was no longer entitled to remain in the house. 
Article 1, Protocol 1: the Commission considered the Borough of Harrogate’s policy as clearly 
in accordance with the law and also as necessary for the protection of the contractual rights of 
the Article 1, Protocol 1. The Commission considered the complaint as ill-founded and de-
clared in inadmissible. 
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Johnson v the UK 
App. no. 10389/83 
17.07.1986 [Commission] 
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant held a party, to which he had invited some 40 people, all of whom were homo-
sexual as was the applicant himself. Between 02.00 a.m. and 02.30 a.m. the police entered the 
flat where the party was still in progress, suspecting that sexual activities with men aged below 21 
were going on. Various items were removed from the applicant's bedroom and the applicant 
was taken to the police station. The applicant had not invited any person aged under 21, nor 
minors were present at the party. However, the applicant was accused of permitting homosexual 
acts contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 1967, which provided that a homosexual act in private 
shall be an offense when more than two persons take part or are present. No prosecutions were 
subsequently brought; however the applicant remained upset and frightened by the events; 
moreover the publicity in the press probably played a decisive part in the withdrawal of an offer 
of permanent employment at the firm of travel agents with which he was on probationary ser-
vice. Before the ECtHR the applicant submitted that the raid on his home was an interference 
with his right to private life and his home. He also complained a discrimination, since the legis-
lation applied to male homosexuals only. He invoked Article 8, alone and in conjunction with 
Article 14. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 8 alone and in conjunction with Article 14: the Commission considered whether the ex-
istence of legislation prohibiting homosexual acts with consenting males under 21, in the per-
sonal circumstances of the applicant, directly affected his private life. It was not however con-
tended that the applicant had had or wished to have homosexual relations with a male under 
21; hence, the legislation did not continuously and directly affect his private life. Accordingly, 
the Commission found that the existence of this legislation did not present any appearance of 
an interference with the applicant's rights. The Commission further noted that the entry into the 
applicant's apartment was made on the suspicion that an offence against this provision was being 
committed, namely that of a man committing buggery with another man aged below 21. As al-
ready held in other cases, the Commission concluded that the difference in treatment between 
male homosexuals and heterosexuals/lesbians was justified by the criterion of social protection 
of vulnerable men and by the peculiar social nature of male homosexuality. Accordingly, the 
Commission declared the complaint inadmissible.  
 439	  
W.J. and D.P. v the UK 
App. no. 12513/86  
13.07.1987 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts  
 
The first applicant was a citizen of New Zealand, living with the second applicant, who was a cit-
izen of the UK. The first applicant had enjoyed of a entry permit, in 1979, and this permit had 
been renewed until 1985. Then, the first applicant requested indefinite leave to remain, on the 
ground that since April 1982 he had been living with the second applicant in a stable homosex-
ual relationship. He was also employed as a teacher. The Home Secretary considered the ques-
tion of the stable homosexual relationship, but highlighted that the Immigration Rules made no 
provision for a person to remain in the UK on that basis. The first applicant appealed against 
the Secretary of State's decision, but he incurred in a rejection. The second applicant stated that 
he would not be admitted to New Zealand to work as enquiries had revealed that he could not 
be considered eligible for the "occupational priority list". Before the ECtHR they complained in 
respect of the refusal by immigration authorities to grant the first applicant to remain in the UK, 
invoking Article 1, and Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision:  
Article 1: the Commission concluded that this aspect was ill-founded and dismissed it.  
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: The Commission held that homosexual relationships 
did not fall within the ambit of family life, but rather within the notion of private life. Hence, 
even though the refusal to allow a person to remain in a country where he has been living and 
working for several years may result in a disruption of his private life, this event can’t be regard-
ed as an interference with the right to respect for private life, unless the person concerned can 
demonstrate that there are exceptional circumstances in his case justifying a departure from that 
principle. Accordingly, the Commission found that the absence in UK Immigration Rules of 
settlement rights for non-nationals in respect of their stable, private relationships, other than 
family relationships, did not, of itself, disclose any appearance of a violation. The Commission 
found no substantiation in this case for the applicants' claim that no individual consideration has 
been given to their particular circumstances by the Secretary of State; nor had the applicants 
provided any substantiation of their claim that it would be impossible to live together in New 
Zealand or elsewhere. In the light of the above considerations, the Commission concluded that 
the complaint was ill-founded and declared it inadmissible. 
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Norris v Ireland 
App. no. 190581/83 
26.10.1988 [Plenary Court]  
 
I. Facts 
 
David Norris was homosexual and had been a campaigner for homosexual rights in Ireland 
since 1971. In 1977 the applicant instituted proceedings in the High Court claiming against the 
existence in Ireland of laws which made certain homosexual practices between consenting adult 
men criminal offences. The applicant had never been convicted on the ground of the afore-
mentioned legislation, but nevertheless he contended to suffer from illegitimate interference 
with his private life. Most notably, the applicant suffered deep depression on realizing that he 
was irreversibly homosexual and that any overt expression of his sexuality would expose him to 
criminal prosecution. He also feared that when his partner came to visit him in Ireland, he 
could be criminally charged. After participating in a television programme on State broadcasting 
company, in the course of which he admitted to being a homosexual but denied that this was an 
illness, a complaint was lodged against that programme but authorities finally decided not to 
prosecute him. However, the applicant gave evidence of suffering verbal abuse and threats of 
violence subsequently to the interview, and he also alleged that in the past his mail was opened 
by the postal authorities. Before the ECtHR the applicant claimed that the existence of laws 
which criminally sanctioned male homosexual practices infringed his right to respect for private 
life. He invoked Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding : 
Existence of criminal laws prohibiting homosexual practices between consenting adult men: vio-
lation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8: the Court adopted a reasoning similar to Dudgeon’s. It held that the existence of 
aforementioned laws did interfere with the applicant’s private life, and it ascertained whether 
such an interference was in accordance with exemption criteria set out in Article 8, namely 
whether it was in accordance with the law, it had a legitimated aim, and it was necessary in a 
democratic society. The Court considered that it could not be maintained that in Ireland there 
was a "pressing social need" to make such acts criminal offences. On the issue of proportionali-
ty, the Court restated that although public opinion who judged homosexuality as immoral may 
be shocked, offended, or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual acts, 
this could not on its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when consenting adults 
alone are involved. Therefore, the Court found a breach of Article 8. 
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C. and L.M. v the UK 
App. no. 14753/89 
09.10.1989 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
In 1984 the first applicant had entered the UK with a prior entry clearance as a working holi-
day-maker. Her stay was extended until 22 February 1986, when the first applicant applied for a 
permanent residence on the basis of her permanent job and her lesbian relationship with a Brit-
ish woman (Ms. E.). Her application was rejected, this not being a status recognized by the 
statement of changes in Immigration Rules. In 1988 further representations were made to the 
Minister, including the fact that the first applicant was now pregnant by artificial insemination by 
a donor, and that the splitting up of such a family unit would be contrary to the ECHR. The 
Home Office replied that it did not consider the pregnancy to be a sufficient reason to depart 
from the immigration rules, even though Ms. E., had no eligibility to emigrate to Australia, nor 
did she wish to. The first applicant gave birth to a daughter, the second applicant, on 6 January 
1989. Since confinement and the birth of the child, the first applicant was financially dependent 
on Ms. E. and parenting tasks were shared between them. In the event of her deportation to 
Australia with the child, the first applicant risked to be homeless, destitute, and to be forced to 
rely only on social security payments for the maintenance of herself and her child. The appli-
cants submitted to be victims of a breach of Articles 8, 12 and, implicitly, 14 of the Convention.  
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 8: the Commission found that the applicants’ lesbian partnership involved private life, 
within the meaning of Article 8. Although lawful deportation might have repercussions on such 
relationships, this measure cannot be regarded as an interference with the ECHR. The Com-
mission, therefore, concluded that there had been no interference with the applicants' right to 
respect for private life ensured by Article 8.  
Article 12: the Commission excluded that such provision might refer to same-sex couples and 
rejected this complaint as ill-founded. 
Article 14: in accordance with its case-law, the Commission considered legitimate that the im-
migration rules give priority and better guarantees to traditional established families, rather than 
other established relationships like a lesbian partnership. The Commission found no element 
of discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention.  
Under these considerations, the Commission declared the complaint inadmissible. 
 442	  
Z.B. v the UK 
App. no. 16106/90  
10.02.1990 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was a Cypriot national, who had arrived in the United Kingdom in 1977 with a 
limited leave to remain as a student. In 1983 the Secretary of State made a deportation order 
against the applicant, who requested a residence permit on the ground that he was in a perma-
nent and stable homosexual relationship with Mr. R., a UK national, with whom the applicant 
had been living since late 1985. After the refusal of his request, the applicant's solicitors made a 
claim for asylum in view of the fact that male homosexual behavior was a criminal offence in 
Cyprus. The applicant was further informed that even taking into account the possible effect of 
the applicant's deportation on Mr. R. and the total period spent by the applicant in the UK, the 
Secretary of State had decided not to revoke the deportation order. The applicant also resorted 
to the High Court, without success. Before the ECtHR he invoked Article 8, alone and in con-
junction with Article 14. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 8: The Commission noted that the applicant formed his relationship with Mr. R. at a 
time when he was aware that he had no right to remain in the United Kingdom. The Commis-
sion held that although lawful deportations inevitably have repercussions on such relationships, 
such a policy cannot in principle be regarded as an interference with the right to respect for pri-
vate life. On the overall, the State's right to impose immigration controls and limits remained 
preeminent. In the present case, however, the applicant further contended that he would have 
been exposed to prosecution for homosexual activity if he had returned to the northern part of 
Cyprus. Nevertheless, the Commission maintained that UK authorities had acted in accordance 
with the law, seeking legitimate aims, and respecting the requisite of proportionality.  
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14: the Commission reiterated that no discrimination exist-
ed contrary to this provision where the Immigration Rules gave priority and better guarantees to 
established couples living in a family relationship as opposed to other relationships. According-
ly, the Commission concluded that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded, and declared it 
inadmissible.
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Kerkhoven, Hinke, and Hinke v the Netherlands 
App. no. 15666/89 
19.05.1992 [Commission] 
 
I. Facts 
 
The first and second applicant had a stable lesbian relationship since December 1983 and con-
sidered themselves to be the social parents of the third applicant, born on 20 November 1986, 
who biologically was the second applicant's son. The first and second applicant requested to be 
vested with the parental authority over the third applicant. This request was rejected on 4 Sep-
tember 1987. Also the Arnhem Regional Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the appli-
cants' plea of nullity. The Supreme Court held that unmarried parents could be vested with the 
parental authority over a minor only if both have legal family ties with the child. The first appli-
cant had no legal ties with the child, nor was she able to establish those ties through recognition, 
as this option was impossible for a woman under Dutch law. Before the ECtHR the applicants 
complained that the refusal to vest the first applicant with the parental authority over the third 
applicant amounted to an unjustified interference with their right to respect for their family life 
and private life. They further alleged a discrimination in respect of heterosexual couples. They 
invoked Article 14, alone and in conjunction with Article 8. 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14: the Commission recalled that a stable homosexual rela-
tionship between the two women did not fall within the scope of the right to respect for family 
life ensured by Article 8. The Commission further noted that the relevant legislation in itself did 
not prevent the three applicants from living together as a family; the only problem was the im-
possibility for the first applicant to establish legal ties with the third applicant. The Commission 
was of the opinion that Contracting Parties were not required to allow that a woman such as the 
first applicant, living together with the mother of a child and the child itself, should be entitled 
to get parental rights over the child. The Commission therefore considered that there had been 
no interference with the applicants' right to respect for their family life. As regards private life, 
the Commission considered that the statutory impossibility for the first applicant to be vested 
with the parental authority over the third applicant did not entail any restriction in the appli-
cants' enjoyment of their private life. The Commission noted that, as regards parental authority 
over a child, homosexual couples could not be equated to a man and a woman living together. 
For these reasons the Commission declared the application inadmissible. 
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Modinos v Cyprus 
App. no. 15070/89  
22.04.1993 [Chamber]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was involved in a sexual relationship with another male adult. He was the Presi-
dent of the "Liberation Movement of Homosexuals in Cyprus” and he stated to suffer from 
great strain, apprehension, and fear of prosecution by reason of the criminal provisions which 
criminalized homosexual acts involving consensual adult males. Before the ECtHR the appli-
cant complained that the maintenance in force of provisions of the Cypriot Criminal Code 
criminalizing private homosexual relations amounted to an unjustified interference with his right 
to respect for private life under Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Existence of criminal laws prohibiting homosexual practices between consenting adult men: vio-
lation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8: even if since Dudgeon judgment the Attorney-General, who was vested with the pow-
er to institute or discontinue prosecutions in the public interest, had followed a consistent policy 
of not bringing criminal proceedings in respect of private homosexual conduct, on the basis that 
the relevant law is a dead letter, this policy provided no guarantee that eventual prosecutions 
will not be taken by a future Attorney-General, particularly when considering the statements by 
Government ministers which suggested that the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code were 
still in force, Moreover, it could not be excluded that the applicant’s private behavior might be 
the subject of investigations by the police or that a private prosecution might be brought against 
him. Against this background, the Court considered that the existence of the prohibition con-
tinuously and directly affected the applicant’s private life. The Court held the same approach of 
Dudgeon and Norris judgments, finding a breach of Article 8. 
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Hauer and Guggenheim v Austria 
App. no. 18116/91 
13.10.1993 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
During a memorial against war and fascism the applicants and other members of their associa-
tion unrolled a banner with the inscription "Thousands of homosexual victims of concentration 
camps wait for their rehabilitation”. Subsequently, two police officers requested the applicants 
to remove the banner. Two other members of the association accompanied them in order to 
ask a superior police officer about the reasons for this request. A group of twenty to thirty po-
lice officers rushed towards the banner and took it. The applicants lodged a complaint with the 
Constitutional Court claiming that they had been violated in their right to freedom of expres-
sion. The Constitutional Court rejected the applicants' argument and held that they had at-
tempted to demonstrate their interests and claims at a particularly solemn ceremony to unveil a 
memorial against war and fascism. Before the ECtHR the applicants complained that the re-
moval of their banner amounted to a violation of their right to freedom of expression. They in-
voked Article 10. 
  
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 10: the Commission had to ascertain whether the police interference in the applicants’ 
freedom of expression had been justified, legitimate, and proportionated. Firstly, the Commis-
sion noted that the removal of the banner was aimed at protecting a particular ceremony and, 
thus, that it pursued legitimate aims within the meaning of Article 10. Secondly, the Commis-
sion recalled that the adjective “necessary” implied the existence of a “pressing social need”. 
The Commission further considered that the applicants had showed their banner on the occa-
sion of a ceremony with a solemn character. The Commission, balancing the applicants' interest 
in exercising their right to freedom of expression and the public interest in protecting the undis-
turbed performance of the ceremony in question, found that the removal of the applicants' 
banner had not overstepped the margin of appreciation left to the national authorities. The in-
terference could, therefore, be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" for the preven-
tion of disorder and the protection of the rights of others. In particular, there was a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate aims pursued. 
The complaint was considered ill-founded and declared inadmissible. 
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Scherer v Switzerland 
App. no. 19/1992/41493 
23.03.1994 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant, who died on 13 March 1992, ran a sex shop for homosexuals in Zürich. The 
shop sold, among other things, magazines, books and films, but the nature of the establishment 
was not apparent to passers-by. At the back of the shop there was a room, used for showing vid-
eo films that were changed every week or every fortnight. On 23 November 1983 the sex shop 
was searched; the Zürich district Attorney's office confiscated the film “New York City”, and 
brought proceedings against the applicant, who was also questioned by the police. After hearing 
the parties, the Canton of Zürich Court of Appeal sentenced Mr Scherer to a fine of CHF 
4,000 for publishing obscene items and for driving while under the influence of alcohol. On the 
first count the Court held that the aim of Article 204 of the Criminal Code was to protect the 
public in a wider sense; Mr Scherer lodged an application for a declaration of nullity with the 
Zürich Court of Cassation and then he resorted to the Court of Appeal, but his appeal was re-
jected. Before the ECtHR he complained under Article 6 of the Convention of the length and 
unfairness of the criminal proceedings against him. He also relied on Articles 8 and 10 for his 
conviction for showing the film New York City and for his conviction for selling obscene mate-
rials. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Striking out. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
the Government asked the Commission to consider whether the instant case should be struck 
out of its list in view of Mr Scherer's death; on the contrary, Mr Scherer’s lawyer challenged the 
Government's argument. He first referred to the wishes of his client, who had expressed the de-
sire that the case be pursued to its conclusion. Secondly he argued that a judgment by the 
Commission would clarify a number of difficult issues related to the freedom of expression. 
Thirdly, he reported that the applicant's executor wanted the proceedings to continue. On a 
number of occasions the Court had accepted that the parents, spouse, or children of a deceased 
applicant were entitled to take his place in the proceedings, but the Commission did not find 
anything similar to these position in the present cases. Under these circumstances Mr Scherer's 
death was held as a “fact of a kind to provide a solution of the matter” and it was stroke out.
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Wilde, Greenhalgh, and Parry v the UK 
App. no. 22382/93 
19.01.1995 [Commission] 
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicants were three homosexual men who, in separate occasions, suffered from homo-
phobic attacks which caused them injuries and distress. The first applicant had been physically 
attacked but they did not report the fact to the police, because he feared not to be considered . 
In 1993 the second applicant, aged 24, took part in a radio discussion in which he referred to 
his sexual relationship with the third applicant aged 19. A member of the public wrote to the 
Director of Public Prosecutions to ask for criminal proceedings to be brought. Mr. Geenhalgh 
and Mr. Parry were then interviewed by the police on 21 July 1993, but the proceedings were 
not ultimately brought against them. Before the ECtHR the applicants claimed a reduction of 
the age of consent and they recalled the Policy Advisor Committee on Sexual Offense, which 
suggested to reduce the age for homosexual relations at 18. They invoked Article 14 in conjunc-
tion with Article 8. 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Striking out 
 
Commission’s decision: 
In 1994 the age of consent for homosexual activities was reduced to 18 years and despite a dif-
ference between heterosexuals/lesbians and homosexuals still existed, the Government asked 
the Commission to strike the case out of its list. 
The Commission found that the aim of the applicants was not to equalize the age of consent, 
rather to have a reduction of the minimum age for homosexual acts from 21 to 18, since they 
were all aged 18 and over. Therefore, even though after the reform UK laws still provided dif-
ferent ages of consent for homosexuals and heterosexuals, the Commission found that the entry 
into force of the entry in force of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 had resolved 
the matter brought forward by the applicants. Against this background the Commission stroke 
the case out of its list.  
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Reiss v Austria 
App. no. 23953/94  
06.09.1995 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant owned a bar in Wien and its customers were mainly male homosexuals. Cus-
tomers seeking entrance to the bar had to ring at the door, minors under 18 years were not ad-
mitted. Following an anonymous letter, three police officers entered the applicant's bar and 
seized a homosexual pornographic video which was shown on a video monitor as well as several 
similar video cassettes. The applicant was heard by the Investigating Judge and charged under 
the Pornography Act. The applicant stated that while he was not at his bar, an acquaintance of 
his had deposited several video cassettes there for him, not to be shown in public; one of his 
employees, however, had shown them on the videos. The Regional Court convicted the appli-
cant of the offence under Pornography Act and sentenced him to a fine of 40 daily rates of 300 
AS each and 20 days of imprisonment. Subsequent appeal were rejected. Before the ECtHR 
the applicant complained that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair and that his 
conviction violated his right to respect for private life. He invoked Article 6 and Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Admissibility: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 6: the Commission found that the Regional Court based its judgment on the assessment 
of the evidence it had and drew its conclusions therefrom. Whether these conclusions involved 
an error of fact or law was an issue which the Commission was not entitled to determine. Under 
such circumstances there was no appearance of a violation of the applicant's right to a fair trial 
under Article 6.  
Article 8: the Commission recalled that while business activities enjoyed to a certain extent the 
protection of Article 8 of the Convention, regard must nevertheless be had in this respect to the 
nature of such premises, the business activities exercised therein and the nature of the alleged 
interference. In the present case the applicant was the owner of a bar, accessible to the public, 
although subject to certain control. At least on 21 November 1991 a homosexual pornographic 
video cassette was shown in the bar and similar video cassettes were found there. In short, hav-
ing regard to the specific circumstances of the present case, the Commission couldn’t find that 
the applicant's conviction under the Pornography Act constituted an interference with his rights. 
The application was considered ill-founded and declared inadmissible.  
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Roosli v Germany 
App. no. 28318/95  
15.05.1996 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had commenced co-habitation with Mr. B. in 1988, at an apartment owned by 
Mrs. W. and rented by Mr. B. The applicant and Mr. B. had a homosexual relationship. Mr. 
B. died in 1993. In March 1994 the applicant informed Mrs. W. that he intended to succeed to 
the late Mr. B.'s tenancy contract, and she commenced eviction proceedings against the appli-
cant. The Munich District Court granted Mrs. W.s eviction claim and ordered the applicant to 
leave the apartment by the end of August 1994. Also the Munich I Regional Court dismissed 
the applicant's appeal. In 1995 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant's 
constitutional complaint. Before the ECtHR the applicant complained under Article 14, taken 
in conjunction with Article 8 that, unlike the surviving partner of married or other heterosexual 
couples, he was refused succession to the tenancy of his late partner's apartment.  
 
 
II. Law 
 
Admissibility: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Commission’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: the Commission recalled that, despite the modern evo-
lution of attitudes towards homosexuality, a stable homosexual relationship between two men 
did not fall within the scope of the right to respect for family life. Moreover, the Commission 
held that the applicant's relationship with his deceased partner accordingly fell outside also the 
scope of the right to respect for private life, since as long as the latter was alive they had not 
been interfered in their relationship. The Commission found that any interference which there 
might have been with the applicant's private life had to be considered in the context of his right 
to respect for home. It was not disputed that the treatment accorded to the applicant had been 
different from the treatment he would have received if his partner had been of different sex. 
The Commission recalled that the family, to which the relationship of heterosexual unmarried 
couples living together as husband and wife could be assimilated, did merit special protection in 
society and that it saw no reason why a Contracting Party should not afford particular assistance 
to traditional families. The Commission therefore accepted that the difference in treatment be-
tween the surviving partner of a homosexual or lesbian couple and somebody in the same posi-
tion whose partner had been of the opposite sex could be objectively and reasonably justified. 
The Commission concluded that the application was manifestly ill-founded and declared it in-
admissible. 
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Wingrove v the UK 
App. no. 17419/90 
25.11.1996 [Chamber]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had written the shooting script and directed the making of, a video work entitled 
"Visions of Ecstasy”, allegedly derived from the writings of St. Teresa of Avila about her power-
ful ecstatic visions of Jesus Christ. The video had only erotic scenes, and the applicant filmed 
two women, supposed to be St. Teresa and her psyche, having sexual intercourses between 
them and with Christ. The British Board of Film Classification denied the applicant the possi-
bility to lawfully sell or distribute the video, since it conveyed blasphemous messages; the appli-
cant appealed against, but he was finally advised that his case was not suitable for judicial review. 
In the event that the applicant distributed the video, he risked to be criminally prosecuted for 
blasphemy. Before the ECtHR the applicant complained that the refusal of a classification cer-
tificate for his video - without certificate no video could be sold in the UK - was in breach of his 
freedom of expression. He invoked Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Refusal to grant distribution certificate for a video depicting a blasphemous lesbian sexual inter-
course: no violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 10: the Court accepted that the applicant had been interfered with his freedom of ex-
pression and it investigated whether the criteria required by Article 10 exemption clauses had 
been met. Firstly, it accepted that blasphemy by its very nature has no precise legal definition 
and afforded national authorities wide flexibility in assessing whether particular facts fall within 
definition. The aims pursued by the government corresponded to the protection of others and 
the Court evaluated the interference as fully consonant and balanced. Lastly, the interference 
intended to protect the audience against seriously offensive attacks on matters regarded as sa-
cred by Christians, and the Court noted that there was not sufficient common consensus to 
conclude that blasphemy legislation was, in itself, unnecessary in a democratic society.  
Although interference amounted to a complete ban, this was the understandable consequence 
of authorities' opinion that the distribution of that video would infringe the criminal law and of 
applicant's refusal to amend it or cut out blasphemous scenes. Hence, the Court found no viola-
tion.
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Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the UK 
App. no. 21627/93, 21628/93, 21974/93 
19.02.1997 [Chamber]  
 
I. Facts 
 
In the course of routine investigations into other matters, the police came into possession of a 
number of video, filmed during sadomasochistic encounters involving the applicants and as 
many as forty-four other homosexual men. As a result the applicants, with several other men, 
were charged with a series of offences, including assault and wounding, relating to sadomaso-
chistic activities that had taken place over a ten-year period. The infliction of pain was subject to 
certain rules including the provision of a code word to be used by any "victim" to stop an "as-
sault", and did not lead to any instance of infection, permanent injury or to the need for medical 
attention. The activities took place at a number of locations, including rooms equipped as tor-
ture chambers. There was no suggestion that the tapes had been sold or used other than by 
members of the group. The proceedings were given widespread press coverage. All the appli-
cants lost their jobs and Mr Jaggard required extensive psychiatric treatment. All the applicants 
were sentenced for imprisonment in accordance with the Person Act 1861, which provided im-
prisonment for whosoever unlawfully and maliciously wounded or inflicted bodily harm upon 
other person. Before the ECtHR the applicants relied on Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention, 
complaining that their convictions were the result of an unforeseeable application of a provision 
of the criminal law which, in any event, amounted to an unlawful and interference with their 
right to respect for their private life.  
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Prosecution and conviction for sadomasochistic homosexual practices: no violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8: the Court held that not every sexual activity carried out behind closed doors necessari-
ly fell within the scope of Article 8. In the present case, national authorities had acted consist-
ently with the Person Act and they had pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the 
rights of others. The Court held that the applicants’ sadomasochistic activities involved a signifi-
cant degree of injury which could not be characterized as trifling or transient. Nor did the Court 
accept the applicants’ submission that no prosecution should have been brought against them 
since their injuries were not severe and since no medical treatment had been required. In sum, 
the Court found that the national authorities were entitled to consider as necessary the prosecu-
tion and conviction of the applicants in a democratic society for the protection of health within 
the meaning of Article 8. 
Article 7: The Court did not consider necessary to examine the complaint under this issue.
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Sobhani v Sweden 
App. no. 32999/96  
10.07.1998 [Commission]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was an Iranian citizen, arrived in Sweden where he later applied for asylum. In 
1995 the National Immigration Board rejected the application and ordered the applicant's ex-
pulsion to Iran. The applicant's appeal was rejected by the Aliens Appeals Board. Before the 
ECtHR the applicant claimed that he would be arrested and executed upon return to Iran on 
the account of his homosexuality. He invoked Article 2, Article 3, and Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Striking out.  
 
Commission’s decision: 
In 1996 the Commission decided to indicate to the respondent Government that it was desira-
ble in the interest of the parties and for the proper conduct of the proceedings not to expel the 
applicant to Iran until the Commission had had an opportunity to examine the application. On 
17 June 1998 the Government informed the Commission of its decision to grant the applicant a 
permanent residence permit. The Government requested the Commission to strike the applica-
tion out of its list of cases. By letter of 1 July 1998, the applicant expressed the wish to withdraw 
the present application. As regards the issues raised in the present case, the Commission found 
no reasons of a general character affecting respect for human rights, requiring the further exam-
ination of the application. The case was struck out.  
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Smith and Grady v the UK 
App. no. 33985/96, 33986/96 
23.02.1999 [Section III]  
 
I. Facts 
 
Both applicants, who were at the relevant time members of the UK armed forces, were homo-
sexual. The Ministry of Defense applied a policy which excluded homosexuals from the armed 
forces. The applicants were each the subject of an investigation by the service police concerning 
their homosexuality and were discharged on the sole ground of their sexual orientation. They 
appealed against this decision, but their appeal was rejected. Before the ECtHR they com-
plained that the investigations into their sexual orientation and their subsequent discharges vio-
lated their right to respect for private life; they further claimed that the policy against homosex-
uals and consequent investigations had been degrading and that they had been illegitimately in-
terfered in their right to express their sexual identity. They also denounced national remedies as 
inadequate. The applicants invoked Article 8, alone and in conjunction with Article 14, Article 
3, alone and in conjunction with Article 14, Article 14 in conjunction with Article 10, and Arti-
cle 13. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Discharge from army due to implementation of policy against participation of homosexual in 
armed forces: violation. 
Lack of adequate domestic remedies: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8: the Court considered that the investigation and discharge together with the blanket na-
ture of the policy of the Ministry of Defense, did not meet the criteria required by exemption 
clauses of the ECHR, also lacking of proportionality with the aims sought and resulting not nec-
essary in a democratic society. Therefore, it found a violation of Article 8, taken alone.  
Article 3: the Court accepted that investigations and discharges were undoubtedly distressing 
and humiliating; however, the Court did not consider that the treatment reached the minimum 
level of severity which would bring it within the scope of Article 3.  
Article 10: the Court also considered that the freedom of expression was not crucial to the pre-
sent case and it found that it was not necessary to examine the applicants’ complaints under Ar-
ticle 10. 
Article 13: the applicants argued that domestic judicial review did not constitute an effective 
domestic remedy: the Court found that the threshold at which the domestic Courts might find 
the policy of the Ministry of Defense irrational had been placed so high that it effectively ex-
cluded any consideration on the question of whether the interference with the applicants’ pri-
vate lives had answered a pressing social need, on whether it was proportionate to the national 
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security and to public order. The Court concluded, accordingly, that the applicants had not 
been granted any effective domestic remedy in relation to the violation of their rights.
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Lustig-Prean and Beckett v the UK 
App. no. 31417/96 
27.09.1999 [Section III]  
 
I. Facts 
 
Both applicants, who were at the relevant time members of the UK armed forces, were homo-
sexual and after investigations by the service police concerning their homosexuality, they were 
discharged on the sole ground of their sexual orientation. They appealed against this decision, 
but their appeal was rejected. Before the ECtHR the applicants complained that the investiga-
tions into their sexual orientation and their subsequent discharges violated their right to respect 
for their private lives and amounted to an unjustified discrimination. The applicants invoked 
Article 8, alone and in conjunction with Article 14. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding : 
Discharge from army due to implementation of policy against participation of homosexual in 
armed forces: violation. 
Lack of adequate domestic remedies: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14: the Court considered that the investigation and the dis-
charge together with the blanket nature of the policy of the Ministry of Defense were of a par-
ticularly grave nature, and did not meet the criteria required by exemption clauses of the Con-
vention. Therefore, it found a violation of Article 8, taken alone.  
Article 3: the Court accepted that investigations and discharges were undoubtedly distressing 
and humiliating for each of the applicants; however, the Court did not consider that the treat-
ment reached the minimum level of severity which would bring it within the scope of Article 3.  
Article 10: the Court also considered that the freedom of expression was subsidiary to the ap-
plicants’ right to respect for their private lives, and it found that it was not necessary to examine 
the applicants’ complaints under Article 10. 
Article 13: the Court found that the threshold at which the domestic Courts could find the poli-
cy of the Ministry of Defense irrational had been placed so high that it effectively excluded any 
consideration by the domestic Courts of the question of whether the interference with the ap-
plicants’ private lives had answered a pressing social need or was proportionate to the national 
security and public order. The Court concluded, accordingly, that the applicants had not had an 
effective domestic remedy, and it found a violation of Article 13. 
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Salgueiro de Silva Mouta v Portugal 
App. no. 33290/96 
21.12.1999 [Chamber]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had been prevented by his ex-wife from visiting his daughter M., in breach of an 
agreement reached at the time of their divorce. He, then, sought an order awarding him paren-
tal responsibility for the child, which was granted by the Lisbon Family Affairs Court in 1994. 
M. lived with the applicant until 1995 when she was allegedly abducted by her mother. On ap-
peal, the mother was given parental responsibility whereas the applicant was granted a contact 
order which, he maintained, he was unable to exercise. The Lisbon Court of Appeal gave two 
reasons in its judgment for granting parental responsibility for M. to her mother, namely the in-
terest of the child and the fact that the applicant was homosexual and he lived with another 
man. Before the ECtHR the applicant complained of an unjustified discrimination against his 
right to respect for his private and family life, in breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 
8. He also invoked Article 8 alone, because he had been forced by the Court of Appeal to hide 
his homosexuality when seeing his daughter.  
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Refusal to grant custody to a parent living in a homosexual relationship and obligation to hide 
his homosexuality during meetings with his daughter: violation.  
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14: the Court noted that the judgment of the Lisbon Court 
of Appeal constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life, and 
it acknowledged that the decision to grant parental responsibility to the mother rather than the 
father, had had regard to the fact that the applicant was a homosexual and living with another 
man. There had been, therefore, a difference in treatment between the applicant and M.’s 
mother based on the applicant’s sexual orientation. The Court of appeal had pursued a legiti-
mate aim in reaching its decision, namely the protection of the child’s health and rights. How-
ever, several passages from the judgment of the Lisbon Court of Appeal suggested that the ap-
plicant’s homosexuality had been decisive in the final decision, which thus amounted to a dis-
tinction dictated by the applicant’s sexual orientation that was not permissible to draw under the 
Convention. That conclusion was supported by the fact that the Court of appeal had discour-
aged the applicant from behaving during visits in a way that would make the child aware that he 
was living with another man “as if they were spouses”. The Court therefore found a violation. 
Article 8: the Court held that it was unnecessary to rule on the alleged violation of Article 8 tak-
en alone as the same point was the same as that considered under Article 8 taken together with 
Article 14. 
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A.D.T. v the UK 
App. no. 35765/97  
31.07.2000[Section III]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was homosexual. Following a police search of his home, he was arrested and tak-
en to the local police station where he admitted that certain videos seized during the search con-
tained footage of himself and up to four adult men engaging in sexual acts in his home. He was 
convicted of gross indecency between men contrary to Sexual Offences Act 1956 and he was 
sentenced and conditionally discharged for two years. Before the ECtHR the applicant com-
plained of an illegitimate interference with his private life, further alleging to have been discrim-
inated against because of his homosexuality. A group of heterosexual individuals or homosexual 
females involved in similar sexual activities would not have been prosecuted, there being no leg-
islation prohibiting such acts. The applicant invoked Article 8, alone and in conjunction with 
Article 14. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Criminal conviction for engaging in homosexual group sex: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8: the Court agreed that, with reference to certain sexual activities, the State’s interference 
may be justified, either as not amounting to an interference with the right to respect for private 
life, or as being justified for the protection, for example, of health or morals. The facts of the pre-
sent case, however, did not indicate any such circumstances. The applicant had been involved in 
sexual activities with a restricted number of friends in circumstances in which it was most unlikely 
that others would become aware of what was going on. The activities were therefore genuinely 
“private” and the Court adopted the same narrow margin of appreciation it had applied in other 
cases involving intimate aspects of private life. Given the absence of any public-health considera-
tion and the purely private nature of the behaviors in the present case, the Court found that the 
reasons submitted for the maintenance in force of legislation criminalizing homosexual acts be-
tween men in private were not sufficient to justify the legislation and the prosecution. 
Article 14: the Court deemed not necessary to examine the case under this provision.
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Craig v the UK 
App. no. 45396/99 
05.09.2000 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was a social worker working with children under five years who had been in-
volved in a homosexual relationship with Ms. L since 1990. L obtained a divorce in February 
1993 but the custody and care of L’s four children were the subject of High Court proceedings 
and L agreed that she would not permit the children to come into contact with or remain in the 
company of the applicant or of any other person known to L to be lesbian. Ms. L asked the ap-
plicant not to call at her home at any time when she had access to the children, and she under-
took not to answer or open the door if the applicant called at her house during a scheduled ac-
cess visit. Before the ECtHR the applicant complained she was deprived of the right to inter-
vene in the custody proceedings, in support of her relationship with L. She further complained 
that she was obliged to disclose to any future employer the fact that her name was mentioned in 
Court orders in proceedings involving children and she alleged that this could negatively affect 
her future work with children. She also complained about a discriminatory difference in treat-
ment, since the orders in question did not apparently restrict the children’s contact with all male 
homosexuals. She invoked Article 6, Article 8, Article 13, Article 14. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 6 and Article 8: the Court found that the applicant’s inability to intervene in or to take 
proceedings with the purpose of supporting her relationship with L did not disclose a violation 
because, it was Ms. L herself who had chosen to limit their relationship in the terms outlined in 
the relevant High Court orders. 
Article 13: the Court held that no separate issue arose under Article 13 in respect of this aspect 
of the applicant’s complaint. 
Article 14: the Court observed that the applicant had compared her position to that of all male 
homosexuals. Since L was a woman and had a relationship with a female applicant, the Court 
did not find that the applicant and other female homosexuals could be compared and consid-
ered analogous to male homosexuals in the particular context.  
Finally, the applicant complained that she was obliged to disclose to any future employer the 
fact that her name was mentioned in Court orders in proceedings involving children and she 
maintained that this could effect her future employment in posts involving children. Both her 
employer and the school where she voluntarily worked were aware of her homosexuality and 
she did not provide any evidence of any positions in respect of which she had been obliged, to 
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her detriment, to disclose the relevant Court orders. Hence, the Court declared the complaint 
inadmissible.
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Cardoso and Johansen v the UK 
App. no. 47061/99 
05.09.2000 [Section III]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The first applicant had been resident in the United Kingdom since 1981 and he had been in a 
long term stable relationship akin to marriage for 18 years with the second applicant. The first 
applicant worked and paid tax and National Insurance contributions and submitted tax returns, 
and tried to obtain a permanent permit by a marriage of convenience, in 1984. In 1995, the first 
applicant was diagnosed as suffering from HIV and in November 1996 with an AIDS defining 
illness. In 1997, the first applicant obtained a false Italian passport to visit his elderly mother in 
Brazil. On his return from that trip, he was stopped and his false identity discovered. On 5 Oc-
tober 1998, the Secretary of State refused the first applicant a leave to enter the United King-
dom and ordered to remove him to France on the basis that the first applicant could make an 
application to enter from there and that this was the Country from which he had entered the 
UK. The first applicant could not benefit from available concessions concerning homosexual 
relationships as, although he had lived in the United Kingdom since 1981, he was technically 
seeking leave to enter and not leave to remain. The first applicant obtained medical reports in 
support of his attempt to stay in the United Kingdom. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Striking out.  
 
Court’s decision: 
By letter dated 26 July 1999, the Government informed the Court that the Immigration Service 
had reconsidered the first applicant’s case and found it appropriate to waive the entry clearance 
requirement. On 27 July 1999, the first applicant was granted leave to enter the UK. On 7 Au-
gust 2000, the applicants’ representatives accepted the offer of the Government to pay their fees 
and costs in the amount of GBP 11,025 in full and final settlement of their claims. The Court 
noted that the applicants had agreed to settle their claims on the basis of the first applicant re-
ceiving leave to enter the UK and on payment of a sum in respect of their legal costs and ex-
penses. In these circumstances, it found that the applicants no longer intended to pursue their 
application. The Court was satisfied that respect for human rights did not require the continued 
examination of the application. For these reasons the Court struck the case out.  
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Sutherland v the UK 
App. no. 25186/94  
01.07.1997 [Commission decision] 
27.03.2001 [Grand Chamber] 
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant, British national, was homosexual. He had met his partner when they both were 
aged 16. They had a sexual relation but were worried about the fact that under the law this was 
a criminal offence. Under Sexual Offences Act 1967 homosexual buggery did not amount to 
offence, provided that the parties had consented thereto and had attained the age of 21. In con-
trast, the age of consent with respect to women was 16. On 21 February 1994 the House of 
Commons had rejected an amendment to reduce the minimum age of consent for male homo-
sexual acts to 16 but, by 427 votes to 162, had accepted an amendment to reduce the minimum 
age to 18. Before the ECtHR the applicant complained that the fixing of the minimum age for 
lawful homosexual activities between men at 18, rather than 16 as for women, violated his right 
to respect for private life under Article 8, and was discriminatory in breach of that Article taken 
in conjunction with Article 14.  
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Striking out. 
 
Commission’s opinion: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: the Commission recalled that there was a legitimate ne-
cessity in a democratic society for some restrictions over homosexual conduct, most notably in 
order to provide the safeguards against the exploitation and the corruption of those who are 
vulnerable by reason of their youth. The Commission also considered that the applicant was in 
a relevantly similar situation to a young man of the same age who wished to enter into and 
maintain sexual relations with a female friend of the same age. UK provisions did pursue a legit-
imated aim, namely the protection of morals and the right of others, but the Government failed 
to demonstrate a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aims sought. In the light of the changes occurred in medical profession on the subject of the 
need for the protection of young male homosexuals and on the desirability of introducing an 
equal age of consent, the Commission reconsidered its earlier approach and considered that 
there didn’t exist any objective justification for maintaining a different age of consent for homo-
sexual and heterosexual acts. 
 
Court’s decision:  
After the approval of Sexual Offences Act, in 2000, the Court received a statement from the 
Government and from the applicant, both asking to strike the case out from its list. By equaliz-
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ing the age of consent for homosexual acts between consenting males to 16, new provisions re-
moved the risk or threat of prosecution that previously existed under national laws of the re-
spondent State. Against this background, the Court was satisfied that the matter had been re-
solved and struck the case out of its list. 
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Mata Estevez v Spain 
App. no. 56501/00  
10.05.2001 [Chamber]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had lived with another man, Mr G.C., for more than ten years. They could not 
sanction their union by marrying because under Spanish law only heterosexual couples could 
marry. In 1997 Mr G.C. had died in a road accident. The applicant claimed the social-security 
allowances for the surviving spouses, arguing that he had cohabited with the deceased for many 
years. The National Institute of Social Security granted the applicant’s claim in respect of an al-
lowance for death expenses, but it refused to grant him a survivor’s pension on the ground that 
since he had not been married to Mr G.C., he could not legally be considered as his surviving 
spouse for the purposes of General Social Security Act. The applicant appealed against that de-
cision, but his appeal was dismissed by the Madrid Social and Employment Court. The appli-
cant lodged an application for the protection of fundamental rights with the Constitutional 
Court, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was ill-founded. Before the ECtHR the 
applicant complained that the refusal to award him a survivor’s pension amounted to a discrim-
inatory treatment infringing his right to respect for private and family life. He invoked Article 14 
in conjunction with Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: the Court reiterated that long-term homosexual rela-
tionships between two men did not fall within the scope of the right to respect for family life 
protected by Article 8 of the Convention. The Court considered that, despite the growing ten-
dency in a number of European States towards the legal and judicial recognition of stable de 
facto partnerships between homosexuals, this was an area in which they still enjoyed a wide 
margin of appreciation. Accordingly, the applicant’s relationship with his late partner did not 
fall within Article 8 in so far as that provision protected the right to respect for family life. With 
regard to private life, the Court accepted that the applicant might have been treated differently if 
his partner had been of different sex. Indeed Spanish legislation had taken some account of 
unmarried couples with regard to their eligibility for a survivor’s pension since, under Spanish 
law, persons living together as man and wife before 1981 who could not marry each other, since 
they had been already married with others and before 1981 Spanish law did not permit divorce, 
had been eligible for a survivor’s pension. However, marriage constituted an essential precondi-
tion for eligibility for a survivor’s pension; in no circumstances relevant Spanish legislation per-
mitted marriage between persons of the same sex. The Court considered such differentiated 
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treatment as pursuing the legitimated aim of protecting the family based on marriage bonds. In 
conclusion, the application was rejected as manifestly ill-founded. 
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Goddard v the UK 
App. no. 57821/00  
15.01.2002 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was engaged as a private in the Royal Logistics Corps of the UK army. In 1999 
she admitted to her commanding officer that she was homosexual, and she received a certificate 
of discharge from the armed forces. On 20 December 2000 the applicant commenced proceed-
ings in the Employment Tribunal alleging a breach of her contract, further denouncing to suffer 
from discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. On 2 March 2000 that tribunal dismissed 
her claims; in addition, on 18 April 2000, her proceedings were struck out. Before the ECtHR 
the applicant complained about the investigations conducted into her sexual orientation and her 
discharge; she invoked Article 8, alone and in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention, 
and Article 3, alone and in conjunction with Article 14. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Striking out. 
 
Court’s decision: 
By a letter dated 30 October 2001 the applicant’s representatives confirmed her acceptance of 
the Government’s settlement offer. The Court noted that the matter had been resolved. It was 
further satisfied that the parties’ agreement was based on respect for human rights as defined in 
the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, the case was struck out of the list of the ECtHR’s 
cases. 
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Fretté v France 
App. no. 36515/97 
26.02.2002 [Section III]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had applied for the authorization to adopt but, in 1993, the Paris Social Services, 
Youth and Health Department refused the applicant’s request. An appeal lodged by the appli-
cant was dismissed on the ground that the applicant’s “choice of lifestyle” did not appear to be 
such as to provide sufficient guarantees that he could give a child a suitable home from an edu-
cational, psychological and family perspective. The Paris Administrative Court set aside the de-
cisions refusing the applicant authorization, noting there was no evidence to establish or even 
suggest that Mr Fretté’s lifestyle denoted a lack of moral rigor or emotional stability. Paris Social 
Services, however, appealed to the Conseil d’Etat, which set aside the Administrative Court’s 
judgment and dismissed the applicant’s request for prior authorization. Before the ECtHR the 
applicant complained that the dismissal of his request amounted to arbitrary interference with 
his private and family life, because it was based exclusively on the unfavorable prejudice about 
his sexual orientation. He invoked Article 6 and Article 14, taken together with Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Refusal to authorize the adoption on the ground of sexual orientation: non violation. 
Failed summoning to judicial hearing: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: French domestic law authorised any unmarried person 
to apply to adopt, and the Court concluded that there had been a difference in treatment based 
on the applicant’s sexual orientation. The Court noted that the decisions refusing authorisation 
pursued the protection of the health and rights of children who might be concerned by an 
adoption procedure. Noting that the scientific community was divided over the issue, the Court 
afforded national authorities with wide margin to legitimately circumscribe the right to be able 
to adopt. Therefore no violation was found.  
Article 6: The Court noted that the applicant had not been summoned to the hearing in the 
Conseil d’Etat. As a result, he had not had the opportunity to have knowledge of the submis-
sions of the Government commissioner. Not being represented, he could not obtain a general 
idea of their content before the hearing either. That had deprived him of the possibility of filing 
a rejoinder in the form of a note to the Court at the deliberations stage. Hence, the Court found 
a violation of Article 6.  
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Perkins and R. v the UK 
App. no. 43208/98, 44875/98 
22.10.2002 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
Both applicants had been at the relevant time members of the UK armed forces and were dis-
charged because of their homosexuality. The applicants were also subjected to an investigation 
by the service police concerning their homosexuality. They appealed against this decision, but 
their appeal was rejected. Before the ECtHR the applicants complained that the investigations 
into their sexual orientation and their subsequent discharges had violated their right to respect 
for private life; they further claimed that the policy against homosexuals were degrading and that 
they had been illegitimately interfered in their right to express their sexual identity. They also 
denounced national remedies as inadequate. The applicants invoked Article 8, alone and in 
conjunction with Article 14. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Discharge from army due to implementation of policy against participation of homosexual in 
armed forces: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8: the Court considered that the investigation and the discharge together with the blanket 
nature of the policy of the Ministry of Defense were of a particularly grave nature and constitut-
ed direct interferences with the applicants’ right to respect for private life which could not be 
justified as being “necessary in a democratic society”. A violation of Article 8 was therefore 
found. 
Article 14: the Court did not consider that the applicants’ complaints under Article 14 of the 
Convention in conjunction with Article 8 gave rise to any separate issue. 
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Beck, Copp, Bazeley v the UK 
App. no. 48535/99, 48536/99, 48537/99 
22.10.2002 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The three applicants had been each the subject of an investigation by the service police con-
cerning their homosexuality and were discharged on the sole ground of their sexual orientation. 
They appealed against this decision, but their appeal was rejected. Before the ECtHR the appli-
cants complained about both the intrusive investigations into their private lives and about their 
subsequent discharges. They invoked Article 8, both alone and in conjunction with Article 14 
of the Convention; they also considered that they had been treated in a manner inconsistent 
with Article 3, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The ap-
plicants further invoked Article 10, both alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Con-
vention. Finally, the applicants invoked Article 13 of the Convention, arguing that they had had 
no effective domestic remedy in relation to the above violations of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Discharge from army due to implementation of policy against participation of homosexual in 
armed forces: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8: the Court considered that the investigation and the discharge together with the blanket 
nature of the policy of the Ministry of Defense were of a particularly grave nature, and did not 
meet the criteria required by exemption clauses of the Convention. Therefore, it found a viola-
tion of Article 8, taken alone.  
Article 3: the Court accepted that investigations and discharges were undoubtedly distressing 
and humiliating for each of the applicants; however, the Court did not consider that the treat-
ment reached the minimum level of severity which would bring it within the scope of Article 3. 
Article 10: the Court also considered that the freedom of expression was subsidiary to the ap-
plicants’ right to respect for their private lives, and it found that it was not necessary to examine 
the applicants’ complaints under Article 10. 
Article 13: the Court found that the threshold at which domestic Courts could find the policy of 
the Ministry of Defense irrational had been placed so high that it effectively excluded any con-
sideration by the domestic Courts of the question of whether the interference with the appli-
cants’ private lives had answered a pressing social need or was proportionate to the national se-
curity and public order. The Court observed that the applicants had not had an effective do-
mestic remedy, and it found a violation of Article 13. 
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L. and V. v Austria* 
App. no. 39392/98, 39829/98;  
09.01.2003 [Section I] 
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicants were convicted of homosexual acts under Article 209 of the Criminal Code, 
which penalized homosexual acts of adult men with consenting adolescents aged between 14 
and 18, while for heterosexuals and lesbians the age of consent was 14. The first applicant had 
appealed and he had also asked a review of the constitutionality of Article 209, but his request 
had been rejected. Before the ECtHR the applicants alleged that the maintenance in force of 
Article 209 as their convictions under that provision violated their right to respect for their pri-
vate lives and were discriminatory. They relied on Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Differentiated age of consent for male homosexual activities: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: the Court noted that, following the Constitutional 
Court’s judgment of 21 June 2002, Article 209 of the Austrian Criminal Code had been re-
pealed on 10 July 2002. Nonetheless, criminal convictions under that provision were unaffected 
by the change in the law. Accordingly, the Court found that the applicants were directly affected 
by the maintenance in force of Article 209 before the age of 18; as a consequence, the Court 
considered that the Constitutional Court’s judgment had not afforded redress for the alleged 
breaches of the Convention. Nor had it resolved the issue in question. The Court denied that 
there was an objective and reasonable justification why young men in the 14 to 18-year age 
bracket needed protection against any sexual relationship with adult men, while young women 
in the same age bracket did not need such protection against relations with either adult men or 
women. The Court held that there had been, in both cases, a violation of Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8.  
 
 
 
 
*  Comparable facts, law, and Court’s decision in Ladner v Austria (App. no. 18297/03); S. L. v 
Austria (App. no. 45330/99); Woditschka and Wilfing v Austria (App. no. 69756/01, 
6306/02); H.G. and G.B. v Austria (App. no. 11084/02); R.H. against Austria (App. no. 
7336/03); E.B. and Others v Austria (App. no. 31913/07, 38357/07, 48098/07, 48777/07 and 
48779/07)
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Karner v Austria 
App. no. 40016/98 
24.07.2003 [Section I]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had been cohabiting with his same-sex partner as tenants in Wien. His partner 
had died in 1994 after designating the applicant as his heir. After unsuccessfully attempting to 
terminate the tenancy, the landlord had appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court, but the Court 
had interpreted the Rent Act as applying to heterosexual couples only, and it had upheld the 
landlord’s appeal. Before the ECtHR the applicant complained that the Supreme Court had il-
legitimately discriminated against him on the ground of his sexual orientation. He invoked Arti-
cle 14 in conjunction with Article 8. The applicant died in 2000. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Impossibility to succeed to same-sex partner’s tenancy: violation of Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 8. 
 
Court’s decision: 
The Court reiterated that, for the purposes of Article 14, a difference in treatment is discrimina-
tory if it has no objective and reasonable justification, that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate 
aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought to be realized. Just like differences based on sex, differences based on sexu-
al orientation required particularly serious reasons by way of justification. The Court accepted 
that the Government sought to protect the traditional family unit, and it also acknowledged that 
the protection of the family in the traditional sense was, in principle, a weighty and legitimate 
reason which might justify a difference in treatment. However, such aim was rather abstract and 
a broad variety of concrete measures might be used to implement it, without discriminating 
against same-sex cohabiting partners. Accordingly, the Court found that Austrian Government 
had not offered convincing and weighty reasons justifying the narrow interpretation of the Rent 
Act that prevented a surviving partner of a couple of the same sex from relying on that provi-
sion.  
Thus, there had been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Ar-
ticle 8. 
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F. v the UK 
App. no. 17341/03 
22.06.2004 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had entered the United Kingdom illegally and claimed asylum on the basis that 
he feared persecution as a homosexual. He and his partner lived in Iran and had been arrested, 
beaten and his partner confessed to being homosexual. After being held in prison for three 
months and four days, he was allegedly released on the payment of bribes by his family who 
feared that he would face the death sentence as a homosexual. The Secretary of State rejected 
the asylum application: he found it lacking in credibility that the authorities had kept him so 
long in custody if they intended to execute him, and he also had doubt on the nationality of the 
applicant. The applicant appealed to the Adjudicator, without success; as the applicant had not 
expressed any prospect of continuing a relationship with his partner and was not at risk of pun-
ishment for acts conducted in private, his request was rejected also by the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal. Before the ECtHR the applicant invoked Article 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Ar-
ticle 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision:  
Article 3: the Court reiterated that the right to asylum was not protected in either the Conven-
tion or its Protocols. However, the expulsion by a Contracting State of an alien might give rise 
to an issue where substantial reasons showed that the person in question would have faced a re-
al risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman treatment. The Court observed that the ma-
terials before it did not disclose a similar situation, and it considered this part of the application 
as manifestly ill-founded. 
Article 5 and Article 6: only in exceptional circumstances, which did not arise in this case, could 
these provisions be engaged by an expulsion decision. The applicant had failed to identify how 
any prosecution, conviction or sentence would infringe either Article 5 or 6. It follows that these 
complaints were deemed as manifestly ill-founded. 
Article 8: the Court observed that its case-law had found responsibility attaching to Contracting 
States in respect of expelling persons who were at risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 
of the Convention. Such compelling considerations did not automatically apply under the other 
provisions of the Convention, since the Court assessed that an expelling Contracting State could 
not be required to only return an alien to a country which is in full and effective enforcement of 
all the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. The Court found that in the circumstanc-
es of this case it had not been established that the applicant’s moral integrity would have been 
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substantially affected to a degree falling within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention. The 
Court declared the complaint inadmissible. 
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I.I.N v the Netherlands 
App. no. 2035/04  
09.12.2004 [Section III]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was Iranian and applied for asylum in the Netherlands. He claimed that he had 
been arrested, ill-treated, and raped by the police of his hometown because he had been caught 
while kissing a male friend in an alley. The applicant also claimed that, on 18 March 2001, he 
had attended a protest meeting in the course of which films had been shot and photographs 
taken, including photographs of the applicant in the company of a good friend, who had been 
found death few days after. Fearing the same fate, the applicant decided to flee Iran. The Depu-
ty Minister of Justice rejected the applicant's asylum request, holding that the applicant's account 
lacked credibility and that the applicant had been unable to provide evidence about his in-
volvement in the aforementioned March, or to show any record related to his detention. The 
applicant's subsequent appeal was rejected on 16 July 2003 by the Administrative Jurisdiction 
Division of the Council of State. Before the ECtHR the applicant complained that, if expelled 
to Iran, he would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention on ac-
count of his sexual orientation.  
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 3: the Court reiterated that the right to asylum was not protected in either the Conven-
tion or its Protocols. However, expulsion by a Contracting State of an alien might give rise to an 
issue under Article 3 of the Convention in the event that there existed a real risk of being sub-
jected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving country. 
The Court observed that the materials before it did not disclose a situation of active prosecution 
by the authorities of adults involved in consensual and private homosexual relationships. The 
Court was not persuaded by the applicant: he reported that he had been arrested after having 
been caught kissing a male friend in an alley, but there was no indication that this had in fact re-
sulted in any criminal proceedings. Although the Court acknowledged that the general situation 
in Iran did not foster the protection of human rights and that homosexuals were vulnerable to 
abuse, the applicant had not established that in his case there were substantial grounds for be-
lieving that he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Arti-
cle 3 of the Convention on grounds of his homosexuality. For these reasons the Court declared 
the application inadmissible. 
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Wolfmeyer v Austria 
App. no. 5263/03  
12.10.2005 [Section I] 
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had been convicted of homosexual acts under Article 209 of the Criminal Code, 
which penalized homosexual acts of adult men with consenting adolescents aged between 14 
and 18, while for heterosexuals and lesbians the age of consent was 14. Upon the applicant's 
appeal, the Innsbruck Court of Appeal requested the Constitutional Court to review the consti-
tutionality of Article 209, and the Constitutional Court gave a judgment holding that Article 209 
of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional. The amendment repealing Article 209 entered into 
force on 14 August 2002; according to the transitional provisions, Article 209 remained appli-
cable in all cases in which the judgment at first instance had already been given before the entry 
into force of the amendment, but it could no longer be applied in the applicant's case since it 
had been the case in point before the Constitutional Court. However the applicant argued that 
his acquittal could not be considered as having removed the discrimination he had suffered: he 
had been exposed to public humiliation and, as a result, he had lost his employment. He in-
voked Article 8, alone and in conjunction with Article 14.  
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Differentiated age of consent for male homosexual activities: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: this case differed from L. and V. v. Austria in that the 
applicant was acquitted following the repeal of Article 209, while the convictions of applicants 
L. and V. continued to stand despite the said repeal. In this context, the Court had referred to 
its above finding that the applicant's position as a victim had not been removed by his acquittal. 
The Court did not consider the repeal of that provision as affecting the applicant's victim status. 
Accordingly, the Court considered that the maintenance in force of Article 209 of the Criminal 
Code and the conduct of the criminal proceedings against the applicant amounted to a violation 
of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, 
the Court did not consider it necessary to rule on the question whether there had been a viola-
tion of Article 8 alone. 
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Love and Others v the UK 
App. no. 4103/04, 5498/04, 10617/04, 14557/04, 27313/04 
13.12.2005 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicants were serving members of the British armed forces. They claim that, following an 
investigation into their sexual orientation, they were each discharged from the armed forces 
pursuant to the policy against homosexuals in the armed forces, between 1997 and 1998. The 
applicants submitted a claim to the employment tribunal arguing that their dismissal, and the 
circumstances leading to it, breached the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act. Two applicants com-
plained also under Article 3 of the Convention, one applicant complained under Article 10 of 
the Convention and all applicants complained under Articles 14 in conjunction with Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision: 
The Court did not discuss the merits of the case, which had been already adjudicated in previ-
ous cases. Rather, the Court emphasized that the applicants had not respected the time-limit of 
six imposed by Article 35, which imposed a period of six months from the date on which the 
final decision was taken, and declared their complaint inadmissible.  
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Kobenter and Standard Verlags GmbH v Austria 
App. no. 18766/11, 36030/11 
02.11.2006 [Section I]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicants were the editor in chief and the publishing company of an Austrian magazine, 
which had been convicted for insult against a regional Court. Commenting a trial, the first appli-
cant had criticized a passage of the judgment, which compared homosexuality to same-sex prac-
tices among animals. The applicant journalist stated in essence that the judgment had not signif-
icantly differed from “the traditions of medieval witch trials” and that it had lent “support to a 
homophobe's venomous hate campaign”. Subsequently, the judge removed the impugned pas-
sage from the judgment and he underwent disciplinary proceedings. Upon a prosecution filed 
by the judge, the regional Court had convicted the applicant of defamation and had imposed a 
fine on him. It had also ordered the publisher of the daily to pay compensation to the judge, 
and to publish the judgment on the newspaper. The Court found that the journalist's statement 
had not only been a value judgment, but had also insinuated that the judge had grossly violated 
fundamental procedural rights, such as the principles of impartiality and adversarial proceed-
ings, like in medieval witch trials. The applicants appealed unsuccessfully. Before the ECtHR 
the applicants complained that the Austrian Courts' judgments violated their right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10. 
  
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Conviction for criticizing a Court's judgment: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 10: the Court considered the impugned statements as based on facts, as concerning the 
judgment and not the alleged deficiencies by the judge in conducting the proceedings. Moreo-
ver, the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings against the judge in question proved that he 
had not discharged his duties in a manner fitting for a judge. The applicants had complied with 
their duties and responsibilities as a public “watch-dog” and the criticism made did not amount 
to an unjustified or destructive attack against the judge concerned or the judiciary as such. Thus, 
the applicants had been violated in their freedom of expression, secured by the ECHR.
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Ayegh v Sweden 
App. no. 4701/05 
07.11.2006 [Section II]  
 
I. Facts 
 
On 8 February 2003 the applicant and her son A, aged 17, arrived in Sweden and applied to 
the Migration Board for asylum and residence permits. They had fled from Iran because A. 
would be called to do his military service when he reached 18 years of age and there was a risk 
that he could be stationed at the border with Iraq. She had given her passport to the smugglers 
and could not prove her identity; she further submitted that A. had been raped, harassed, and 
beaten by his school headmaster. Since homosexual acts were strictly forbidden in Iran, he 
feared that he would be severely punished if he were forced to return to his home country. The 
applicant later admitted that her husband had denounced her for adultery, and she risked death 
penalty. The Migration Board rejected the application for asylum and residence permits. It first 
found that the applicant and A. had not been persecuted by the Iranian authorities and thus 
they could not be considered as refugees or granted asylum. Moreover, the claim that he had 
had a conflict with his headmaster did not alter this conclusion. Thus, the Migration Board 
found no reason for A. and the applicant to be allowed to stay in Sweden on humanitarian 
grounds. Despite several appeals, the Migration Board did not alter its decision. Before the EC-
tHR they complained that the deportation to Iran would subject her to a real risk of being killed 
or subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading punishment, in violation of her rights under 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 2 and Article 3: the Court observed that Contracting States have the right to control the 
entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting 
State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State 
under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Arti-
cle 3 in the receiving country. The applicant’s main allegation was that she would face the pro-
spect of being sentenced to death or to corporal punishment for having committed adultery, but 
the Court doubted of the submissions, since Iranian Government had claimed that they are 
with great certainty false. Also the allegations of violent act suffered from A. were not consid-
ered reliable.  
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Bączkowski and Others v. Poland  
App. no. 543/06 
03.05.2007 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicants had sought permission from the Warsaw municipal authorities to stage a march 
through the city to alert public opinion to the issue of discrimination against minority groups, 
homosexuals, and women. Citing road traffic regulations and the risk of clashes with other de-
monstrators, the authorities had refused permission for the march. Shortly before the date 
scheduled for the demonstrations the Mayor of Warsaw said in an interview that he would re-
fuse the applicants' request in all circumstances and that “propaganda about homosexuality is 
not tantamount to exercising one's freedom of assembly”. Although municipal authorities' deci-
sions were subsequently quashed on appeal, the applicants argued that the remedy had come 
too late as the dates planned for the demonstrations had already passed. Before the ECtHR the 
applicants complained that their right to peaceful assembly had been breached by the way in 
which the domestic authorities had applied the relevant domestic law to their case. They in-
voked Article 11 of the Convention, alone and in conjunction with Article 13, and Article 14, in 
conjunction with Article 11. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Unlawful refusal to grant permission for a march and meetings to protest against homophobia: 
violation. 
Belated quashing of an unlawful refusal to grant permission for a march and meetings to protest 
against homophobia: violation. 
Possibility that a municipal authority's refusal to grant permission to protest against homophobia 
was influenced by the mayor's publicly expressed views: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 11: the Court recalled Polish Constitutional Court’s judgment and held that the deci-
sions to refuse the applicants permission to take part in the demonstrations had violated the ap-
plicants’ freedom of expression. 
Article 13: the Court also held that the timing of the appeal who quashed the initial refusal was 
ineffective and threatened to render freedom of assembly meaningless, for it was delivered after 
the date scheduled for manifestation. The applicants had been denied an effective domestic 
remedy.  
Article 14: the Court could not overlook the newspaper interview in which the Mayor had ex-
pressed strong personal opinions about freedom of assembly and “propaganda about homo-
sexuality”. Since the decisions concerning the applicants' request had been given by the munici-
pal authorities on the Mayor's behalf, the Court was surmised that his opinions had affected the 
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decision-making process and had consequently infringed in a discriminatory manner the appli-
cants' right to freedom of assembly. The Court found a breach of Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 11. 
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E.B. v France 
App. no. 43546/02 
22.01.2008 [Grand Chamber]  
 
I. Facts 
 
In 1998 the applicant had applied for the authorization to adopt a child. During the adoption 
procedure she mentioned her homosexuality and her stable relationship with Ms. R., who did 
not feel committed to her partner’s decision. On the basis of the reports drawn up by a psy-
chologist, the president of the Council for the département refused the authorization. The rea-
sons given for both decisions were the lack of “identificational points of reference” due to the 
absence of a paternal image or reference and the ambiguous nature of the applicant’s partner’s 
commitment to the adoption plan. Domestic Courts upheld the council decision and the Con-
seil d’Etat dismissed E.B.’s appeal on the ground, among other things, that the Administrative 
Court of Appeal had not based its decision on a position of principle regarding the applicant’s 
sexual orientation, but it had had regard to the needs and the interests of an adopted child. The 
applicant alleged that she had suffered discriminatory treatment, based on her sexual orienta-
tion, and she had been interfered with her right to respect for her private life. She invoked on 
Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Refusal to grant the authorization to adopt on account of sexual orientation: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: the Court found that the attitude of the applicant’s 
partner was not without interest or relevance in assessing the application. With regard to the 
lack of paternal referent in the household, the Court considered that, in the present case, it was 
permissible to question the merits of such a decision as the application had been made by a sin-
gle person and not by a couple. In the Court’s view, however, that ground might have served as 
a pretext for rejecting the applicant’s application on the grounds of her homosexuality. Regard-
ing the systematic reference to the lack of a “paternal referent”, the Court disputed not the de-
sirability of addressing the issue, but the importance attached to it by the domestic authorities in 
the context of adoption by a single person. The Court further assessed that the domestic au-
thorities had not based their decision on one ground alone but on “all” the factors, namely the 
lack of a paternal figure and the attitude of the applicant’s partner. Consequently, the illegitima-
cy of one of the grounds (lack of a paternal referent) had contaminated the entire decision. Ac-
cordingly, that there had been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction 
with Article 8.  
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Fairfield and Others v the UK 
App. no. 24790/04 
08.03.2008 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicants were the daughter and the executors of the estate of the late Harry Hammond 
and she complained about his arrest for breach of the peace and his conviction for having been 
preaching in a public place with a sign including the words “Stop Homosexuality”. Mr Ham-
mond had refused to take down the sign and leave the area after an angry crowd had gathered 
and a disturbance had occurred. On his death in 2002, during the Administrative Court pro-
ceedings, his daughter and executors had obtained permission to pursue his case. Before the 
Court the applicants complained under Articles 9 and 10 that the arrest and conviction of Mr 
Hammond had infringed his freedom of religion and freedom of expression. He had been pre-
vented from teaching his religion by preaching and had been penalized for the content of his 
message and for expressing his opinion, although he had not used offensive or degrading lan-
guage, or incited the use of violence.  
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision: 
The Court noted that an individual applicant should claim to have been actually affected by the 
violation he alleges; under the ECHR actio popularis were not permitted and individuals were 
not entitled to complain about a law simply because they felt that it contravened the Conven-
tion. 
The existence of a victim, that is to say, an individual who is personally affected by the im-
pugned legislation, was indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention 
into motion, although this criterion was not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible 
way throughout the proceedings. A case might be continued after the death of an applicant, and 
even in the absence of heirs wishing to continue, where the issues transcended the interests of 
the applicant and raised an important question of public interest relevant to human rights 
standards in Contracting States, that applicant had also died after the introduction of the appli-
cation before the Convention organs. In the present case none of these circumstances occurred 
and the Court declared the complaint as incompatible ratione personae. 
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Courten v the UK 
App. no. 4479/06 
05.11.2008 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant and his long-term partner, Mr Stanley, had been living together for 25 years 
when, in 2003, Mr. Stanley suddenly died. On 21 April 2005 the applicant wrote a letter to the 
Inland Revenue asking for an extra-statutory tax concession equivalent to the exemption from 
inheritance tax which a spouse would have received. The Inland Revenue informed the appli-
cant that the exemption was not available on the ground that also heterosexual unmarried cou-
pled were not entitled to such exemption. The applicant however appealed because unlike het-
erosexual cohabitees, he had been unable to marry and had been denied access to any right to 
exemption. The applicant was informed that his appeal to the House of Lords bore no reason-
able prospect of success under the Human Rights Act 1998. Before the ECtHR the applicant 
complained that as a survivor of a same-sex couple who had been unable to marry, he had been 
illegitimately denied the tax exemption from inheritance tax available to married couples. The 
applicant invoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1, Protocol 1: the Court recalled that under Article 14 not 
every difference in treatment amounts to discrimination contrary to this provision. In order to 
find a breach, it had to be established that other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar 
situation enjoyed of preferential treatment, and that there was no reasonable or objective justifi-
cation for this distinction. The Court remarked that, notwithstanding social changes, marriage 
remained an institution that was widely accepted as conferring a particular status on those who 
enter it. The applicant had pointed out that he was unable at the relevant time, through no 
choice of his own, to enter into a legally-binding arrangement akin to marriage, since the facts of 
his case predated the entry into force of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. However, in the area of 
evolving social rights, UK Government could not be criticized for not having introduced the 
2004 legislation at an earlier date and for not having enabled the applicant to obtain the benefit 
of inheritance tax exemptions. For these reasons, the Court declared the application inadmissi-
ble. 
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Small v the UK 
App. no.7330/06  
02.06.2009 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant, a UK homosexual citizen, lodged his application when he was aged 16. He had 
his first homosexual encounter when he was sixteen with another person of his own age: they 
were both worried about the relevant law of Jersey at the material time, which decriminalized 
homosexual acts in private only if the consenting parties were at least eighteen years of age. He 
further alleged that the Jersey police investigated his private life and attempted to prosecute his 
partner under this law. He invoked Article 8, alone and in conjunction with Article 14, against 
the differentiated age of consent. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Striking out. 
 
Court’s decision: 
On 20 March 2009 the Government informed the Court that it was prepared to pay the sum of 
5830 Euros in full and final settlement of the applicant’s claim. In 2007 the Sexual Offences 
Jersey Law also reduced the age of consent for sexual activities from 18 to 16 years, thereby 
equalizing the age of consent between homosexual men with the age of consent between men 
and women. The applicant accepted the proposal and waived any further claims against the 
UK. The Court took note of the friendly settlement reached between the parties, and it consid-
ered appropriate to strike the case out. 
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M.W. v the UK 
App. no. 11313/02 
23.06.2009 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had been living with his same-sex partner, Mr. M., for twenty-three years until the 
latter’s death on 10 April 2001. The applicant stated that he and his partner were financially in-
terdependent, pooled their income and that each had designated the other as his heir. Around 
two weeks after M’s death, the applicant asked a social worker whether he could claim Be-
reavement Payment. He was advised that the benefit was only payable to the survivor of a mar-
ried couple, and so he did not formally claim it. The applicant complained of his ineligibility for 
bereavement benefits to his Member of Parliament. The applicant also wrote to the Prime Min-
ister, who forwarded his letter to the Department of Work and Pensions, which replied that 
marriage was a cornerstone of the contributory benefits system and that all rights to contributory 
benefits were based on the concept of legal marriage. The applicant complained under Article 
14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that, 
as a survivor of a same-sex couple who had had no means to achieve formal recognition of their 
relationship, he had been denied a benefit available to those who had been able to marry. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 and Article 1, Protocol 1: the Court recalled that in or-
der for an issue to arise under Article 14 there had be a difference in the treatment of persons 
in relevantly similar situations. The applicant’s complaint that it was impossible during his part-
ner’s lifetime to gain formal recognition of their commitment to one another was, in effect, a 
criticism of the length of time it took the United Kingdom to enact the necessary legislation. 
However the Government could not be criticized for not having introduced the Civil Partner-
ship Act at an earlier date that would have entitled the applicant to claim Bereavement Pay-
ment. Nor could the enactment of the Civil Partnership Act be taken as an admission by the 
domestic authorities that the non-recognition of same-sex couples, and their consequent exclu-
sion from many rights and benefits available to married couples, was incompatible with the 
Convention. Instead, the United Kingdom authorities remained within their margin of apprecia-
tion. In light of the above, the Court concluded that the applicant was not entitled to claim that, 
at the material time, he had been in an analogous situation to a bereaved spouse. His complaint 
therefore was rejected as manifestly ill-founded. 
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Porubova v Russia 
App. no. 8237/03 
02.03.2010[Chamber]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper D.S.P. and she published an article in 
2001 which accused V. and K., two local officials in the Sverdlovsk Region, of misappropriation 
of public funds. It also alleged that the two officials were having a homosexual affair. The offi-
cials concerned subsequently brought criminal proceedings against the applicant for criminal 
libel and insult. Ultimately, domestic Courts, leaving the alleged embezzlement outside the 
scope of the charges, found that the articles in question had damaged V.’s and K.’s reputation 
as politicians and public servants. Following a trial conducted in private to protect V. and K. 
from further publicity about their private lives, the applicant was found guilty, charged and sen-
tenced to one-and-a-half year’s correctional work, from which she was subsequently dispensed 
on the account of an amnesty in favor of women and minors. Before the ECtHR the applicant 
complained that the proceedings against her had infringed her right to freedom of expression, 
and also that her right to a fair trial had not been respected. She invoked Article 6 and Article 
10 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Penalties imposed on journalists for suggesting the homosexuality of public officials, in connec-
tion with public resources unjustified: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 10: the Court found that the articles in question, concerning the allocation and the man-
agement of public resources, had dealt with issues which merited legitimate public concern and 
on which the applicants, as journalists, had the right to report. Despite the charges retained 
against the applicant had been in relation to V. and K.’s alleged homosexual relationship, the 
Court considered that the main thrust of the applicant’s articles had been the dubious transac-
tions with taxpayers’ money and not V. and K.’s private life. Their alleged homosexual relation-
ship had served to explain why the scheme had been mounted in such a way that K. would be 
its ultimate beneficiary. Moreover, the subjects of the applicants’ scrutiny had been, in the first 
case, professional politicians, and in the second case, a State body and civil servants acting in 
their official capacity, who had to accept that the limits of acceptable criticism were wider for 
them than for private individuals. Given the severity of the sanctions against the applicant, the 
Court found that the Russian Courts had not adduced relevant and sufficient reasons to justify 
the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression. The interference had not therefore 
been “necessary in a democratic society” and it amounted to violation. 
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Article 6: the Court considered the decision to hold the trial in private as not arbitrary or unrea-
sonable and, therefore, it held that there had been no violation. 
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Kozak v Poland 
App. no. 13102/02 
02.03.2010 [Chamber]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant had lived together with his partner in a homosexual relationship, for several 
years. They shared a municipality flat rented by the applicant’s partner. After his partner’s 
death, in April 1998, the applicant applied to the municipality to succeed to the tenancy of the 
flat. The municipal buildings department denied the request and ordered the applicant to move 
out. The applicant brought proceedings against the municipality, seeking to have his succession 
to the tenancy acknowledged. Relying on the Housing Act in force at the time, he brought for-
ward that he had a right to succession, as he had run a common household with his partner for 
many years and had thus lived with him in de facto marital cohabitation. The claim was dis-
missed by the district Court, holding in particular that Polish law recognized de facto marital re-
lationships only between partners of different sex. Also the Constitutional Court dismissed the 
applicant’s claims. Before the ECtHR he complained that Polish Courts had discriminated 
against him on the ground of his homosexual orientation, and he claimed the right to succeed 
to his partner’s tenancy. He invoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
succession to tenancy of a flat denied to homosexual after his partner’s death: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: the Court agreed with Polish Government that some of 
the applicant’s statements concerning the nature and duration of his relationship with his part-
ner and his residence in the latter’s flat might had been considered as inconsistent. However, 
the Court observed that in establishing whether the applicant fulfilled the conditions set in the 
Housing Act, the domestic Courts had focused on the homosexual nature of the relationship 
with his partner; moreover, Polish Courts had rejected his claim on the grounds that only a rela-
tionship between a woman and a man could qualify for de facto marital cohabitation. The 
Court accepted that the protection of the family founded on the union of a man and a woman 
was in principle a legitimate reason which might justify a difference in treatment. However, 
when striking the balance between the protection of the family and the rights of sexual minori-
ties, States had to take into consideration the developments in social attitudes. The Court could 
not accept that a blanket exclusion of persons living in a homosexual relationship from succes-
sion to a tenancy was necessary for the protection of the family. It therefore concluded that 
there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.  
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Schalk and Kopf v Austria 
App. no. 30141/04 
24.06.2010 [Section I]  
 
I. Facts 
 
In 2002 the applicants, a same-sex couple, was denied the permission to get married: under 
Austrian law a marriage could only be concluded between persons of opposite sex. Following 
their subsequent constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court held that Austrian Constitu-
tion did not require that the concept of marriage, which was geared to the possibility of 
parenthood, should be extended to same-sex relationships. In 2010 the Registered Partnership 
Act entered into force in Austria, aiming to provide same-sex couples with a formal mechanism 
for recognizing and giving legal effect to their relationships. While the Act provided registered 
partners with many of the same rights and obligations as spouses, some differences remained; in 
particular registered partners were unable to adopt or undergo artificial insemination. Before 
the ECtHR the applicants claimed the right to marry; they further held that before the entry in 
force of the Registered Partnership Act they had been illegitimately denied any possibility to 
have their relationship recognized, on the ground of their sexual orientation. They invoked Ar-
ticle 12, and Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Inability of same-sex couples to marry: no violation.  
Lack of legal recognition of same-sex partnership: no violation. 
Differentiated treatment between marriage and civil partnerships: no violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 12: the Court accepted that the relationship of the applicants fell within the notion of 
“family life”, just as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation did. However 
the Court held that the applicants were not entitled to claim the right to marry under Article 12. 
In the light of recent developments in domestic and European law, the Court argued that it 
could not be concluded that Article 12 did not apply to the applicants’ complaint. At the same 
time, given the lack of consensus and the relevance attached to the traditional model of family, 
the Court left the decision whether or not to allow same-sex marriages to national law’s discre-
tion.  
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: the Court was also unable to share the applicants’ view 
that the obligation to grant same-sex marriage could be alternatively derived from Article 14 
taken in conjunction with Article 8. Austrian legislature could not be even reproached for not 
having introduced the Registered Partnership Act any earlier stage; the fact that there existed 
some substantial differences compared to marriage in respect of parental rights mirrored the 
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trend in other member States adopting similar legislation, and did not violate the applicants’ 
rights. 
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J.M. v the UK 
App. no. 37060/06 
28.09.2010 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was the divorced mother of two children living mainly with their father. Since 
1998 she had been living with another woman in a long-term relationship. As the non-resident 
parent, she was required by child-support regulations to contribute financially to the cost of her 
children’s upbringing. Her child-maintenance obligation was assessed without referring to the 
regulations which provided for a reduced amount where the absent parent had entered into a 
new relationship but took no account of same-sex relationships. The applicant complained that 
the difference was appreciable – she was required to pay approximately 47 sterling pounds per 
week, whereas if she had formed a new relationship with a man the amount due would have 
been around 14 sterling pounds. Her complaint was upheld by three levels of jurisdiction, but 
the case was overturned by a majority ruling in the House of Lords in 2006. Before the ECtHR 
the applicant complained a discrimination because of her sexual orientation on the right to en-
joy of her resources. She also complained a discrimination in her right to respect for private life. 
She invoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1, Protocol 1, and in conjunction with Arti-
cle 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Difference in treatment on grounds of sexual orientation in relation to child-support regula-
tions: violation.  
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1, Protocol 1: the Court held that the case came within 
the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol 1, and that it attracted the protection of Article 14 even in the 
absence of any deprivation of, or other interference with, the existing possessions of the appli-
cant. The statutory obligation on an absent parent to pay money to the parent with custody 
could be regarded as an interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
The Court did not find it necessary to go on to decide whether the facts of the case also fell 
within the ambit of Article 8. The only relevant point of difference between the applicant’s situ-
ation and the comparable situation of an absent parent who formed a new relationship with a 
person of the opposite sex was the applicant’s sexual orientation. Bearing in mind the purpose 
of the regulations, which was to avoid placing an excessive financial burden on the absent parent 
in their new circumstances, the Court could see no reason for treating the applicant differently. 
Therefore, the Court found a violation.  
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D.B.N. v the UK 
App. no. 26550/10 
31.05.2011 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was Zimbabwean, she had arrived in the United Kingdom in 2009 and had made 
an asylum application on the basis of her homosexuality. She claimed that in 1996 her and her 
partner had been gang raped by a group; both her and her partner had become pregnant, as a 
result of which her partner had committed suicide. The applicant had tried to take her own life 
shortly afterwards, and she had been harassed by her family and community over a number of 
years. The applicant’s asylum claim was refused by the Secretary of State; it was accepted, inter 
alia, that the applicant was a lesbian and that the incidents in 1996, 2005 and 2008 had effective-
ly occurred. Nevertheless, it was not accepted that the applicant was entitled to international 
protection because her problems had been caused by her family and other private actors, not by 
public authorities. The Immigration Judge considered that any discrimination experienced by 
the applicant in Zimbabwe had been limited because she had been able to work without diffi-
culty and the amount of incidents which had occurred were linked to her family’s disapproval 
of her sexuality. Before the ECtHR the applicant complained under Articles 2 and 3 that she 
faced the risk of being killed or ill-treated if returned to Zimbabwe. Further, she complained 
under Article 8 of the that her removal to Zimbabwe would destroy her right to private life. She 
also complained under Article 13 and Article 14 in respect of how UK authorities had dealt 
with her procedure.  
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision:  
On 8 April 2011 the Government informed the Court that they were having difficulty in estab-
lishing the applicant’s whereabouts and that there was no evidence that she was still in the Unit-
ed Kingdom. They explained that she had left the UK voluntarily in June 2010 travelling as a 
South African national and had later been identified in Lille, Dublin and Madrid. Given that 
the questions posed by the Court in the application related to risks associated with the appli-
cant’s removal to Zimbabwe from the United Kingdom and that the Government understood 
that she had left the United Kingdom voluntarily, the Government considered that the Court’s 
questions were no longer relevant. The Government therefore requested that the Court verify 
with the applicant where she was, whether she accepted that she had South African nationality 
and whether she continued to pursue her claim before the Court. In the absence of any re-
sponse, the Government invited the Court to strike the application out its list of cases. The ap-
plicant’s representative informed the Court that they were not in continuous contact with the 
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applicant and had been unable to take instructions on the issues raised by the Government. In 
the light of the above the Court struck the case out. 
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Stasi v the UK 
App. no. 25001/07 
20.10.2011 [Section V]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was charged with fraud in two occasions and he was sentenced to two and three 
years’ imprisonment, including a suspended term of eighteen months. He served the second 
sentence immediately following the first, remaining in Villefranche-sur-Saône Prison. On his ar-
rival in Villefranche-sur-Saône Prison for the second time, on 27 July 2006, Mr. Stasi reported 
that he had been the victim of acts of rape during his previous period of detention. He was thus 
placed alone in a cell on a corridor of the prison reserved for vulnerable prisoners. He re-
mained alone in the cell except for the period 26 February 2007 to 18 March 2007, when he 
had to share with another prisoner, who ill-treated the applicant, as confirmed by a medical cer-
tificate. During his imprisonment the applicant was victim of other violent acts, such as bruising, 
he was beaten, and also stubbed with cigarettes. On the day of his release he was admitted to 
the psychiatric hospital of Saint-Cyr au Mont d’Or, when he remained until 14 January 2009. 
Before the ECtHR the applicant complained he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatments contrary to Article 3 during his detention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Positive obligations in respect of homosexual detainees: no violation. 
 
Court’s decision:  
Article 3: the Court noted that the applicant had produced a number of medical certificates 
concerning the various incidents complained of. It thus found it established that while in prison 
he had been subjected to acts of violence and that were serious enough for the facts in question 
to be classified as inhuman and degrading treatment. The Court observed that on his arrival at 
Villefranche-sur-Saône Prison the applicant had mentioned his homosexuality and reported the 
acts of violence against him during his first period of imprisonment. To the Court, French Pris-
on’s Administration had positively complied with their positive obligations, by placing the appli-
cant in a corridor reserved for vulnerable inmates by allowing him to take a shower alone at a 
different time to other inmates and by accompanying systematically when he moved around. 
The Court found that, in the circumstances of the case, and taking into account the facts that 
had been brought to their attention, the authorities had taken all the measures that could rea-
sonably be expected of them to protect the applicant from physical harm. The Court held that, 
having regard to the facts of the case, there had been no violation of Article 3 of the Conven-
tion, and found no need to examine separately the applicant’s other complaint.
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Alekseyev v Russia 
App. no 4916/07 
21.10.2010 [Section I]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was one of the organizers of a series of marches planned to be held in Moscow in 
2006, 2007 and 2008 to draw public attention to discrimination against the gay and lesbians. 
The organizers informed the mayor’s office and undertook to cooperate with the law-
enforcement authorities in ensuring safety and respect for public order and to comply with 
noise restrictions. Their requests were, however, turned down on public-order grounds after pe-
titions from people opposed to the marches were received. In the authorities’ view, there was a 
risk of a violent reaction degenerating into disorder and mass riots. The mayor and his staff 
were also quoted in the media as saying that no gay parade would be allowed in Moscow under 
any circumstances. The applicant mounted an unsuccessful challenge in the domestic Courts. 
Before the ECtHR the applicant complained a violation of his freedom of manifestation, and 
he further held that he had not had at his disposal any procedure which would allowed him to 
obtain a final decision prior to the date of the planned demonstrations. The applicant invoked 
Article 11, alone and in conjunction with Article 13, and Article 14 in conjunction with Article 
11. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Repeated refusals to authorize gay-pride parades: violation.  
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 11: the Court refused all the arguments put forward by Russian Government. Firstly, the 
risk of a demonstration creating a disturbance was not sufficient, for the society would be de-
prived from hearing differing views on questions which were relevant even though offended the 
sensitivity of traditional public opinion. Secondly, in the event of a counter-demonstration, the 
authorities could have made arrangements to ensure that both events proceeded peacefully and 
lawfully. Thirdly, the Court considered the Mayor’s expression and the Government submis-
sion against “gay propaganda” as incompatible with the ECHR. Consequently, the decisions to 
ban the events in question had not been based on an acceptable assessment of the relevant 
facts, nor did they meet a pressing social need or were necessary in a democratic society. In the 
absence of a legally binding rule requiring the authorities to issue a final decision before the 
dates on which the marches were planned, the judicial remedy afforded to the applicant had 
been of a post hoc nature and had not guaranteed adequate redress. Lastly, the main reason for 
the bans was the authorities’ disapproval of demonstrations which they considered to promote 
homosexuality. The applicant had thus suffered a discrimination on the ground of his and other 
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participants’ sexual orientation. The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 11, 
alone and in conjunction with Article 13, and of Article 14, in conjunction with Article 11.
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Zontul v Greece 
App. no. 12294/07 
17.01.2012 [Section I]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was a Turkish national. In 2001 while trying to illegally reach Italy, he and other 
migrants were intercepted by the Greek coastguard and escorted to a port on the isle of Crete. 
The applicant reported that two coastguard officers had forced him to undress while he was in 
the bathroom and that one of them, D., had raped him. The commanding officer, who had not 
been present during the incident, ordered an inquiry, but in June 2006 the Naval Appeals Tri-
bunal sentenced D. to a suspended term of six months’ imprisonment, which was commuted to 
a fine of EUR 792. Before the ECtHR the applicant denounced Greek authorities both for tor-
ture and inhuman treatment, and for the inadequacy of the redress afforded. He invoked Arti-
cle 3 and Article 6 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Rape of illegal immigrant by coastguard responsible for supervising him: violation.  
Inadequacy of redress afforded by State to detainee victim of torture: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 3: the rape of a detainee by an official of the State has to be considered as an especially 
grave form of ill-treatment; owing to its cruelty and its intentional nature, the treatment to which 
the applicant had been subjected amounted also to an act of torture.  
Article 6: the Court had doubts as to whether a thorough and effective investigation had been 
carried out in the context of the disciplinary proceedings brought against the coastguard officers. 
The penalty imposed on D. resulted manifestly disproportionate in the view of the seriousness 
of the treatment inflicted on the applicant. In view of that finding and of the fact that the appli-
cant had been subjected to an act of torture, Greek criminal-law system, as applied in the pre-
sent case, did not reach the desired deterrent effect such as to prevent the commission of the 
offence complained of by the applicant, nor did it provide adequate redress. Consequently, the 
Court found a violation. 
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Vejedland and Others v Sweden 
App. no. 1813/07 
09.02.2012 [Section V]  
 
I. Facts 
 
In 2004 the applicants went to an upper secondary school and distributed a hundred leaflets, by 
leaving them in or on the pupils’ lockers. The statements in the leaflets were, in particular, alle-
gations that homosexuality was a “deviant sexual proclivity”, had “a morally destructive effect on 
the substance of society” and was responsible for the development of HIV and AIDS. The Dis-
trict Court convicted the applicants of agitation against a national or ethnic group. The charges 
against the applicants were rejected on appeal, on the ground that a conviction would amount to 
a violation of their right to freedom of expression. The Supreme Court, however, convicted the 
applicants of agitation against a national or ethnic group. The majority of judges found in par-
ticular that the pupils had not had the possibility to refuse the leaflets and that the purpose of 
supplying the pupils with arguments for a debate could have been achieved without offensive 
statements to homosexuals as a group.  
Before the ECtHR the applicants alleged that the Supreme Court had violated their freedom of 
expression and they further submitted that they had been punished without law. They invoked 
Article 7 and Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Criminal conviction for distributing leaflets offensive to homosexuals: no violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 10: the applicants were convicted of agitation against a national or ethnic group in ac-
cordance with the Swedish Penal Code. The Court, therefore, considered that the interference 
with their freedom of expression had been sufficiently foreseeable and thus “prescribed by law” 
within the meaning of the Convention. The interference had served a legitimate aim, namely 
“the protection of the reputation and rights of others”. The Court agreed with the Supreme 
Court that, even if the applicants’ aim to start a debate about the lack of objectivity of education 
in Swedish schools might be regarded as legitimate, regard had to be paid to the wording of the 
leaflets. The Court further emphasized that the applicants had imposed the leaflets on the pu-
pils by leaving them on or in their lockers; in addition, the distribution of the leaflets had taken 
place at a school which none of the applicants attended and to which they did not have free ac-
cess. The Court therefore considered that the interference with the applicants’ exercise of their 
right to freedom of expression had not exceeded the discretion left to national authorities.
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A.S.B. v the Netherlands 
App. no. 4854/12 
10.07.2012 [Section III]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was Jamaican and lived in the Netherlands, where he applied for asylum. He 
feared persecution and treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in his country of 
origin on account of his homosexual orientation. The final negative decision on his asylum re-
quest was given on 11 January 2012 by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council 
of State. The applicant complained that if expelled to Jamaica he would face a real and personal 
risk of treatment in violation of Article 3 due to his homosexuality.  
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Striking out.  
 
Court’s decision: 
On 25 January 2012, the President of the Chamber indicated to the Government that it was in 
the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant should 
not be expelled to Jamaica while pending the proceedings before the Court. On 20 April 2012, 
the Government informed the Court that on 19 April 2012 the applicant had been granted an 
asylum-based residence permit. This information was transmitted on 24 April 2012 to the ap-
plicant who did not call the Court to continue the examination. Accordingly, the Court struck 
the case out of its list. 
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Eweida and Others v the UK 
App. no. 48420/10, 598442/10, 36516/10 
15.01.2013 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
All four applicants were practicing Christians who complained that domestic law had failed ad-
equately to protect their right to manifest their religious beliefs. The first and the second appli-
cant complained on issues not related to sexual orientation. The third applicant, Ms. Ladele, a 
Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages and the fourth applicant, Mr. McFarlane, a counsel-
lor in a relationship counselling service, complained that they had been dismissed for refusing 
to carry out certain of their duties which they considered would condone homosexuality, a prac-
tice they felt was incompatible with their religious beliefs. The invoked Article 9, alone and in 
conjunction with Article 14. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Disciplinary measures against employees for refusing to perform duties they considered incom-
patible with their religious beliefs: no violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 9 and Article 14: the Court acknowledged the importance in a democratic society of 
freedom of religion, and it considered that the better approach to the present case would be to 
consider whether the restriction was proportionate. In considering the proportionality of the 
measures, it was notable that the consequences for the third applicant were serious: she pre-
ferred to face disciplinary action rather than be designated a civil-partnership registrar and, ul-
timately, she lost her job. When she had entered into her contract of employment she couldn’t 
specifically waive her right to manifest her religious belief by objecting to participating in the 
creation of civil partnerships, since this requirement had been introduced by her employer at a 
later date. However, the local authority’s policy aimed to secure the rights of others and the 
Court allowed the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation on the issue. In all the cir-
cumstances, the Court did not consider that either the local-authority employer, which had 
brought the disciplinary proceedings, or the domestic Courts, which had rejected the third ap-
plicant’s discrimination claim, had exceeded the margin of appreciation available to them. 
While employed by a private company with a policy of requiring employees to provide services 
equally to heterosexual and homosexual couples, the fourth applicant had refused to commit 
himself to providing psycho-sexual counseling to same-sex couples, facing consequent discipli-
nary sanctions. He had voluntarily enrolled on his employer’s post-graduate training program in 
psycho-sexual counselling; the Court did not consider that that margin had been exceeded. 
There had therefore been no violation of Article 9 alone or in conjunction with Article 14.  
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X. v Turkey 
App. no 24626/09 
09.10.2012. [Section II]  
 
I. Facts 
 
In 2008 the applicant was sentenced to prison for almost ten years for various offences. He was 
initially placed in a shared cell with heterosexual prisoners, but he asked the prison administra-
tion to transfer him, for his own safety, to a shared cell with homosexual inmates. He was im-
mediately placed in an individual cell, small and rat-infested, being also deprived of any contact 
and of any social activity. After a number of unsuccessful requests to the public prosecutor’s of-
fice and to the post-sentencing judge, the applicant was ultimately transferred to a psychiatric 
hospital where he was diagnosed with depression and remained for about a month. Another 
homosexual inmate was placed in the same cell as the applicant for about three months; during 
that period they filed a complaint against a warder for homophobic conduct, insults, and blows. 
The applicant was subsequently deprived again of any contact with other inmates and he with-
drew his complaint. This situation ended in February 2010 when the applicant was transferred 
to another prison and placed with three other inmates in a standard cell, where he enjoyed the 
rights usually granted to convicted prisoners. He invoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 
3 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Holding of homosexual prisoner in total isolation for more than eight months to protect him 
from fellow prisoners: violation.  
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3: the Court emphasized that Prison Administrations im-
posed on the applicant harsher conditions of life than other detainees, on the solely basis of his 
sexual orientation, allegedly to protect him from bodily harm. He had requested to be treated 
on an equal footing with the other inmates, so to benefit from the possibility of outdoor exercise 
and social activities with others whilst being protected from physical harm, but as a result he had 
been treated harsher than prisoners condemned to a life-sentence. In the Court’s view, the pris-
on authorities had not performed a sufficient assessment of the risk for the applicant’s safety. 
The applicant’s total exclusion from prison life could not be regarded as justified. Thus the 
Court was not convinced that Prison Administrations acted for the applicant’s physical well-
being, ascribing their behavior to a prejudiced attitude against the applicant’s homosexuality. As 
a result it was established that he had sustained discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.
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X and Others v Austria 
App. no. 19010/07 
19.02.2013 [Grand Chamber]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The first and third applicant are two women living in a stable homosexual relationship. The se-
cond applicant is the third applicant’s minor son; he was born out of wedlock, his father had 
acknowledged paternity but the third applicant had sole custody. The first applicant wished to 
adopt the second applicant, in order to create a legal relationship between them without sever-
ing the boy’s relationship with his mother and an adoption agreement was concluded between 
the two women to that end, while the father strongly disagreed. However, domestic Courts re-
fused to approve the agreement since under domestic law adoption by one person had the ef-
fect of severing the family-law relationship with the biological parent of the same sex: the boy’s 
adoption by the first applicant could not but severe his relationship with his mother, the third 
applicant, while it could not affect his father’s parental role. Before the ECtHR the applicants 
invoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Impossibility of second-parent adoption in same-sex couple: violation.  
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: the Court accepted that the applicants were in a rele-
vantly similar situation to an unmarried different-sex couple in which one partner wished to 
adopt the other partner’s child. The Court was not convinced by the Government’s argument 
that the applicants’ adoption request had been refused on grounds unrelated to their sexual ori-
entation. The domestic Courts had not dealt with the question whether there were any reasons 
for overriding the refusal of the child’s father to consent to the adoption; in contrast, in the case 
of an unmarried different-sex couple they would have been required to examine that issue. The 
Government had failed to give convincing reasons to show that excluding second-parent adop-
tion in a same-sex couple, while allowing that possibility in unmarried different-sex couples, was 
necessary for the protection of the family in the traditional sense or for the protection of the 
child’s interest. The distinction resulted therefore discriminatory.  
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Boeckel and Gessner v Germany 
App. no.8017/11  
07.05.2013 [Section V]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicants were two women who had been living together in a registered civil partnership 
since 2001. In 2008 the second applicant gave birth to a son, and she was recognized in the 
birth certificate as the mother, while the space provided in the form for the father’s name was 
left blank. In 2009 the applicants concluded an agreement whereby the child would be adopted 
by the first applicant. The district Court granted the adoption order and declared that the child 
obtained the legal position of the child of both applicants. In the meantime the applicants re-
quested the district Court to rectify the child’s birth certificate by inserting the first applicant as 
the second parent, submitting that the Civil Code, which stipulated that the father was the man 
who was married to the mother of the child at the time of birth, should be applied mutatis mu-
tandis in cases where the mother lived in a registered civil partnership with another woman. 
They also claimed that there was no reason to treat children born into a civil partnership any 
differently from children born in wedlock. The domestic Courts rejected their request and sub-
sequent appeals. Before the ECtHR they invoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision: 
The Court based its examination on the assumption that the applicants were able to claim to be 
victims of a violation of their Convention rights in the view of the fact that the first applicant had 
to undergo the adoption process in order to be recognized as the second parent. The applicants 
lived together in a registered civil partnership and were raising the child together. It followed 
that the relationship between the two applicants and the child amounted to “family life” within 
the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. Accordingly, Article 14 of the Convention in con-
junction with Article 8 was applicable. The Court took note of the domestic Courts’ reasoning 
according to which section 1592 § 1 of the Civil Code contained the presumption that the man 
who was married to the child’s mother at the time of birth was the child’s biological father. The 
Court also noted that it was not confronted with a case concerning transgender or surrogate 
parenthood: in cases where one partner of a same-sex partnership gave birth to a child, it could 
be ruled out on biological grounds that the child descended from the other partner. The Court 
accepted that, under these circumstances, there was no factual foundation for a legal presump-
tion that the child descended from the second partner. Consequently, there was no appearance 
of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 8 and the com-
plaint was dismissed as ill-founded. 
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Vallianatos and Others v Greece 
App. no. 29381/09, 32684/09 
07.11.2013 [Great Chamber]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The first application was lodged by two Greek nationals, and the second by six Greek nationals 
and an association whose aims included providing psychological and moral support to gays and 
lesbians. On 26 November 2008 Law no. 3719/2008, entitled “Reforms concerning the family, 
children and society”, had entered into force. It had introduced an official form of partnership 
for unmarried couples called “civil union” which was restricted to different-sex couples, thereby 
excluding same-sex couples from its scope. Before the ECtHR the applicants alleged that the 
fact that the civil unions were designed only for couples composed of different-sex adults in-
fringed their right to respect for their private and family life and amounted to unjustified dis-
crimination between different-sex and same-sex couples, to the detriment of the latter. They in-
voked Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Exclusion of same-sex couples from civil unions: violation.  
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: the Greek Government contended that same-sex cou-
ples were already enabled to provide a legal framework under ordinary law to their patrimonial 
interests. Also, the enacted legislation sought to achieve several objectives, including the 
strengthening of the legal status of children born outside marriage. The Court considered it le-
gitimate for the legislature to enact legislation to regulate the situation of children born outside 
marriage, and also evaluated the protection of the family in the traditional sense as a weighty 
and legitimate reason which might justify a difference in treatment. It remained to be ascer-
tained whether the principle of proportionality had been respected in the present case. Greek 
legislation had introduced a form of civil partnership which excluded same-sex couples while 
allowing different-sex couples, whether or not they had children, to regulate numerous aspects 
of their relationship. Lastly, under Greek law, different-sex couples could have their relation-
ship legally recognized even before the enactment of Law no 3719/2008, whether fully on the 
basis of the institution of marriage or in a more limited form under the provisions of the Civil 
Code dealing with de facto partnerships. Consequently, same-sex couples were recognized as 
bearing a particular interest in entering into a civil union, since it amounted to the sole basis in 
Greek law on which to have their relationship legally recognized. The Court dismissed Greek 
Government’s arguments as not weighty to justify the differentiated treatment and found a 
breach of the ECHR.  
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M.E. v Sweden 
App. no. 71398/12 
26.06.2014 [Section V]  
08.04.2015 [Grand Chamber] 
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant, a Libyan national who had been living in Sweden since 2010, applied for asylum 
initially on the grounds that he feared persecution because of his involvement in the illegal 
transportation of weapons. Some months later he raised an additional ground for asylum stating 
that he was homosexual and had married a man in Sweden. The Migration Board rejected his 
request because he had given contradictory statements and his story lacked credibility. The 
Board considered that the applicant would find no obstacle to his returning to Libya and to ap-
ply form there for a residence permit in Sweden on account of his family ties and marriage. Be-
fore the ECtHR the applicant complained that, if he were forced to return to Libya to apply for 
family reunion from there, he would face a real risk of being persecuted and ill-treated primarily 
because of his homosexuality, but also due to previous problems with the authorities. He relied 
on Article 3 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Homosexual required to return to Libya in order to apply for family reunion: no violation.  
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 3: in the Court’s view, the applicant had failed to give a coherent and credible account 
on which to base the examination of his claims. Even though there was little information about 
the situation of homosexuals in Libya, there appeared to be no public record of anyone actually 
having been prosecuted or convicted for homosexual acts since the end of the Gadhafi regime 
in 2011.  
Even though he would need to be discreet about his private life during the waiting period in 
Lybia, that would not require him to conceal or suppress an important part of his identity per-
manently or for a longer period of time. While it was true that he would have to travel to Egypt, 
Tunisia or Algeria for interview, since there was no Swedish Embassy in Libya, the Court de-
nied that the applicant was at risk of ill-treatment in those countries. In sum, the Court found 
no substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would be subjected to ill-treatment on the 
account of his sexual orientation if he returned to Libya in order to apply for family reunion 
from there.  
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M.K.N. v Sweden 
App. no. 72413/10  
26.06.2014 [Section V]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was Iraqi and applied in Sweden for asylum. He was Christian and his wife and 
children lived in Syria. He claimed that he had been persecuted and kidnapped due to his 
Christian beliefs and the fact that he was well-off. The rest of the family had left for Syria, where 
they remained in difficult circumstances. The Migration Board rejected the application, and it 
pointed out that the applicant had stayed in Mosul for almost a year after the kidnapping with-
out facing further threats. In sum, there was no individual threat against the applicant. The ap-
plicant appealed and claimed that, after his departure from Iraq, the Mujahedin had found out 
that he had had a homosexual relationship and that his partner had been stoned to death. He 
had not revealed this information earlier as he had not been aware that homosexual relation-
ships were accepted in Sweden. In reply, the Migration Board submitted that as a Christian, the 
applicant had a need of protection in regard to Mosul, but he was not facing any risks in the 
Kurdistan Region, which constituted a reasonable relocation alternative. As to the new personal 
information given by the applicant, the Board noted that it had not been submitted in the be-
ginning of the proceedings. Noting that there was no substantiation for the claim, the Board 
found that the story lacked credibility and refused the applicant’s appeal. Before the ECtHR the 
applicant complained that his return to Iraq would involve a violation of Article 3 of the Con-
vention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Implementation of the deportation order: no violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 3: the Court concluded that, as a Christian, the applicant faced the risk of ill-treatments 
in the southern and central parts of Iraq, but he may reasonably relocate to the Kurdistan Re-
gion. On the applicant’s alleged homosexuality, the Court acknowledged the difficult situation 
for real or perceived homosexuals in Iraq, but it noted that the applicant has expressed the in-
tention of living with his wife and children. In particular, the Court justified the Migration 
Board’s negative decision on the ground of the inconsistencies in the applicant’s submissions. 
Having regard to all the circumstances, the Court considered that the applicant’s claim concern-
ing the homosexual relationship was not credible and it did not find a violation of Article 3.
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Identoba and Others v Georgia 
App. no. 73235/12 
12.05.2015 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicants were a non-governmental organization set up to promote and protect the rights 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people in Georgia, and 14 individuals. On 17 May 
2012 a peaceful demonstration took place in Tbilisi and was attended by approximately 30 
people, including 13 of the individual applicants. During the event, the participants in the 
march were insulted, threatened and assaulted by a larger group of counter-demonstrators who 
were members of two religious groups. The police eventually arrested four of the applicants and 
briefly detained and/or drove them around in a police car, with the alleged aim of protecting 
them from the counter-demonstrators. The applicants filed several criminal complaints, re-
questing that criminal investigations be launched into the attacks against them and into the acts 
and omissions of the police officers, who had failed to protect them from the assaults. Two in-
vestigations into the injuries sustained by two of the applicants were opened in 2012 and re-
mained pending. Before the ECtHR the applicants complained that the relevant domestic au-
thorities had failed to protect them from the violent attacks perpetrated during their peaceful 
march and to investigate effectively the incident. They invoked Article 11 and Article 14 in con-
junction with Article 3. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
State’s failure to protect demonstrators from homophobic violence and to launch effective in-
vestigation: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 11: the Court firstly held that since the organizer of the march had specifically warned 
the police about the likelihood of abuse, the authorities had been under a compelling positive 
obligation to protect the demonstrators from violence. However, police officers distanced 
themselves from the scene, thus allowing the tension to degenerate into physical violence, and 
they had even arrested some of the applicants. Domestic authorities had failed to provide ade-
quate protection to the applicants from the attacks of private individuals during the march, and 
the Court found a violation. 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3: the authorities had also fallen short of their procedural 
obligation to investigate what went wrong during the incident. Despite the reiterated complaints 
filed by the applicants, domestic authorities had not launched a meaningful inquiry and the 
Court considered police’s resultant indifference as tantamount to acquiescence or even conniv-
ance in hate crimes. Therefore, the ECtHR found a violation.  
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Oliari and Others v. Italy  
App. no. 18766/11 and 36030/11  
21.07.2015 [Section IV]  
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicants were three couples living in stable same-sex relationships who had been denied 
to publish marriage banns because the Italian Civil Code provided that the spouses had to be of 
the opposite sex. Following an appeal by the first couple, the Italian Court of Appeal had made 
a referral to the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of the legislation. In April 
2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicants’ constitutional challenge inadmissible, 
finding that the right to marriage, as guaranteed by the Italian Constitution, did not extend to 
homosexual unions and was intended to refer to marriage in its traditional sense. At the same 
time, that Constitutional Court pointed out that it was for the Parliament to regulate, in time 
and by the means and limits set by law, the juridical recognition of the rights and duties pertain-
ing to same-sex couples. The appeal was consequently dismissed. Before the ECtHR the appli-
cants complained that they had no means of legally safeguarding their relationship; they invoked 
Article 8 alone and in conjunction with Article 14. The applicants in app. no. 18766/11 also in-
voked Article 12, alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding:  
Lack of legal recognition of same-sex partnership: violation. 
 
Court’s decision: 
Article 8: the Court considered that the legal protection currently available in Italy to same-sex 
couples failed to take into account the core needs relevant to a couple in a stable committed re-
lationship, which fell within the scope of family life under Article 8. The Court further noted a 
trend among Council of Europe States towards the legal recognition of same-sex couples, with 
24 of the 47 member States having legislated in favor of such recognition. Moreover, the Italian 
Constitutional Court had pointed out the need for legislation to recognize and protect same-sex 
relationships, but the Italian legislature had for a long time failed to take this into account, thus 
leaving the individuals concerned in a situation of legal uncertainty. In view of the foregoing, the 
Court found that Italy had failed to fulfill its obligation to ensure that the applicants had availa-
ble a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of their union.  
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14: the Court considered not necessary to consider the 
complaint under this perspective.  
Article 12 in conjunction with Article 14: in the light of its case-law, the Court considered this 
part of the complaint as ill-founded and declared it inadmissible. 
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A.E. v Finland 
App. no. 30953/11 
22.09.2015 [Section IV] 
 
I. Facts 
 
The applicant was a Kurd living. He and four of his friend had been allegedly questioned by the 
police at a private homosexual party. The applicant was frightened and decided to flee the 
country; he managed to reach Finland, where he applied for the status of refugee. The Finnish 
Immigration Service rejected his application; Iran was a relatively tolerant country as concerned 
homosexuality, as long as it was not exercised in public. Even though the death penalty could be 
imposed, Finnish Immigration Service did not consider the applicant’s account that the police 
knew about his homosexuality credible and, in any event, he could move to another city in Iran. 
As the applicant had been able to live in Iran as an active homosexual for five years without 
problems, it could not be said that he had been obliged to suppress his identity in an unbeara-
ble manner. The case was still pending before the Supreme Administrative Court. Before the 
ECtHR the applicant invoked Article 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6. 
 
 
II. Law 
 
Holding: 
Inadmissible. 
 
Court’s decision: 
The Court noted that after filing the recourse to the ECtHR, the applicant had been granted a 
continuous residence permit valid for a period of one year with a possibility of renewal. He was 
thus no longer subject to an expulsion order; moreover, the Court observed that the applicant 
had not put forward any arguments which could be construed as indicating his dissatisfaction 
that all issues giving rise to his application had not been adequately addressed by the domestic 
authorities, even though he did not call to strike the case out. In the light of the foregoing, the 
Court found no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights and decided to strike 
the application out of its list of cases. 
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